THE APOLOGY
OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

AND A DIGEST OF PLATONIC IDIOMS,

BY THE

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COMPLETE in itself, this volume is yet but a fragment of a larger undertaking. In the Oxford series of Plato's works, which commenced with Mr. Poste's edition of the Philebus in 1860, the Apology, Crito, Phædo, and Symposium were undertaken by Mr. Riddell. Had he lived, all four would probably have appeared together. The Digest of Idioms, founded on an examination of all the writings of Plato, which he had prepared to accompany his edition of these dialogues, would not have seemed out of proportion to the other contents of such a volume. His death on the 14th of September, 1866, left the undertaking incomplete. The preparations which he had made for the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium, though extensive and valuable, had not received their final shape. But the Apology seemed to be ready for the press. Its text was settled, a critical and exegetical commentary was written out fair, and a full introduction had been provided, together with an appendix
on the διάμονον of Socrates. The Digest of Idioms also, to which frequent reference was made in the commentary, appeared to have been transcribed for the printer, although a few pencil notes (which have been printed in this volume at the foot of the pages to which they belong) showed that additions would have been made to it, if the writer had lived to print it himself, and perhaps in some instances a different expression would have been given to the views which it contains. Under these circumstances it has been thought advisable to publish the Apology and the Digest of Idioms by themselves. My task has been only, in conducting them through the press, to remove clerical errors and to verify references.

It may be convenient to state that Plato is cited in this volume according to the pages of Stephanus. In reference to the Orators the sections of Baiter and Sauppe's Zurich edition have been given together with the pages of Stephanus in the minor Orators and Reiske in Demosthenes. In the Dramatists Dindorf's numbers are followed as they stand in the edition of the Poetae Scenicī published in 1830. With regard to quotations, the text of the Zurich editions has been used both for Plato and for the Orators, the text of Dindorf (from the edition of 1830) for the Dramatists. Wherever a reading is quoted which is not found in these editions, I have endeavoured to indicate the source from which it has been derived.
The text of the Apology itself is in the main that of C. F. Hermann. Even the punctuation is his. Some of the brackets found in his edition have been silently omitted: but, with this exception, every instance in which he has not been followed is mentioned in the commentary.

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INTRODUCTION.

PART I.

THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES.

1. Nature of the Proceeding.

The trial of Socrates took place before a Heliaistic court, according to the forms of an ordinary γραφὴ δημοσία. The indictment (ἐγκήμα) is called ἀντωμοσία 19 B, 24 B, and ἀντι-γραφὴ 27 C,—terms which allude to the proceedings of the ἀνάκρισις before the Archon Basileus, before whom both the indictment and the plea in answer to it were presented in writing and confirmed severally by oath. And the terms ἀντιγραφῆ, ἀντωμοσία, proper at first to the prosecutor, and even were transferred to the indictment (ἐγκήμα) itself, thus presented in writing and sworn to.

2. The Accusers.

The indictment was preferred by Meletus; see below the form preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and compare Plato's Euthyphro 2 B. Hence it is Meletus who is called on by Socrates to answer arguments as to its words and meaning in the Apology. Hence again Socrates asks why did not Meletus bring witnesses (34 A), and again observes (36 A) that the penalty for not obtaining \( \frac{1}{3} \) of the votes would have fallen on Meletus. Little account can be taken of the statement of Maximus Tyrius, Disp. xxxix. p. 228, Μέλιτος μὲν ἐγράψατο Ἀντωτὸς δὲ εἰσῆγαγε Αὐκὼν δὲ ἐδώκε. For authors vary on this distinction, and the continuation of the passage—κατεδίκασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐδησαν δὲ οἱ ἐνδηκα ἀπέκλειε δὲ δ ὑπηρέτης—shows that these words are, as Stallbaum says, magis oratoric
quat ver de dicta. See Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 709 n. 19.

Of Meletus, the ostensible prosecutor of Socrates, in reality little more than the tool of Anytus, we only know that he was a young tragic poet. He is characterised by Plato (Euthyphro 2 B) as νέος τις καὶ ἄγνως, and is ridiculed as a poet by Aristophanes (Ran. 1302). The Meletus (Andoc. de Myst. 94. p. 12) who was one of the four who arrested Leon (Apol. 32 C) may have been this Meletus’ father, who bore the same name, but there is nothing to show it.

Lycon, a rhetorician, is mentioned by Aristophanes (Vesp. 1301) with Antiphon.

Anytus was by far the most considerable of the three accusers, whence they are described (Apol. 18 B) as τῶς ἄμφι Ἀνυτός, and Socrates is called by Horace (Sat. II. iv. 3) Anyti reus. He was a leather-seller (Xen. Apol. Soc. 29), and had been a rich man. As a sufferer and worker for the popular cause he had earned a reputation second only to Thrasybulus. With Thrasybulus he had fled from Attica, and the Thirty had confiscated his estates and included him in the decree of banishment (Xen. Hell. II. iii. 42). He held a command in the camp at Phyle (Lys. xiii. 78. p. 137), and at the restoration was joint author with Thrasybulus of the Act of Amnesty (Isoc. xviii. 23. p. 375). Plato (Meno 90 B) represents him as high in popular favour. His was nevertheless (Athenaeus XII. p. 534 E) not a spotless character. Aristotle moreover (acc. to Harpocrate on the word δεκάζεως) says that he was the first man who bribed an Athenian court; and Diodorus, who repeats this (xiii. 64), adds that it was on his trial for treason (Zeller, Philos. der Griech. II. p. 142 n.). As Anytus was the most influential accuser, so there is reason to think he was the most inflamed against Socrates. Meletus and Lycon were actuated at most by a class-prejudice,—if indeed we should not rather regard them as mere tools of Anytus. All three however belonged to classes¹ which Socrates had offended by his incessant censure

¹ Socrates is made by Plato (Apol. 23 E) to represent his three accusers as all actuated by class-feeling in their attack upon him. 'Εκ τούτων καὶ Μή- λητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀνυτός καὶ Λύ- καν, Μήλητος μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχόμενος, Ἀνυτός δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅμορφο- ρῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκαν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν βιττόρων. The contrast which is implied in this sentence between ὑπὲρ copes and πολιτικοῖ shows that the words severally denote definite classes
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of those who exercised professions of the principles of which they could give no intelligent account. Nowhere is this cause of offence traced more connectedly than in the Apology itself of Athenian citizens. There seems no ground for thinking with Wiggers (Sokrates p. 97) and others, who have followed in this view Petittus’ Comment. in Legg. Attic. Lib. III. Tit. iii. that there was any order of ἰητορεῖς, ten in number, appointed yearly, and deriving their origin from Solon. Any such institution could not but have interfered with the ἰητορικά which even to the time of Demosthenes was the cherished charter of Athenian democracy. On the contrary, even the precedence which was allowed by Solon in the assembly to speakers above the age of 50 seems to have fallen into abeyance. But we find that in the time of the Orators or earlier (see the latter part of Cleon’s speech in Thucyd. III. 40) these ἰητορεῖς had attained a mischievous importance. Æschines speaks of them (iii. 3. p. 54) as δυνατεῖς λαυτοὶ πεποιθότες, and in Alcib. II. 145 A it is said that ὅσα δὴ ποτὲ ἡ πόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτῇ καθ’ αὐτῇ, ἀπὸ τῶν ἰητορῶν ἱσμοβολή ἄκαντα γίγνεται. To be a ἰητόρος had become a regular profession. A new art had arisen, designated by the name ἰητορική, which is seen to have been itself a new word from the way in which it is used in the Gorgias (448 D)—τὴν καλομένην ἰητορικήν. In their capacity of συνήτοροι the ἰητορεῖς were brought into prominence (Hec- ren, Polit. Hist, of Anc. Greece, c. 13. p. 232 of Eng. Tranal.) by the frequency of state trials in the time succeeding the Peloponnesian war. But it was no less as σύμβουλοι to the Assembly that the ἰητορεῖς were in requisition. In all questions of legislation and of policy the debate was mainly in their hands. The epoch of this ascendancy is dated by Isocrates (viii. 121. p. 183, where he calls it τὴν ἐκ τοῦ βυθατος δυνατεῖαν) from the Decelean war, or subsequent to Pericles (ib. 126. p. 184). The two species, συμβουλευτική and δικαστική, of Aristotle’s triple division of ἰητορικά in his treatise correspond with this double scope of the ἰητόρος’s profession. The πολιτικός as a class must have emerged at the same time as the ἰητορεῖς. In itself πολιτικός means no more than ‘Statesman’ in the sense in which this term might have been applied to Pericles. But an Athenian of Plato’s time, speaking with reference to Athens, would mean by πολιτικός that class of men who made public business their profession,—τοὺς πολίτικους λεγομένους, Plat. Politic. 303 C. Our conception of the πολιτικός will be best completed by comparing them with the ἰητορεῖς. Down to Pericles’ time there would be no distinction. He united both characters like the great men before him. But afterwards the debates came into separate hands, and the speakers in the Assembly were for the most part no longer the great commanders in the field and the bearers of the highest offices. The fact and the reasons are stated by Aristotle (Pol. V. v. 7), νῦν δὲ τῆς ἰητορικῆς ηδονήν όι δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγοῦσι μὲν δ’ ἀπειρὰν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιθυμεῖται. At the same time, inasmuch as counsel as well as action was needed for the conduct of the state, those who were engaged in the different branches of this common work were not absolutely contradistinguishing: cf. Plato, Gorg. 520 A, Phdr. 258 B, and the general terms in which the ἰητορεῖς are described—c. g. by Lysias (xviii. 16. p. 150) as οἱ τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγ- τοντες.
(21 C—22 C). Illustrations occur also abundantly elsewhere. We see from the Ion (533 E) how poets were brought under this censure for parading inspiration as the substitute for reason. The rhetoricians again as in the Gorgias were censured for producing persuasion without knowledge. Yet stronger and yet more incessant was the denunciation of the mischievousness and presumptuousness of undertaking politics ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου (Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 3), or without knowledge of principles (Aleib. I. 113 C). But Anytus was actuated, over and above such a class-feeling, by personal animosity. One ground of this has been said to have been his "amor spretus Aleibiadæ":" so Luzac and Wiggers. Plato further (Meno 94 E) makes him threaten Socrates with mischief in bewilderment and mortification at being told, in effect, that in teaching his son the family business he had done nothing towards his real education. These personal motives, however, remained in the background; and so again, if he entertained yet another grudge against Socrates as the teacher of Critias, the avowal of it was incompatible with the Act of Amnesty. Therefore he made the attack under cover of defending the democracy. The ἐπιείκεια of the restored people did not last long (Plat. Epist. VII. 325 B), and was naturally succeeded by a sensitive and fanatical zeal for their revived popular institutions.

3. Number of the Judges.

The statement of Wiggers (Sokrates p. 132 note), and of Matthiae (Miscell. Philol. vol. I. p. 252. note 35), that the number of the judges on Socrates' trial was 556 or 557, has been repeated without question even by Mr. Grote (Hist. Gr. vol. VIII. p. 654, chap. 68). It is, however, as Dr. Cron remarks (in his note on Apol. 36 A), merely an assumption from the false reading τρεῖς in this passage, taken in connection with the

9 The enmity of the rhetoricians extended itself after Socrates' death to the Soeratists (Luzac de Dig. Soer. Sect. II. § 4).

3 The story of this "amor Aleibiadæ" rests on the testimony of Plutarch and of Satyrs apud Athenæum, but is unlikely in itself, and because Plato and Xenophon are wholly silent about it.—Zeller II. p. 141 note.


5 Plato's Ausgewählte Schriften erklärt von Christian Cron und Julius Deuschle.—Teubner, 1865.
statement of Diogenes Laertius (II. v. 40), κατεδικάσθη διακοσίας ὀγδοίκοντα μιᾷ πλείσσι ψήφοις τῶν ἀπολυνομῶν, whence the numbers are supposed to have been 281 for condemnation, 275 for acquittal.

There is no reason (as Mr. Grote allows) for mistrusting the precise statement of Diogenes, nor is there any more reason, if we have regard to Greek habits of expression, for doubt that the 281 represented the aggregate majority, not the amount by which it exceeded the minority.

Hence, accepting the reading τριάκοντα here, the whole number cannot have been 556 or 557. An independent argument against such a number would be that it resembles no other recorded numbers on trials. Those which we find, such as 200 (Dem. in Mid. 223, p. 585), 500 (frequently), 700 (Isocr. xviii. 54. p. 381), 1000 (Dem. in Mid. 223, p. 585), 1500 (Plutarch. Vit. Pericles, 72), 2000 (Lysias, xiii. 35. p. 133), 2500 (Din. in Dem. 52. p. 96), 6000 (Andoc. i. 17. p. 3), even if they are only approximate, must stand for something near multiples of 100.

Now Pollux (VIII. 48) mentions 401 and 201 as the numbers in two different cases of φάσις, and elsewhere 1001 and 1501. This affords the clue to a conjecture of much probability (Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Process, p. 140), that this was a provision not exceptionally but uniformly for an odd number of judges, (frustrated sometimes, it would appear, by the default of individuals at the last moment), but that the common way of indicating the number was, for brevity’s sake, to mention the variable constituent, omitting the invariable 1. And Heffter (Athen. Gerichtsverfassung, p. 55) clutches this by a passage from Ulpian’s Commentary on Demosthenes’ oration against Timocrates: διὰ τούτο δὲ ὁ ἐὰν προσετίθητο ἢ ὁ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἵνα μὴ ἰσαὶ γένοιτο αἱ ψήφοι. Thus a Heliastic court always consisted of some multiple of 100, +1.

Accordingly, if we take the total number of Socrates’ judges

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6 [Ulpian’s note is on the words δικαστηρίων δυοῦ εἰς ἑνα καὶ χίλιον ψηφοσύνων (Dem. c. Timoccr. 9. p. 702) and stands as follows: ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις καὶ ἐστονδασμένοις πράγμασιν ἀρκὴγον ἐκ δύο δικαστηρίων πλη-

ροῦτες ἀρχιμόν χίλιων καὶ ἑνᾶς. διὰ τούτο δὲ ὁ ἐὰν προσετίθητο ἢ ὁ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἵνα μὴ ἰσαὶ γένοιτο αἱ ψήφοι εἰς ἑισα ἅντελθεναι οἱ δικασταὶ ἐλλα τείνου δέξῃ νικήν ἢ ἐν ὧ ἐὰν προσετίθη.]
as 501 (which is also Heffter's conclusion), and the number of those for condemnation as 281, we have 220 for his acquittal. Then 31 exactly, or 30 in round numbers, changing sides, would have effected his acquittal. Cron, not allowing for the odd 1, reckons 219 for acquittal.

4. Form of Indictment.

Plat. Apol. 24 B. ὑσκράτης ἁδικεὶ τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείρων καὶ θεοὺς οὔς ἡ πόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζουν ἑτέρα δὲ δαμόων καὶ νά.

Diog. Laert. Π. 40. ἡ ἀντωμοσιὰ τῆς δίκης εἶχε τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀνάκειται γὰρ ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν, φησὶ Φασμωρίνος 7, ἐν τῷ Μητρώῳ. Τάδε ἐγράφατο καὶ ἀντωμόσατο Μέλητος Μελήτου Πιτθεύς ὑσκράτεις Συφρονίσκου 'Ἀλωπεκέμεν' Ἀδικεὶ ὑσκράτης οὔς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζουν, ἑτέρα δὲ καὶ νά δαμόων εἰσηγούμενος ἁδικεὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων. τίμημα θάνατος.


From Ἀeschines (iii. 197. p. 82) we learn that in a γραφῇ παρανύμῳ the time assigned for the trial was divided into three equal lengths: ἐγχείται τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὕθορ τῷ κατηγόρῳ ... τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ὕθορ τῷ τὴν γραφὴν φεύγοντι καὶ τοὺς εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πράγμα λέγοντι (i.e. τοὺς συνηγόρους, not the witnesses whose examination was extra to the time allowed for the pleadings: cf. Lys. xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166, 167, καὶ μοι ἐπιλαβὲ τὸ ὕθορ) ... τὸ τρίτον ὕθορ ἐγχείται τῇ τιμῆσθαι καὶ τῷ μεγάλει τῆς ὄργῆς τής ὑμετέρας (i.e. for the prosecutor to speak again on the amount of penalty, and the defendant to reply, and the judges to vote).

The second of these lengths then would be occupied by the defence of the accused and his συνήγοροι, represented by the main part of the Apology, i.e. as far as 35 E. The Xenophontean Apology says (22) that speeches were made υπὸ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συναγορευόντων φίλων αὐτῷ, but the Platonie manifestly would have us think of Socrates defending himself alone.

Then would follow the taking of the votes of the judges, and the announcement of the result, by which the charge is declared proven.

The third length then begins with the second speech of the

9 [Favorinus wrote a work on Socrates in the time of the Emperor Hadrian.]
prosecutor in advocacy of the penalty he had named; and the remainder of it would be occupied by Socrates' ἀντιτίμησις, where the Apology again takes up the thread (35 E—38 C). It was open to the prosecutor to ask now for a lighter penalty than that which he had named in the indictment. It was in the defendant's speech on the ἀντιτίμησις that he brought forward his wife and children ad misericordiam.

Then would follow the voting of the judges upon the amount of the penalty.

Here the formal trial would end, and the condemned person would be led away by the officers of the Eleven (cf. Apol. 39 E). This is the moment, however, to which the concluding portion of the Apology (from 38 C) belongs. Whether or not the indulgence of such a concluding address was historically conceded to Socrates, there must have existed sufficient precedent for it to give verisimilitude to the ascription of it to him. The Xenophontean Apology (24) agrees here.

The raised platform, called βῆμα, served for accuser and accused in turn as well as for their witnesses, whereas the phrase ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, Apol. 34 A, and similarly Andoc. i. 26. p. 4, καὶ σωπῶ καὶ παραχωρῶ εἶ τις ἀνωβαλέω βούλεται, and Æsch. iii. 165. p. 77, παραχωρῶ σοι τὸν βήματός ἦν ἄν εἶπης.


We find that speeches were made by all the three. Compare for Meletus Apol. 34 A, and for the other two Apol. 36 B, ἀνεβὰ Ἀνύτος καὶ Λύκων. It is implied however that Meletus spoke first.

Grote (VIII. 647. e. 68) conjectures that they made a partition of their topics, “Meletus undertaking that which related to religion, while Anytus and Lycon would dwell on the political grounds of attack.” More accurately, Meletus' business would be to support the indictment proper, while the political charges and insinuations would be dwelt on by Anytus as carrying with him ἡθικὴ πίστις in this topic, and by Lycon as familiar with it in his capacity of ῥήτωρ. The only citation in Plato's Apology which is referable to one accuser rather than another is the saying ascribed to Anytus (29 C), εἶ διαφεύγεται Σωκράτης, ἥδη ἄν υἱῶν οἱ ζητήσαντες ὑμᾶς διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθοράς εἰστε ὑμῖν τὴν ἀρχήν οὐκ
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"Ergon δ' ούδὲν ὤνειδος ἀεργείη δὲ τ' ὤνειδος: τούτου δὴ λέγειν αὐτὸν ὡς ὁ ποιητὴς κελεύει μηδενὸς ἐργοῦ μήτε ἀλλικοῦ μήτε αἰσχροῦ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτα ποιεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ κέρδει... ὃν ὁμήρου ἐφή ὁ κατήγορος πολλάκις αὐτὸν λέγειν ὡτι 'Οδυσσεύς

"Οντινα μὲν βασιλῆα κ. τ. λ.
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(i.) The Defense.

Socrates speaks in presence of a large audience of Athenians over and above his judges (cf. Apol. 24 E, where he speaks of οὕτος οἱ ἀκροαῖα in pointed distinction from οἱ δικασταὶ), but he is addressing professedly his judges alone8 (cf. Apol. 17 C, εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσινεῖα, 18 A, δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὴ ἄρετή). It is therefore these alone who are designated by the ἀνδρεῖς 'Ἀθηναίοι at the opening and throughout: Steinhart observes that the appellation ὑδραίς δικασταὶ is reserved until the final address to be applied only to the judges who vote for acquittal. For mention of such audiences cf. Lysias xii. 35. p. 123, πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ τῶν ἔξων ἥκουσιν εἰδομένοι τίνα γνώμην περὶ τούτων ἔχετε, Ἀρεσκ. i. 117. p. 16, ὅρων πολλῶν μὲν τῶν νεωτέρων

8 The δικασταὶ were very animated listeners. They answered speakers on being appealed to: cf. Ἀρεσκ. iii. 202. p. 82; so Ἀρεσκ. i. 33. p. 5, εἴ μὲν οὖν ἢμιν δοκεῖ ἵκανόν περὶ τούτων ἀπολελυγμένα δηλώσατε μοι ἵνα προσμύτερον περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπολογίματι. Or they stopped a speaker to put a question: cf. Ἀρεσκ. i. 70. p. 10, εἴ τις τι ἢμιν πολεμάτω ἀναμφίκοιτο, καὶ Ἀρεσκ. ii. 9. p. 29. They used the interpellation of κατὰβας Aristoph. Vesp. 979. It seems to have been a common practice not only of political but even of judicial assemblies to express their pleasure or displeasure at what was said. The general word for such expressions of feeling was δόρυβος. That it was a word media significationis νοοῦ from Plato, Legg. 876 B, δικαστήρια . . . . ὑπὸν μὴδε συνήπτω οἷον ἔφεσεν ποιεῖν καθέσταν ἐπαινοῦτα τε βοή καὶ πέσωσα τῶν ῥήτωρ ἐκατέρων ἐν μέρει κρίνῃ, and Ἀρεσκ. i. 51. p. 34, ὑδραίσθησαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῶν μὲν ὡς δεινόν τε εἰπὲ καὶ σύντομον τὸν ἐπείδοσαν ὡς πονηρὸν καὶ θυσίνω. The word occurs in an unfavourable sense in Plato, Protag. 319 C, καταγελῶσαν καὶ ὥρμοσαν, Ἀρεσκ. ii. 15. p. 21, Ἀρεσκ. xii. 73. p. 126, ἠθυρεύετε ὡς οὐ ποίησατε ταύτα, 74. p. 127, ἐδέχετε ὡς οὐ μέλοι αὐτῷ τοῦ ὑμετέρου ὥρμου. It was unrestrained in its nature: cf. Ἀρεσκ. i. 83. p. 11, μετὰ γέλωσαν ὥρμσαν, 164. p. 23, πολλὴ κραυγὴ παρὰ τῶν δικαστῶν αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσατε, i. 112. p. 70, κραυγὴ πολλὴ καὶ ὥρμος, Ἱσσ. xv. 272, ἠθύρευε καὶ ὥρμα ὡς ἐμπλήσατε τὸ δικαστήριον. On the other hand it expressed applause unequivocally: cf. Ἱσσ. xii. 264. p. 288, ὡς ἠθύρευσαν οἱ πολεμὴν εἰπώσαν ἑπὶ τῶν χαράτων διελεγμένοις ἀλλ' ἀνέβασαν ὡς ὑπερβαλλόντων ἐνεργοῖς. The ὥρμος which Socrates deprecates was of the unfavourable kind. This is implied by his urging that it is not his fault if the truth is unpalatable. θύρμος would thus seem to be confined to the δικασταὶ, not joined in by the ἀκροαταί. The word is applied to Meletus in Apol. 27 B merely in the sense of interrupting by making irrelevant remarks instead of answering.
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It has been questioned by C. F. Hermann whether Plato intended the reader of the Apology to imagine any introduction of witnesses to take place. It can hardly be doubted that he did: it is part of the verisimilitude which characterises the whole speech. At 19 D Socrates, wishing to appeal to the judges as witnesses, employs the common formula for doing so —μάρτυρας δ' αυτοῦ υμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι. Cf. Æsch. ii. 122. p. 44, καὶ τούτων υμεῖς οί τήν ψήφον μέλλουσεν φέρειν ἐστέ μοι μάρτυρες. Similarly, when at 21 Α—καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἄδελφος υμῶν αυτοῦ οὗτοι μάρτυρες, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκε —he uses the very circumstantial formula commonly in use in such a case, he must intend us to go on to fill up the picture with the actual production of the witness. And at 32 Ε καὶ τούτων υμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες must mean that the production of the witnesses is to follow, coming so near as it does to the common formula τούτων δ' υμῖν τοὺς μάρτυρας παρέξομαι (cf. e. g. Antipho v. 20. p. 131, and Lysias x. 5. p. 116). The future consistently used in the two last cases (contrast the present in the first case) would not suit the supposition of mere reference to persons who are not to be produced. Again, 34 Α, τούτων τὰν τούναυστὸν εὑρήσετε is very like an implied promise to produce evidence. Lastly, the employment against Meletus of the common topic (34 Α)—'Why did he not call witnesses who if what he said was true could not have failed to establish it?'—and the subjoining of the conventional challenge εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο νῦν παρασχέσων ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ would be suicidal in a speaker who forbore to call witnesses himself.

Interrogation of the accuser.

In accordance with the law (Demosth. c. Steph. B. 10. p. 1131, τοῖν ἄνωδικον ἐπάναγκες εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι ἀλλήλων τὸ ἐφωτόμενον μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μή), and with the common practice (cf. Lysias xiii. 30, 32. p. 132, where spaces are left for a
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formal ἜΡΩΤΗΣΙΣ, as for ΜΑΡΤΥΡΕΣ elsewhere, and add
Lys. xii. 24, 25. p. 122, where a specimen is given at length),
Meletus is questioned by Socrates in 24 C and the following
paragraphs. In 25 D Socrates himself appeals to the law in
support of his right to put such questions—ἀπόκρωνα, ὲ γαθέ·
καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρήνεσθαι.

(ii.) Ἡ ἀντιτίμησις.

In the Xenophontean Apology (23) it is denied that Socrates
made any ἀντιτίμησις—οὔτε αὐτὸς ὑπετίμησατο οὔτε τοὺς φίλους
εἶσεν ἄλλα καὶ ἔλεγεν ὅτι τὸ ὑποτιμᾶσθαι ὀμολογοῦντος εἶν ἄδι-
κέων. The Platonic ἀντιτίμησις, both of the σήμεια ἐν πρωτα-
νείῳ and of the 30 minae, is (waiving the question of its being
historical or not) wholly ironical: there could be no serious
expectation that such an offer would be accepted. Diogenes
Laertius says that this ἀντιτίμησις turned 80 more of the
judges against him—καὶ ὦ θάνατον αὐτοῦ κατέγνωσαν προσθέντες
ἄλλας ψήφους ὑγοῦσανωτα.

(iii.) The last words.

The latter part from τοὺς δὲ ἀποψήφισαμένους (29 E) we are
to imagine as spoken ἐν ὃ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἔγον, and only
those who chose would hear it (cf. παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον,
ibid.).
PART II.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE APOLOGY.

1. ITS ORATORICAL STRUCTURE.
   i. Its employment of commonplaces (τόποι).
   ii. The "old accusers."
   iii. The Delphic response.
   iv. The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.
   v. Its dramatic framework.

2. HOW FAR CHARACTERISTIC OF SOCRATES.

3. ITS ADEQUACY AS A DEFENCE.

   1. Oratorical Structure.

   A close examination of the structure of the Apology resolves the question how far it preserves to us the actual defence made by Socrates. The criticism of Wiggers and Schleiermacher, that the Apology is the purest extant relic of Socrates, falls to the ground before the internal evidence which the Apology itself supplies. Xenophon (Mem. IV. viii. 5) tells us that Socrates turned his thoughts away from the preparation of any defence—ἡ δὲ μον ἑπιχειροῦντος φρουτίσαι τής πρὸς τῶν δικαστῶν ἰσολογίας ἤμαντωθή τὸ δαμόνων. Now the Apology is artistic to the core, whether in respect of the recurrence of received τόποι of Attic pleaders, or of the arrangement and outward dress of the arguments (observe especially the artifice of "the old accusers," of which presently), or of the tripartite dramatic arrangement of the whole. The art and the manner, worthy as they assuredly are of Plato, are also distinctively characteristic of him. The subtle rhetoric of this defence would ill accord with the historical Socrates, even had the defence of Socrates been as certainly as we know it not to have been the offspring of study and premeditation.
(i.) Employment of commonplaces.

We may trace this in detail through the defence or the first of the three parts of the oration.

The exordium may be completely paralleled, piece by piece, from the Orators. The imputation of conjoint falsity and plausibility, the denial of being δεινὸς λέγειν (cf. Lys. xix. 1, 2. p. 152, Isæus x. 1. p. 79), the asking pardon for λόγους πολὺ τῶν εἰθισμένων λέγεσθαι παρ’ ὑμῖν ἐξηλλαγμένους (as Isocr. xv. 179 expresses it), the plea of unfamiliarity with law-courts (Isocr. xv. 38. p. 318, οὗτος ἀπέχομαι τούτων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν), the begging for an impartial hearing (Lys. xix. 2, 3. p. 152), the depreciation of θόρυβος (cf. e. g. Aesch. ii. 24. p. 31, ἐπαυῶ εἰς ὑπερβολὴν ὑμᾶς, ὡ ἄνδρες, ὅτι στιγῇ καὶ δικαίως ἡμῶν ἀκούετε), the disclaiming a style unbefitting an old man (cf. Isocr. xii. 3. p. 233, ἤγονοι γὰρ οὐχ ἀμαώτεων)—these topics, of which the exordium of the Apology is wholly made up, occur continually in the Orators.

Next, in meeting the judges' prejudices, advantage is taken of another common topic—allegation of the existence of διάβολος (cf. Lysias xix. 5. p. 152). The way in which the charge of being a σοφὸς is dealt with has many parallels: cf. e. g. Isocr. xv. passim. No accusation was more indiscriminately launched than this, and the answers to it assumed consequently, in great measure, the character of commonplaces.

Socrates twits Meletus with having instituted the whole of the proceedings for his own amusement (24 C); so Lysias xxiv. 18. p. 170; and again with presuming on the inadvertence or obtuseness of the court; cf. Lys. xxvi. 5. p. 175, ταῦτα χρή ὑπολαμβάνειν μὴ εὑρίσεις αὐτῷ εἶναι δοκῆτη.

Socrates alleges (32 A), though in a refined way, the meritorious acts of his past life;—a common τόπος. Cf. Lys. xvi. 13, xxi. 1. pp. 146, 161.

Compare again ἔγω δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐγενόμην (33 A) with Isocr. xv. 85, ἔγω δὲ τῶν μὲν ἴσωτῶν οὐδένα πώποτε φανήσομαι παρακαλέσας ἐσ’ ἐμαυτὸν τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὅλην περιώμαι τέλειω τοιούτων πράγμασιν ἐπιχειρεῖν ἐξ’ ὧν αὐτοὶ τε εὐδαιμονίασαν κ.τ.λ.

The answer to the charge about perverting the young is
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paralleled by Isocrit. xv. 240, τούς πατέρας ἂν ἐωράτε τῶν συνόν-
tων ἰμῶν καὶ τούς οἰκείους ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ γραφομένους.

The particular form of challenge is paralleled by Andoc. i. 35. p. 5, τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ἀνθρώπων οί μὲν ἦκουσι καὶ εἰσὶν ἐνθαδὲ
tῶν δὲ ἀποδανύτων εἰσὶ πολλοὶ προσήκουστε· ὃν ὡστις βούλεται
ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ λόγῳ ἀναφέρεται ἐν ἐλεγχόματο.

The argument (34 A) καὶ ἄλλους πολλούς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν
ὅν τῶν ἡχοῦν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἐαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχεθαι Μέλη-
tου μάρτυρα is a stock argument against an adversary who
does not produce witnesses. Cf. Arist. Rhet. I. xv. 17. The
avowal of disdaining to solict compassion is to be compared

The leaving the event to God (19 A), τοῦτο μὲν ἐν τῷ ὄψιν τῷ
θεῷ φίλον, and (35 D), ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίνειν περὶ ἐμοῦ
is not characteristic of Socrates, for it occurs in the typical
oration of Antipho (i. 20. p. 113, ἡ δ’ αἰτία…….ἐξει [τὰ ἐπίθεμα],
ἐὰν ὑμεῖς τε καὶ οἱ θεοὶ θέλωσιν, and ibid. 25, 31. p. 114), though
indeed sparingly in the Orators generally. The Gods are
invoked at the outset of Demosthenes’ speech on the Crown
(p. 225).

(ii.) “The old accusers.”

Aristotle in his Rhetoric (III. xv. 1.) remarks, περὶ δὲ δια-
βολῆς ἐν μὲν τὸ ἐξ ὃν ἄν τις ὑπάληψε δυσχέρη ἀπολύσαιρτο· οὔθεν
γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰτε εἰπόντως τινὸς, εἰτε μη.

An artifice in the Apology which demands separate notice is
the way in which the prejudices of the judges are dealt with.
The attack on them is so carefully masked that its point might
be missed by a cursory reader. The strength of the prejudice
which existed against Socrates demanded that a substantive
and prominent portion of his defence should be directed
especially against it. He could not hope to combat the charges
of his prosecutors on their own merits in presence of a general
aversion which was in harmony with these charges. Worst
of all, this aversion was too well reflected by the Court itself.
It was matter of exigeney, therefore, to deal with it at once,
and so we find it succeeding the exordium almost hurriedly.
But to this was joined the necessity of avoiding both the direct
imputation of it to the judges, which would have been to offend
them further, and the designation of it at once as a vox populi, which would have been to acknowledge its weight.

It is therefore introduced to the judges under a disguise. Their attention is drawn to it not as the attitude of their own minds, not as matter of common fame, but as emanating from certain individuals who with time and perseverance have done their work. The calumny, now so wide-spread and influential, is all traceable to them. It is not possible to single them out ("except perhaps a certain play-writer"); in default of which, —the only fair method,—they are individualised in imagination. They are marked off by a special designation,—"the original accusers,"—and their calumny is made more tangible by throwing it into the form of a technical indictment supposed to be preferred by them and read before the Court.

Of πρόται κατήγοροι are but a figure for ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή, and what makes the neutralising of this διαβολὴ at once so necessary and so delicate a matter is that it is that ἢ πολὺς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε. But these two identifications emerge in one or two places only. Twice only is the reference to the judges pointedly disclosed,—"I hope, if possible, to convert you from a prejudice which you" (the repeated pronoun is emphatic) "have so long harboured" (19 A, 24 A). Immediately, however, after these disclosures, the argument resumes its disguise. In like manner once only, considerably later (28 A), when he notices the inferior importance of the charges of Meletus, which he has just answered, to the older charges, he acknowledges these as vox populi—ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνος.

The seriousness of tone which marks the answer to "the old accusers," the μαθὴ πίστει which is thrown into it, and the absence of irony, contrast sharply with the banter with which the charges of the real indictment are met immediately afterwards. This earnestness and almost anxiety of tone, the prominent position of this portion of the Apology, the irrelevance of its ostensible reference, the very technicality with which it is drawn up, forbid a more literal acceptance of its drift, and constrain us to find in it a signal exercise of rhetorical art.

(iii.) The Delphic response.

Again, as the objective prominence given to "the old
"accusers" is a rhetorical sneak for an attack on the prejudices of the judges, so the prominence given to the Delphic response (20 E sqq.) is a device of a semi-rhetorical character under cover of which Socrates is enabled to avoid an avowal of the real purpose which had animated him in his tour of examination,—which was to effect an intellectual revolution by substituting a sounder knowledge for the prevalent pretensions to knowledge, of the hollowness of which he entertained the deepest conviction. Such an explanation would, to say the least, not have been appreciated. What is to be noticed is, that he does not plead the oracle, (the authenticity of which there is no ground for doubting), as an after excuse for his necessarily unpopular mission,—which would have been natural enough. But he goes beyond this, and represents the oracle as the cause of his engaging in that mission; whereas (as Zeller observes) he must have already been committed to this and already been a marked person, before any such question as that put to the Pythia by Chærophon could have had any point or elicited any such remarkable answer. The representation of the oracle as giving him the first suggestion of his crusade against fictitious knowledge, as having throughout been the lodestar to which he shaped his course, and as having sustained him in the thankless labour of years, is unhistorical; but Socrates employs it in the exposition of his antecedents in a semi-rhetorical spirit, to bring the audience a certain distance on their way without the offence which a direct avowal of his purpose would have aroused in their minds.

(iv.) The general arrangement of the defence properly so called.

Every care has been taken to marshal the topics of the defence to the best advantage. The answer to the indictment itself is placed in the middle of the speech, where least attention naturally falls upon it. The arrangement is the same as that of Demosthenes' speech on the Crown, but the reasons are different in the two cases. In both the technical argument is introduced, where it will least challenge attention; but there because it is the weak point of Demosthenes' case, here because, though easily established, it is comparatively immaterial to the issue. The real effort of the defence needed
to be exerted first in combating the general prejudices which
affected Socrates as a reputed Philosopher and Sophist, and
secondly in offering a somewhat more particular personal jus-
tification of Socrates. Accordingly the portions of the defence
which are concerned with these two points, as they are the
fullest and most earnest, are also the most conspicuous by
position. The first confronts us at the outset, and the other
engages us after Meletus has been dealt with.

(v.) Dramatic framework.

The customary procedure of an ἄγων τιμητός has prompted
Plato to crown the Apology of Socrates with a further artistic
completeness. The oration becomes a drama. An action in
three stages passes before us; the tone changes with the
action; there is even some change in the dramatis personae.
We take our stand among the listeners who crowd the court.
The first Act comprises the defence, with the dialogue between
Socrates and Meletus, the voting of the judges, and the decla-
ration of their verdict. The second comprises the τιμητικός of
the prosecutor, Socrates' ironical ἄντιτιμητικός, the intervention
of Plato and other friends of Socrates, the first suspense, and
then the final verdict. In the third Act the judges appear
before us distinguished into two separate bodies, addressed
separately by Socrates, the one his friends, his true judges,
the other divested of the name and doomed to the conse-
quences of their unrighteous deed. The tone of apologetic
argument in the first Act is succeeded by dignified irony in
the second, and this again in the third by a strain of lofty
prophecy.

2. How far is the Apology characteristic of
Socrates?

Zeller (II. 134. note) insists that there is an absence in the
Apology of that free artistic handling which characterises the
Dialogues, and claims this as an evidence that Plato has bound
himself to follow the line actually taken by Socrates. But
the strength of this position is diminished by several con-
siderations. In the first place we have seen how great an
amount of art has found its way into the structure of the
Apology; we have seen too how that same art has not been
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restricted to the arrangement and outward dress of the speech, but so penetrates its very substance, that even here it is impossible to ignore or definitively to limit the rhetorical element. It is only with this considerable abatement that Zeller’s assertion of the absence of free artistic handling can be admitted. But, in the second place, so far as the fact remains,—and to a certain extent it does,—it is referable to more obvious causes than that of fidelity to the speech of Socrates. The conditions which Plato had to fulfil were those of a speech in a court of justice, pronounced on a definite historical occasion; he had to consult the exigencies of forensic verisimilitude, and to embody a reply to the definite charges of a well-known indictment. And although with him (as with Xenophon in the Memorabilia, though in a different manner,) the main object certainly was the ultimate one of presenting to the world a serious and adequate justification of his adored teacher, yet he was none the less under the necessity of adopting for his framework the circumstances of the actual trial. In the third place,—in presence of little or no independent testimony as to what Socrates actually said,—we have the fact before us that the Platonic Apology was not alone in the field as a professed record of the great teacher’s defence. The Xenophontean Apology, devoid as it is of authority, being perhaps a compilation from Xenophon’s Memorabilia I. i, ii, IV. viii (see Stein- hart’s Anmerkungen I. 2 in Platon’s Sämttliche Werke über- setzt von Hieronymus Müller, Leipzig 1851), is a case in point. Had the Platonic Apology been a record of confessed history, is it possible that the Xenophontean Apology should have been so framed as to differ from it not only as to what was said but as to what was done,—as for instance in the statement (22) that Socrates’ friends spoke at the trial as συνήγοροι, and again (23) that Socrates refused ὑποτιμάθαι altogether, both which statements conflict with the Platonic representation? But there were yet other Apologies extant besides these. Aristotle in the Rhetoric (II. xxiii. 13) quotes from a Socratic Apology of Theodectes, as containing the following passage, ἐσ ποίων λεπόν ἀσέβηκε; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τατύμηκεν οὖς ἣ πόλις νομίζει; and besides in the same chapter he quotes the following passages without mention of their authors but obviously from similar compositions; μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ
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пеp ІСуκράτους ὀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ἑπταθείματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν (18), and τὸ δαμώδιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ὅλλ ἡ θεὸς ἡ θεοῦ ἐργον καὶ τοι ὅστις οἶται θεοῦ ἐργον εἶναι τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἷοσθαί καὶ θεοῦς εἶναι (3). Once more, it is probable enough, that the story of Lysias having offered Socrates for use on his trial a defence of his own composing grew out of his having written an elaborate posthumous Socratic Apology.

It is then too much of an assumption, though countenanced by Zeller and Mr. Grote as well as by many older writers on the subject, that we can rely on the Platonic Apology as a substantial reproduction of the speech of Socrates. Independently of Plato's representation we know not what Socrates said, or whether he said much or little, or how far he concerned himself with a direct reply to the charges laid against him; nor, when we have studied that representation, do we know these things any the better. Even if the studied speech of Plato embodied authentic reminiscences of the unpremeditated utterances of his master, to disengage the one from the other is more than we can assume to do.

Notwithstanding, we can seek in the Apology a portrait of Socrates before his judges and not be disappointed. Plato has not laid before us a literal narrative of the proceedings and bidden us thence form the conception for ourselves: rather he has intended us to form it through the medium of his art. The structure is his, the language is his, much of the substance may be his; notwithstanding, quite independently of the literal truth of the means, he guarantees to us a true conception of the scene and of the man. We see that "liberam contumaciam a magnitudine animi ductam non a superbia" (Cic. Tusc. I. 29), and feel that it must be true to Socrates, although with Cicero himself we have derived the conception from Plato's ideal and not from history. We hear Meletus subjected to a questioning which, though it may not have been the literal ἐρωτήσεις of the trial, exhibits to us the great questioner in his own element. We discover repeated instances of the irony, which, uniting self-appreciation with a true and unflattering estimate of others, declines to urge considerations

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which lie beyond the intellectual or moral ken of the judges. Here we have that singularity of ways and thoughts which was half his offence obtruding itself to the very last in contempt of consequences. Here we have that characteristic assertion of private judgment against authority which declares itself in the words ἐγὼ υμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἡ υμῶν (29 D). Here we have also his disapproval of the existing democracy of Athens which he rather parades than disguises. And lastly, the deep religiousness which overshadowed all his character breathes forth in the account he renders of his past life, in his anticipations of the future, and in his whole present demeanour.

Thus while the problem of the relation of the Apology to what Socrates actually said must remain unsolved, there is no doubt that it bodies forth a lifelike representation; a representation of Socrates as Plato wished us to conceive of him, yet at the same time as true to nature as the art of Plato could render it.

3. THE ADEQUACY OF THE APOLOGE AS A DEFENCE.

That the Apology aims at much more than a refutation of the indictment of Meletus is already sufficiently evident. We have seen that the avowed answer to Meletus is that part of the speech which by its position least challenges attention, and which is least characterised by an air of serious concern. The statement is besides repeatedly made, that the real strength of the prosecution lies outside of the indictment, and requires a commensurately wider effort to meet it.

The worth, then, of the Apology as a defence must be measured, in the first instance, if we will, by its sufficiency as an answer to Meletus, but chiefly and ultimately by its sufficiency as a justification of Socrates’ whole manner of life.

It will not much affect our estimate, whether we regard the Apology as no more than a defence adapted to the historical occasion of the trial and to judicial ears, or as a posthumous justification of the great master in the eyes of the Hellenic world. Though the more comprehensive aim is doubtless the real one, yet public opinion had undergone so little change

10 As a matter of fact, the Athenians never repented of Socrates’ death. The story of their passionate remorse being evoked by the repre-
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in favour of Socrates since his death, that the justification which was most calculated to satisfy it was identically that which would have been most to the purpose at the trial.

First, then, what sort of an answer is offered to the indictment of Meletus?

That indictment divides itself into two allegations, under the heads respectively (as we should say) of religion and of morality. The mischief to morality is the perversion of the youth; the offence against religion is the setting forth of strange gods in the place of those of the state.

Now though these are put into the form of specific charges against Socrates, they are so (all but that of the καυρα δαιμόνια) in appearance alone; they are really selected from the string of imputations currently brought against Philosophers and Sophists. The Philosophers, i.e. Physicists, were popularly associated with atheism, the Sophists with perversion of the youth. The allegations of "the old accusers," to which the Apology first addresses itself, are drawn from the same repertory, and arraign Socrates in like manner under the two heads of religion and morality as Philosopher and Sophist. It is true that the particular complaints there expressed are not the same; but it is not that the charges put forward here are less general than those. They are only omitted there because they were to come under consideration here. In the Clouds both these and those are put forward against Socrates, one after the other. And in the Apology itself (23 C—D) "the old accusers" are represented as eventually appending both "perversion of the youth" and "atheism" to their other charges.

The indictment therefore of Meletus contained no charge, save that of δαιμόνια καυρα, which would not be met (so far as might be) by the explanation Socrates had rendered of the deeper and wider and older prejudices, personified in "the old accusers," or by the justification he might be able to offer of the general method of his life.

sentation of Euripides' Palamedes (41 B. n.) is fabulous. Euripides pre-deceased Socrates by 7 years. Xenophon and Plato would have made the most of any such change of feeling: whereas we find Xenophon, five years after Socrates' death, dealing with the allegations against Socrates as if still in full possession of the popular mind. See Zeller, II. p. 138, note.
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Here therefore Socrates contents himself with a dialectical victory over Meletus; instead of entering into the merits of the question with him, he disposes of him summarily by adding him to the list of pretenders. If the charge of δαμώνια καυνά is subjected to the same treatment,—a treatment characterised by Döllinger as little better than sophistical,—it is because that charge is itself a sophistical one. It wrests τὸ δάμωνιον into δαμώνια, the divine agency of which Socrates consistently spoke into divine beings. Socrates therefore is only returning Meletus' sophism upon himself, when he treats the δαμώνια of the indictment as if it had been δαμώνια πράγματα. His whole dealing with the question of heterodoxy has an observable air of carelessness. Though he explicitly disavows atheism, and calls the sun and moon gods, yet he nowhere commits himself to a distinct recognition of the state gods, any more than he repudiates belief in any others. But it must be remembered that in those days few could have cast a stone at Socrates for such reticence: and that if a man's practice was religious, there was little enquiry into his opinions; and that Socrates' character as a religious man, his strictness and frequency in religious observances, was beyond doubt and made proof superfluous,—though the Xenophontean Apology enters into it at length. From the personal imputation of irreligion, in short, Socrates had little to fear, and he could afford to deal with it lightly; whereas to that of perverting the youth he addresses himself twice elsewhere, in addition to the dialectical refutation of it here.

Thus what was really formidable in the indictment of Meletus resolved itself into the more general imputations which connected Socrates with those two suspected classes of men, the Philosophers and the Sophists; and, keeping in view the fact that the Apology addresses itself elsewhere in full to those imputations, any fuller treatment of them under the head of the indictment can be spared.

The remainder of the defence is taken up with two lines of argument: the first, at the outset of the speech, deals with the general prejudices, which existed against Socrates as Philosopher (Physicist) and Sophist; the other, which follows the special reply to the indictment, offers a particular justification for Socrates' manner of life as a citizen.
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In the earlier portion Socrates does what he can, first to separate himself from those two suspected classes, and then to explain how the prejudice arose in the public mind, and how it became strengthened by personal animosity.

It is hardly necessary to show that the imputations of "the old accusers" contain nothing of an individual character, but are (as Socrates alleges) mistakenly transferred from the popular notion of the Philosophers and the Sophists. The title σοφὸς ἀνήρ, which Socrates takes such pains to disclaim, is the appellation originally bestowed on the Ionic philosophers, as men whose speculations had fathomed the universe, and from this association was matured that distinction between it and φρόνιμος which we find in Aristotle (Ethic. Nic. VI. vii. 5, Ὁσαλὴ ν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν φρονίμους ὃ οὖ φασιν εἶναι).

It was in connecting Socrates with a supposed class of speculative men that the force and odiousness of the designation σοφὸς ἀνήρ consisted. The imputation contained in the words τὰ μετέωρα φροντίζων or ἐγκλημα. In 431 B.C. Diogenes, a fanatical Rhetor, carried the law εἰσαγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεία μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρρυθμίων διδασκόντας (Plutarch. Vit. Periel. 169 D, Aristoph. Vesp. 380). Eupolis (Fragm. Com. ed. Meineke, II. p. 490) says of Protagoras, ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν, ἄλλοις, περὶ τῶν μετεώρων. Once more, the reference in τῶν ἔρτω λόγων κρείττων ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταύτα ταύτα διδάσκον is palpably general. The earlier Sophists, as teachers of pleading, first incurred and perhaps courted the imputation of τῶν ἔρτω κ.τ.λ., and from them the imputation was derived to others. Isocrates (xv. 15. p. 313) speaks of the charge being made against himself, ὥς ἐγὼ τοὺς ἔρτους λόγους κρείττους δύναμαι ποιεῖν, and again (30. p. 316), ὡς διαφθείρω τοὺς νεωτέρους λέγειν διδάσκον καὶ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἐν τοῖς ἄγωσι πλεονεκτεῖν. Oidium also attached to the profession of an instructor in speaking. Hence Ἀσχίνης' designation (i. 94. p. 13) of Demosthenes as λογογράφος, and (117. p. 16) ὅ ταῖς τῶν λόγων τέχνας κατεπαγγέλλομεν τοὺς νέους διδάσκει, crowned by the freedom of speech. How came the suspicion of λόγων τέχνη to survive the Tyranny?  

11 Λόγων τέχνη μὴ διδάσκειν (Xen. Mem. I. ii. 31) was a law of the Thirty Tyrants against liberty and
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designation σοφιστής (125. p. 17): cf. ii. 165, iii. 173. pp. 50, 78. Hence, weightier for its dispassionateness, a remark of Thucydides (VIII. 68) about Antiphan ὑπότος τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μὲντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ πλείστα εἰς ἀνήρ, ἵσοις ἐμβουλεύσαιτό τι, δυσάμενος ἄφθελεν. This odium, in which the profession was held, was akin to fear; Isocrates (xv. 230) explains it thus, ἢ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δεινότης ποιεῖ τοὺς ἀλλοτρίους ἐπι-βουλεύειν.

Thus the charges recited present us with nothing individually characteristic of Socrates, but only (as he himself calls them 23 D) τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφοῦντων πρόχειρα. These were the materials for the popular representation of Socrates, which accordingly (like the caricature in the Clouds) is a compound of the conventional lineaments of the Philosopher (Physicist), and of the Sophist. The μετέωρα φροντιζον is due to the Philosopher, and the τὸν ἥττο λόγον κ.τ.λ. to the Sophist, while the title σοφός ἀνήρ stands alike for the one and the other.

To relieve himself from the yoke of these imputations Socrates fairly draws attention to the want of connection between himself and these two suspected classes. Of those speculative studies he denies any knowledge, and as to his having ever discoursed on them to others he courts further the testimony of his judges, of whom many had frequented his society.

The line of argument which he takes in distinguishing himself from the Sophists seems less cogent than it might have

12 Plat. Apol. 20 Α, Evenus is ἀνήρ Πάριος σοφός, Xen. Mem. II. i. 21, Πρόδικος ο σοφὸς is mentioned; as on the other hand σοφιστής is borrowed to express Philosopher.

13 There is no want of harmony between Socrates' disclaimer here and what he tells us in the Phaedo of his having taken up physical speculation in early life. He had given it up forthwith, on finding no satisfaction in it; and he could truly say (Apol. 19 C), ἐμοὶ τούτων οὔδεν μέτεστι. Nor again is his disclaimer at variance with the fact, that he used to call attention to the evidence of design in nature as a help to piety (Xen. Mem. VI. iii. 3 sqq.), that he is in fact (as Zeller remarks, II. p. 117) the parent of the teleological idea which has given unity and ideality to the study of nature ever since his days. This half-religious view of his had nothing in common with those indeemonstrable hypotheses, which the Physical Philosophers tried in turn to fit to the universe.
been. He dwells on the most external difference alone. He points to the Sophists giving courses of lectures on various subjects, professing to turn out finished politicians, pleaders, debaters, and the like, pursuing this as a regular trade, and flourishing by it; he flatly disclaims any such characteristics (for even these, it seems, had been attributed to him, εἰ τινὸς ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ. 19 D), and so passes on. Here certainly was a sufficiently palpable dissimilitude, demanding no acuteness to appreciate it; but why was it not worth while to clench the argument by going more thoroughly into the contrast? We miss the manifold and deep divergence which might have been traced between a system which relied on the attainment of objective certainty, and one which, while it questioned received opinions, had no interest in either substantiating these, or establishing truer ones in their place; between a system which opened out a method of truth-seeking investigation, and one which, had it prevailed, would have made philosophy henceforth an impossibility (Zeller, II. p. 130); between a system which proposed to place all human action on an intelligible principle, and one which professed to furnish the intellect alike for any use, regardless of principles. All this and more could have been pleaded in evidence of the wide gulf which separated Socrates from the Sophists; we can only suppose that the Court, or the people of Athens (to which ever we suppose for the moment the justification to be directed), were incapable of appreciating the fundamental unlikeness, and that the dropping of the subject here is at once true to the Socratic irony, and at the same time suggests that the real position of Socrates was never understood by the mass of his countrymen or by their compendious representative the Heliastic Court.

The sequel of this disclaimer of the popular identification is a setting forth of the facts which were the occasion of it. A man who himself exercised no practical profession, was ever showing himself dissatisfied with received empirical rules and maxims, and ever requiring from others a reason for tenets which they had never questioned, while in doing this he evinced matchless dialectical powers and forced a confession of ignorance from men known to be perfectly self-satisfied,—such a man answered sufficiently well the description of Philosopher
and Sophist when once Aristophanes\textsuperscript{14} had given the hint. This was the naked explanation of the popular identification, and this it is in fact which lies couched under Socrates' parables of the wisdom which consisted in knowing his own ignorance, the Delphic Response, and the tour of questioning (Apol. 20 D—E, 23 A—B). And this account, which has all the appearance of truth, must stand good, in our estimate of the defence, as a plea which ought to have commanded attention. The speaker himself indeed despairs of its obtaining entrance into minds preoccupied; it was likely, he says (20 D), to sound to them like a jest. But the cause for despair lay not in the insufficiency of the plea, but in the invincibility of the prejudice to be combated. Nor has the whole strength of that prejudice yet been indicated. Had Socrates been really a Philosopher or a Sophist, there would have been nothing to be added; the supposed mischiefs of his teaching would have been alone in the scale. But so far as popularity was concerned, the difference between Socrates and Philosophers or Sophists told against him and not in his favour. The moral suspicion harboured against what he was supposed to be was aggravated by personal animosity against what he was. The ever busy talker, the merciless questioner, who avowed the exposure of self-deceived pretenders to be the mission of his life, and pursued this mission uncompromisingly for a quarter of a century and more in such a narrow society as was comprised within a Hellenic state, without ever even stirring from the midst of them, encountered enmities which never lighted on the head of Philosopher or Sophist; a specimen of which is the individual grudge which Anytus is said to have borne Socrates.

It is then a mistaken moral prejudice, intensified and quickened by the actual smart of personal affronts,—the former refuted to no purpose, the latter absolutely intractable,—which here threatens to overbear the defence. It is this aggravated prejudice, the working of which is foreshadowed in those discerning words (28 A), καὶ τοῦτ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, ἐὰν περ

\textsuperscript{14} Zeller remarks that the fact of the Aristophanic caricature having stuck to Socrates to the end of his life shows that Aristophanes hit the popular conception. May we not rather suppose that he led it, and regard the Apology here as elsewhere as true to facts?
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αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ ‘Αμντος, ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ τε καὶ φθόνος.

On Socratic principles, a defence had discharged its office when it had set before the Court not grounds of feeling but rational grounds for its acceptance. Socrates has hitherto disproved (as fully as the range of the popular mind admitted) the mistaken 15 identification of him with Philosophers and Sophists. He has given the explanation of the mistake, and he has pointed out how that very explanation accounts for the confirming of the mistake irrationally through personal animosity. He has exhausted his armoury; against this animosity itself he has no weapons; if his judges or the public will allow it to affect their verdict, it cannot be helped—ταύτῃ ἐστὶν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἄνδρας Ἀθηναίων, τάληθή, . . . . καὶ τοῖς οἴοις σχέδιον ὅτι τούς αὐτοὺς ἀπεχθάνομαι (24 Λ).

Beyond the reply to Meletus' indictment we find a fresh branch of the defence before us. Socrates is no longer overtly answering charges, old or recent, but rather directly justifying the usefulness of his life. He takes a view of himself, as it were from further off, and reviews his whole attitude as a citizen.

The question arises, how this part of the speech serves any direct purpose of the defence.

Of the strong points on the side of the prosecution, one has remained hitherto almost untouched: it is not one which appears in the indictment proper, or in that of "the old accusers;" nor again has it that stamp of inveteracy which would have marked it had it been part of the Aristophanic caricature. But it was the moving cause of the present indictment being preferred at all.

15 The mob who in 1791 sacked Dr. Priestley’s house at Birmingham in consequence of his espousal of the principles of the French Revolution, of which the news had just reached England, proceeded to threaten all with whom Priestley had been associated not in politics or religion but merely by a common devotion to chemistry and invention. "A common cry among the mob was, 'No "Philosophers!' 'Church and King for 'ever!" And some persons, to escape "their fury, even painted 'No Phi- "losophers' on the walls of their "houses! . . . Boulton and Watt were "not without apprehensions that an "attack would be made on them, as "the head and front of the 'Philo- "sophers' of Birmingham.'—Smiles "Life of Boulton, ch. 20."
It is tolerably clear from the accounts of the speeches for the prosecution that political charges entered freely into them. See Xen. Mem. I. ii. 9, 12, &c. To Socrates was there ascribed the evil done to their country by Critias the oligarch and Alcibiades the demagogue; the strange doctrine that the poorer private citizens were a fair mark for ill usage; the unfriendly criticism on election to offices by lot,—which was probably made use of as a special ground in support of the accusation of perverting the youth, since the ventilation of such doctrines tended to make them disloyal or insubordinate. A line of Hesiod was alleged to have been wrested by him to a like purpose, as countenancing rapacity.

There were indeed independent and domestic proofs alleged for perversion of the youth, but those which have been noticed were political. All these topics had been employed by the prosecution, and it is scarcely likely that in addition to them Socrates’ abstinence from public affairs, his relations to Charmides, another of the Thirty, and to Xenophon, the friend of Sparta, and under sentence of banishment at the time, and perhaps his depreciating mention of the tradesmen in the Ecclesia (Xen. Mem. III. vii. 6), were not also brought up against him. Such charges and insinuations as these were indeed foreign to the indictment, but they were calculated to have considerable weight with the Court.

For one characteristic of the moment was the keen feeling with which since the restoration of the democracy the Athenians cherished their particular conception of political loyalty. That conception was somewhat narrow and exacting. The primary requisite was not only ‘assent and consent,’ but enthusiasm towards the letter of the constitution; and second only to this, as the natural reaction from the depression which the usurpation had caused, was a devotion to the material interests of the state, and the display of energy in amassing wealth.

The prosecutors, or at least the leading spirit among them, were no doubt actuated in their institution of the proceedings by the same political sensitiveness which they sought to inspire in the judges and betrayed in their speeches. Anytus was a man of strong political convictions; he had lost a fortune through his fidelity to the cause of freedom. And if he
was partly animated by a personal grudge against Socrates, he was none the less the person to take up a political grievance against him.

There must have come to the surface some fresh element for the old prejudice so to pronounce itself. As Sophist or Philosopher, Socrates' cup had long been full; nor was there any reason in that point of view for its overflowing now if it had not before. Aristophanes 16 had ceased to attack him. As a mark for personal enmity 17 he had been more prominent and defenceless either in connection with the Hermæ trials or after the battle of Arginusæ. It would be a difficult problem, why the extreme step was taken now and not till now, did we not take into account the 18 political sensitiveness which, as the offspring of the restored democracy, formed a new element in public opinion as it affected Socrates.

We shall not be unprepared, then, to find that the remaining part of the defence is in some sense political,—as much so, as that of a non-political man could be. It is the defence of a reformer, though not of a political reformer. To ignore the political charge altogether in the defence would have been either a confession of weakness or a dangerous oversight, however fully the indictment might have been disposed of. But, moreover, political insinuations had been pressed into the service of the indictment itself in connection with the charge of perverting the youth.

It is obvious, that Socrates was precluded from meeting these charges in the way which would best have pleased his judges. He could have said that he had never transgressed the laws; he could say (as in fact he does say) that he loved his countrymen intensely; but for the existing constitution he could profess no enthusiasm. Yet here we must observe, that his coldness did not arise from frank political dislike of democracy, nor is his dissatisfaction to be measured by the one or two well-known criticisms which he passed upon it. He cared

18 Cf. Zeller, II. p. 152. The usur-

pation of the Thirty lasted from June 404 B.C. to February 403. The Archonship of Euclides began in 403 and ended in 402. In April 399 Anytus brought Socrates to trial.
for politics only as involving the interests of the individual (Xen. Mem. III. iv. 12), and it is to his view of individual well-being that we must look, if we would understand the degree or the significance of his reserved attitude towards the constitution. Its faults connected themselves in his mind with other faults at once further from the surface and far graver. To him the alarming symptoms were such as these,—that this system extolled as so perfect could coexist with an utter abeyance of principles; could be carried on by men, who, in knowledge of it, were mere empirical adventurers; that it neither undertook nor directed education; that much might be going wrong within it, without its giving any check or warning; that morality might share the general wreck and not be missed;—and that, all this while, the Athenian mind should throw itself without misgiving into such a system, and find all its wants satisfied, and its self-complacency encouraged; that, while intolerance was stimulated, the belief in any unwritten law of right beyond and above the positive enactments of the state had all but died out, and a belief in divine sanctions was scarcely felt (Apol. 35 D).

It was for these deeper reasons that Socrates was totally out of harmony with the political optimism of his countrymen. Here was the cause of the gravest manifestation of his irony. The discord was the more complete, because it turned upon considerations of the well-being of individuals rather than upon political predilections and fancies. And out of those considerations there rose up before his mind a clear vision of a great need, and of the remedy which would remove it, and of an obligation upon himself to be the applier of that remedy.

The discord had jarred upon the sensitive ear of restored democracy, and filled it with a feeling of offence which presently found interpreters in Anytus and others. The whole deep disharmony did not strike them; but, conscious of its presence, they detected and treasured up superficial results of it, such as the detached adverse criticisms upon the government, and perhaps followed with a like jealousy the abstinence from public life; and they added to these other irrational aggravations, such as the connection with Critias and Alcibiades, and the well-known cry of perversion of the youth. It was the
same offended sense which prompted the decisive step and brought Socrates to trial; and which, while the charges brought were the old and staple cries against the Philosophers and Sophists, aggravated these with a new political stigma.

But it is time to return to Socrates, and to the part of the Apology which still remains to be considered. We are now in a position to judge of it as a political defence, if such it shall turn out to be.

Of the particular political charges we find Socrates here only touching upon one, and that allusively,—the charge of being answerable for the misconduct of Critias and Alcibiades and perhaps others (33 B). The line he mainly follows is general.

We have analysed the attitude of Socrates towards the state of which he was a citizen into the following parts;—first, dissatisfaction, chiefly on moral grounds, with the prevalent state-theory; secondly, conception of the remedy to be applied to it; and, thirdly, conviction that the application devolved upon himself. And in a full general justification of himself in a political point of view, he would have had to expound all these points seriatim. We find him however reticent as to the first point: at most he only hints at it in the simile (30 E) of the high-bred horse, whose greatness of frame makes him somewhat sluggish, and who needs some gadfly to stir his spirit, and in the remark (31 A) that it is an extreme boon to be so roused. He interweaves the second point with the third, yet sparingly, and only in the way of explanation. It can hardly be said that the conception of the remedial plan is completely unfolded; though we find notices of it in the doctrine (29 D sqq.) that the care and improvement of the soul, and the pursuit of wisdom, truth, and virtue, are to be ranked infinitely above the pursuit of riches; the doctrine (36 C) of the need of consciously-possessed principles of individual and political action, tested (29 E, also 38 A) by self-examination; and the doctrine (33 A) of the imperative duty of adhering to what is just, alike in public and in private life. It is the third point, the assumption by himself of this mission, into which the speaker throws his strength: with this he starts, and to this he limits his justification. His first and paramount plea in this justification is that (28 B sqq. and 33 C) the work was under-
taken in obedience to the above-mentioned divine call, i.e. was an indefeasible duty, and therefore to be performed without respect of consequences, or counter-inducements, or human inhibition (29 D).—the proof of the divine call, i.e. of the reality of the obligation, being that nothing else would have sustained him in such a course of self-sacrifice (31 B). His other plea is that his assumption of this work was an incalculable benefit to his countrymen. In what remains he sets forth, in answer to supposed objections, first, that to have entered public life in preference to dealing with individuals would have been neither a practicable nor an effective method of pursuing this mission (31 C sqq.); and, secondly, the innocent tendency of his work (inculcating righteousness, not training for professions or imparting knowledge, 33 A), excluding the suspicion of perverting the youth,—a suspicion which is also refuted independently (33 C).

To have enlarged upon the first point would obviously have stood Socrates in little stead. He could not have done so without appearing to admit the political allegations of his accusers in their entire force; and thus the vindication of himself as a reformer lacks the support which it would have gained from a premised statement of the need of reform. But, to pass on from this first drawback to its effectiveness, the actual vindication offered must in itself have seemed to the majority of the Athenians partly paradoxical and partly visionary. In representing himself as having done good service by urging on them the care of their souls, by unswervingly insisting on righteousness in them and in himself, Socrates was traversing ground where they could not follow him. These things had for them no meaning. They required devotion to the letter of their constitution, they were on the verge of a panic at the appearance of disaffection; and this was their righteousness. With this they were content, when the substance of the old religion and the old morality were really departed from them. They were necessarily far from believing that it could be any man's duty or mission to set himself up among them as a preacher of righteousness,—as he himself says expressly in the ἀντιτυπος (37 E—38 A). To us there may seem to be nothing so far out of the common in the moral work of which Socrates claims to be the sole promoter, as to
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elevate him to a position of singularity. But it was a novel work enough to his contemporaries. It is a difficulty throughout in the way of appreciating Socrates, that positions, which ever since his time have been household words, not in moral philosophy merely but in common life, were in his mouth, to the men of his generation, original and novel; and that the simple principles he lays down here, so far from being commonplace to his audience, must have rather transcended their moral apprehension.

Nor must it be forgotten that their old distrust of the Sophist came in to the aid of their distaste for the reformer. So far from believing in his principles of moral reformation, they were confusedly identifying these with the old sophistical teaching. Hence it is that the disclaimer ἐγὼ διδάσκαλος οὐδενός κ. τ. λ. finds place here.

There were ample reasons, then, why this part of the defence should fail. Socrates stood before his countrymen a confessed reformer, and they were strangers to the idea of reformation except in a political sense,—a sense in which the Athens of the day had no room for reformers.

But the failure of the defence here urged by Socrates upon his countrymen is to be laid not to his charge but to theirs. The point upon which our whole judgment must turn is this. Was the need of a reformation so urgent as Socrates supposed it to be? If so, then Socrates was no less in the right, no less a benefactor, because they failed to feel the need, and they in crushing him were no less guilty of a national hypocrisy.

There is no need to sum up at any length the results of our

19 It is a poor sophism to urge that the stages of an ἐγὼ τιμήτως, or the venality of Athenian jailors, made Socrates' death his own act,—an eventuality which his accusers themselves never contemplated. This last assumption (which Köchly espouses) is directly at variance with the Apology, which (29 C) makes Anytus responsible for the argument that it were better Socrates should never have been tried, than that he should escape with his life. To excuse the judges as having been after the first step unwilling instruments of a legally unavoidable catastrophe, is a plea which we never think of allowing to the eastern despot, who after betraying his righteous minister "laboured till the going down of the sun to deliver him." The justice or injustice of the catastrophe is involved in that of the first step. The whole responsibility fell upon the judges from the moment when, in affirming the accusation ἢν ἄμαρτην ὄνηκεν κ. τ. λ., they gave their voice against the truth.
inquiry into the worth of the Apology as a defence. Its art is consummate; its statements are (as the exordium promised) unalloyed truth; its reticences are condescensions to the audience with whom it deals. It is exhaustive; it lays open by turns all the motives and influences which were at work against Socrates; and the more pains we are at to represent these to ourselves by means of an independent investigation, the more reason we shall find to acknowledge that the true clue lay all the while close to our hand in the Apology.

That the Sophists had no hand in bringing about the condemnation of Socrates is clear. Anytus was the enemy of Sophists. The Sophists had no political influence, and were themselves too much under the same suspicion with Socrates to have dared to inflame that suspicion. Cf. Zeller, II. p. 139.

ABBREVIATIONS IN TEXTUAL COMMENTARY.

V = Vulgar text, settled originally by Stephanus.
B = Bekker.
S = Stallbaum.
Z = Zurich editors.
H = Hermann.
Oxon. = the Bodleian MS. known as 'Codex Clarkianus.'

[Dr. Gaisford first published the readings of this MS. in 1820. Mr. Riddell collated the Apology anew for this edition, and also the Crito, Phædo, and Symposium.]
ΑΠΟΔΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

I. Ὅ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἄθηναίοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δὲ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὶ αὐτῶν ὁλίγον ἐμαντοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καὶ τοῖς ἀληθεῖς γε, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, 5 οὐδὲν εἰρήκασι. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑδαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὦν ἐγευσάντο, τοῦτο ἐν ὃ ἔλεγον ὡς χρὴν ὤμοις εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μὴ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐξεπατηθῆτε, ὡς δεινον ὑποσ λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθήναι, ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργον, ἐπειδὰν μηδ᾽ ὅπως - 10 τούτων φαίνωμαι δεινῶς λέγειν, τούτῳ μοι ἐδοξὲν αὐτῶν ἁνασχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλουσιν οὕτω λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτῳ λέγουσιν, ὠμολογοῦν· ἄν ἔγγει γὰρ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὕτωι μὲν οὖν, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, 15

5. ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν] This qualifies the oидεω following, making it equivalent to ἃ τι ὁ ὁδεὶν below.
8. μὴ — ἐξεπατηθῆτε] This sentence is not affected by the tense of the main construction, because the contingency it expresses remains still future at the moment of its being alluded to by the speaker. Digest of Idioms, § 90.
14. οὗ κατὰ] A thorough litotes: 'far above these;' 'a far greater orator than they.' Cf. Hdt. i. 121, πατέρα καὶ μητέρα εὐρήσεις, οὐ κατὰ Μιτραδάτην τε τὸν Βουκόλον καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ.
1. ἢ τι ἦν οὖν ἀληθεία εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δ’ ἐμοῦ ἀκοῦ· πεσθεὶ πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι μᾶ Δί’, ὦ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, κεκαλλυσθηκένεσυ γε λόγους, ὅστερ οἱ τούτων, ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν, οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένοι.

2. οὐ μέντοι] Opposed to ἀκούσεσθε τ. τ. ἀλ.—You shall have the truth entire, but not drest up. This contrast is only carried as far as ὀνόμασιν after which the idea of the contrast between truth and falsehood is resumed (that is, πιστεύω γὰρ κτλ. gives the rationale of ὑμεῖς δ’—ἀληθείαν) and continues to εἰσίναι,—since πιάττοντι λόγου refers not to artificial language but to falsification; a μεράκιον, to hide a fault, uses falsehood and not rhetoric.

3. ὅστερ οἱ] The nom. is the regular construction, where the noun brought into comparison can be made the subject of the clause introduced by ὅστερ. The attracted construction, exemplified by ὅστερ μετατιθήθη below, is less common. Dig. 176.

4. ῥήμασι ... ὀνόμασι] What do these two terms mean here? For in Sophist. 262 a, b, they distinctly mean ‘verb’ and ‘noun,’ in Cratyl. 399 b, c, as distinctly ‘expression’ and ‘word’ (Δί φίλος is the ῥήμα, Δέφιλος the ὄνομα). Now the conjoint phrase seems to have had a familiar rhetorical significance; cf. Symp. 198 b, τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ τελευτής τοῦ κάλλους τῶν ὄνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς ὄν ἢ εξεπλάγη ἄκοιμω; 199 b, ὀνόματι καὶ θέσει ῥημάτων, 221 ε, τοιαύτα καὶ ὀνόματα καὶ ῥήματα: whence we may conclude that the association here is similar. And if we compare passages of rhetorical criticism in the Orators, where these words occur, we shall find the meaning approaches to that in Cratyl. rather than that in Sophist.: cf. Λέσchin. iii. 72, p. 64, οὔ γὰρ ἔφη δειν (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα μέμην—μαι ὅ τις εἰπε, διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος) ἀπορρήξαι τῆς εἰρήμης τὴν συμμαχίαν—where the ῥῆμα is the whole expression, the ὀνομα is ἀπορρήξαι. Further, as Socrates could not speak without ‘expressions’ and ‘words,’ it is the artistic use of them he here disclaims; which, in the case of ὀνόματα, would consist in what Λέσchines—ii. 153, p. 48—calls ἦ τῶν ὀνομάτων σύνθεσις, and also in tropes and other figures of speech, and choice of unusual words, cf. Isocr. ix. 9. p. 190, μὴ μάνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔννοια τὰ δὲ κανονὶ τὰ δὲ μεταφοραὶ: while ῥήματα would extend to whole expressions, cf. Λέσchines’ caricature, iii. 166. p. 77, τὰ μιαρὰ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπίθανα ῥήματα.
17. μένους, ἀλλ' ἀκούσθησθε εἰκή λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόματι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω, καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἂλλος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήποτε πρέποι, ὥς ἄνδρες, τὴν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὀσπερ μειρακίᾳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσίνεισθαι. καὶ μέν· 5 τοι καὶ πάνω, ὥς ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, τούτο ὑμῶν δεόμεθα καὶ παρέμας· εὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούσας τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου, δι' ὀσπερ εἴσωθα λέγει καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπέζων, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασιν, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τοῦτον ἔνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ ὑπ' ὅσια: τὸν ἐγὼ προτέρον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἐτὴ γεγονός πλείω ἐξδομήκοντα.

12. πλείω] Hermann's note may satisfy us here: "Πλείω vel contra Oxon. cum VBS retinere quam cum Turicensibus omittere

4. ὀσπερ—εἰσίνεισθαι Three peculiarities; 1. μειρακίῳ is attracted into the case of πλάττοντι, cf. Dig. 176; 2. πλάττοντι is attracted into the case of ἡλικίᾳ; and 3. the gender of πλάττοντι notwithstanding follows the thought, cf. Dig. 184.

5. καὶ μέντω] A stronger form of καὶ—δι'. Dig. 145.

7. τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων] This has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσβάλτῃ τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. But, as something like this was recognised in ordinary pleadings under the name of ἐφόρσις (see Introd. p. x.), the reference here probably extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 c), and imagined (28 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it (30 d, 31 e, 35 b, c).

9. ἀγορὰ k.t.l.] The passage of Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 10) is well known;—ἐκείνοις γε ἄπει ἂν ἐν τῷ φανερῷ. προι τε γὰρ εἰς τοὺς περιπάτους καὶ τὰ γαμνάσια ἦν, καὶ πληθυνεῖτε ἄγοράς ἐκεὶ φανερὸς ἦν, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἄπει τὰς ἡμέρας ἣν ὅπου πλείστους μέλλοι συνίστεθαι. For τραπεζαῖς as places of resort cf. Lysias ix. 5. p. 114, καροὶ μὲν τὰ προειρημένα διελεκτο ἐπὶ τῇ Φιλίου τραπέζῃ· and shops generally, cf. Lys. xxiv. 20. p. 170.

5. ὑμῶν πολλοὶ] ὑμῶν is emphatic. As Stallb. remarks, the frequenters of the τράπεζα would be of the richer class.


11. ἐπὶ δικαστήριον] The prep. has the notion of 'presenting oneself to' the court. Cf. Isæus, Fr. vii. 1. 15, λέγων ἐπὶ δικαστήριον. The ἀναβέβηκα refers to the βήμα, cf. Introd. p. xv.
πλάτωνος

Αὖεν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὑπὲρ ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως. ὁσπερ ἑπτάπεν ἄν ὑπὲρ σκετε δῆπον ἄν μοι, εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φοινῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐλεγον, ἐν οὐκ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τὸν τὸν τῆς λέξεως εὖν ὅσος μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ὅσος δὲ βελτίων ἄν εὔτε ἀυτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τοῦτο τὸν νῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαιαι λέγω ἢ μὴ δικαστοῦ ὡς γὰρ αὕτη ἁρπῆ, ὑπήρος δὲ τάληθε λέγειν.

Π. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμι ἀπολογησάσθαι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Αθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδὴ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρῶτους κατηγόρους, ἐπείτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ υστερα καὶ τοὺς υστέρους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ βασικὸροι γεγονοῦσιν πρὸς υμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἕδη ἐτη καὶ οὔπω ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὐς ἔγοι μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀντόνων, καίτερ ὅταν καὶ malui, quia doctius additamentum est quam quod ad interpolatum referamus. Immo facile ejici poterat propter Crito. 52 ε, videturque jam Apollodoro ignotumuisse, qui apud Diog. La. Π. § 44. ipso septuagesimo ante mortem anno natum statuit; at duos ut minimum annos adjiciendos esse se dicit Boeckhius Corp. Inscr. Π. p. 341 probavit, nosque max comparato Scaev. Calv. Encom. c. 17 confirmavimus; cf. de theor. Deliac. p. 7." Zeller agrees, but makes 72 years the extreme limit.

5. δίκαιον] 'I request this of you as a piece of justice.' Cf. 41 d, χρη...τοῦτο διανοεισθαι ἀληθές, Legg. 795 c, ταύτων δὴ τοῦτ...ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοις πάσι χρη προσδοκάν ὀρθῶν 'as the right thing.'

6. ὅσος μὲν γὰρ] The reason urged is a general one. The consideration of style, if allowed at all, will be operative just in those cases where it is better or worse than the case deserves,—just where it will interfere with true judgment.

9. αὕτη] This represents the preceding clause αὕτο—ἡ μὴ being in fact τοῦτο, attracted into the gender of ἁρπῆ. Dig. 201.

14. καὶ πάλαι] This is only emphases πάλαι. Dig. 133. And in καὶ οὔπω—λέγοντες we have the common καὶ after πάλαι.—It was 24 years since the Clouds were represented: Forster.
18. τούτους δεινούς: ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ὥς ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παιδῶν παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπείθον τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοὺ μᾶλλον οὕτων ἀληθὲς, ὡς ἐστὶ τις Σωκράτης, σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστῆς καὶ τὰ ὕπο γῆς ἀπαντα ἀνεξήκτηκός καὶ ὁ τόν ἦττο λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν. οὕτωι, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οἱ ταύτῃ τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάζοντες, οἱ δεινοὶ εἰσὶ μου κατηγοροῦν: οἱ γὰρ ἀκούσαντες ἠγούνται τοὺς ταύτα ξητούντας οὔδε θεοὺς νομίζοντες. ἐπείτα εἰςών οὕτωι οἱ κατηγοροῦν πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἴλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ὧν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες, ἐνίοι δ’ ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενος. δ’ δὲ

3. μᾶλλον] BS omit: Z retain, and rightly; for the rhythm would be intolerable without it, or without (which Hermann would prefer) the three words μᾶλλον οὕτως ἀληθὲς.

2. τοὺς πολλοὺς] Closely with ἐκ παιδῶν. They ἐπείθον all, but only most, not all, as children. Cf. below ε, παιδές ὄντες, ἐνιοὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

3. μᾶλλον] With ἐπείθον and κατηγόρουν just in the same way as πολὺ μᾶλλον [κατηγ. ] below ε. Here it is intended to balance the comparative δεινότεροι—‘were more busy in accusing me and trying to persuade you.’

4. σοφὸς—ποιῶν] This “accusation,” both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality 19 b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. See Introd. p. xxiii. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist: the μετέωρα φροντ. points to the Philosopher, the τὸν—ποιῶν to the Sophist. The title σοφὸς ἀνήρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation,—cf. 23 a, 34 c; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so as distinctly to exclude those of Sophist. See Introd. p. xxxii. n. 12.

13. παιδές . . . μειράκια] We should have reversed the order, and said, ‘when you were all of you young, and most of you mere children.’

14. δ’ δὲ—δὲι] This is not a changed but an abbreviated
πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα οἶνων τερ. 18
αὐτῶν εἶδέναι καὶ ἐπείν, πλὴν εἰ τις κωμῳδοποιοῦσιν
τυγχάνει ὄν, ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι
ἡμᾶς ἀνέπειδον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἀλλοσ
πειθόντες, οὗτοι πάντες ἀποροτατοί εἰσιν, οὐδὲ γὰρ
ἀναβίβασασθαι οἶνον τ' ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταῦθοι οὐδὲ
ἐλέγχαι οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ σκια-
μαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀπο-
κρινομένου. ἄξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ
λέγω, διττοὺς μου τοὺς καθηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέ-
ρους μὲν τοὺς ἀρτί καθηγορήσαντας, ἑτέρους δὲ τοὺς
πάλαι, οὗς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους
πρῶτον μὲ ἀπολογήσασθαι καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων
πρῶτον ἱκούσατε καθηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον

2. κωμῳδοποιοῦσιν] VH; κωμῳδοποιοῦ ΒΣΖ with 2 MSS. B quotes
Fischer mistakenly asserting that at Phaedo 70 c all the MSS.
have κωμῳδοποιοῦ; but this is untrue for Oxon. and 6 others.
Meris' assertion that κωμῳδοποιοῦ is the Attic and the other
the common form does not bind us.

collection. In fall it would
be δ' δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν ἀλογώτατον,
ἐστὶ τοῦτου, ὅτι. Dig. 247.
2. εἰ τις] Aristophanes is
named below, 19 c, and is
doubtless chiefly meant, but
not exclusively. Eupolis had
said (Meincke ii. p. 553), Μιστὸ
δ' εγὼ καὶ Σωκράτης, τὸν πτωχὸν
ἀδολεσχήν, ὥστε ταλλα μὲν πεφρό-
τικες, ὥσπερ δὲ καταφευγήν ἔχοι
Τοῦτον καθήλεκεν. And a play
of Ameipsias, represented with
Aristophanes' Clouds, was called
the Connos, and the Chorus
was of Phrontis (Athen. v.
p. 218). It is likely enough
(Zeller, ii. p. 41. note 3), that
Ameipsias introduced the same
fact, or the same fiction, as
Plato (Menex. 235 c, Euthyd.
272 c), and made the music-
master Connus Socrates' in-
structor.
3. οὐκ εἶ δὲ includes all but
the εἰ τις' that is, οὐκ stands
for οὐκ ἄλλοι. Cf. Theaet. 159 b,
where πάντα ἂν is equivalent to
πάντα τάλλα ἂν. This οὐκ [ἀλ-
λαύ] is then subdivided into
[οἵ μὲν] φθόνῳ χρώμενοι καὶ οἵ
δὲ—πειθόντες. The οἵ μὲν
is supplied from οἵ δὲ by ana-
strophe; Dig. 241. The ἄλ-
lαυνοι πειθόντες is put in to make
the sense clear, but virtually
repeats the idea of ἡμᾶς ἄνε-
pειθόνω it does not affect the
regularity of the construction.
III. Ἄναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τὸς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστίν, ἐξ ἡ ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἡ δὴ καὶ ἡ πιστεύων Μέλητος με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην.

3. ἐσχετε] BZHT; ἐσχετε V. The preposition ἐ would be strange with ἐσχετε if the meaning were 'have entertained during so long a time.' ἐν means rather 'within the limits of;' and so, with respect to the further limit, 'at the distance of.' Thus ἐσχετε exactly falls into its place; 'ye first came to have so long ago.'

4. ἐν οὐτος] Though this collocation is rarer than οὐτως ἐν ὀλ., yet it occurs; e.g. below 24 a (where this passage is alluded to); Iseeus vi. 33. p. 59, ἐν πάνι ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, Lysias, xix. 8. p. 152, ἐν οὐτὸ δεινῇ καθέστηκεν. The rhythm probably determines the order. There is no need for the οὐτως of V.

2. τὴν διαβολὴν] Not the name of σοφίς (cf. 20 d, τὸ τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν, and again 23 a); nor 'calumny' simply (cf. below, ἡ κατηγορία . . . ἐξ ἦς ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ); but calumny believed, i.e. 'prejudice.'

7. οὐ πάνι here as elsewhere retains its meaning of 'hardly,' 'scarcely;' but this is to be interpreted as a litotes:—'I can hardly say I do not know.' Dig. 139.

II. ἡ δὴ] The antecedent of ἡ is διαβολὴ. Cf. 28 a, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστίν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρήσει, . . . οὐ Μέλητος, . . . ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολὴ.

13. διαβαλλὼν οἱ διαβάλλοντες] This fulness of expression is common in Plato, and gives the air of deliberateness. Dig. 262.

14. ὀσπερ qualifies not only κατηγοροῦν but also ἀντωμοσιάν and ἀναγγέλλων. They are quasi-prosecutors; it is a quasi-indictment; and Socrates makes believe to read it.
na autōn. Socrātēs ā'dikei kai pērierγάζεtai ζη- p. 1 tōn tā te ūpō γῆs kai ouρánia, kai tōn ēpttō logon kρei$tto poioν, kai āllous taütā taütā diādaskōn. e toiaútē tis ēstī: taútα γαρ ūorfāte kai autōi ēv 5τη 'Aristotfánous kouμidía, Socrātē tis πiνa ekei peri-
ferόmeνον, fásakontā te ēároβatein kai āllhν pοl-
λήν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, òn ēγō ūndēν ūxtē μέγα
ōute mikrōn perī ēpάw. kai ūnx ùs ātīmāξων légyo
tn toiaútēn ēpιsttēμhnh, ēī tis perī tōn toioútωn
10 σοφόσ ēstī: μη pws ēgō ūpō Mēlētōn tōsαύτας

2. kai ouράνia] So Z; VBSH kai tā ēpουράνia. 8. μικrōn]
According to Æris, σμικρός is Attic. Yet in Æschin. and Isocr. 
μικρός occurs uniformly. Below, d, all the MSS. have σμικρόν.
But to press uniformity would be arbitrary. See Lobeck, Fathol. Pars II. De Orthogr. Gr. inconst. § 1, who instances pas-
sages in which both forms occur in close neighbourhood or even 
xx. pp. 506, 507. He quotes from Apollonius (Pron. 63) the 
general principle ōn ēxomilōstai tā tōn dialēktōn kai māλιστα tā 
tōn 'Attikōn. Cf. Phædo, 90 a. Rhythm must be in some degree 
a guide.

term, like ἀντιγραφή 27 a, is 
used to designate the ἔγκλη-
ma. Both ἀντωμοσία and ἀντι-
grαφή were properly said of 
defendant's plea, presented 
in writing and sworn to, in 
the ἀνάκρησις, or preliminary 
proceeding before the Archon 
Basileus. But as the ἔγκλημα 
was likewise then presented in 
writing and sworn to, the same 
words came to be applied to it 
also. See Introd. p. ix.

7. ὑν ἔγω] The antecedent 
of ὑν must be the matters in 
the ἀντωμοσία, not the imme-
diately preceding words.

οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα] Accus. cog-
nate, not accus. of the object; 
Dig. 6. 'Επάw is intransitive.

8. καί οἷς ὃς—ἐστι] This is 
well-marked irony. Socrates 
decides here to pronounce, 
before an audience who would 
have welcomed it, a condem-
nation of studies against which 
at other times he had freely 
declared himself, on the double 
ground (1) that human nature 
ought to be studied first, Xen. 
Mem. I. i. 12, and (2) that the 
Physicists got involved in ques-
tions which were really beyond 
the powers of the human mind, 
ib. i. 11, and arrived moreover 
at impotent conclusions, ib. IV. 
vii. 6, 7.

10. τοσαύτας] 'Upon so grave 
a charge’ as that of pronounc-


AΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 51

19. δικας φύγοιμι· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἀνδρές Ἄθηναίοι, οὖ δὲν μέτεστι. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῦς ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἄξιος ἦμας ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοὶ πῶς τὸ πότε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγόμενον τολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσι. 5 φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις, εἰ πῶς τὸ ἡ συμκρόν η ἑκατοστοί σος ὑμῶν ἐμοὶ περὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων διαλεγόμενον καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαύτες εστὶ καὶ τάλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἄ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὔτε γ’ ἕτεν νικάτατε ὁς ἐγὼ παιδεείς ἐπικείρῳ ἀνθρώπων καὶ χρήματα πράττομαι, οὔτε τούτο ἄλληθες. ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτο γέ μοι δοκεῖ δικόν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶος τ’ εἶν παιδεεύς ἀνθρώπως ὀστερ Γοργίας τε ὅ

3. τῶν] H. brackets. But if we read αὐτοὺς just before, following the weight of MSS., τῶν is required by the Greek.

was ignorant,—the fault he himself so strongly reprobed in others.

1. ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But the truth is.' Dig. 147.


ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν] This is a hysteron proteron: Dig. 308. With φράζειν is to be supplied of course ἀλλήλους, dropped by an idiom of abbreviation: Dig. 233.

14. ὀστερ Γοργίας] Gorgias is spoken of by Isocrates as having made greater profits by teaching than any other man of his profession. Yet the sum was but small: ὅ δὲ πλείονα κτησάμενον ἐν ἡμείς μηχανεύομαι, Γοργίας ὅ Λεοντίνος, though a single man and unburdened by Liturgies, χίλιους μόνους στατήρας κατέλειπ. Isocr. xv. 155. p. 83. The ἐποκρατεῖ, he says, ib. 157, made much greater fortunes. Nor indeed is Socrates saying that the profits made by the Sophists were great. The sum which Socrates mentions below, 20 b, as Evenus' price, 5 mince (500 francs), seems to have been above the average: Isocrates, xiii. 3. p. 291, speaks of 3 or 4 minae (3-400 fr.) as a common price. Isocrates has been said, it is true, to have taken as much as 10 minae for his rhetorical course; Gorgias and Prodicus even 100. But what made the frequenting of Sophists' courses expensive was that people never thought they had had enough of them.

E 2
Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλείος. p. 199
τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστὸς, ὁ ἄνδρες, οἴος τ' ἐστὶν οἷον εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, ὃς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν πρῶκα ἐξυνεῖναι ὥς ἅν βούλωνται, 5τούτων πεῖθοι τὰς ἐκείνων ἐξυνομίας ἀπολύποντας σφισί ἐξυνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσελθόντας ἐπεί καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστὶς Πάροις ἐνθάδε σοφός, ὃν ἐγὼ ἡσθόμην ἐπιθημοῦντα ἐτυχόν γὰρ προσελθῶν ἄνδρὶ ὃς τετελεκε χρήματα σοφιστάς 10πλείω ἡ ἐξυπαντες ὁι ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου τούτων οὖν ἀνηρρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο νιή—ὁ Καλλία, ἂν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μὲν σοι τῷ νιή πόλω ἡ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἶχομεν ὅν αὐτῶν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὁς ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλό τε καὶ 15ἀγαθῷ ποιῆσεν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν. ἂν δ' ἂν οὕτως ἡ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἡ τῶν γεωργικῶν νῦν δ' ἐπείδη ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτῶν ἐν νῦ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν; οἷοι γὰρ

14. καλὸ τε καὶ ἀγαθῶ] So Oxon. It seems unnecessary to introduce a synalepha.

5. τούτων πεῖθοι.] The construction is changed from the infinitive to a finite verb. Dig. 277. The change of construction is not gratuitous, but expresses (ironical) admiration. The passage in Theages, 128 a, is a reminiscence of this passage, including the change of construction.

6. προσελθόντας.] The pros stands compounded in its adverbial and not in its prepositional sense. Dig. 129.

7. ἐπεί καὶ.] The connecting thought is—'and at Athens there is quite as good a field for professed teachers as elsewhere.'

8. ὁν ἡσθόμην.] Socrates implies that he speaks from hearsay when he states ἐστίν ἐνθάδε.

20. σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν νῦν κτῆσιν. ἔστι τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἡ οὖ; Πάνω γε, ἡ δ' ὦς. Τίς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καί ποδατός, καί πόσον διδάσκει; Εὐνυός, ἐφη, ὁ Σόκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών καί ἐγώ τὸν Εὐνυόν εἰμακάριστα, εἰ ώς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταῦτην τὴν τέχνην καί 5 οὕτως ἐμμελεῖς διδάσκει. ἐγώ οὖν καί αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυ-

νόμην τε καί ἡμρυνόμην ἂν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. 'Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἵσως. ἅλλ' ὁ Σώ-
κρατες, τὸ σοῦν τι ἐστί πράγμα; πόθεν αἰ διαβολαί ὁ σοι αὐτάι γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήποτ' σοῦ γε οὖν ἄν
tὸν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευμένον ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καί λόγος γέγονεν εἰ μὴ τι ἐπρατ-
tεσ ἄλλοιον ἢ οἱ πολλοί' λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν, τί ἐστιν, d' ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περί σοῦ αὐτοσχεδίαξομεν. ταυτί μοι δικεὶ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῶν πειράσομαι ἀποδείξαι, τί ποτ' ἐστι τούτο ὁ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τὸ τε

6. ἔγω οὖν] So Oxon. and 2 other MSS. ἔγω γε is not wanted here.

9. 'Ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν] Here Socrates, though still ostensibly occupied with 'the old ac-
cusers,' passes from the denial of the imputations current against him as a reputed so-
φός to an account of the personal dislike which had be-
fallen him individually. See Introd. p. xxxiv.

10. πράγμα] In the sense of pursuit, or plan of life or study or the like. Cf. Crito 53 d, τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα, Ethylid. 304 a, τούτο τοῦ πράγ-

ματος σφῶν, ε, χαρίν γε τι πράγμα ἐστι ἢ φιλοσοφία.

The order of the words in this clause gives emphasis to

soν 'What is it, then, that you (since we are not to identify you with the σοφοί) have been about?'

13. ἐι μὴ—πολλοί] This clause is the double of σοῦ γε—πραγ-

ματευμένον: an instance of the widely extended idiom which I have ventured to call Binary Structure: Dig. 207. Very parallel is Thuc. V. 97, καὶ τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἡμῖν διὰ τὸ καταστηφή-

ναι ἄν παράσχετε . . . εἰ μὴ πε-

ρεγίνοιθε,—where εἰ μὴ περεγί-

νοισθέ ἐπε διὰ τὸ καταστη-

φήναι. Cf. also Hom. Od. ii. 246,

Εἴπερ γὰρ κ' Ὀδυσσέας κ.λ., ἁλλὰ

κεν αὐτοῦ ἀνεκία πόταυν ἐπισποι,

Ει πλέονες μάχοιο.
"Of sofoi. See note on sofoi, 18 b.

5. ἢπερ κ.τ.λ.] 'My wisdom is precisely (περ) that only wisdom, as I believe (ἰσως), which is possible to man:' namely (21 d, 23 b), knowledge of his own ignorance. Socrates speaks of this as knowledge because it implies two things;—(1) the possession of a standard or ideal of knowledge, with the conception of a method for attaining it; and (2) self-knowledge, such as would result from the Socratic system of self-examination (cf. 38 a, note), revealing the amount of actual short-coming. This is knowledge until the positive knowledge is attained, and if that never can be, then this is the only knowledge. Socrates' faith, however, in the partial attainableness of positive knowledge never wavered, and his misgiving here must be restricted to the possibility of complete attainment.

8. ἢ ὦκ ἔχω τί λέγω] 'Or some wisdom that—I know not how to characterise it.' It is some predicate, alternative with μείξω ἢ κατ' ἀνθρωπον, which Socrates affects to be at a loss for. The idiom is an expedient for abbreviation; the sentence is hurried to its conclusion after its point has been expressed, by a clause superseding the enumeration of further particulars: cf. Dig. 257, where the present passage is especially compared with ῾Οργ. 494 4, (Δ) Φημί τῶν κνώμενων ἰδεῶς ἀν βιώσαι. (Β) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μόνον κηρισί, ἢ ἐτι τι σε ἐρωτάτω.

12. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν] Cf. Symp. 177 a, ἢ μὲν μοι ἁρχὴ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Ἑὐρισκόνθη Μελανίπ-πυν' οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μίθος ἀλλὰ Φαίδρου τοῦθε. Cf. also Alc. I. 113 e. The verse in the Melanippae was Οὐκ ἔμως ὁ μίθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα. So Eur. Hel. 513, Λόγος γὰρ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἐμὸς, σοφῶν δ' ἔτος.
3. μάρτυρα—Δέλφοις | “There is no need (says Zeller, Phil. der Griechen II. p. 45, note 2), to deny the authenticity of the oracle, but we cannot regard it as having given the primary impulse to Socrates’ tour of enquiry. Socrates must have been already a known personage for Chærephon to have put his question to the Pythia, or for her to have taken it up.” It is therefore semi-rhetorically that the oracle is here represented as the cause of Socrates’ eccentric and unpopular proceeding. The Iambic form,—σοφὸς Σοφοκλῆς &c.—in which the response appears in Diog. II. 37, and Suid. σοφάς, is a later invention—an expansion of the Pythia’s simple negative recited here.

6. καί ὑμῶν—κατὰλθέτει | This allusion to Chærephon’s antecedents is added not without purpose,—to dispose the court to hear more indulgently the story which is to follow.

In detail:—The full point of the phrase πλήθει ἑταῖρος is to be found in the contrast of the adherents of the Thirty; more especially the ἑταῖρος of the oligarchical clubs, and the body of 3000 hoplites organised by the Thirty from their partisans. φυγή refers to the subsequent expulsion of all not included in the 3000 from Athens, and their withdrawal presently after (when they found no safety in Attica) to Thebes, Megara, Oropus, Chalcis, Argos, &c. This flight, as an event still vividly remembered, is called ταίτηρ, ‘the recent.’ So Isocr. matches it with the old troubles under the Piünstatidw;—τὴν δημοκρατίαν... διέ ήδη καταλύθεσαν, καὶ τὰς φυγὰς τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τυράνων καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα γενομένα, viii. 123. p. 184. With κατὰλθεῖ cf. Lysias, x. 4. p. 116, ἐξ ὧν ὑμεῖς καταλήψατε: it is the recognised description of the restoration of democracy and end of the eight months’ reign of the Thirty, signalised by the solemn return of Thrasybulus and the exiles from Piræus to Athens.
VI. Σκέψασθε δὲ ὅν ἔνεκα ταύτα λέγω· μέλλω δὲ γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδαξεῖν, οὗθεν μοι ἡ διαβολή γέγονε. ταύτα γὰρ ἔγω ἀκούσας ἐνεβυθοῦμην οὕτωσι· τί ποτὲ λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτὲ αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν εὔνοια ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὁν· τί οὖν ποτὲ λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφότατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δὴν ψεύδεται γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ· καὶ πολλῶν μὲν χρόνων ἦπορον, τί ποτὲ λέγει, ἐπείτα μόνος πάνυ ἐπὶ ξητησίν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινά ἑτεροτην. ἤλθον ἐπὶ τινὰ τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς γὰρ ἐνταῦθα, εἰ πέρ πον, ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀπο-

1. ἀδελφὸς] Chaerecrates:
Xen. Mem. II. iii. 1.
2. μαρτυρήσει] The μαρτυρία is to be supposed to follow at once. Introd. p. xviii.
10. οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ] Cf. Pind. Pyth. ix. 42, τὸν οὐ θεμι-
tὸν ψεύδει διετέν.
17. τῶν πολιτικῶν] In itself this word means no more than 'statesman,' in the sense in which it might have been ap-
plied to Pericles, and is applied, Legg. 693 a, to the old law-
givers and settlers of Hellas. But an Athenian of Plato's
time speaking of Athens would mean by πολιτικὸν that class of men who made public business a profession,—τοὺς πολιτικοὺς
λεγομένους (Politic. 303 c). As distinguished from the ρήτορες, they were men who sought
appointments to public offices, while the ρήτορες were pro-
fessional speakers in the Ec-
clesia. Cf. 23 c, and see Introd.
p. x. note i.
19. διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ, ἔδοξέ
μοι] This inversion of govern-
ment is of common occurrence
among the forms of changed
construction: Dig. 27.1. ἔδοξέ
is 'I came to think,' as 32 b.
21. ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἐαυτῷ, εἶναι δ’ οὐ κἂπειταὶ ἐπειράμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι, ὅτι οὐκετι μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς, εἰδ’ οὐ. ἐνετεύθεν οὖν τοῦτο τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων, πρὸς ἐμαυτόν δ’ οὖν ἀπὶῶν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφὸς—πετός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλῶν καγαθῶν εἶδέναι, ἀλλ’ οὕτως μὲν οἶστι τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδῶς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶμαι· ἐδικα γοῦν τοῦτο γε σμικρὸ τιν αὐτῷ τοῦτο σοφότερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἡ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴμαι το εἰδέναι. ἐνετεύθεν ἐπ’ ἄλλον ἦν τῶν ἐκείνου δο- κοῦντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταύτα ταύτα ἐδοξεὶ καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκειν καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην.

VII. Μετὰ ταῦτ’ οὖν ἡδ’ ἐφεξῆς ἦν, αἰσθανόμενον μὲν καὶ λυποῦμενοι καὶ δεδώσαντες ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὁμοίως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖν καὶ ἵτεν διόν οὐκ χαιρετεύω τὸν Χρησ- μὸν, τί λέγει, ἔπι ἀπαντᾷ τοὺς τι δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ νὴ τοῦ κόσμου, ὃς ἄρης Ἀθηναίοι· δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθρι λέγειν· ἥ μὴν ἐγὼ ἐπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἐδοξέαν μοι ὁλίγον δεῖν τῷ πλείστῳ ἐνδείκτης εἶναι ἤποτε κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλοὶ δὲ δοκοῦντες φαινότεροι ἐπεικεῖστεροι εἶναι ἄρης πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεὶ δη ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδείξων δῆσπερ πὸνοὺς τινὰς πονοῦν·

20. τοῦ κόσμου] What was meant by this oath is clear from Gorg. 482 b, ἵτε τῶν κόσμων ἄλογων θεῶν,—that is, the dog-headed or, more correctly, jackal-headed Anubis. In Plato this oath is only found in the mouth of Socrates. In Aristoph. Vesp. 83, a slave, Sosias, uses the same oath.


I. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ὁ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ p. 257 τὸς οὖν μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ p. 257 γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἢ ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τοὺς τοῦ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν διδυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπʼ αὐτοφόρῳ καταληψόμενος σὲμαντὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὑπα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα, ἡ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεύσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἄν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἢ ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνομι παρ’ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἁνδρέες, τὰληθή όμος δὲ ἱρητέου. ὡς ἐτοσ γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅλιγον αὐτῶν ἀπαντεὶς οἱ παρόντες ἀν ἐλεύθερον ἐλέγων περὶ δὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήσαν. ἐγγων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅλιγῳ

I. καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος] Ἰ᾽s conjecture κἂν ἐλεγκτὸς (1) is mere conjecture; (2) would not give the sense he wishes, since ἐλεγκτὸς is not ‘contradicted’ but ‘admitting contradiction’; and (3) if it did, would spoil the general meaning, since Socrates’ leading principle throughout is that the oracle must be true, and that the proof of this would come out simultaneously with the true sense. 12. ἐν ὅλιγῳ] Ἰ᾽s conjecture ἐνί λόγῳ is needless. For ἐν ὅλιγῳ means the same, viz. ‘in short,’ not ‘in a short time;’ just like ἐν βραχεί, Symp. 217 a, ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ, Isocr. i. 40. p. 11. Of course ἐνι λόγῳ occurs also, e. g. Lysias, xiii. 38. p. 133; and Ἰ might have argued something from the variation of reading between καὶ ὅλιγον and κατὰ λόγον, Thuc. vi. 34. med.

1. ὃν μοι — γένοιτο] ‘With the object of finding positively unimpeachable proof of the divine declaration.’ A double meaning is wrapped up in μοι,—it is both ‘by my agency’ and ‘for my satisfaction.’ καὶ signifies the superaddition of demonstration, which all the world must accept, to the certainty which had been in Socrates an exercise of faith. μαντεία signifies (1) the process by which oracles are obtained, or (2), as here, and 29 a, the fact oracularly communicated. This signification still remains distinct from that of μαντείων, which was the form of words in which the oracle was given; μαντεία is the meaning of the μαντείων a distinction to feel which we have only to remember that to get at the meaning from the words was in the case of oracles a process involving exactly that degree of difficulty which suited the god or his prophet.

II. οἱ παρόντες] With Stallb., and against Wolf, we must take this to mean ‘those present at each several time,’ and not ‘the present audience.’
τούτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφία ποιοῖν ἀ ποιοῖν, ἀλλὰ φύσει ετειν καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, ὅσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοὺδοι· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ, ἵσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὅν λέγοντοι. τοιοῦτον τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες· καὶ ἀμαζήθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων, ὃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπήγον καὶ ἐντεύθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἴομενος περιγεγονέναι, ὅσπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνις ἦς·

δὲ μαντὸ γὰρ ξυνήθειν οὖθεν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, τοῦτος δὲ γ᾽ ἤδειν ὅτι εὐρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τοῦτον μὲν οὐκ ἐγεύσθην, ἀλλὰ ἣπισταντο ἀ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἤπιστάμην καὶ μου ταύτη σοφώτερον ἦσαν. ἀλλ᾽, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ταύτων μοι ἐδοξάν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὅσπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ, καὶ οἱ ἄγαθοι δημιουργοὶ· διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξηγοῦσαν ἐκαστὸς ἥξιόν καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφωτάτων εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην εἰς τὴν σοφίαν ἀποκρύπτειν' ὅστι ἐμὲ ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωμεν.

20. ἀποκρύπτειν] This is the reading of one MS. Φ. The dominant reading of the MSS. (including Oxon.) is ἀποκρύπτει. The editors have espoused ἀπεκρύπτειν· but such a text would not account for such a variant as ἀποκρύπτει in the best MSS. Ἀποκρύπτει itself is scarcely possible (on the principle of πεπραγ-...

The usage of the orators proves this; cf. Antipho ii. A. a. 9. p. 116, and (esp.) γ. 5. p. 118, οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὅτι τῶν παρ- ύσων οὐκ ἦν ὑπερήφανος ... ἢν. Lysias uses in the same meaning, but without the same possibility of question, οἱ παραγε- νόμενοι. The expressions used, whether for the audience or for the court, are different; e. g. Antipho vi. 14. p. 143, πολλοὶ τῶν περιστούσων τοῖς ταύτῃ πάντα ἀκριβῶς ἐπίστανται, Andoc. i. 139. p. 18, οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν καθήμενων οὐδεὶς ἦν ἐπιτρέψεις.

16. ἐδοξάν] The nom. is καὶ οἱ ἄγαθοι δημιουργοῖ. The force of the aor. is, as in 21 c, ἐδοξέ, 'I came to see.'

18. τὰ μέγιστα] Politics are especially meant.
which experiments further supplied the key to the intensity of the prejudice against Socrates individually, in the personal enmities which they had excited;

IX. Ἐκ ταυτησι ἀλήθεια, τοῦτο μὲν ἀπέχθειαν μοι γεγονασι καὶ ὅ ἄνδρες
οἷα καλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὅστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπὸ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὅνυμα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι,
σοφὸς εἶναι. οὖνται γὰρ μὲ ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες
ταῦτα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφοῦ, ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω τὸ
dὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὁθὲς σοφὸς εἶναι,
καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἄνθρω-
πίνη σοφία ὁλίγου τινὸς ἄξια ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς· καὶ
φαίνεται τοῦτ' ὃν λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρησθαι
dὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἔμε παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὅσπερ ἂν
eὶ ἐποίη ὅτι οὐτὸς ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφωταῖς ἐστίν, ὅστις ὅσπερ Σωκράτης ἐγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς
ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' ὃν ἐγὼ

μάταιμα, ἀπείρηκα, Πάδεο 99 δ, ὅπο ib. 98 b); but points to ἀπο-
κρύπτει, which is to be governed by ἢδοξε understood from ἢδοξαν,
which gives also the best sense.

Παρσ. II. p. 230, "Sæpe Oratores, etiamsi de absentibus loquentur,
quos modo designarunt et auditoribus quasi spectandos propo-
nunt, iota demonstrativo utuntur, et æxius etiam neglignant, si
de presentibus." Cf. τοῦτι, 37 e. 
ἐξετάσεως] We cannot follow Oxon. and 3 other MSS. in reading ἢδεως, which is the result of an old contraction misread. 15. τοῦτ' ὃν] This conjecture
of F. A. Wolf we must needs adopt for τοῦτος of the MSS.

9. ὅνυμα δὲ—εἶναι] Lit. 'and I am called by this name, that I am wise.' The subject of ἄ-
γεσθαι is [ἐμὶ], not ὅνυμα. And σοφὸς εἶναι is by attraction for
[τῷ] εἶναι με σοφὸν.

11. τὸ δὲ] Accus. of pronoun neuter, standing for the whole sentence immediately follow-
ing: Dig. 19.

14. καὶ οὐδενὸς' or nothing:' the καὶ is disjunctive.
μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιοῦν ξητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἀν τινα οὐκ μάθημα σοφῶν ἐίναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐν-
deίκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὐτε τί τῶν τῆς πόλεως πράξαι μοι σχολὴς γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὐτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλὰ ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες, οἶς μάλιστα σχολὴ ἔστων, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι χαίρουσιν ἁκοῦντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται ἐν ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν' κάπητα, οἵμα, εὐ-
ρισκονοῦσιν πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδῶτοι δὲ ὀλίγα ἤ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξεταζομένοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, ἀλλ’ οὐχ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαρώ-
tatos καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὰν τις

1. μὲν ἔτι] Oxon. gives μὲν ἔτι, but in the hand of a re-
ster, and not on the traces of the old letters. (Gaisf. wrongly represents ἔτι as the reading. ἔτι would be redundant, like ἔτι φωναρίς, &c.)

2. καὶ ξένων] So Oxon. and 3 other MSS. Edd. καὶ τῶν ξένων. But the variation is in the spirit of Plato: cf. Díg. 237, and add Phaedo 85 a, αὐτή ἢ τε ἀνδρῶν καὶ χελιδῶν καὶ ὁ ἔπος.

11. μιμοῦνται] So Oxon. &c. μιμοῦνει is a conjec-
ture of Hermann.

4. ὑπὸ ταύτης] Later, 31 c, he gives a second reason for ab-
staining from public life.

6. ἐν πενίᾳ μυρία] Cf. Legg. 677 c, the beautiful expression μυρίας τινα φοβερῶν ὕπομαι, Rep. 520 c, μυρία βελτίων.

For the fact, with respect to Socrates, cf. with Stallbaum Xen. Econ. ii. 3.

Forster compares Rep. 539 b, οἱ μεράκισκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγῳ γενώντας, ὡς παύσαι αὐτοῖς κατα-
χρόνια, αὐτὺς εἰς ἀντιλογίαν χρώ-
μενοι, καὶ μιμοῦμενοι τοὺς ἐξελε-
γχομαι αὐτοὶ ἄλλους διέγχουσι.

καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἂν ἂν τοῦ ἄλλου ἐξελε-
γχομαι. εἰ ἐν μιμοῦμαι] By practising
upon each other.
and lastly, in combination

4. tā́ντα] Latin ista; idiomatically expressive of contempt, Dig. 318.

5. τὰ μετέωρα] Understand ἑυτῶ or the like, by comparison of 19 b.

12. ἐκ τῶν τῶν] "It is upon this footing"—namely that of an old general prejudice, aggravated by supervening personal animosity,—"that I am now attacked by" &c. The meaning "in consequence of" would be too strong, both for the sense here, and for the idiomatic use of the phrase; cf. Dig. 116: the meaning "upon the strength of" would also exceed the warrant of the Greek, though not of the sense, cf. 19 a, ἐχών δὲ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητος ε.τ.λ.

καὶ Μέλητος — ρήτορων] For an account of Socrates' three accusers and their motives, and of the classes of persons called here πολιτικοὶ and ρήτορες, see Introd. p. x. note 1.

The δημοσφημοσύνεις are here joined with the πολιτικοῖ, because Anytus represented a trade himself, and herein was but one of many instances of the same conjunction of pursuits in those times at Athens. Socrates was wont to speak slightlying of mechanical arts (Xen. Οἰκον. iv. 3), —a view which would seem to connect itself with his praise of σχολή (Diog. ii. 31, Εἰκ. Var. x. 14): and a conversation, in which he pressed an uncommercial view of education upon Anytus himself with reference to his son, seems to have been among the causes of Anytus' personal hatred of Socrates. (See again Introd. p. xii.)
. 23. "Ανυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχρόμενος, "Ανυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἤρητων· ὡστε, ὑπὲρ ἄρχομενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζομι ἃν εἰ οἷς τ' εἴην ἐγὼ ύμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελεύθη δέν συν εὐτώς ὁλίγω χρόνῳ ὴτι πολλὴν γεγονοῦν. ταῦτ' ἐστιν ύμῖν, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθή, καὶ ύμᾶς. οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ἀποκρυφάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδ ὑποστειλάμενος. καὶ τοι οἴδα σχέδου ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεξεβάνομαι· ὁ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἄληθη λέγω ἃ καὶ ὅτι αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἳτα ταῦτα ἐστὶ. καὶ εάν τε νῦν εάν τε αὕτης ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὔτως εὐρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὅν οἱ πρῶτοι μον κατηγόρου κατηγόρον αὐτὴ ἐστὼ ἰκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ύμᾶς. πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλότολον, ὡς φησί, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταύτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογεύσθαι. αὕτης γὰρ δή, ὡσπερ ἐτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσία. ἔχει δὲ πῶς οἴδε: Σωκράτης φησίν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζεις οὐ νομίζοντα, ἔτερα δὲ δαμόνια καὶνα. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλῆμα τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ· τοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλῆματος

1. ὑπέρ] We are to understand, not that the accusers were acting on behalf of their respective classes, but merely that they were to be regarded as representatives of the feelings of those bodies.

9. τοῖς αὐτοῖς] Lit. 'through the same things;' that is, in stating the facts I am virtually reiterating and attesting the charges.

11. ὡς διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ] Emphasis is of course on διαβολὴ. 'This is,'—i.e. 'in this consists—the prejudice against me.'

16. ἀγαθὸν] 'Public benefactor.'

Two answers (both dialectical); i. the hypocrisy of the charge;

3. σπουδὴ χαριντίζεται] Oxy-romon: 'is playing off a jest under solemn forms.' The machinery of the law, with all its solemnity of circumstance and all its serious consequences, is set in motion by him for his mere amusement. Cf. χαριντίζεται with the same sense 27 a, where it is explained by παιζοντα.

8. Καί μοι κ.τ.λ.] The examination of Meletus by Socrates, which now follows, though it naturally affords scope for exhibiting Socrates' characteristic talent, is legally speaking the customary έρώτησις, to which either party was bound to submit at the requisition of the other. Introd. p. xviii.

18. ἀμείνους] 'Better citizens,'—better toward others: whereas βελτίων above means, strictly speaking, better in themselves.
24. Μέλητε; οίδ'ε τούς νέους παιδεύειν οϊν' τε εἰσι καὶ 
βελτίους ποιοῦσι; Μάλιστα. Πότερον ἀπαντεῖς, ἥ 
οι μέν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ' οὐ; Ἱ ᾗς ἀπαντεῖς. Εὐ γε νῦ 
τὴν Ἡραν λέγεις, καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ἀφελοῦν-
των. τί δὲ δή; οἴδε οἱ ακροσταί βελτίους ποιοῦσιν, σ 
ἡ οὐ; Καὶ οὕτω. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βου-
λευταί. Ἀλλ' ἀρα, ὃς Μέλητε, μὴ ὦ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, 
ὁ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἤ 
κάκεινοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἀπαντεῖς; Κάκεινοι. Πάν-
τες ἀρα, ὃς ὑιείς, Ἀθηναίοι καλοὺς κἀκαθοὺς ποιοῦσιν 
πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρο. οὐτω λέγεις; 
Πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατ-
έγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καὶ μοι ἁπόκριναι ἤ καὶ περὶ 
ἵππους οὐτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν οἱ μὲν βελτίους ποι-
οῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἀνθρωποί εἶναι, εἰς δὲ τις ὁ 
διαφθείρων; ἦ ναντίον τούτου πάν εἰς μὲν τὸ 
βελτίους οἴος τ' ὁν ποιεῖν ἴ πάνυ ὄλγοι, οὶ ἱππικοὶ 
οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ εάνπερ ἐνυνδοί καὶ χρῶνται ἱπποὺς, δια-
θείρουσιν; οὐχ οὖτως ἔχει, ὃ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ 
ἵππουν καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀπαντῶν ζώων; πάντως δή— 
πον, εὰν τε σὺ καὶ Ἰ Ἀνυτοὶ οὐ φητε ἐὰν τε φητε' 
πολλή γὰρ ἄν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴῃ περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ 
εἰς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δ' ἀλλοί ὀφε-
λοῦν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὃς Μέλητε, ἰκανὸς ἐπιδείκνυσι 
ὅτι οὐδεπότετε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς 
ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμε-
λήκε περὶ ὃν ἐμὲ εἰςάγεις.

24. ἄλλ' γάρ] 'But the truth 
is;' as above 19 c, &c. Dig. 147.
26. ἀποφαίνεις—ἀμέλειαν] Be-
tween ἀμέλειαν and Μέλητε a 
play upon words is doubtless 
intended; see several instances 
in Plato collected Dig. 324. 
In this case the probability is 
strengthened by the constant
ΧΙΛ. Ἐτὶ δὲ ἡμῶν εἰπὲ ὦ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητε, πῶτερον ἔστων οἰκεῖν ἀμεινὸν ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἡ πονηροὶ; ὦ τῶν, ἀπόκριναι οὐδὲν γὰρ τοι ταλεπῶν ἐρ τῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἐαυτῶν ὡντας, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι; Πάνω γε. Ἐστων οὖν ὡστὶς βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμνώντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἡ ὀφελείσθαι; ἀπόκριναι, ὦ γαθεί καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρῖνεσθαι. ἦσθ' ὡστὶς βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δήτα. Φέρε δὴ, πῶτερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῖρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεατέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἡ ἄκοντα; Ἐκόντα ἔγγυε. Τί δήτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμὸν σοφότερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὡν, ὡστε σὺ μὲν ἕγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακῶν κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται ἂεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον εαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἦκω, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτ' ἄγνω, ὅτι, εάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν ἐμνωτῶν, κυινυεύσω κακὸν τι λαβεῖν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼ ποιῶ, ὡς φής σὺ; ταῦτα ἐγὼ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδέναν' ἀλλ' ἢ οὐ π. διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω, ἀκων, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ' ἀμφότερα ψεῦδει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιουτῶν καὶ ἀκουσίων ἀμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῖρο νόμος εἰσάγοντ' ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἵδια λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν'

recurrence of the juxtaposition; see 24 c above, and 26 b below.
1. εἰπὲ — Μέλητε] The address ὦ Μέλητε has suffered tmesis by the interlacing of εἰπὲ πρὸς Δίως with it: Dig. 288. See also Rep. 332 c, τι ὀνεῖ, ὦ πρὸς Δίως, ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ, and 26 c below.
8. οὐ νόμοι] See note, 24 c.
13. τηλικόσδε] Meletus was a very young man: cf. Euthyph. 2 b, c, and below 26 c extr.—Stallb.
26. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων τοιῶ. 
σὺ δὲ ἐγκενέσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἐφύγεσι καὶ 
οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ νόμοι ἐστίν εἰσά- 
γειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους, ἀλλὰ οὐ μαθήσεως.

XIV. 'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τούτο μὲν ἓν 
δῆλον ὣδ' ἐστίν, ὅ ἐγὼ ἐλεγο, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτῳ 
οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὅμως δὲ 
δὴ λέγε ἧμιν, πῶς μὲ φῆς διαφθείρεις, ὥς Μέλητε, 
τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφήν, 
ἡ ἐγράψω, θεοὺς διδάσκουτα μὴ νομίζειν οὖς ἡ πόλις 
νομίζει, ἑτέρα δὲ δαιμόνια κατά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι 
διδάσκων διαφθείρω; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα 
λέγο. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοῖς, ὥς Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν 
θεῶν, ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰτε ἐτί σαφέστερον καὶ 
ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τουτοῖς. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι 
μαθεῖν, πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν μὲ νομίζειν εἰναὶ 
τωναθεός, καὶ αὐτός ἁρα νομίζω εἰναὶ θεός, καὶ 
οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀθέος οὔθε ταῦτη ἄδικω, οὐ 
μέντοι ὅσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτ 
ἐστίν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους' ἡ παντάπασι μὲ 
φῆς οὔτε αὐτῶν νομίζειν θεοὺς τους τε ἀλλοὺς ταῦτα 
διδάσκειν. Ταῦτα λέγω, ὥς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζει

2. ἐφύγεσι 'Didst decline.' 
Cf. Ar. Ach. 717, Κασταλίουνε 
χρή τό λαοῦν, καίν φύγη τις ζη 
μοῖν. With Plato, however, 
this meaning of the word is 
more common in the com 
174 a. ἐφύγεσι and οὔκ Ἕ 
form a hysteron proteron, 
though not a strongly marked 
one.

cognate after ἐμέλησεν, not 
om. to ἐμέλησεν. Dig. 6.

14. ὃν νῦν] 'Whom the ar 
argument at present concerns:' 
equivalent to ὅν λέγομεν as 
distinguished from περὶ ὃν λέ 
γομεν.—Stallb., rightly. 
Cf. Soph. 263 a, σών ἔργοιν ἡ χρ 
ζειν περὶ τ' ἐστί καὶ ὅτου 
ὁ λόγος, Legg. 678 a, τόλως 
καὶ πολιτείας περὶ καὶ νομοθεσίας, 
ὃν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν παρέστηκεν, 
... μνήμην εἰναι.
3. Mā Δ'.] Understand οὐ νομίζει.

5. 'Αναξαγόρου] Xen. Mem. IV. vii. 7, makes Socrates refute the alleged opinion of Anaxagoras, τῶν ἡλίου λίθον διάπυρον εἶναι, Anaxagoras' formula was μύδρον διάπυρον, which others took to mean a mass of iron. Of the moon he asserted that it had οἰκόσεις, λόφους, φάραγγας, whence that he believed it to be γη was an inference.

8. βιβλία] "Is secundum Laert. II. iii. 8, et Clem. Alex. ibi ab interpp. laudatum, philosophorum primus βιβλίον εξίδωκε συγγραφής, librum a se scriptum vidit. Hoc tanen de Anaximandro ali, ali de Pherecyde Syro diecunt."—Forst.

9. καί δὴ καὶ] Ironical: 'and so then.'

10. ἀ—πραμένονυ] The doctrines, not the books. ἐνίοτε that is, if they should happen to see a play in which these doctrines are promulgated, as in Eurip. Orest. 982, μόλομι τὰν οὐρανοῦ μέσον χθονός τε τετα-

μιναί αἰωρήσας πέτραν ἄλυσει χρυσέας, φερομένων δίναις, βω-

λον ἐξ Ὀλυμποῦ. Dacier, as Stallbaum observes, curiously mistook the sense of this passage, and imagined that a volume of Anaxagoras might be bought at that time for a drachma. But in fact the price of paper itself was then excessive at Athens. Emile Egger, in a letter to Firmin Didot (Revue Contemporaine du 15 Septembre, 1856), mentions fragments of an account rendered by certain Athenian officers in 407 b.c., in which the price of sheets of paper (χάρται), for writing copies of these accounts (ἀντίγραφα) upon, was 1 drachma and 2 obols each, i.e. 1 fr. 20 cent.—a sum which, according to Boeckh's computation, accepted by Egger, would be equivalent to 4 fr. 80 cent. now.

ei πᾶν πολλοῦ] 'At the most:' the same expression occurs Alcib. I. 123 c, ἀδίοις μνών πεντήκοντα ei πᾶν πολλοῦ, Gorg. 511 d, ἐὰν πάμπολον, ... δόν δραχμάι ἐπράξατο. The ut-
most the θεαρψώνς could demand for any place was a drachma; the price for an ordinary place was two oboli. See Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, translated by G. C. Lewis, p. 223. n. 315 of 2nd edition.

2. ἄλλως τε καί] Which the youths must know are not mine, 'to say nothing of their singularity,' which would make the theft still more glaring. Steinhart has well observed that the meaning of ἄτοπα is not 'absurd,' but 'uncommon' or 'peculiar;' etymologically, what cannot be assigned to any known place or origin. He further remarks that neither Socrates nor Plato would have rejected these notions as 'absurd.' Cf. the striking passage in Legg. 886 d, where Plato declines to controvert these positions although he would uphold the gods.

3. οὕτωσι—εἶναι] The two sentences οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ and οὔδενα—εἶναι are both descriptions of the same fact, the re-statement being the more precise; οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ stands by a sort of attraction for οὕτωσι σοι δοκεῖ περὶ ἐμοῦ, of which the filling up in the re-statement would have been ἐμὲ οὐδένα—εἶναι. Dig. 207, 208.

5. "Απιστός κ.τ.λ.] The question Meletus had answered affirmatively was, not whether Socrates was an atheist, but whether it was his opinion that Socrates was an atheist,—οὕτωσι σοι δοκῶ; Socrates' comment on this is 'Very well; nobody else will believe that, and I am pretty sure you do not yourself,' i. e. I am pretty sure you are saying what you know to be untrue.
ται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριευτικομένου καὶ ἐναντί ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἡ ἔξαπατήσω αὐτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἅλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὕτως γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαί
νεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ὁσπερ ἂν ἐνε ἐνεπο; ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοῦς οὐ νο
μίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοῦς νομίζων. καὶ τοι τοῦτο ἐστὶ παῖζοντος.

XV. Ἐνεπισκώπασε δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες, ἥμιν φαι
νεται ταύτα λέγειν· οὐ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὁ Μέλητε· νεὶς δὲ, ὁσπερ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ὡμᾶς παρηγησάμην, μέμνη
θέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν, ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσώθοτι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι. ἔστων ὅστις ἄνθρωποι, ὁ Μέλητε, ἄνθρωποι μὲν νομίζει πράγματι εἶναι, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ὅστις ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὃ ἄνδρες, καὶ μή ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτο· ἔσθ' ὅστις ὑποῦς μὲν ὅστις ἐναντίως μὲν ὅστις ἐναι, ἑπτάκα δὲ πράγματα; ἡ αὐλητὰς μὲν ὅστις ἑπτάκα δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστων, ὃ ἄριστε ἄνθρω
εἰ μὴ σὺ βουλεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς

1. διαπεραμένειον] ‘He is like one, who, by framing a mock-riddle, is trying (as he says to himself) whether will Socrates,’ &c. We have here one participial clause (ὁσπερ — ἐνεπο) within another (δια
περι;) as Rep. 555 ε, τῶν ἕν ὑπείκοντα ἐνεπο ἄργῳν τυπώ
σκοντες. Notice, that it is ὁσ
περ ἐνεπο, ‘a mock-riddle,’ one which has no answer.

2. ἐμοῦ χαριευτικο] The use of the genitive, after verbs of knowing, seeing, and shewing, seems to be limited in Attic Greek to a noun joined with a participle. After verbs of men-
tioning, it is not so limited. Dig. 26. Cf. Lobeck on Soph. Αją 136.

15. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα] Similar expressions are—Euthyd. 273, ἄλλην καὶ ἄλλην ἀποκλείσοντες, Phdr. 235 a, ὡς οἴδος τε ὁν, ταύ
tα ἐπιρως τε καὶ ἐπιρώς λέγον, ἀμφοτέρου εἰςεῖν ἔριστα, 271 d, ἔστων οὖν εἰδώ τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοῖα καὶ τοῖα, Legg. 721 b, χρή
μασι μὲν τόσοις καὶ τόσοις, τῇ καὶ τῇ δὲ ἀμεία, Philod. 24 d, τὸ εἰς αὐδῆς τε καὶ αὖδης.

16. θορυβεῖτο] Merely by making irrelevant remarks in
stead of answering;—brawling, as we might say.
6. δαίμονι γε] To make the reasoning sound, δαίμονι here and δαίμονα πράγματα above ought to mean the same; which it must be acknowledged they do not. It must be observed, however, that the original perversion lay with Meletus, whose charge of δαίμονα καὶ ἔνα was based simply on Socrates' τὸ δαίμονον. Now by this Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here the equivocation of Meletus is simply returned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adjectival θείον τι καὶ δαίμονιν 31 ε. See Appendix A, on τὸ δαίμονον.

8. ἀντιγραφῇ] The ἔγκλημα is so called, as it has been already called ἀντιμοσία. See 19 b note.

18. ἐκ τινὸν ἄλλων ἄν] That is, ἐξ ἄλλων ἄν τινων.
[τοὺς ἡμιώνους], ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῦτο εἶναι. p. 27 
ἀλλ’, ὡς Μέλητε, οὐκ ἐστὶν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὕχι ἀποτελούμενον ἡμῶν ἐγράψω [τὴν γραφὴν ταὐτην] ἢ ἀπορῶν ὃ τι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σὺ τινα πείθοις ἄν καὶ σμικρῶν νοῦν ἔχουτα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ δαμόνια καὶ θεία ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὐτῷ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἡρωᾶς, οὐδεμία μηχανή p. 28 ἐστίν.

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ ὃς ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελῆτον γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλ’ ἰκανά καὶ ταῦτα ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθέν ἑλεγον, ὅτι πολλῆς μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἵστε ὅτι ἀληθὲς ἐστί. καὶ τούτ’ ἐστιν ὃ ἐμε αἰρήσει, ἐάντερ αἴρῃ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ’ ἤ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ὁ δή πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἤρθεν, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεων οὐδέν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. ἵσως δ’ ἄν οὖν εἴποι τις

6. πείθοις ἄν ὃς οὖ] The οὖ is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational. It is a confused anticipation of the coming negative οὐδεμία. Dig. 264.

18. οὐδὲν—στῇ] 'The rule is in no danger of breaking down in my case.' This use of οὐδὲν δεινὸν is idiomatic: cf. Gorg. 520 δ, οὐδέν δεινὸν αὐτῶ μὴ ἀδικηθῇ, 'we need not apprehend for him any injury,' Phædo 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ φοβηθῇ, 'we need not apprehend that the soul will have to fear.' The 'apprehension' is supposed to affect the speaker and his hearers, as interested in the contingency under discussion. So here Socrates is speaking half ironically, interesting himself, as it were, for the rule, against himself, στῇ is also idiomatically used, as a quasi-impersonal; —that is, a vague nominative, such as 'the course of events,' is understood. See Dig. 97; where among other parallels is given Λρ. Εθ. Nic. VI. ix. 9, στῇ σεται γὰρ κακόν. στῇ is literally 'come to a stand-still.' Stallb. is wrong here.
4. ὑπολογίζονται] See below, d note.
5. ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν] 'A man of any worth at all.' This idiomatic concurrence of καὶ with σμικρὸν τι is frequent: Dig. 132.
10. ὅ τις Θέτιδος] The same illustration is used Symp. 179 e. The reference in what follows is to Hom. II. xviii. 90.
23. οὗ δὲ ἄν τις κ.τ.λ.] The former ἤ in this sentence is hyperbolically postponed to οὗ τῶν τάξιν, which in sense is included under it. Dig. 290*.
κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε p. 285 ἀλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἱργασμένος, ὥς ἀνδρείς Ἀθηναίοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν μει ὁ ἄρχοντες ἐταττοῦν, ἐ σοῦς ὑμεῖς ἐλευθεράρχην μον, καὶ ἐν Ποτίδαια καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὔ ἐκείνοι ἐταττοῦν ὀστερ καὶ ἀλλός τις καὶ ἐκδικοῦν ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος, ὥς ἐγὼ φήμην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν εἴην καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτῶν καὶ τοὺς ἀλλους, ἑνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεῖς p. 296 ἡ θάνατον ἡ ἀλλο ὀτιού πράγμα λίποιμί τὴν τάξιν. δεινοῦ μέντ' ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότ' ἂν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὃτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδῶς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενον 15 σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὄν. τὸ γὰρ τοῦ θάνατον δεδείναι, ὥς ἀνδρείς, οὐδὲν ἀλλο ἐστίν ἡ δοκείν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὑντα: δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδεναι ἑστίν αὐτὰ ὑν εἰδεν. οἰδὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τοῦ θάνατον οὐδ' ἐὰν τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὅν τῶν ἁγαθῶν, δεδιαστὶ 20 δ' ὡς εὖ εἰδότες ὃτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἑστὶ. καὶ b τούτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἑστίν αὐτὴ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ 1. ὑπολογιζόμενον] 'Giving any countervailing weight to'; literally, 'reckoning per contra.' The ὑπό conveys no image of subtraction, according to our notion of the operation, but the significiation of meeting from an opposite direction: see Dig. 131.

5. Ποτίδαια—Δηλίῳ] At Potidea (see Charm. init., Symp. 219, 220) between 432 and 429 B.C., Socrates rescued Alcibiades but resigned in his favour his claim to the reward of bravery. Delium, 424 B.C., witnessed his famous retreat, (Symp. 221 a, b, Lach. 181 b). Of his campaign before Amphipolis, 422 B.C., we know less.

10. ἑνταῦθα δὲ] ἑνταῦθα repeats τοῦ θεοῦ τάπτοντος κ.τ.λ.—δὲ marks the apodosis.

20. καὶ τούτῳ . . . αὐτῆ] Not pleonastic; but 'what is this but that very same reprehensible ignorance?' τοῦ ἔλεγκται which follows is a genitive epexegetic of ἀμαθία. Dig. 24.
2. τούτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.] 'In this province also [of the unseen] I believe I am distinguished from the mass of mankind herein, and if I were to say I was wiser in any point than any other person, I should say it was herein, that' &c. The former as well as the latter toútp both relate to the same fact, to the same òti,—upon which a strong emphasis is thus made to converge. Cf. Gorg. 484 e, λαμπρός τ’ ἵστιν ἑκατος ἐν τούτῳ, κάπι τούτῳ ἐπελεγεται, Νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας τούτω μέρος, 'Ἰν αὐτός αὐτοί τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ἂν. The suppression after τούτω ἂν is a graceful evasion of self-assertion. See Dig. 255.

10. ἀπιστήσουσέν] 'Disbelieving' the representation urged by Anytus as the reason why Socrates should die; not 'refusing to follow Anytus' counsel' to put Socrates to death. It is therefore to be connected, not with the words immediately following (ὡς ἐφη—ἀποκτεῖναι μέ), but with those next to them (λέγων—διαφθαρήσωσαντα). Stallb. differs.

13. ἢδη ἂν] The construction of the fut. indic. with ἂν is abundantly established. ἂν here belongs to διαφθαρήσωσαντα, and to refer it to the part. ἐπιρρέοντες is a shift which will not apply to other passages (Dig. 58), and dislocates this. Observe, as to διαφθαρήσωσαντα itself, that its not being affected by the Oratio Obliqua is to be accounted for regularly; it is because the event it denotes is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by Socrates. Plato is never arbitrarily irregular in this class of constructions: Dig. 90. It might be said here, that διαφθαρήσωσαντα denotes an event equally in the future. But
the plan being, to teach the paramount value of the soul, and the duty of caring for it, and the need of consciously-possessed principles of action.

then it is not an event which is assumed as about to happen at all.

For constructions of relative pronouns and adverbs with the infinitive, see Dig. 79.

8. ἀστάξομαι καὶ φιλῶ] “Ἀστάξομαι est aliquem salutare ita, ut eum amplectaris; φιλεῖν ita, ut eum osculæris.”—Stallb. Here of course both words are used, by transference, for the feelings which those actions betoken. Note too, that the transference affects both: it is not that φιλῶ already expresses a feeling, and thus gives the turn to ἀστάξομαι: their coordination in the phrase requires that they should enter into it homogeneously.

p. 30. δὲ, ὁνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστον ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστον ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονοις. ταύτα καὶ νεωτέροι καὶ πρεσβυτέροι, ὅτι ἂν ἐνυγχάνω, ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστός, μᾶλλον δὲ τοὺς ἀστός, ὅσοι μου ἐγνυτέρω ἐστε γένει. ταύτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖς ἵστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδὲν πω ὑμῖν μείζουν ἀγαθον γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡ τῇ ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἡ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρων καὶ πρεσβυτέρως μὴτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μὴτε χρημάτων πρὸτερον μηδὲ οὕτω οὐδε σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἐσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τάλλα ἁγαθά τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταύτα λέγων διαφείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτ' ἂν εἰη βλαβερά: εἰ δὲ τίς με ζητήσω ἄλλα λέγειν ἡ ταύτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταύτα, φαίνῃ ἂν, ὅ Ἀθηναῖοι, ἡ πείθεσθε Ἀνυώφ ἡ μῆ, καὶ ἡ ἀφίετε ἡ μή ἀφίετε, ὡς ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσωντος ἀλλὰ, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθαναίναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, ἄλλ' ἐμμείνατε μοι ὡς ἐδείξῃσιν ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἄλλ' ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι, ὡς ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῶν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἰσως βοήσεσθε· ἄλλα μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τούτο. εὖ γὰρ ἵστε, ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοι-οὐτόν ὅτα, οἰον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε

15. ταύτ' ἂν εἰη] 'If preaching virtue is perversion, then indeed I am a mischievous person; for I never rest from preaching it.' The ταύτα is not identical with the ταύτα of the line before, but is more comprehensive; it stands for the whole clause referred to in the phrase ταύτα λέγων, and means 'this practice of mine.'

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

η ύμαις αυτούς' ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειν π. 39
οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε 'Αντως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύνατο· δ
οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι θεμίτων εἶναι ἁμείνοι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χεὶ-
ρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνει μὲντ' ἂν ἰσως ἡ ἐξε-
λάσειν ἡ ἀτυμάσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἰσως οἴεται
καὶ ἄλλος τις ποιν μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ οἶμαι,
ἄλλα πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν οὗτος νυνὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα
ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες
'Αθηναίοι, πολλοῦ δεό ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολο-
γείσθαι, ὦς τις ἂν οἴστο, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ υμῶν, μή τι
ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν υμῖν ἐμοῦ κατα-
ψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ διόδος ε
ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιοτέρον
eἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὦστερ
ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναῖῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθε-
στέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μῦστος τινος' 
oῖν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι
tοιοῦτον τινα, ὦς ύμαις ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ υἱε-
δίξων ἔνα ἐκαστόν οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην π. 31
πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων. τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὖ ῥα-
dίως υμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πεί-
θησθε, φείσεσθε μοι' ύμεῖς δ' ἰσως τάχ' ἂν ἀχθο-
μενοι, ὦστερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες

5. ἀτυμάσειν] Η substitutes a conjecture of his own, ἀτυμώσειν, quite needlessly; for ἀτυμάζω, though it properly means to treat or regard as ἄτιμος, while ἀτυμω is to make ἄτιμος, yet also has this technical sense: cf. Legg. 762 d, peri τὰς τῶν νέων ἀρχὰς ἑγ-
μάσθω πάσας. 23. κρούσαντες] Another unhappy conjectural substitution of Η occurs here,—ὁρόσαντες, because (he says)

13. εἰ καὶ γελοιοτέρον refers not to the words immediately succeeding, namely, προσκείμε-

23. κρούσαντες] 'With a sin-
gle tap,'—as you would a
μύσωψ.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 79

p. 31. ἀν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτω, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείνατε, εἴτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίων καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτ ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλων ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειε κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δὲ ἐγὼ τυχάνω ὃν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδοσθαί, ἐνθένυε ἂν κατανοῆσαι τοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ οὐκείοις ἀμελομένων τοσαῦτα ἦδη ἐτη, τὸ δὲ ύμέτερον πράττειν ἀεὶ, ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ προσιόντα ὠσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πειθόντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ ἓν μέντοι τι ἄπο τούτων ἀπέλαυνο καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνον ταῦτα παρεκελεύομην, εἰχον ἂν τινα λόγον· νῦν γὰρ ὅπατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοί, ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τὰλλα πάντα ᾠνασχυντος οὐτω κατηγοροῦτες τούτῳ γε ὦν όϊοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπανασχυντήσαι παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινα ἡ ἔπραξάμην μισθὸν ἡ ἔτησα. ἰκανον γάρ, οὐμαί, ἐγὼ παρέχωμαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ἀλήθῃ ὡς λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἰσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἀτοπος εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ κρούσατες is 'debile pulsandi verbum.' Such a word however is just what was wanted.

10. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι] Π drops the τοι, probably for want of considering that the collocation is hyperbolic for καὶ μέντοι εἰ τι. Cf. 41 e.

14. όὐχ όϊοι τε] They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 19 d: but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it. That is, grammatically speaking, the primary intention of the sentence ἀπανασχυντήσαι—μάρτυρα lies in the participial clause, and not in the verb ἀπανασχυντήσαι. See Dig. 303.

19. Ἰσως ἂν οὖν] The dominant reason of Socrates' abstinence from public affairs was not so much the impossibility of maintaining himself in a public position without sacrifice of principle or of life; but rather, that he felt his mission to be a moral and an individual one, and that from his point of view it was infinitely less important to rectify a
supposed objection) that to have entered public life, in preference to dealing with individuals, was not a method practically possible for a righteous man,

εγὼ. ιδία μὲν ταῦτα ἑυμβολεῖν περίμων καὶ πολυ- πραγμονώ, δημοσίᾳ ἐδε οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ύμέτερον ἑυμβολεῖν τῇ πόλει. τούτων δὲ αἰτίων ἐστὶν ὃ ἑμεῖς ἐμοὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολ- 5 λαχού λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θείον τι καὶ δαμόνιον γίγνε- ται φωνῇ, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμιῶδὼν Μέλη- τος ἐγράφατο· ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστιν ἐκ παιδός ἀρξάμε- νον φωνῇ τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀπο- τρέπει με τοῦτο ὅ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ 10 οὕτωτε τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὃ μοι ἑναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικά πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλος γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἑναντιώσθαι εὖ γὰρ ἵστε, ὃ ἄνδρες 'Αθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπε- χείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικά πράγματα, πάλαι ἄν ἀπολὼλη καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὀψελήκη ὑδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ε 15 ἐμαυτόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἀχθεσθε λέγοντι τάληθ' ὦν

5. γίγνεται φωνῇ] All MSS. have this φωνῇ, and all eed. except V bracket it. Needlessly; Fishe points out the parallel to the next sentence, τοῦτ' ἐστιν ἐκ παιδός ἀρξάμενον φωνῇ τις γιγνο- μένη. 9. τοῦτο δ' ἂν] Edd. prefer τοῦτον. But ἀποτρέπει πράτ- τεια τοῦτο is a construction borne out by Theæt. 151 a, ἐνίος μὲν τὸ γυναῖκι μοι δαμόνιον ἀποτρέπει ἔννεια, [Dem.] Proecem. xx. p. 1431, δείχτως αὕτο τέρα ἡμέρατε, νῦν ἀποτρέγω ταῦτα παθεῖν, and analogous constructions such as Xen, An. III. i. 20, παρίσεθαι τὰ ἑπιγίδεωι κατέχουν ἡμᾶς. τοῦτο here is the reading of five MSS. besides Oxon. It is moreover less likely to have been invented than τοῦτο. 15. καὶ μοι μὴ] H alters this into καὶ μὴ μοι, comparing Phædo 105 b. But καὶ μοι is a common commence- ment of a sentence in the Orators.

particular policy, than by laying hold of individuals and making statesmen of them to raise the standard of statesmanship.

2. ἀναβαίνων] To the Πυθι; as in the famous πάς δ' ἐθικὸς ἄνω καθίστα, Dem. de Cor. 169. p. 285.
5. θείον τι καὶ δαμονίον] See Appendix A, on τὸ δαμονίον.
6. εἰν τῇ γραφῇ] When he spoke of the ἑτερα καὶ καὶ δαμο- νι, — a perversion of the truth which Socrates characterises as a caricature by his use of the word ἐπικωμιῶδαν, which seems to mean 'selecting for caricature.' So σκάπτειν is to mock at, ἐπισκόπτειν to mock at some particular trait in a person.
31. γὰρ ἐστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὕτε ὑμῖν οὕτε ἄλλω πλήθει οὐδεις γυναικός ἐναντιούμενος καὶ δια-
κολύνων πολλὰ ἀδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἄλλα ἄναγκαιόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ οὕτι μαχοῦ-
μενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μελλει ὀλίγον χρόνους σωθήσεται, ἰδιωτεύειν ἄλλα μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ’ ἐγαγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἄλλ’ ὃ υμεῖς τιμάτε, ἔργα. ἀκού-
σατε δὴ μου τα ἐμοὶ ἐξυμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδήτε ὅτι οὕδ’ ἂν εἰ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, το
μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἁμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορ-
τικά μὲν καὶ δικαιικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, δ’ Ἀθη-

II. ἁμα καν] This is Ast’s conjecture. MSS. are chiefly divided
between ἁμα καὶ ἀμα ἂν (which Oxon. exhibits), ἁμα καὶ ἀπολοίμην,
and ἀλλα καὶ ἀμ’ ἂν ἂπ. Of the edd., VSZ have ἁμα καὶ ἀμ’ ἂν,
Β ἁμ’ ἂν ἀπολοίμην, Ἂ ἁμ’ ἂν καὶ ἀπολοίμην. It seems vain to find
more than a shadowy justification for ἁμα καὶ ἁμα. The variants
may easily have come from ἁμα καν, in the form ἁμα καὶ ἂν. My
friend Mr. Campbell ingeniously proposes ἀλλα καὶ ἀλλ’ ἂν ἂπ.,
‘should be ready to meet death in sundry forms:’ cf. Soph.
O. Τ. 661, δ τι πίματον ὀλοίμαν.

12. δικαιικά] H conjecturally
prefixes οὗ, observing “quis credat, Socratem, qui statim a prin-
cipio se ἔχειος ἔχειν τις ἐνδεικτικὰ λέξεως professus est, nunc judicialia
verba promittere?” But equally how then should Socrates know
that what he was going to say was not δικαιικά? Besides, the
speech in point of fact betrays abundant knowledge of techni-
calities; cf. 34 a, ἐὶ δὲ τότε κ.τ.λ. See Commentary below.

8. δ—ἐργα] ‘What your
body is wout to appreciate
highly, the actions of a life.’
ὑμεῖς (says Socrates),—not as
individuals, but as represent-
ing Athenians generally, when
acting as judges in the Ecclesia,
or the ἡλίκαια, —‘you parti-
cularly are susceptible to such
appeals.’

Here appears, in a refined
form, the common τόπος of
rehearsing a man’s past ser-
vice in his defence; of which
practice Lysias, xii. 38. p. 123,
says, εν τῇ τῇ πόλει εἰςομένων
ἐστι, πρὸς μὲν τὰ κατηγοριμένα
μηδὲν ἀπολογεῖον, περὶ δὲ σφόν
αυτῶν . . . . ὁς στρατιώται ἄγαθοι
ἐσοι κ.τ.λ. Whence again So-
crates says just below, he is
‘about to employ a topic of
vulgar use, and one that sa-
vours of the law-courts.’

11. μὴ ὑπείκων δέ] ‘But would
be ready to perish at once as
the price of not yielding.’

φορτικὰ καὶ δικαιικὰ] φορτικὰ
7. ύμω is retained, in deference to weight of MSS., and with all the edd., against Oxon. and 2 other MSS. : although ἐννυτιοῦθα does not require a dative of reference, especially in a description of formal proceedings.

stands here in its simple meaning of 'vulgar' in the sense of 'common,' — not as implying (as Fischer and others think) self-assertion or bad taste; a meaning which (1) would make ἐρω ύμω sound blunt even to harshness; (2) does not harmonise with δικαϊκά, for an arrogant tone is not characteristic of persons addressing their judges; and (3) does not suit the parallel passage Gorg. 482 e, εἰς τοὺς ἄγνους φορτικά καὶ δημιουργικά, ... η φύσι μὲν οὐκ ἐστι καλό, νόμω δὲ. δικαϊκά is likewise a colourless word; — not 'lawyerlike' in the sense of 'dry,' nor yet 'streitsüchtig' (Steinhart), but simply 'characteristic of speakers in courts of justice.'

3. τοὺς δέκα] Strictly only eight; for Conon was not included, and another of the ten was dead. Xenophon, in one of his accounts (Mem. I. i. 18), speaks with more definite inaccuracy of ἐννυτιοῦθα.

5. παραβιάσεως, in two respects; (1) that they were tried ἀθροώ (see Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. vol. IV. App. 2, where it is shewn that this right of separate trial is not to be traced to the decree of Cannones); and (2) that they were not heard in their own defence; for in the assembly in which the charge was brought first informally, they only (Xen. Hell. I. vii. 5) βραχία ἐκατος ἀπελογήσατο, οὐ γὰρ προτέθη σφίς λόγος κατὰ τὸν νόμων and in that in which they were condemned they were not heard at all.

7. ἤναντιοθη ... ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην] What is the precise reference of these expressions? Was ἤναντιοθή a refusal to put the question? This is left for uncertain by Mr. Grote, who says that upon Xenophon's shewing 'it can hardly be accounted certain that Socrates was Epistates.' (Hist. Gr. ch. 64.) Again, to what act does ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην refer?

It may be well to give the other accounts of this occurrence at length:—

(a) Xen. Mem. I. i. 18, βουλεύσας γάρ ποτὲ, ... ἐπιστάτης ἐν
32. νόμοι καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην, καὶ ἐτοίμων ὄντων
tῷ δήμῳ γενόμενος, ἐπιθυμήσαντος
tου δήμου παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐννέα

(b) Ιβ, IV. iv. 2, ἐπιστάτης
gενόμενος οὐκ ἑπέτρεψε τῷ δήμῳ

(c) Xen. Hell. I. vii. 9–115,

(d) Axiochus, 368 d. . . . οἱ

(e) Gorg. 474 a, πέρασε βου-

historical fact before us dis-
guised by Socratic irony.

That Socrates was Epistates is at least a probable conclu-
sion from (a), (b), and (d), to say nothing of (e); in further
support of which, (b) and (d) imply that he carried his point,
which he could not have done but as Epistates.
The reference of ἡπνατίωθην must therefore be to Socrates' refusal to put the question, which resulted, as (d) credibly relates, in the adjournment of proceedings to the next day, when a more pliable Epistates presided.

The other clause, ἐναντία ἐψηφ., is, equally with ἡπνατι-
ωθην, in connection with μό-

νοι τῶν πρυτανέων: the struc-
ture of the sentence points to this inevitably. Now against referring this to the eventual voting in the assembly is (1) the unlikelihood that Sco-

crates should be the only one of the prytanes who voted in the minority, when several of them had seen that the bill was illegal. And (2) what if he had been the only one? it was no marked distinction: the minority was large, and he and the rest of the prytanes would merely vote as individuals. So likewise to refer it to the stages immediately preceding that final voting, would be in contradiction with the mention made in the accounts of the opposition of others beside Socrates. To refer it, again, to the debate on the bill in the council, before it was adopted as a
προσβούλευμα, would be to lay the scene of it too far from that of ἰματιώθην ὑμῖν with which it is coupled, and would make μόνος τῶν προτάσεων flat, since the προτάσεις had no prominent functions in the council. The remaining alternative, and this is in itself a plausible one, is to refer it to the first stage of proceedings in the assembly, where, preparatorily to the προσβούλευμα being read out by the κήρυξ, it was handed to the proedri, who with the nomothetae had to pronounce whether it contravened any existing law. Here was the precise moment at which legal provision had been made for entertaining the very objection taken by Socrates. We may then, with at least some probability, refer ἐναντία ἐφησιασάμην to Socrates' condemning the bill as illegal when it was referred in due course to the joint consideration of the proedri and nomothetae. The hysteron proteron is on Greek principles natural: ἰματιώθην—νόμοι precedes, because it, and not the earlier opposition, was the conspicuous and crowning act in Socrates' whole proceeding; Dig. 308.

With Socrates' more glorious refusal to put the question may be compared the conduct contemptuously attributed to Demosthenes by Ἀσχίνης, ii. 84. p. 40, ἀναγνωσθέντος τοῦ ψήφισματος, ἀναστὰ ἐκ τῶν προεδρῶν ἀπομονένης οὐκ ἔφη τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπιψηφίσειν Βοώντων δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν προεδρῶν ἐπὶ τὸ βήμα κατ' ὀνομα καλούσων,

οὕτως ἀκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπιψηφίσθη.

The series of checks which the forms of the Ecclesia imposed on bills in progress, with a view to guard existing laws, was as follows: —1. The προσβούλευμα was handed to the proedri, who after conferring with the nomothetae pronounced whether or not it contravened existing laws; and, if they passed it, it was read out by the κήρυξ. 2. After this, it was open to any citizen to stop it by lodging an ἑπομοσια in earnest of his intention to bring against its author a γραφή παρανόμων. 3. Or the Epistates might refuse to put the question—under liability, of course, to ἐνδείξει if he refused improperly. 4. Or the rest of the proedri (by a majority, we may suppose,) might in like manner refuse their consent. See Ἀσχ. ii. 65, iii. 39. pp. 36, 59.—Schömmann de Com. Ath. ch. xi.

1. ἐνδείκνυαι καὶ ἀπαίγειν] 'To procure my suspension or arrest.' The processes of ἐνδείξει and ἄπαγωγή are often mentioned in conjunction, as here, and Dem. c. Timocr. 146. p. 745, Lempt. 156. p. 594, Antipho v. 8, 9. p. 130, &c., and in the βουλευτικά ὁρκος as it stood after the amnesty. Amid several divergent accounts of these processes, the best is Heßler's (Ath. Gerichtsverf. p. 195). "Ἐνδείξει might be instituted, among other cases, against any who should hold an office while he owed public money; or (a luculent
instance) against any prytanis or procrsus who in discharge of his function in an assembly of the people should depart from the form of proceeding prescribed by law (Dem. c. Timocr. 22. p. 707). In the latter case, offenders were liable to a fine, and to ἐνδείξεις, which ἐνδείξεις was not only an expedient for levying the fine, but had the immediate effect of suspending them from office until the fine was paid. The Thesmophorēs had exclusive cognisance of ἐνδείξεις. The statement of Pollux, that it pertained to the Archon Basileus, is unsupported; likewise his definition of ἐνδείξεις, on which some writers rely,—that it was ὑμολογούμενον ἀδικήματος, οὐ κρίσεως ἀλλὰ τιμωρίας δειμόνον,—is called by Heffter 'a mere jingle of words.' Ἀπαγωγή was of wider application than ἐνδείξεις. Moreover, its object was the bringing the offender into custody, which in ἐνδείξεις was not the rule. ἐνδείξεις was an interdictory procedure, ἀπαγωγή a procedure of summary arrest. To be liable to it, a person must be taken ἐν τῷ αὐτοφίλῳ, in perpetration of an illicit act. The body which had cognisance in ἀπαγωγή was the Eleven, who registered (Heffter p. 210) the apprehension of the criminal and the cause of arrest (Lys. xiii. 86. p. 138), and who further, supposing the arrested person to be already under sentence of law, had charge of the execution of this sentence.

7. ἰθὸν] The building where the prytanes, and while they lasted the Thirty, daily banqueted and sacrificed. It was near the council-chamber.

10. ἀναπλήσα] This word, like implicer in Latin, is used idiomatically of communicating pollution; whence here 'implicate.' See for example Phædo 67 a; and cf. especially with the present passage Antiphos, ii. Λ. a. 10. p. 116, συκαταιμιπλάναι τούς ἀναπλην.
The matter is supposed to follow here. Introd. p. xviii.

20. διδασκάλος οὐδενός He means (see b below) that he imparted no μάθημα,—no professional knowledge; even of καλοκαγαθία he never ἐπέτειχεν διδασκάλος εἶναι Xen. Mem. I. ii. 3. Cf. his declining ἐπιμελείας Nicias' son, Laches 208 d. What he sought to impart was rather a habit of mind; "not to dispense ready-made truth like so much coin, but to awaken the sense of truth and virtue; not to force his own convictions on others, but to test theirs."—Zeller.
XXII. 'Alla dia ti d' pote met' emou xairousi
tives polonv xronon diatrepontes; akhkoase, o av
dris Athnaiou p'asan w'min thn alitheian egw eipou
ot akouontes xairousin egezaimeneis tois oioimeous
men evnai sfofois, osi d' ou evsti gar ouk anhes.
emoi de touto, os egw phmi, proostetaктai upo tou
theou prattew kai ek manteiwv kai ex enwvnon kai
pantl trpof, fiper tis pote kai allh theia moira
anbropwv kai otiouv prosetaxe prattew. taust, o
'Athnaiou, kai alithi evst kai evleugkta. ei gar dh
egvge toon vewn toous men diaftheiro, touvs de dief-
baraka, xrhv dh'pou, eite tivies aitwv preobutereoi
gevomevnoi egvvasan oti vewn ouv auwv eugw kawv
pupote ti xuneboulwvsa, vni auwv auwv anabainontas
emou katgoroiv kai timopoeisai: ei de mi auwv
thelev, twn oikeiv tinas twn ekeinwv, pateras kai
adelfoiv kai allous toous proshkontas, eiper up'

2. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι] BS om.; VZ retain; H brackets. The likelihood is not great that the words have been inserted from the end of the former sentence (H brackets them there, by mistake); the rhythm almost requires them; and there is point in attributing the same vindictive feeling to the kinsmen as to the youths themselves. The repetition is like Brutus' repetition of 'for him have I offended,' in Shakespeare's Jul. Ces. Act III. Scene ii.

4. Κριτοβούλου &c.] With Critobulus Socrates holds conversation in Xen. Mem. I. iii, II. vi. He is mentioned also in Athen. V. 220 a, with Ἐσχίνη, distinguished from others of the name as ὁ Σωκρατικός, the son of Lysanias (see Diog. Laert. II. 60), who afterwards became a teacher for money of the Socratic doctrines, and wrote Socratic dialogues (Schol. in Menex.). He was at variance with Aristippus (Luzac de Dig. Soc. sect. II. § 2), and there is a fragment of an inductive written against him by Lysias, illustrating the enmity of the Orators against the Socrates: he is of the company named in the Phaedo (59 b). Epigenes is mentioned Xen. Mem. III. xii. 1, and Phaedo 59 b: his father Antipho is not otherwise known. Docous, the father of Paralus and Theages, is an interlocutor in the Theages. Of Theages it is said, Rep. 496 b, εἶ ὃ ἄν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἐταίρου Θεάγους χαλικοῦ ὁς κατασχεῖν καὶ γὰρ Θεάγε τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάσα παρεσκευαστεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίαν, ἵ δὲ τῶν σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπέργουσα αὐτῶν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. Adinantis is an interlocutor in the Rep. (357–368, 548). Apollodorus appears in the Phaedo (59 a, 117 d) as passionately attached to Socrates, and in the Symp. says of himself (172 e), ἐγὼ Σωκράτει συνδιαιρίζω καὶ ἐπιμελὲς πεποίημαι ἐκάστης ἡμέρας εἰδέναι ὃ τι ἂν λέγῃ ἢ πράττῃ, and is said (173 d) to have got ἀπεωνυμά τὸ μανῆς καλείσθαι. Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Εάντοδοτος are only mentioned here.
33. τετελευτηκεν, ὅστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκείνος γε αὐτοῦ κατα-

34. δεθεῖ—, καὶ Πάραλος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὐ ἢν

Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε ἐς Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος,

οὐ ἀδελφὸς οὔτοςι Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδορος, οὐ

Ἀπολλόδορος ὅδε ἀδελφὸς. καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἤχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τινὰ ἔχρην μάλιστα μὲν ἐν

τῷ ἑαυτῷ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα·

εἶ δὲ τότε ἐπελάβετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω, ἐγὼ παρα-

χωρῶ, καὶ λέγετο, εἰ τι ἐξεῖ τοιοῦτον. ἄλλα τούτω

πᾶν τούναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὃ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ ἐποθεῖν ἐτοίμως τῷ διαφθείρουτι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζό-

μένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὃς φασί Μέλητος καὶ

Ἀντων. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάξιν ἂν

λόγον ἔχουν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσ-

βύτεροι ἢ ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἔι

ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἄλλον ἦ τὸν

ὄρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ἐξυπνάσας Μελῆτον μὲν ἰε-

δομένω, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;

XXIII. Εἴειν δὴ, ὃ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχομι

ἀν ἀπολογείσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἵσως

c τοιαῦτα. τάχα ὅ ἂν τις ὑμῶν ἀγαυκτήσεις ἀνα-

μησθεὶς ἐαυτοῦ, εἰ ὃ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τούτοι τοῦ

ἀγώνος ἀγώνα ἄγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἴκετευσε

tοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε

αὐτῶν ἀναβιβασάμενος, ἢν ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐληθεύει,25

καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἐγὼ δὲ

1. καταδεθείη] The kata-

implies absence of all reserve

or modification: here in a bad

sense it expresses an unprin-

cipled act. Dig. 122.

8. ἔγω παραχωρῶ] The full

extension occurs Eschin. iii.

165. p. 77; παραχωρῶ σοι τοῦ

βήματος, ἐως ἀν εἴπης. Note by

the way, that the examination

of witnesses was extra to the

time allowed for the pleadings;

cf. Lysias xxiii. 4, 8. pp. 166,


ἔγω δ' ἀρα] 'And then

finds that L'
οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, p. 3 ὃς ἂν δόξαμι, τὸν ἐσχατὸν κινδυνοῦν. τάχ' οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη, καὶ ὄργυσθεις αὐτοῖς τούτοις θείον ἂν μετ' ὀργῆς 5τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δὴ τις ύμῶν ὁποῖος ἔξει,—οὐκ ἄξιῶ δ μὲν γὰρ ἐγὼγε' εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐπιεική ἂν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὃ ἀριστε, εἰςι μὲν ποὺ τινὲς καὶ οἰκείοι· καὶ γὰρ τὸτο αὐτὸ τοῦ τοῦ 'Ομήρου, οὖδ' ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυός οὖθ' ὑπὸ πέτρης πέ·

10φικα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ οἰκείοι μοι εἰσι καὶ υἱείς, ὃ ἀνδρὲς 'Αθηναίοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἡθι, δύο δὲ παιδία: ἀλλ' ἡμος οὐδὲν' αὐτῶν δείρο ἀνάβασαμενος δήσομαι ύμῶν ἀπονηφίσασθαι. τι δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, e 15ὡ ἀνδρὲς 'Αθηναίοι, οὐδ' ύμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μή, ἀλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ύμῶν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεὶ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικῶνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἔχοντα, 20εἰτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἰτ' οὖν ψεύδος· ἀλλ' οὖν δεδογμένον γέ ἐστι τὸν Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινὶ τῶν πολλῶν

21. τὸ Σωκράτει] VBS τὸν Σωκράτη, ΖΗ τὸ Σωκράτη, both with some MS. authority. The last is worst; for such an emphatic use of the name Socrates palpably requires the article. And

2. ὃς ἂν δόξαμι] Refers to κινδυνῶν, not to ἐσχατον.—'danger, as he would think it.'
5. οὐκ ἄξιῶ μὲν γὰρ] γὰρ refers to εἰ.—'[I say if], for though I do not expect it of you, yet [making the suppo-
sition], if it should be so.'
6. ἐπιεικῇ] 'Conciliatory.'

11. εἰς μὲν] Lamprocles (Xen. Mem. II. ii. 1). δῶρo
Sophroniscus and Menexenus (Phaedo 116 b).
15. ei μὲν] 'Whether I can look death in the face or not.'
—Whewell.
19. τοῦνομα] The name of σοφὸς' cf. 20 d, and below, εἴτε
σοφία εἴτε κ.τ.λ.
against both this and τὸν Σωκράτης stands the consideration, that the meaning would be 'people have made up their minds that Socrates is to differ'; it is the form of a resolution which is to take effect; whereas the meaning required is 'they have made up their minds that Socrates differs' now. τὸ Σωκράτης leaves this clear. It is the reading of Oxon. and three other MSS.; and in accepting it we follow Bernhardy (Syntax, p. 94), who supports it with parallels. See Dig. 183.

2. ἀνδρεία] Oxon. here has ἀνδρια, but is not consistent. Dindorf (on Ar. Nub. 510) says ἀνδρεία alone is the true form, —as proved (1) by the Ionic diacresis ἀνδρια (2) by the fact that in poetry it never occurs where the metre would require ἀνδρια (except in Eur. Herc. F. 475, πατὴρ ἐπιφρονη, μέγα φρονών ἐν' ἀνδρια, which Elmsley has emended εἰκανδρια); (3) by the testimony of Etym. M. p. 461. 53, that the traditional orthography was ἀνδρεία till Apollonius invented ἀνδρια (4) by the preponderating adherence of the MSS. to ἀνδρεία. 13. οὕτε ὑμᾶς] VII ὑμᾶς, BSZ (following 2 MSS.) ὑμᾶς. H says "ὑμᾶς com-modum sensum præbet; nec plebem, modo aliquo loco haberi velit, facere, nec si singuli faciant, permittere debere."

3. ἵσοντα] 'If we are to have such conduct on the part of those,' &c. ἐν would have given a different turn to the meaning.
φιείσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεείνα ταύτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος p. 35 καὶ καταγέλαστον την πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἦ τοῦ ἑσυχίαν ἁγιόντος.

XXIV. Χωρίς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὡς ἄνδρες, ούδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δείσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν.

οὔ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστὴς, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταύτα: καὶ ὀμομοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἰς ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσεωι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὐκοῦν χρῆ οὕτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ύμᾶς ἐπιρρέειν, οὐθ' ύμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι οὔδετεροι γὰρ ἄν ἡμῶν εὐπεθοίεν. μὴ οὖν ἡξιοῦτε με, ὡς ἄνδρες Αθηναίοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ύμᾶς πράττειν, ἄ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε δίκαια μήτε ὀσία.

15 ἀλλος τε μέντοι νῆ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσβεστὰς φεύ- 

gontα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τούτου. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ 

πείθουμι ύμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζόμεν ὀμομοκότας, 

θεοὺς ἄν διδάσκομι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ύμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ 

ἄτεχνος ἀπολογοῦμενος κατηγοροῦν ἄν ἐμαυτὸν ὡς

9. ὀμομοκεν] Part of the judge's oath was ἡ μὴ ὁμοίως ἀκροαστικὰ τῶν κατηγοροῦντων καὶ τῶν ἀπολογοῦμένων. Isocr. xv. 21. p. 314.

χαριεῖσθαι] 'That he will not favour whomsoever he feels inclined to favour.'

10. ἡμᾶς] Defendants in general.

11. ἐθίζεσθαι] 'Allow yourselves to be habituated;' an instance of the semi-middle sense. Dig. 88.

15. ἀλλος—καὶ] 'But, by Zeus, especially, when I am on my trial at Meletus' instance for impiety.' A remarkable hyperbaton. The phrase ἀλλος τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the μέντοι νῆ Δία (which is also a familiar sequence, Phaed. 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a), which could have found no other convenient place. What makes such a tmesis possible, without prejudice to perspicuity, is the very fact that ἀλλος τε πάντως καὶ is a sufficiently familiar phrase to admit of this dismemberment and yet be recognised: Dig. 294. Thus Bekker, in reading arbitrarily ἄλλος τε πάντως νῆ Δία μέλιστα μέντοι καὶ, is wide of the mark.
35. θεούς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν' νομίζω τε γάρ, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς οὗτες τῶν ἐμὸν κατηγόρουν, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρίναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὁποῖη μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

5

36. ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μον κατεψηφίσασθε, ἀλλὰ τέ μοι πολλὰ ἐξωμβάλλεται, καὶ ο;base rog ἀνέλπτιστὸν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τούτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θανμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τῶν γεγονότα ἀριθμοῖν. οὐ γὰρ ὃμην ἐγγυς οὕτω παρ᾽ ὀλίγων ἐσεθαι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ νῦν δέ, ὡς ἐσικεῖν, εἰ τριάκοντα

12. τριάκοντα] So ZH; τρεῖς VBS. Of MSS, Oxon. with five others has τριάκοντα which also approves itself independently.

5. καὶ υμῖν] The defence of Socrates, which would occupy the second division of the pleadings, being thus concluded, there would follow here the voting of the judges, and the announcement of their verdict, declaring the charge proven. Then would begin the third division of the pleadings, consisting firstly of a speech on the side of the prosecution in advocacy of the penalty named, and secondly of Socrates' antitheseis, where the Apology again takes up the thread. Introd. pp. vi, xi, xvii.

8. καὶ οἷς—τοῖς] The halting connection (grammatically speaking) between this clause and the preceding part of the sentence is idiomatic. The shortest way is taken to arrive at the particular which is the point of the sentence: Dig. 258. It is incorrect to supply, as Stallbaum does, καὶ [ὅ] καὶ τοιτὸ ὅτι οἷς, κ.τ.λ. Rather there is a substitution of a shorter form of expression, complete in itself, but not agreeing with the plan on which the sentence set out.

11. οὕτω παρ᾽ ὀλίγων] Hyperbatic for παρ᾽ οὕτως ὀλίγων. Dig. 298. Lit. 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared: i.e. 'so close.' Dig. 124.

12. τριάκοντα] The number of condemning votes was 281, out of a court of 501: so 30 in round numbers, or 31 exactly, changing sides, would have effected an acquittal. See, for the fuller discussion of this point, Introd. p. xii sqq.
The implication in μόνα that the majority would recommend the corruption of τριάκοντα into τρείς. In Andoc. iii. 4. p. 23, πεντήκοντα is a necessary emendation for πέντε. Cf. Taylor, Lectt. Lys. cap. vi.

2. ἀποπέφυγα] Half in jest, in allusion to his accusers being three to one, Socrates represents the majority as obtained by the joint influence of the three: supposing then each accuser represented by one-third of the majority, Melatus gets less than 100, i.e. less than one-fifth of the whole. The indictment stood in Melatus' name, but the really formidable accuser was Anytus: see again Introd. p. x.

6. τὸ πέμπτον μ.] Not 'a fifth,' but 'the' indispensable 'fifth.'

10. παθεῖν ἡ ἀποτίσα] A technical legal expression; ἀποτίσα applies to a pecuniary penalty, παθεῖν to death, imprisonment, or the like. So Dem. Mid. 47.

p. 529, ὅτου ἂν καταγῇ ἡ ἡλιαία, τιμάτω περὶ αὐτοῦ παραχώρημα, ὅτου ἂν δοκῇ ἄξιος εἰναι παθεῖν ἡ ἀποτίσα (part of the νόμος ὑβέρεως), in Timocrat. 105. p. 733.

ἀ τι μαθῶν] 'For having taken it into my head, in the disposal of my life, to deny myself rest,' ἐν is not 'during.'

13. ἄλλων] Here is the idiomatic use of ἄλλος for 'besides.' Dig. 46. ἄλλων agrees with all three genitives following: 'and what not besides—magistracies, clubs, and factions.'

ξυνομοσίων] These associations were as rife at Athens under the Thirty as in the Peloponnesian war.
5. ἐπὶ δὲ—ἐνεργεύσαν] This clause is repeated in the word ἐναιδα, and governed by ἡ: and the ἡ with ἐνεργεύσαν is a redundancy. (At the same time probably another clause is confusing itself with this in the speaker's mind, to which ἡ would be essential, namely, οἱ δὲ ἤδη ἐκαστὸν ἔμελλον ἡν ἐνεργεύσαν, i.e. οἱ δὲ ἡν ἐμελλον ἤδη ἐκαστὸν ἐνεργ.)

14. τιμᾶσθαι] 'That I should lay the penalty.'


17. μᾶλλον πρέπει οὔτως ὡς] This is the form of comparison with ὡς, complicated by the redundant insertion of οὔτως. Dig. 16.4.

20. ζητεῖι] Here this word plainly stands for three or four horses. Hesychius in voc. says καὶ ἐπὶ τριῶν καὶ τεσσάρων ἔτασον.
ο μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν [εἶναι], ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι καὶ ο μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ εὐδομαι. εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἄξιος τι- 5 μᾶςθαι, τούτου τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτῆσεως.

10 τούτῳ οὖ πείθω· οἴλγων γὰρ χρόνων ἀλλήλοις διελεγμέθα: ἐπεί, ὥς ἐγέρμαι, εἰ ὦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὀστερ καὶ ἀλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἂν νῦν δ' οὖ ῥάδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύ- 15 ἐσθαί. πεπειμέμονος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δεός ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐ- τός, ὥς ἄξιος εἰμὶ του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιοῦτον τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ, τί δεῖτας; μὴ μὴ πάθω τούτο, οὖ Μέλητος μοι τιμᾶται, ὁ φημι οὖν εἰδέναι οὐτ' εἰ 20 ἀγαθὸν οὐτ' εἰ κακὸν ἔστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἔλωμαι ὁν εἰ οὖ ὁτί κακῶν οὖντων, τοῦτον τιμήσαμεν; πότερον δὲσμοῦ; καὶ τί με δεῖ ζην ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, καὶ δουλεύοντα τῇ ἂει καθυσταμένῃ ἄρχῃ, τοῖς ἐνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ δεδέσθαι ἐώς ἂν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ

12. ἀλλοις ἀνθρώπων] The Lacedaemonians, for instance. See Thucyd. i. 132.

21. ἐν—ὅτων] Genitive of a noun with participle after verbs of knowing, &c.: Dig. 26. The clause however is complicated by the presence of ἄτι, indicative of a momentary intention to adopt a finite instead of a participial construction: Dig. 279.

23. τοῖς ἐνδεκα] εἰς ἀφ’ ἐκάσ- της φυλῆς ἐγίγνετο, καὶ γραμμα- τεύς ('secretary') αὐτοῦ συν- ἐφαμείτο: Poll. viii. 102. They had charge of the prisons, as well as of the execution of sentences.
37. ταύτων μοι ἐστίν, ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα, ὅποθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσομαι. ἢς ὁ γὰρ ἀν μοι τοῦτο τιμήσατε. πολλῇ μὲν ἄν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλογιστός εἰμι, ὅστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν οἴντες 5 πολίται μου οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκείν τὰς ἐμὰς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλ’ ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασι καὶ ἐπιφθονώτερα, ὡστε ξυτείε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλαγήναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ραδίως. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὁ Ἀθηναῖοι. καὶ ὅπως οὖν ἂν μοι ὁ βίος εἰ ἐξελθόντι τηλικόθεν ἀνθρώπω ἄλλης ἐξ ἄλλης πόλις πόλεως ἀμειβομένω καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζην. εὖ γὰρ οὗτοι ὅτι, ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοὶ ἀκραίτονται οἱ νέοι οὕσπερ ἐνθάδε· καὶ μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὐτοὶ ἐμὲ αὐτοῖ ἐξελώμενε, πείθοντες τοὺς 15 επερεβυτέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκεῖοι δὲ αὐτοῖς τούτως.

XXVIII. Ἰσως οὖν ἂν τις εἴποι σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὁ Σῶκρατες, οὐχ οἷος τ’ ἐσεὶ ἠμῖν ἐξελθόντι ζην; τοτε δὴ ἐστὶ πάντων χαλεπώτατον 20 πείσατι τινας ὑμῶν. εάν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ’ ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· εάν τ’ αὖ λέω ὅτι καὶ τυχάνει μέγιστον ἁγαθὸν ὑπ’ ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἐκατ’ ἡμέρας περὶ ἁρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποι- 25 εἰσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, περὶ δὲ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε

20. τούτι Cf. textual note on ταυτης, 22 ε.

2. ἀλλὰ δὴ] Introduces the last of a series of suppositions. 11. ἐξελθόντι] ‘If I quit the city.’ as below ε, ἐξελθὼν ζήν.
Dig. 142.
9. ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα] Ironical.
The interrogatory discipline which Socrates thus extols was that to which he sought to bring all with whom he conversed.

The subject, about which the answerer was questioned, was himself: which is the reason why Socrates always identified the process with the carrying out of the Delphic precept, Γνῶθι σεαυτόν. The branches of enquiry to which it led were manifold:

(1) knowledge of one’s own natural endowments and position, with a view to living for the greatest good of oneself and others:—ὁ εαυτὸν ἐπισκέψειμαι ὡσποδὸς τίς ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρώπινην χρείαν κ.τ.λ. Xen. Mem. IV. ii. 25:

(2) review of the actual use to which one has been and is putting one’s life—Laches 187 e, διδόναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὡστια τρίπον νῦν τε ἕκαστο τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον βεβιάσκειν and below 39 c, διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου

(3) examination of one’s opinions, — their coherence, their consistency, the history of their formation; of which the results are—consciousness of one’s own ignorance, and consciousness of the grounds of one’s knowledge: Xen. Mem. III. ix. 6, Soph. 230 b—d:

(4) investigation of the principles of human life and action (for which the knowledge of one’s own nature is a prerequisite: Alc. I. 133 c, ἥ τ’ ὀν μὴ γγυνωσκοντε ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς... δυναῖμεθ’ ἄν εἰδέναι τὰ ἡμέρα αὐτῶν κακὰ τε καὶ ἀγαθά;)—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16, περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὶ διελέξεως σκόπον τοῖς ἑπεξέεται, τί ἄσβεστος, τί καλὸν, τί αἰσχρόν, τί δίκαιον, τί ἀδικον, τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία, τί ἀνδρεία, τί δυνασία, τί πολιτικός, τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχικὸς ἀνθρώπων, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἁλλῶν, ἂν τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας ἥγεσιν καλῶς κἀκεῖνος εἰναι, τοὺς δ’ ἀγνοούσας ἀναποδώθειν ἀν δικαίως κεκλησάς and here (just above) τυγχάνει μέγατος ἁγαθόν διὰ ἀνθρώπου τοῦτο, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τούς λόγους ποιεῖσαι.

But this examination was not a mere discipline ending in itself, but a preparation to qualify a man for receiving culture and improvement (Alc. I. 124 d, ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, Laches 188 b, ἀξίωσα μαθήμα- νεων ἐσωπερ αν ζη), for attaining connectedness of knowledge and rational method in action, and for doing the best by himself and the state.

Socrates seems to have employed the strongest terms he could find to assert the indis- pensableness of this discipline:

—Xen. Mem. I. i. 16 (quoted above), III. ix. 6, τὸ ἁγιασθὲν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ ἢ μὴ οἶδε δοξάζειν τε καὶ οἴςαθαι γυνώσκειν, ἐγγυτάτω μανίας ἐλογίζετο ἐκαὶ, Soph. 230 d, τοῦ δ’ ἀνέληκτον αὐ νοματεῖν, ἂν καὶ τυχεῖν βασιλεῖς ὡς μέγας ὡς, τὰ μέγιστα ἀκάθαρτον ὤστα, ἀπαιδευτὸν τε καὶ αἰσχρόν κ.τ.λ., Hipp. Ma. 304 c, τὸ καλὸν ἄγαθον καὶ ὅποτε οὕτω διάκεισαι, οἷς σο}
κρείττον εἶναι ἥμισυ μᾶλλον ἢ τεθνά-
ναι; and in the passage be-
fore us.

And was there not a cause? The current opinions, drawn
from men's practical exigencies, imperfect observation, and
debased morality, were no sounder than their sources. It
was abhorrence of this mass of error and conventional-
ity (which meanwhile the Sophists were accepting as the material
of their system), which impelled Socrates to seek to reconstruc-
t human opinion on a basis of
'reasoned truth.'

3. καὶ ἔγω ἀμ' [A supplementary reason;—'Wero si-
lence possible, it would be no
less a κακὸν which therefore
I should decline imposing on
myself.'

6. νῦν δὲ νῦν γὰρ] This com-
bination of particles occurs
always in setting aside a hy-
pothetical case which is the
opposite of the existing state
of the case. The δὲ and the
γὰρ enter simultaneously into
the combination, where there
is no ellipse nor apopiosis.
Dig. 149.

12. ἐγγυᾶσθαι] Governed by
an equivalent of 'they say' con-
tained in κελεύονται. Cf.
Symp. 213 a, πάντας οὖν . . .
κελεύοντες εἰσέλθαντι καὶ
κατακλύσα-
θαι, καὶ τὸν Ἀγάθωνα καλεῖν ἀυ-
τόν. Dig. 245.

13. ἀξίωκρεφ.] The third and
last division of the pleadings
being thus concluded, there
would follow first the final
voting and then the final ver-
dict of the judges: by which
the formal trial would be con-
cluded.

After this, however, some
'last words' are still conceded
to Socrates, who continues to
address those of his judges.
XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ’ ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὥς ἄνδρες p. 3

Αθηναῖοι, ὁνόμα ἔξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλο-
μένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε,
ἄνδρα σοφὸν φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ μὲ σοφὸν ἐἶναι, εἰ
5 καὶ μὴ εἰμὶ, οἱ βουλόμενοι ύμῶν ὀνειδίζειν. εἰ οὖν
περιμεῖνατε ὅλιγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν
ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἥλικιαν, ὅτι
πόρρω ἢδη ἔστι τοῦ βίου, θανάτου δὲ ἐγνύσ. λέγω
δὲ τούτῳ οὐ πρὸς πάντας ύμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῖ δ
10 καταψηφισμένοις θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς
τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἵσως μὲ οἴσεθε, ὥς ἄνδρες,
ἀπορία λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων, οἷς ἄν ύμᾶς
ἐπεισα, εἰ ἡμὴ δεῖ ἀπαντᾶ ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν, ὡστε
ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλ’ ἀπορία
15 μὲν ἐάλωκα, οὗ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμησ καὶ ἀνα-
χυντίας καὶ τοῦ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ύμᾶς τοιαῦτα,
οὐ ἄν ύμων ἡδιστ’ ἢν ἀκούειν, θρηνοῦντός τε μου καὶ
ὁδυρομένου καὶ ἀλλὰ ποιοῦντος καὶ λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ
ἀνάξια ἐμοῖ, ὡς ἐγὼ φημί· οία δὴ καὶ εἴδυσθε
20 ύμεῖς τῶν ἀλλῶν ἀκούειν. ἀλλ’ οὔτε τότε φήσῃν

who choose to remain and hear him.

Whether such a concession was actually made to Socrates,
or whether it was only a sufficiently common practice to
give verisimilitude to the fiction, is a question which can
hardly be determined. See Introd. p. xv.

I. οὐ πολλοῦ γ’ ἕνεκα χρόνου] Socrates is telling the Athen-
ians that they would not have had to wait long to be saved
had the reproach of putting him to death, by letting nature take
her own course. ‘It was but

a brief space after all, by fore-
stalling which they were ent-
tailing on themselves the re-
proach.’ ἔνεκα marks here the
efficient not the final cause;
the meaning is not ‘you will
incur reproach for the sake of
taking from me a brief re-
mainder of life,’—but ‘a brief
space will be the cause of
your incurring it.’ The ‘brief
space,’ accordingly, is not that
between the present moment
and his execution, but that be-
tween his execution and the
moment when he would have
died in the course of nature.
4. ἐκεῖνως] Understand ἀπολογηθομένος again.

12. μὴ ... ἢ] An instance of the prescriptive variety of the deliberative conjunctive. It is confined to negative sentences. Dig. 59 note.

13. βατόν γάρ θ. θεί] This refers to the reflex effect of wickedness on the evildoer's soul, which it degrades and ruins. Cf. Crito 47 ε, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνου (sc. the soul) ἄρα ἡμῶν βιοτὸν διεφθαρμένον, ὁ τὸ ἀδικὸν λαβαίτοι κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 α, μεγάλωτον τῶν κακῶν ἔστιν ἡ ἀδικία τὸ ἄδικον. Between danger and death there is many a chance of escape, as Socrates has just before said; but none between the evil deed and its internal consequences. Stalib.'s quotation of Odys. viii. 329, Ὁσκ ἄρετὰ κακὰ ἑργα καίγανε τοι βραδὺς ὡκίν ἑτοίματα] is not to the point.

18. ῥῆμα—ἀφηλήκτες] 'Sentenced by Truth to receive the penalty of.'—Whewell.
Φιληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ αδίκιαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ p. 39
tιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὕτω. ταῦτα μὲν πον ἱσως
οὕτω καὶ ἐδει σχέων, καὶ οἴμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

XXX. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ύμῖν χρη-

σμορθῆσαι, ὃ καταψηφισάμενοι μου καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ ε
ηδὴ ἐνταῦθα, ἐν ὧν μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμορθῶσιν,
ὅταν μελλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γὰρ, ὃ ἄνδρες,
οἱ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ύμῖν ἴδεις εὐθὺς μετὰ
τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δὶ ἡ οἶαν
10 ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε' νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἰόμενοι
ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἑλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ

10. οἰόμενοι] After οἰόμενοι Η inserts conjecturally μὲν, taking
this to be suggested by οἰόμενοι μὲ of some MSS., and by an
erased blank in Oxon. The erasure in Oxon. was probably μὲ,
for an accent has been erased also from —ό. This however
may have been an erasure by the original scribe; such as for in-
stance must have been that at Crito 53 d, where stands δι φθέραν
with an erasure between—δι φθέραν being plainly the true reading.

1. ἐγὼ τε... καὶ οὕτω] 'I
as well as they.' ἐγὼ has the
stress, and stands (in accord-
ance with Greek arrangement)
first for that reason. Dig. 307.
6. ἐν ὧν—χρησμορθῶσιν] The
opinion, which connects pro-
phetic enlightenment with the
approach of death, has main-
tained its hold upon mankind
in all ages. Patroclus foretells
Hector's death, Π. xvi. 851,
and Hector the death of Achil-
les, ΙI. xxii. 358: instances to
which classical writers often
appeal; thus Xen. Apol. 30,
ἀνέδεικε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ομήρος ἔστιν οἷς
τῶν ἐν καταλύσει τοῦ βίου προ-
γγυμωσικὰ τὰ μέλλοντα, βούλουμαι
dὲ καὶ ἐγὼ χρησμορθῆσαι τι, Τιε.
De Div. Ι. 30. Facilius evenit
appropinquante morte ut animi
futura augurentur; ex quo et
illud est Calani, de quo ante
dixi, et Homeri Rectoris qui
moriens propinquam Achilli
mortem denuntiât. So Shakes-
ppear, Rich. ΙI. Act ΙΙ. Sc. i.
(Gaut) 'Methinks, I am a
prophet new inspir'd; And
thus, expiring, do foretell of
him.' And Sir H. Davy ('Re-
mains,' p. 311) speaks of him-
sell as "looking into futurity
with the prophetic aspirations
belonging to the last moments
of existence"—in a letter dated
just two months before his
death.

9. οἶαν] Sc. τιμωρίαν. A vir-
tual cognate accusative after
ἀπεκτόνατε. Dig. 1.
11. διδόναι ἑλεγχον] Namely,
under the process of εἰσιάσως.
cf. 38 a note, and esp. Lachés
187 e there quoted.
XXXI. Τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένοις ἢδεως ἂν διαλεξθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν ὃι οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἁγοῦσι καὶ οὕτω ἐξχωμαι οἱ ἐλθόντα με δεὶ τεθνάναι. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὃ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλυει διαμυθολογησαι πρὸς ἄλληλους, ἐως ἐξεστιν. ύμῖν γὰρ ὁς φίλοις οὕτω επιδείξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι ἐναβεβηκός τι ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ, ὃ ἄνδρες δικα-—σταῖ—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστάς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖν —θαυμάσιον τι γέγονει. ἡ γὰρ εἰσῳδείντι μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνω πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἡν καὶ πάνω ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιοῦμεν, εἰ τι μέλλομι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν· νυνὶ δὲ 25

15. οἱ ἄρχοντες] That is, oi ἐνδικαρ.
20. δικασταῖ] Steinhardt remarks that up to this point, where first the true and false judges are separated, the form of the address used has been δ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι.
22. ἡ εἰσῳδεία] 'The direction I am wont to receive from the divine voice.' See App. A, on τὸ δαιμόνιον.
24. πάνω ἐπὶ σμικροῖς] ἐπὶ separates πάνω from σμικροῖς, to which it belongs: Dig. 298.
This accurately represents the reading of Oxon., which stands μελλοντι (τι being prima manu), importing that τι should follow μελλοντι. Gaisford here is inexact in his representation. 7. ταύτην [So VBH; αὐτήν SZ. It is impossible to find a clear meaning for αὐτήν, which is the reading of Oxon. and five other MSS. Cf. Phædo 60 a, where Oxon. (alone) has ταύτην for αὐτήν.

4. ἐνταυθοὶ ἐπὶ τὸ δικ. Cf. Legg. 679 d, κατὰ πόλιν μάνον αὐτοῦ, equivalent to κατ’ αὐτὴν μόνον τὴν πόλιν, Thucyd. vii. 16, τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐκεί δύο προκλητο, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μήλην αὐτοῦ Φιλιπποῦ κατιστάσιν.

18. οἷον] ‘As it were.’ Parenthetical to the construction. The words which it qualifies are μηδὲν εἶναι. (The subject of μηδὲν εἶναι is τῶν τεθνατῶν). Dig. 16. Cf. below, οἷον ὕποκριτικός, and again e, οἷον ἀποδημήσαι.

19. τὰ λεγόμενα] In the popular religious teaching.
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 105

40. τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθεῦθε ἐσι ἄλλον τόπον.

Δ καὶ εἶ ὡς μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὦν ὅπως,

ἐπειδὴ τις καθεύδων μηδ' ὅναρ μηδὲν ὅρα, θαυμά-

σιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος. ἔγω γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἶ

tina ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νῦκτα, ἐν ᾗ οὔτως

cατέδαρθεν, ὡστε μηδ' ὅναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας

νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντι-

παραθέντα ταύτη τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰσεῖν,

τόσος ἁμείρου καὶ ἡδίων ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης

τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν εἰ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ 10

ε ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἄλλα τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαρμνή-

τους ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ

νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατος ἔστι, κέρδος ἐγὼ γε

λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείον ὁ πᾶσ' χρόνος φαίνεται

οὔτω δὴ εἶναι ἡ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οἶνον ἀποδημήσαί 15

ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθεῦθε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ

ἔστι τὰ λεγόμενα, ώσ ἀρα ἐκεῖ εἰσίν ἀπαντεῖ τις ἑνε-

νώτες, τί μείζον ἡγαθὸν τοῦτον εἴη ἂν, ὥς ἄνδρες

dικασταί; εἰ γὰρ της ἀφικόμενος εἰς 'Αιδοῦ, ἀπαλ-

λαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρή-

το σει τοὺς ώς ἁληθῶς δικαστάς, οὔτερ καὶ λέγονται

ἐκεὶ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθος καὶ Αἰακὸς

21. ὡς] So VBS; ZH omit. Oxon. has it above the line but

in first hand. The ὡς is constantly added where it is a popular

appellation of which the propriety is recognised, and is frequently

found after the article, as Phdr. 256 b, τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς Ὁλυμπιακῶν,

Rep. 345 e, τοὺς ὡς ἁληθῶς ἄρχονται, &c., &c.

1. τῇ ψυχῇ] An intensified

form of the dative of reference,

equivalent nearly to a genitive:

Dig. 28.

12. αὐτῶν] A resumption of

ἰδιώτην τινά and βασιλεία, after

the intervention of εὐαρμν. ἄν

eὑρεῖν.

22. Μίνως τε—ἄλλοι] These

nouns are in the nominative

by attraction to the interposed

relative clause, as the nearest

construction: Dig. 192.

Nowhere else does Triptole-
mus occur as judge of the

dead (though in Hom. Hymn.
καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὄσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι p. 415. εἰς εὐνοῦντο ἐν τῷ ἐαυτῶν βίῳ, ἀρα φαύλη ἢ εἰς ἡ ἄποδημία; η· ἂν ὁ Ὀρφεὺς ἔγονεν θείου καὶ Μουσάωρ καὶ Ἡσιόδος καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἢν τις ἐξαιτιῶν 5 ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθλάναι, εἰ ταῦτ' ἐστίν ἄληθεν· ἦτε ἐμοίνε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἢν εἰς διαμβίζη αὑτόθι, ὅποτε ἐνυχομεν Παλαμῆδε. ὁ καὶ Αἴαντο τῷ Τελαμόνω καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικων τέθληκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλ-

Demet. 153 he sits in judgment on earth). Also Plato is the only Greek who styles Ἀπεκούς judge of the dead, here and Gorg. 523 e; though many Romans mention him thus. But the same principle accounts for the ascription of such a subterranean preeminence to these two, and to the remaining two more widely recognised judicial personages named here. All four were connected with the secret rites, or mysteries, of their native places; Minos with the Cretan mysteries, which through the Orphic influence were widely known. Rhadamantus, his assessor, is his countryman. Ἀπεκούς was the hero of Ἁγίνα, where there were (Pausan. II. 30, Origen adv. Cels. vi. 290, c. 22, Lucian, Navig. 15) mysteries of Orphic origin. And Triptolemus was connected, of course, with Eleusis. These judges are an instance of the fact that certain features of the Greek mythology were first the product of the mystery-worship, and thence made their way into the popular mind.—Döllinger, Gent. and Jew, Vol. I. Dk. iii. p. 175. The same account may be assumed to hold of the ἄλλοι τῶν ἡμιθέων, who are subjoined to these four; for very many places had mystery-rites. Rhadamantus is mentioned in Homer, (Od. viii. 323), and therefore antecedently to mysteries, as a judge, but on earth and not in the nether world.

6. ἔμοινε καὶ αὐτῷ] I. e. 'I should have a pleasure peculiarly my own.'


ὅπως—τέθληκεν] This depends upon ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι. The whole sentence ὅπως—ἅγιὸς ἢ ἐν is a re-statement more at length of θαυμαστὴ ἢν ἢ διαμβίζη, which it follows asyndetically,—an instance of Binary Structure: Dig. 207.

9. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι] Soocrates' comparison of himself with Palamedes recalls the fable of the representation of the Palamedes of Euripides soon after Soocrates' death, when, at the words ἐκάνετε ἐκάνετε τῶν πάντων σοφον, ὁ Δαναι, τῶν οὐδέν ἀληθούσαν ἄρδονα Μοῦσαν, τῶν Ἑλλάνων τῶν ἀριστῶν, the whole
ΛΟΝΤΙ ΤΑ ΕΜΑΥΤΟΥ ΠΑΘΗ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΑ ΕΚΕΙΝΩΝ, ΩΣ ΕΓΩ ΟΜΑΙ, ΟΥΚ ΑΝ ΑΝΘΕΣ ΕΙΗ. ΚΑΙ ΔΗ ΤΟ ΜΕΓΙΣΤΟΝ, ΤΟΥΣ ΕΚΕΙ ΕΞΕΤΑΖΟΝΤΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΡΕΥΝΩΝΤΑ ΩΣΠΕΡ ΤΟΥΣ ΕΥΤΑΘΑ ΔΙΑΓΕΝ, ΤΙΣ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΣΟΦΟΣ ΕΣΤΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΙΣ ΟΙΕΤΑΙ ΜΕΝ, ΕΣΤΙ ΔΟΥ. ΕΠΙ ΠΟΣΟΙ Δ' ΑΝ ΤΙΣ, Δ' ΆΝΔΡΕΣ ΔΙΚΑΣΤΑΙ, ΔΕΞΑΙΤΟ ΕΞΕΤΑΣΑΙ ΤΟΝ ΕΠΙ ΤΡΟΙΑΝ ΆΓΟΝΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΠΟΛΛΗΝ Ο ΟΡΙΑ ΈΟΙΚΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡΟΥ, ΕΛΛΟΥΣ ΜΥΡΙΟΥΣ ΑΝ ΤΙΣ ΕΙΠΟΙ ΚΑΙ ΆΝΔΡΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΑΣ; ΟΙΣ ΕΚΕΙ ΔΙΑ-
ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΞΥΝΕΙΝΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΞΕΤΑΖΕΙΝ ΑΜΗΧΑΝΟΥ ΑΝ ΕΙΗ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΣ. ΠΑΝΤΩΣ ΟΥ ΗΗΠΟΙ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΓΕ ΕΝΕΚΑ ΟΙ ΕΚΕΙ ΑΠΟΚΤΕΙΝΟΥΣΥ, ΤΑ ΤΕ ΓΑΡ ΆΛΛΑ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΕΙΣΤΕΡΟΙ ΕΙΣΟΙ ΟΙ ΕΚΕΙ ΤΩΝ ΕΝΒΑΣΕ, ΚΑΙ ΉΔΗ ΤΟΝ ΛΟΙΠΟΝ ΧΡΩΝΟΝ ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΙ ΕΙΣΙΝ, ΕΣΠΕΡ ΓΕ ΤΑ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΑ ΆΛΘΗ ΕΣΤΙΝ.

XXXIII. 'ΑΛΛΑ ΚΑΙ ΥΜΑΣ ΧΡΗ, Δ' ΆΝΔΡΕΣ ΔΙΚΑ-
ΣΤΑΙ, ΕΥΕΛΠΙΔΑΣ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΙ ΤΟΥΤΟ ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ ΆΛΘΕΣ, ΟΤΙ ΟΥΚ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΆΝΔΡΙ ΑΓΑΘΩ ΚΑΚΩΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΟΥΤΕ ΞΟΝΤΙ ΟΥΤΕ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗΣΑΝΤΙ, ΟΥΔΕ ΆΜΕ-
ΛΕΙΤΑΙ ἩΠΟ ΘΕΩΝ ΤΑ ΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΑ: ΟΥΔΕ ΤΑ ΕΜΑ
ΝΥΝ ΑΡΧΟΝΤΟΙ ΑΥΤΟΜΑΤΟΥ ΓΕΓΟΝΕΝ, ΆΛΛΑ ΜΟΙ ΔΗΛΟΝ
ΕΣΤΙ ΤΟΥΤΟ, ΟΤΙ ΉΔΗ ΤΕΘΝΑΙΝΙΑΙ ΚΑΙ ΑΠΗΛΛΑΞΑΙΝΙ ΠΡΑΓ-

6. ἄγωντα] Edd. ἄγαγώντα. But there is strong syntactical justification (besides the weight of Oxon. and five other MSS.) for ἄγωντα. See Commentary.


6. ἄγωντα] Participle of the imperfect, which gives greater fullness and vividness than the aorist would have given. Cf. Legg. 635 a, καθήσατε μάντις ἅπων τῆς τότε διανοίας τοῦ τιθέντος αὑτά (meaning Lycurgus or Minos), 677 c, Ὑμεῖς δὲ τάς ἐν πεδίῳ πόλεις . . . ἀράδην ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ διαφθείρεσθαι (meaning at the Deluge).

7. η ἄλλους—ἐἰπο] The desire for brevity in the summing up of the enumeration breaks off the legitimate plan of the sentence: Dig. 257.

16. άλθεις] ‘As a verity.’ See 18 a, note.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

μάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τὸ τούτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοὶ ἐπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπάνω. καὶ τοῦτο οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψήφισεντό μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόρους, ἀλλὰ οἴκους βλάπτειν τὸ τούτο αὐτῶς ἔξιον μέμψησθαι. τοσοῦτο θέωμαι μέντοι αὐτῶν τῶν υἱῶν μου, ἐπειδὴ ἡ δύσης, τιμοροῦσα, οὔτε ἄνδρες, ταύτα ταύτα λυποῦντες, ἀπερ ἐγὼ υμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐάν υμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ εάν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὑπερ, οὐνείδιετε αὐτοῖς, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελεύονται ὅποι δει, καὶ οἴονται τι εἶναι ὑπερ οὐδενὸς ἀξίου. καὶ εάν ταύτα ποιήτε, δίκαια πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἐσώμαι ὑπ' ὑμῶν αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ υἱῶν.

6. θέωμαι μέντοι αὐτῶν] Edd. μέντοι αὐτῶν θεώμαι, and so all MSS. except Oxon. But which collocation most exactly suggests the emphasis required? The position of μέντοι has often to be referred to a subtle ear. Cf. 31 b, καὶ εἶ μέντοι τι, and Dig. 294. 17. ἡ] So edd., rightly. The weight of Oxon. with four other MSS., giving ἡ, is diminished by the itacism.

θεοφυλόν καὶ οὐράς τετυχεῖσας τούτου μὲν γὰρ βίον τὸ χαλεπῶτατον ἀπέλιπε κ.τ.λ.

3. οὗ πάνυ] Here, as elsewhere, οὗ πάνυ marks only a bare denial: Dig. 139. Socrates is satisfied with saying, 'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.' His εἰρωνεία would in no case have suffered him to say, 'I am far from being displeased.'

8. ταύτα ταύτα λυπούντες] By plying them unwearily with warning and remonstrance.

17. πλὴν ἡ] This combination is exactly parallel to ἀλλ’ ἡ. The two particles enter the combination coordinate, introducing the exception to the preceding universal negative in their own several ways. πλὴν implies 'it is known to none,—saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God;' ἡ, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.' See Dig. 148, and cf. Ar. Nub. 360, ὅ τι γὰρ ἄν ἄλλῳ γ’ ὑποκόυσαμεν . . . Πλὴν ἡ Προδίκη.
APPENDIX A.

Τὸ δαίμόνιον.

The word δαίμων was used to denote either θεὸς or a spiritual being inferior to θεὸς. Its distinctive meaning as applied to either class is that it denotes such a being in his dealings with men. From Homer to Plato δαίμων is persistently marked by this meaning. Δαίμονιοι therefore denotes a connection with divine agency; and τὸ δαίμόνιον denotes sometimes such an agency, and sometimes the agent itself. So Aristotle (Rhet. II. xxiii. 8), τὸ δαίμονιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἄλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ τεκνὸς ἐργον, and for this distinction we may compare Plato (Phdr. 242 e), εἰ δὲ ἐστὶν ὄσπερ οὖν ἐστι θεὸς ἢ τι θεῖον δ Ἔρως. When we read in Xenophon (Mem. I. i. 2), διεθνύλητο ὅστ' φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαίμονιον ἐπιχείρησις σημαίνει· ὥθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δικοῦσιν αὐτὸν αιτιάσασθαι καὶ δαίμονα εἰσφέρειν, both senses of the word are exemplified. Socrates meant by τὸ δαίμονιον a divine agency; Meletus wrested this into the sense of a divine being. In the Apology Socrates marks the position as a caricature by the expression ἐπικωμοῦν, and then gives the interpretation consistent with his own meaning—viz. δαίμονα πράγματα. That Socrates is not speaking of a being is clear from other passages also, as when he says (Apol. 31 c), ὅτι μοι θεῶν τί καὶ δαίμονιον γίγνεται, or (Phdr. 242 b), τὸ δαίμονιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον γίγνεσθαι, or (Euthyd. 272 e), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαίμονιον, or (Theet. 151 a), τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαίμονιον. Nor does Plato, who recognises the common notion

1 In Plat. Symp. 202 d — 203 a, this view of δαίμων appears very distinctly, though there, as the doctrine held is that θεὸς ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ μίγνυται, all μαντικὴ is the province of the δαίμων.

2 Whence the phrase of Ἀσχίνης (iii. 117. p. 70) ἵνα δὲ καὶ δαίμονιον τινὶ ἰεραρτάνειν αὐτὸν προσαγομένων is indeterminate.
of a personal attendant δαίμων (Legg. 730 a, Tim. 90 a), ever give this name to the phenomenon in question. Even Theages (as Zeller remarks, II. 65. u. 2) gives no personality to τὸ δαίμονον. 'Η φωνὴ ἡ τοῦ δαίμονον (Theag. 128 e) is ambiguous. Plato's use is sometimes adjectival (e. g. τὸ δαίμονον σημεῖον), and sometimes elliptically substantival. Grammatically, Xenophon confines himself to the latter use only,—still merely in the signification of a divine agency. Zeller notices that the interpretation of Socrates' δαίμονας as a being remained peculiar to his accusers (Cicero translating it by divinum quiddam, Divin. I. 54, not by genius) until it was revived by Plutarch, the Neo-Platonists, and the Christian Fathers.

What then were the nature and function of this δαίμονον σημεῖον?

Let us first consult Xenophon, in whom the chief passages are these:

Mem. I. i. 2—5, διετεθρύλητο γὰρ ὦς φαίη Σωκράτης τὸ δαίμονον ἐαυτῷ σημεῖον ὄθεν δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μοι δοκοῦσιν αὐτῶν αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ δαίμονα εἰσφέρειν. ὃ δὲ οὐδὲν κανύστερον εἰσέφερε τῶν ἄλλων, ἀσι μαντικὴν νομίζοντες οἰωνίως τε χρῶνται καὶ φήμαι καὶ συμβόλοις καὶ θυσίας. οὐκ οὐ τὰ χάρ ὑπολαμβάνοντι οὐ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων οὐδὲ τῶν ἀπαντώτας εἰδέναι τὰ συμφέροντα τοῖς μαντευόμενοις, ἀλλὰ τόσος θεός διὰ τούτων αὐτὰ σημεῖον, καὶ ἄνευς δὲ αὐτῶν ἐνόμιζε. ἀλλ᾽ οἱ μὲν πλεῖστοι φασίν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀρνίθων καὶ τῶν ἀπαντῶντων ἀποτρέπεσθαι τι καὶ προπρέπεσθαι. Σωκράτης δὲ, ἄπειρον ἑγίνωσκεν, οὕτως ἔλεγε. τὸ δαίμονον γὰρ ἐφή σημεῖον καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ξυνόντων προηγόρευε τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, ὡς τὸ δαίμονον προσημαίνοντος. καὶ τοῖς μὲν πειθομένοις αὐτῷ συνέφερε, τοῖς δὲ μὴ πειθομένοις μετέμειλε.

IV. iii. 12—13, Σολ β', Ἕφη, καὶ Σάκρατες, λοίκασαν ἄγας φιλικότερον ἃ ἄλλως χρήσαντο [οἱ θεοὶ], εἴ γε μὲν ἐπερωτώμενοι ὑπὸ σοῦ προσημαίνασθαι σοι αἱ τε χρή ποιεῖν καὶ αἱ μὴ. Ὁτι δὲ γε ἀληθῆς λέγω καὶ σύ, καὶ Ἐθανάτης, γνώση, ἃν μὴ αναμένῃς ἔως ἃν τὰς μορφὰς τῶν θεῶν ἤδη, ἀλλὰ ἐξαρκῆς σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὀρθῶν ἄβεβηκα καὶ τιμῶν τοὺς θεοὺς.

IV. viii. 1, φάσκοντος αὐτοῦ τὸ δαίμονον ἐαυτῷ προσημαίνειν ἃ τε δεόι καὶ αἱ μὴ δεόι ποιεῖν ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν κατεγνώσθη θάνατος.

IV. viii. 5—6, Ἀλλὰ νὴ τὸν Δίαν, φάναι αὐτοῦ, ἡ Ἐρμογένες, ἡδὴ τοῦ ἐπιχειροῦντος φροντίσαι τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δικαστὰς ἀπολογίαν ἤπαττωθῆ τὸ δαίμονον, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιεύα, Θεαμαστὰ λέγεις. τὸ δὲ, Θεαμαζέεις, φάναι, εἰ τὸ θεῖο δοκεῖ βδλίτων εἶναι εἴμη τελευτῶν τοῦ βίου ἡδῆ.

IV. viii. 11, εὐσεβῆς οὕτως ὅστε μηδὲν ἄνεν τὴν τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν.

Symp. viii. 5, τοτε μὲν τὸ δαίμονον προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγει μοι τοτε δ ἄλλου τοῦ ἐφιμένουs.
To which must be added still from the Memorabilia, I. i. 19, 
Σωκράτης ἤγετο πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι, τὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῆ βουλευόμενα, πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων.

Thus we see that Xenophon tells us nothing as to the nature of Socrates' ὀνομασίαν, save that it was the instrument through which divine intimations reached him unsolicitedly. He adheres (unless we admit as his the θεοὶ μοι φωνὴ φαίνεται in § 12 of the Xenophontean Apology) to the expression σημαίνειν τὸ δαιμόνιον, meaning by this expression (as already said) that τὸ δαιμόνιον is but the instrument, while it is the gods who are the agents, whence in other passages we have as equivalent expressions [θεοὶ] προσημαίνουσι (Mem. IV. iii. 12), τῷ θεῷ δοκεῖ (ib. viii. 6), θεῶν γνώμη (ib. 11). Its intimations differ from those obtained by μαντικὴ in being given spontaneously. Socrates is represented as having thought himself singular, as a matter of fact, in possessing this gift. He did not urge others to seek for a similar sign. Although he believed (Mem. I. i. 19) πάντα μὲν θεοὺς εἰδέναι . . . πανταχοῦ δὲ παρεῖναι καὶ σημαίνειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων, he seems either to have directed others to μαντικὴ (Mem. I. i. 6), or the oracle (Cic. de Divin. i. 54), or to have given them the benefit of his own divine intimations (Mem. I. i. 4). He however believed that if others had not this gift, it was by their own fault (Mem. IV. iii. 13).

What its function was according to Xenophon, we gather from the identification of its province with that of μαντικὴ, which is defined in Mem. I. i. 6—9, ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιοίει καὶ τάδε πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαία συνεβουλεύει καὶ πράττειν ὡς ἐνομίζεις ἄριστον πρακτικὴν περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβΗθησοί μαντευσομένους ἐπεμπένει εἰ ποιητέα καὶ τοὺς μελλόντας οἰκους τε καὶ πόλεις καλῶς οἰκήσεως μαντικῆς ἐφή προσδείσαθαι τεκτονικῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ χαλκευτικὴ ἡ γεωργικὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχικῶν ἡ τῶν τοιούτων ἑργῶν ἐξεταστικῶν ἡ λογιστικὴ ἡ οἰκονομικὴ ἡ στρατιγικὴ γενέσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιοῦτα μαθήματα καὶ ἀνθρώπου γνώμη οἰρτά ἐνομίζεις εἰναι τὰ δὲ μεγίστα τῶν ἐν τούτως ἐφή τοὺς θεοὺς ἐαντοῦς κατελεύσεις, ὡς οὐδέν δήλον εἰναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις . . . ἐφή δὲ δὲν ἡ μὲν μαθόν τας ποιεῖν ἐδόκατοι οἱ θεοὶ, μανθάνει, δὲ δὲ μὴ δήλο ποῖος ἀνθρώπως εἶστι, περάσαται διὰ μαντικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν πυθαγαίαται τοῖς θεοῖς γὰρ οὐκ ἔν δαίμονες σημαίνειν.

This accords with Plato, Apol. 40 a, ἢ εἴσοδοι μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου. It was no such guide in the matter of right and wrong, as conscience is; nor yet an universal oracle to reveal truths of science or of futurity. Its function was on the one hand practical
—to pronounce upon a proposed course of action, of which Socrates had cognisance, either as himself a party to it or in the interest of his friends—, on the other hand it pronounced not on the morality but on the expediency (in the Socratic sense of what was really for the best) of the proposed course. This would not exclude from its decision moral questions, where the obligation either was obscure or mainly depended on the consequences. It was not a mere presentiment, a foreboding of chance misfortune or of chance success, the mere reflection of a man's own feelings of happiness or gloom while in spite of them he carries out his course of action. It stamped in Socrates' belief a definite character of expediency or inexpediency on the course intended, and he never disobeyed it.

In Plato the notable passages are these:—Apol. 31 c–d, τούτον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ὃ μὲν ὤμοι ἐμοὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκόασε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὡς μοι θείων τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται φωνή, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμωδῶν Μέλιτος ἐγράφατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτῳ ἐστίν ἐκ παιὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνῇ τις γνωσμένη, ἡ ὅπου γένηται δὲ ἀποστρέπει με τούτο, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὕτως. τούτῳ ἐστίν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικά πράττειν. 40 a–b, ἢ γὰρ εἰσοδύνα μοι μαστυκὴ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσβεθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάντων πυκνῇ ἢν καὶ πάντως ἐπὶ σωματομερίᾳ, καὶ τῷ μέλλομι μὴ ὅρθως πράξειν. νυνὶ δὲ ἐμπεθερήκῃ μοι, ἀπέρ ὄρατε καὶ ἀποτέλεσεν, ταῦτα, ἢ γὲ δὴ οἰδιπεῖν ὅ τις καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχάτα κακών εἶναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτως ἐξιόμενοι οὐκαθέν ἡνωτικάθεν οὐκ ἂν ἠπλατείνῃ ἐναντιοῦται τὸ τῶν θεῶν σημεῖο, οὕτω ἢν ἡπειρατείαν ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὐθὲ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μελλόντι τι ἐρεῖν καίτως ἐν ἄλλους λόγους πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπισήνεχε λέγοντα μεταξὺ. νυνὶ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πράξειν οὕτως ἐν ἔργῳ οὐκετί οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ ἡνωτικώτατοι μοι.—Euthyd. 272 e, κατὰ θεόν γὰρ τίνα ἔτυχον καθήμενον ἐνταῦθα, οὐτέρ σὺ μὲ εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτήριῳ μόνος, καὶ θῇ ἐν νῦ εἰχὼν ἀναστήσας ἀνασταμένον δὲ μου ἐγένετο τὸ ἐκεῖθεν σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον, πάλιν οὖν ἐκαθέζομεν.—Phdr. 242 b, ἢνίκη ἔμελλον, ὅγαθε, τὸν ποταμὸν διαβαίνει, τὸ δαιμόνιον τε καὶ τὸ εἰσοδός σημεῖον μοι γίγνεται, ἀντὶ δὲ μὲ ἐπίσηκος ἄν μέλλω πράττειν, καὶ τῶν φωνῶν ἢδοξά αὐτοῦ ἀκύών, ἡ μὲ νὰ ἐὰν ἀπέναι πρὶν ἄν ἀφοσιώσωμαι, ὃς τῇ ἡμερησίᾳ τοῖς τὸ θείον.—Alcib. I. init. 103 a–b, τούτου τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τὸ δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὐδὲ τῷ δυνάμει καὶ ὅστετον πεύτερον, καὶ νὰ ἐπεθείρετο εἶναι ἐναντιοῦται, οὕτω προσελθάτα. ἐκεῖπος δὲ εἴμι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν μὴ ἐναντιωθοῦσεν αὐτῷ.—Theet. 151 a, εἴνιος μὲν τὸ γανός τούς ἄθετους ἀνθρώπους—

* Wiggers and Zeller have noticed this. Remark the contrast in the Apology. The matter of duty—not to desert the post of preacher to the Athenian people—is thrown on the divine mission (28 e), the matter of judgment—to abstain from politics—is attributed to the δαιμόνιον (31 d).
Τὸ δαμόνιον. 113

μοι δαμόνιον ἀποκωλέει εὐνείναι ἐνίοις 8' ἐφ.—Rep. 496 c, τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαμόνιον σημείων ἢ γάρ πού τιν ἄλλῳ ἢ οἰδον τῶν ἐμπροσθέν γένοει. The passages in the Theages consist in part of parrot-like repetitions of descriptions of the phenomenon culled from various dialogues, in part of inventions founded on these.

The account in these passages exhibits some additions and variations as compared with that of Xenophon.

As to the nature of the phenomenon, it is explained to be a sign, which consists of articulate words, and the use of which corresponds to the μαντίκη of other men. It is represented as a gift almost peculiar to Socrates, though by him possessed from his childhood upwards.

Its function seems somewhat heterogeneous, compared with what we have found it in Xenophon. Besides giving warnings as to an intended course of action, it reminds of a duty unperformed (Phdr.); or an advantage accrues from obeying it, which has no rational connection whatever with the obedience (Euthyd.). The tales of the Theages dwell on the marvel exclusively; yet, while they leave the φωνὴ unconnected with any act of the judgment, they leave room for supplying such a connection. Plato further tells us that its function was a negative one—ἀδι ἀποτρέπει προτρέπει δὲ ὁποτε (Apol.). The importance of this limitation shall be considered presently.

From these data we may now seek to arrive at a conclusion for ourselves. According to both Xenophon and Plato the fact itself, which Socrates accounted for by the δαμόνιον σημείων, was a sudden sense, immediately before carrying a purpose into effect, of the expediency of abandoning it,—or, Xenophon would add, of prosecute it. Meanwhile we are not bound to accept Socrates' account of the cause of this sudden feeling; first, because he was no psychologist, and, while in his own belief he was merely describing his own consciousness,—or, as Xenophon says, ὄσπερ ἐγιγμοσκεῦν οὔτω καὶ ἐλεγε,—he was really importing into his description an inference of his own; secondly, because he rather diminishes the weight of his own testimony for us, not merely by his attention to dreams (Phædo 60 e), but more by his absolute faith in μαντίκη and its use in obtaining for others the same divine guidance which he obtained unasked through the σημείων; and, thirdly, because while he believed himself to have detected divine agency here, he was perfectly unconscious of it in its more ordinary province, as the author of "all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works." If, then,
declining Socrates' account, we are disposed to refer the pheno-
menon to ordinary psychological causes, we can do so satisfactorily,
provided we confine our attention to Xenophon's account alone.
All Xenophon's notices of it encourage the view, that it was a
quick exercise of a judgment informed by knowledge of the sub-
ject, trained by experience, and inferring from cause to effect
without consciousness of the process. In a mind so purified by
temperance and self-knowledge, so single of purpose and unper-
turbed by lower aims, endowed with such powerful natural faculties,
especially those of observation and of causality, the ability to fore-
cast and forejudge might become almost an immediate sense. But
it must be confessed that some of the features in Plato's account
are a little embarrassing to this view. The singularity ascribed by
Plato (Rep. 496 c) to the gift need not rank among these diffi-
culties, since Xenophon mentions it as a singular characteristic of
Socrates (Mem. IV. viii. 11) that he was φρόνιμος ὡστε μη διαμαρ-
tάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείριν, μηδὲ ἄλλον προσδείναι ἄλλον αὐτάρ-
κης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τοῦτον γρώσιν, which is the rationalised description
of this very phenomenon. But the statement that Socrates enjoyed
the gift from his earliest days is not fully consistent with the ex-
planation just put forward,—with any consideration, that is, of
the effect of observation, experience, moral training, or habit of
mind. Again, as we have seen, two of the instances of the occur-
rence of the σημείων which are related in Plato preclude the expla-
nation of an act of judgment. It is no judgment, however pen-
etrating, which recalls Socrates from the stream he had purposed
crossing and brings him back to Phædrus, or which forbids him to
leave his seat just before the fortuitous entrance of Euthydemus
and his companions. If we are to accept these features as his-
torical, we must give up all attempt to rationalise the phenomenon
at all, and fall back upon Socrates' own account as final. But, first,
we have seen that there are reasons against accepting his account,
and, secondly, against the historical probability of these two instances
stands the fact that, though paralleled in Plutarch, they are unlike
any other instances given by Xenophon and Plato; for (setting
aside the Theages as apocryphal) in all the other instances it is
implied that the course of action forbidden by the warning is pre-
judicial, not through its fortuitous consequences, but through some-
thing amiss in itself, and that the course upon which the agent is
thrown back leads to the good result by a chain of means and not
by a chain of accidents.
Τὸ δαμόνιον.

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We must therefore adopt the alternative which involves less considerable difficulties, and regard Plato as less faithful than Xenophon in his illustration of the phenomenon. It is not difficult to suppose that by tracing it back to Socrates' boyhood nothing more may be intended than that his memory did not serve him to indicate the first beginning of those habits of observation and that moral and mental training from which the faculty grew. And as to the heterogeneous instances of warnings given by it, since as individual instances they are certainly inventions, part of the machinery of the dialogues in which they stand, it is doing no violence to Plato's genius to suppose, that as an inventor he has not scrupled to travesty the character which belonged to the actual and serious use of the gift, and to extend its operation playfully into the domain of chance.

There remains to be noticed in Plato's account the well-known restriction of τὸ δαμόνιον to negative functions. In describing the sign as a voice, Plato adds (Apol. 31 d), ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὥσπερ μέλλω πράττειν προστέθει δὲ οὐποτε. One difficulty lies in the nature of the case. What kind of divine communication or what kind of judgment could that be which yielded only negative utterances? Certainly no act of judgment could be such; the same penetration which could discern the inexpediency of a course of action would serve for the discerning of the more expedient alternative. A divine communication might be imagined under any self-imposed restriction; still the restriction would, in proportion to its arbitrariness, discredit yet more this hypothesis, which we have already seen reason to abandon. Another difficulty lies in the conflict of testimony as to this peculiarity. Xenophon attributes to the sign an approving as well as disapproving force (Mem. IV. viii. 1, φαίνοντο αὐτοῦ τὸ δαμόνιον ἐαντὶ προσημαίνειν ἀ τε δει τι καὶ δὴ μὴ δει τι ποιεῖν. cf. I. i. 4, as quoted above). Cicero (De Divin. i. 54) simply echoes Plato. Plutarch (De Socr. Dæm. c. 11. p. 1015), agreeing with Xenophon, represents the sign as καλεῖν ἢ κακεῖν.

These are the two difficulties which have to be met. No attempt has been made to meet the first: the second has been met by swallowing the first whole, and supposing Xenophon to be in error in not distinguishing the actual communication made by the sign, and the inference which Socrates made from it, and which might (as in Apol. 40 a) be positive. But we shall meet both difficulties by some such explanation as the following. As to the reconcilement of authorities, when Plato makes Socrates say ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με, he
describes it by its most perceptible act, for its coincidence with an existing purpose would be superfluous and little noticeable. It was only when the presentiment ran counter to his will that Socrates became distinctly conscious of it. An illustration of this oversight occurs in the statement of some moderns concerning conscience, that it has only a negative function,—as if there were no such thing as “an approving conscience.” In this case also the origin of the misstatement is the same, the more acute and marked character of the negative function. Thus it is the statement of Plato which needs to be supplemented, while that of Xenophon, so far from needing qualification, is alone commensurate with the common sense of the case. As to the fact to which Plato’s notice points, the words προτρέπει δὲ οὖντο would seem not to be an idle tautology, a reiteration of what we have seen to be a defective statement, but to mark another feature in the case. The Voice was no impulse; it did not speak to the will, but had a critical or reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a purpose, but pronounced judgment on a purpose already in being. Motives, on the other hand, impel the will always in some direction; they cannot be negative. Thus the setting forth the first part of the statement on the negative side only is justified in a way by the antithesis. And the meaning of the two clauses together is, that the Voice is a reflexive judgment on purposed actions, but does not supply motives of action.

The fact which τὸ δαιμόνιον represented was an unanalysed act of judgment,—not on a principle, but on a particular course of action already projected; not on the morality of this, but on its expediency in the Socratic sense of the term. It was κριτικὴ, not ἐπιτακτικὴ. Whatever connection it might really have with the springs of the will would certainly be left out of the statement by one who could identify virtue with knowledge. It was Socrates’ substitute for μαντική. This implies that in the province where men are wont to supplement the failure of penetration by external preternatural aids, Socrates refused, for himself, such irrational expedients, and found, in many instances at least, a guide within himself. But to this guide, being (as we have seen) the outcome of an assemblage of unanalysed processes of thought and judgment, he in all good faith gave a religious name. His mental acts, so far as he could unravel them, were his own, were human; beyond his ken they were divine; and what really was of the nature of an immediate critical sense seemed to him an immediate inspiration.

No Christian would be startled by a view which recognised every
part of his mental processes as performed in dependence on God,—
not on the other hand would he be shocked to hear them spoken
of as independently and properly his own. So long as each view
reached the whole way, he would be satisfied with it, and would
comprehend it. What Socrates did was to halve each of these
views, and to speak of his mental processes as human up to the
point where he could still follow them,—beyond that as divine.
APPENDIX B.

DIGEST OF IDIOMS.

Idioms of Nouns:—Accusative Case, §§ 1—23.
Idioms of Nouns:—Genitive Case, §§ 24—27.
Idioms of Nouns:—Dative Case, §§ 28—29.
Idioms of the Article, §§ 30—39.
Idioms of Pronominal Words, §§ 40—55.
Idioms of Verbs, §§ 56—110.
Idioms of Prepositions, §§ 111—131.
Idioms of Particles, §§ 132—162.
Idioms of Comparison, §§ 163—178.
Idioms of Sentences:—Attraction, §§ 179—203.
Idioms of Sentences:—Binary Structure, §§ 204—230.
Idioms of Sentences:—Abbreviated Construction, §§ 231—261.
Idioms of Sentences:—Pleonasm of Construction, §§ 262—269.
Idioms of Sentences:—Changed Construction, §§ 270—286.
Idioms of Sentences:—Arrangement of Words and Clauses, §§ 287—311.
Rhetorical Figures, §§ 312—326.

§ 1. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—ACCUSATIVE CASE.

Besides the Accusatives governed by Verbs Transitive, as such, occur the following, of a more Adverbial character.

A. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Cognate Accusative.

a. Direct and regular instances of the Cognate Accusative. It will suffice, as a notice of these, to point out that they are of two kinds only, viz.—

a. the Accusative of the Act or Effect signified by the Verb.

β. the Accusative of the Process indicated by the Verb.
Virtual Cognate Accusatives, i.e. such as are cognate in sense only and not etymologically, are intended to be here included. The "Accusative of the General Force of the Sentence" is really an Accusative of Apposition. See below, F (§§ 10–12).

§ 2. b. Accusatives which must be analysed as Adjectives or Pronouns in agreement with an unexpressed Cognate Accusative. These are commonly neuter (not always; cf. Hdt. v. 72, κατέθησαν τὴν ἑπὶ θανάτῳ).

Phedo 75 b, ὅραν καὶ ἀκοῦειν καὶ τῶλλα αἰσθάνεσθαι—'perform the other acts of the senses.'

Πb. 85 b, ἡγούμαι ... ὀν χείρον ἑκεῖνων τὴν μαντικὴν ἔχειν.

Symp. 205 b, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλους καταχρώμεθα ὄνομασιν, i.e. 'in the other cases.' Stallbaum takes this of 'the other (εἴνη) species of things' which have to be named, 'quod ad cæteras attinet formas.' This might be; but the construction of the particular verb χρήσθαι leads us the other way; cf. Thuc. ii. 15, τῆς κρίσεως . . . ἐγών οὖσα τὰ πλείοντο ἀξία ἐχρώντο, Hdt. i. 132, χράται [τοὺς κρέασιν] ὅ τι μν ῥόγος αἰρείει.

Phdr. 228 c, (Ἀ)"Ως μοι δοκεῖς σὺ υἱόδαμος με ἄφθησεν κ.τ.λ. (B)
Πάνι γὰρ σοι ἀληθῆ δοκῶ.

Theæt. 193 c, δείξα εἰς ἄριστερὰ μεταρρέουσης.

Legg. 792 c, τοῦτ' οὐκ' ἐν ἑγὼ ἡνωκαλούθησαμ' ἄν—'this is one step further than I can go with you.' Exactly parallel are the Homeric τὸ δ' ἵκανες, τὸδε χάεο, &c.

Crat. 425 c, εἰ τι χρηστῶν ἐδίει αὐτὰ διελέσθαι.

§ 3. c. Adjectives as well as Verbs are followed by a Cognate Accusative, or by one referable to the same principle.

Apol. 20 b, καλῶ τε καὶ ἄγαθω τὴν προσεκούσαν ἄρετήν.

Πb. d, κῦδυνεϊν [σοφίαν] ταύτην εἶναι σοφός.

Meno 93 b, ταύτην τὴν ἄρετήν, ἢν αὐτοὶ ἄγαθοι ἦσαν.

Rep. 349 c, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄπερ φρόνιμον ἄγαθον [ἐίναι λέγεις];—'good at those things in which he is wise.'

Πb. 579 d, δοῦλος τῶς μεγίστας θυσίαι καὶ δουλείας.

Laches 191 c, τοῦτο τοῖνος αἰτίων ἔλεγον ὅτι ἐγὼ αἰτίος.

So Thucyd. i. 37, αὐταρκῆθέσιν κειμένη, v. 34, ἄτιμους ἔποιησαν ἀτιμίαν τοιάδε.

(B, C, and D, which follow, are to be regarded as very near akin to each other.)
§ 4. B. Accusatives of the part to which the action, or characteristic, is limited, as περὶν πῦθα, βρύχεων ὁδόντας. (Lobeck). Adjectives as well as Verbs, of course, are followed by this Accusative.

Charmid. 154 c, ἀπανετοῦ τὸ κάλλος.

§ 5. C. Accusatives Quantitative (or, in all the instances following, Adjectives in agreement with such Accusatives), expressing how much of the subject is brought under the predication.

Legg. 958 d, ἀ δὶ ἄ χώρα πρὸς τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ μόνον φύσιν ἔχει, ... ταῦτα ἐκπληροῖν.
Ib. ε, ὅσα τροφὴν ... ὡ γῆ ... πέφυκε βούλεσθαι φέρειν.

Rep. 467 ε, οἱ πατέρες, ὅσα ἄνθρωπα, οὐκ ἀμαθεῖς ἔσονται—‘to the extent of human capacities.’ It is hard to hit upon the exact ellipse, comparing other instances; but it cannot be wrong to look on the Accusative as quantitative.

Crito 46 ε, ὅν γὰρ, ὅσα γε τὰνθρώπεα, ἐκτὸς εἰ τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποδηνηςκεῖν αὕριον.
Ib. 54 d, ἀλλ’ ἵσθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦτα, εἀν τι λέγῃς παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτηρ ἐρείς.

Rep. 405 ε, ἱστρικὴς δεῖσθαι ὅ τι μὴ τραυμάτων ἔικεν, ἀλλὰ δὶ ἄργιαν.
Phdr. 274 a, οὖ γὰρ ... ὂμοδουλοῖς δὲι χαρίζεσθαι μελετῶν ... ὅ τι μὴ πάρεργον.

Tim. 42 ε, ἀριστα τὸ θητον διακυβερνήν ἔσων, ὅ τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ γένοιτο αἰτίων.
Ib. 69 d, σεβόμενοι μαίνεω τὸ θείον, ὅ τι μὴ πάσα ἡν ἀνάγκη.
Ib. 90 ε, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμνηστεῖον, ὅ μὴ τει ἀνάγκη μηκύνεων.

§ 6. Hither are also to be referred the following instances, with the distinction that here the quantitative accusative is applied metaphorically, as the measure of the degree of the act or process.

Legg. 679 a, οὐδὲ ἐν προσδέονται σιδήρον. As we say, ‘not one bit.’
Cf. τί δεῖ; (‘what need?’ not ‘why is there need?’) illustrated by Isæus, ii. 39, τί ἐδει αὐτοὺς ὁμοῦναι ...; οὐδὲ ἐν δήσον.

Phædo 91 d, σῶμα γ’—δεὶ ἀπολλύμενου οὐδὲν παύεται—‘ceases not one bit.’ To join it with σῶμα would ruin the sense. And cf. 100 b, ἀπερ ... οὐδέν πέπαιμαι λέγων, and Euthyphro 8 c, οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν παύοντα ταῦτ’ ἀμφιρμήθηντες.
Phædo 99 c, τάγαθον καὶ δέων ἔνεδειν καὶ ἔνεκέον οὖδὲν οἴοντα.

Euthyd. 293 c, ἢττον οὖν τι οὐκ ἐπιστήμων εἰ;

Charm. 174 c, ἢττον τι ἡ λατρικὴ ἐγκαίνειν πούσθει;

Crito 47 c, τούς τῶν πολλών λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαίοντα. Note, that ἐπαιόντων is intransitive (as infra d, εἰ τίς ἔστιν ἐπαίων), and therefore μηδὲν ἐπ. is not ‘who understand nothing,' but ‘who do not understand one bit.'

Apol. 19 c, δὲν ἐγὼ οὖδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πέρι ἐπαίω.

Ib. 21 b, ἐγὼ . . . οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξύνοικα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὄν.

Ib. 26 b, Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν πῶς τοστε ἐμελήσης—where, in accordance with the two last instances, οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν is not the Nom. to ἐμελήσῃ, nor in regimen with τούτων, but in agreement with the Acc. Cognate after ἐμελήσῃ. In Crat. 425 c, οὖδὲν εἰδότες τῆς ἀληθείας, and Legg. 887 c, ὁσιο καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦ κέιμενται, the case is different.

Crito 46 c, πλεῖο τῶν παρόντων . . . ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται.

Phileb. 23 e, πολλὰ ἐσχισμένων.

Symp. 193 a, ἀπαντάειν οὐσίειν περὶ θεῶν—‘in all his acts to act piously towards the gods.'

Apol. 30 c, ἐμὲ μείζον βλάψετε.

Gorg. 512 b, ἔλαττω δύναται σωζέν.

Cf. Homer’s πάντα, as in Od. iv. 654, τῷ δ’ αὐτῷ πάντα ἐφέκε, and the common expression τά μεν—τά δὲ.

§ 7. D. Accusatives of the way, or manner—

Symp. 207 d, τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκείνῳ λόγῳ, ἡ θυνηθ fhvias ἔγνηεi αἰε εἰναι.

Politic. 296 e, τὸν ὅρον . . . ὦν ὁ σοφὸς . . . διουκῆσε τὰ τῶν ἀρχο-

μένων.

Rep. 416 b, τὴν μεγιστὴν τής εὐλαβείας παρεσκευασμένωι—‘on a foot-

ing of the greatest possible caution.’ (τὴν μεγιστὴν τῆς εὐλαβείας

like τὴν πλειότητα τῆς στρατιᾶς, Thuc. vii. 3, &c.)

Cf. Ar. Pax 232, καὶ γαρ εἰξίεναι, γρώμην ἐμὴν, μελλει.

§ 8. Refer to this the common phrase τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, &c.: and, probably, the “Accusative Absolute,”—‘on such and such a footing.'

Protag. 314 c, δάσαν ἡμῖν ταῦτα, ἐπορευόμεθα.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχάμα τῶν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρόπον δὲν μὴ δυνώμεθα πίνως ἀποδοῦναι συγγενώσκειν χρεών.

Phileb. 13 b, τι οὖν δὴ ταύτα . . . ἤνων, πάσας ἡδονὰς ἄγαθὸν εἶναι
§ 9. E. Accusatives referable to the principle of the Accusative of Time or Space.

To designate them thus is not an idle periphrasis; it seems to include, together with the instances of an Accus. of Time or Space in the literal meaning, those in which the notions of Time or Space are applied metaphorically. Only the latter need be noticed here.

Phileb. 59 e, τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦτα ἀπ’ οὗ μιγνύαι αὐτὰς ἐπιχειρητεύον;—where 'after' means in the order of discourse.

Soph. 259 b, τὸ δὲ ... μυρία ἐπὶ μύριοι οὐκ ἔστι—'ten thousand times twice told' for 'in so many instances.'

Phdr. 241 d, οὐκέτα ἄν τὸ πέρα ἀκούσας ἐμοὶ λέγοντος—'saying anything further' for 'saying anything more;'—a real metaphor, as discourse only metaphorically takes up space. As to the construction, τὸ πέρα is not governed, transitively, by ἀκούσας, but follows λέγοντος.

Symp. 198 b, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοῦ καλλοῦς τῶν ὁνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων τίς οὐκ ἔξεπλάγη ἀκούσαν; τὸ ἐπὶ τελ. is a metaphor from space, probably, rather than time. Either way, Stallo. is wrong in explaining the construction by his favourite 'quod attinet ad.'

§ 10. F. Accusatives in Apposition with, or standing for, sentences or parts of sentences.

These Accusatives may be either (1) Noun-Phrases; see a below: or (2) Pronouns Neuter, agreeing with Nouns understood,—viz. either Relative Pronouns; see b below: or Demonstratives, &c.; see c below.

The doctrine here advanced asserts two positions, which are worthy of notice; viz.

§ 11. (i.) These Noun-Phrases and Neuter-Pronouns are Accusatives. The prevalence of the Neuter Gender makes this difficult to prove; but such instances as are decisive afford an analogy for the rest:—

Theod. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτως τῶν κολοφώνω, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.
Cf. Soph. O. T. 603, ἐν τῷ τὸν δλεγχαὶ ἐπὶ, and the Adverbs ἀρχὴν, ἀκραῖο, τὴν πρώτην, &c.

§ 12. (ii.) They represent, by Apposition or Substitution, the sentence itself. To say, that they are Cognate Accusatives, or in Apposition with the (unexpressed) Cognate Accus., would be inade-
§ 13.] ACCUSATIVE CASE. 123

quate to the facts. For (1) in most of the instances the sense points out that the Noun-Phrase or Pronoun stands over against the sentence, or portion of a sentence, as a whole; (2) in many of them, not the internal force—but merely the rhetorical or logical form of the sentence is in view. It might be said that they are Predicates, while the sentence itself is the Subject.

§ 13. a. Accusative of Noun-Phrases in Apposition—

Logg. 736 a, τούτοις, δι' εἰσημαίας ἀπαλλαγῆν, διόμαι ἀποκιάν τιθέμενος.

Crat. 395 d, ἃν καὶ τέλος, ὡς παρίς ἀνετράπητο.

Crito 45 d, τὸ σῶν μέρος, δ' τι ἃν τύχωσι τούτο πράξουσι.

Soph. 260 a, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἃν οστειδήμεν.

Apol. 25 b, ὃ τούναντίον τούτον πάν, εἰς μὲν τις κ.τ.λ.

Logg. 691 a, τὸ μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ πολύ, βασιλέως τούτο ἐστι νόσημα.

Polit. 293 a, ἐπόμενον δὲ τούτῳ, τὴν ὀρθὴν ἀρχὴν δεὶ γητείν.

The Accusatives in the instances which follow characterise the logical or rhetorical form—

Symp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, ἢτι πάσα ἤ ... ἐπιθυμία ... ἔρως.


Theaxt. 153 c, ἐπὶ τούτου τὸν κολοφώνα, ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 66 c, δυοῦ θάτερον, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἢτι κτήσασθαι τὸ εἰδέναι, ἢ κ.τ.λ.

Similarly 68 c (plural), and Charm. 160 b.

Illustrations from other writers begin with Homer: II. iv. 28, Λαδυ ἀγαφοῦση, Προμῷρ κακά, 155, θάνατον νῦ τοι ὥρα! ἔταμνον, ix. 115, σὺ τι φεῦδος ἐμός ἀτα κατελεξα, xxiv. 735, ῥήψε ... ἀπὸ πύργων, λυγρῶν ἀλεθρῶν, Od. xxxi. 35, ἔχχοι θδωκεν, Ἄρχην ξινοσύνης. Æsch. Ag. 225, ὅτι τῆς γενεάς ἄστρον, γνωκοποιῶν πολέμων ὀφραγίων, 1406, νεκρός ... τήσαν δεξίας κρένῳ ἔργου, Cho. 200, εἴχε συμπεπέθεν ἢμοι Ἄγαλμα τύμβοι, κ.τ.λ., 205, Καὶ μὴν στίζον γε, δεύτερον τεκμήριον, Ποδῶν ὄμοιο, καὶ τ' ἐμοίσαν ἐμεφείσει. Eur. Or. 1105, Ἐλένην αἰνώμεν, Μενέλαφ λύπην πικράν. Ar. Acharm. 411, οὐκ ἐτὸς χωλοὺς ποιές. (So Virg. Æn. xi. 383, Proindo tona eloquio, solitum tibi.) Thucyd. iii. 111, πρόφασιν ἐπὶ λαχανισμῶν ἐξελθούτες (and similarly v. 80): cf. the Homeric precedent II. xix. 302, ἐπὶ δ' στενάχουσι γυναῖκες, Πάτροκλος πρόφασιν, σφῶν δ' αὐτῶν κάπ' ἐκάστη (not, as Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 580, πρόφασιν in Apposition to Πάτροκλον). Ar. Vesp. 338, Τοῦ δ' ἐφεξῆ, ἢ μάταιε, ταῦτα δρῶν σε βουλεῖται; Antipho v. 63, p. 136, ἀλ', αὐτὸ
DIGEST OF IDIOMS.

§ 14. The formula of Quotation falls under this head—

Alcib. I. 121 d, ἡμῶν δὲ γενομένων, τὸ τούτο κωμῳδοποιοῦ, οὐδ᾽ οἱ γείτονες σφόδρα αισθάνονται.

Apol. 34 d, καὶ γὰρ, τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὄμήρου, οὐδ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 77 d, δοκείς . . . δεδείναι, τὸ τῶν παιδῶν, μη ὡς ἀληθῶς δ ἀνεμος κ.τ.λ.—where τὸ τῶν π. is not connected with δεδείναι, but refers to the sentence ὃ ἀνεμος αὐτήν . . . διασκεδάζων' that is, does not mean 'to fear, as children fear,' but 'to fear lest it be as children think it is, that the soul goes into the air.'

§ 15. b. Accusative of Relative Pronoun Neuter in Apposition, with a sentence following—

Protag. 352 e, τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, ὃ φασιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἠπάθαι—

'which is what men describe when they say they are,' &c.

Soph. 217 c, δ᾽ ἐρωτησέων, οἷον ποτε καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμάτω καὶ διεξόμενοι λόγους παγκάλους παρεγενόμενος ἐγώ. The illustration which Socrates means to impress on the stranger is not simply Parmenides' use of ἐρωτήσεις, but the whole scene,—the λόγοι πάγκαλοι in which the ἐρωτήσεις were interwoven, and his own presence on these occasions. Cf. Thucyd. ii. 40, δ τοῖς ἄλλωσ ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκκον φέρει̂ and vi. 55, οὔχ ὡς ἀδελφὸς νεώτερος ὑπόθετον ἐν φ' οὐ πρότερον ἔμεθα ἤμιληκε τῷ ἀρχῷ—where ἐν φ' is not = ἐν τούτῳ ἐν φ', but = ἐν τούτῳ ὁ, i.e. 'in a predicament which was that of his not having,' &c. And in the common expressions ἀνθ᾽ ἀνθ᾽ ἄντι τῶν, ὁ, and ὅνεκα ἐνεκα τοῦ, ὁ, the Relatives ἀ and ὁ are instances of the same construction, agreeing with the sentence which they introduce. Gorg. 483 a, ὁ δὴ καὶ σὺ, τοῦτο τὸ σοφὸν κατανεωκεῖς, κακογρεῖς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις—'and this is exactly how you, profiting by your knowledge of this subtlety, cheat in argument.'

Theaet. 158 b, (A) ἄρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ ταύτα ἀμφιβολήμα τοῦ νοεῖς . . . ; (B) τὸ ποίην; (A) ὁ πολλάκις σε οἴμα λέγων ἠτρώσθης, τί ἐν τοῖς ἵλοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι κ.τ.λ.—'that which is expressed by the question, which I dare say you have often heard, what,' &c.

Symp. 188 c, ὅ δη, προανακοματι τῇ μαντικῇ ἐπισκόπων τοὺς ἔρωτας—where ὅ δη agrees with the whole of what follows—'And thus it stands, accordingly;' μαντικῇ is charged with the care of,' &c.
§ 16.} 

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Smyp. 222 b, & δή, καὶ σοι λέγω μη ἐξαπατᾶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦτον—'and thus accordingly, I press upon you also not to be,' &c.

§ 16. So with the 'parenthetical' οἶνος,—in Apposition with the entire sentence—

Rep. 615 b, καὶ οἶνος εἰ τινες πολλὰς δακάτως ἦσαν αἰτιοὶ . . ., κοµί-

σαντο. So Politic. 298 a, Tim. 19 b.

Euthyphro 13 a, λέγομεν γὰρ που,—οἶνον φαμέν ἵππους οὐ πᾶς ἐπιστα-

tαι θεραπεύων κ.τ.λ.

Politic. 267 c, οἶνοι οἱ ἐμποροὶ καὶ γεωργοὶ καὶ . . . διαµάχουν’ ἄν οὖντι

ξύμποτες κ.τ.λ.

Or with a portion of a sentence or a single word.

Phdr. 243 d, ποιμῶν λόγῳ οἶνον ὁμοίων ἀκοὴν ἀποκλύσασθαι.

Politic. 277 c, τὴν οἶνον τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τῇ συγκράσει τῶν χρωµάτων

ἐνάργειαν.

Phædo 64 d, ἱδονᾶς τὰς τοιάσθε, οἶνον στίγμω τε καὶ ποτῶν.

Ib. 73 c, (A) πῶς λέγεις ; (B) οἶνον τὰ τοιάδε.

Ib. 78 d, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν οἶνον ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 83 b, κακῶν ἐπιθειν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν . . . οἶνον ἡ νοσήσας ἡ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 40 c, διοῦν βάτερον ἐστὶ τὸ τεθνάναι’ ἢ γὰρ οἶνον μηδὲν εἶναι . . .

τὸν τεθνώτα ἡ κ.τ.λ.

All these instances of οἶνος show that1 it stands outside the con-
struction of the sentence. But its being in a particular number
and case still requires explanation, and the only explanation is,
that it is in Apposition with the sentence or some portion of it.

Note, that this οἶνος has two shades of meaning, according as it
introduces (a) a metaphor, when it means 'as it were;' or (b) an
instance, when it means 'for instance.' A different analysis is re-
quired for οἶνον δή, οία δή, οία, e. g. in

Critias 112 c, οία δέρους, κατεχράντο ἐπὶ ταύτα αὐτοῖς.

Smyp. 203 b, ἐπειδὴ δέ ἐδείπνησαν, προσωπήσουσα οἶνον δή ἐνωχίας
οἰσης ἀφίκετο ἡ Πενία.

Here the same principle so far appears, that the Neuter Ante-
ceedent to which the Relative refers is (not a Cognate Accus. but)
the whole clause,—viz. in the former instance, κατεχράντο ἐπὶ ταύτα
αὐτοῖς, in the latter προσωπήσουσα. The Relative sentence is ellip-
tical; cf. the use of Relatives generally with δή, and the fuller
expression in

Phædo 60 a, τοιῶν’ ἀττα ἐπευ οία δή εἰσθασών αἱ γυναῖκες.

1 The οἶνος in οἶνον οὗ stands exactly in the same position.
§ 17. c. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (not Relative) standing for a sentence or portion of a sentence, expressed previously or immediately after.

a. For a previously expressed portion of a sentence—

Soph. 238 a, ἔτι γάρ, δ' μακάριε, ἔστιν, καὶ ταῦτα γε τῶν ἀποριῶν ἢ μεγάλη—where ταῦτα is the pronominal substitute for ἔτι ἄστι.

Legg. 630 e, ἀρετῆς μόριον, καὶ ταῦτα τὸ φαυλότατον—where ταῦτα is the substitute for μόριον.

Euthyd. 299 d, (A) χρυσίων ἄγαθῶν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἔχειν; (B) πάνω γε, καὶ ταῦτα γε πολύ—where ταῦτα is the substitute for χρυσίων ἔχειν.

Rep. 341 c, τίνα γοῦν ἐπεξείρησας, οὐδὲν ἄν καὶ ταῦτα—where ταῦτα = ἐπεξείρησας, which thus is brought close to οὐδὲν ἄν, with contemptuous emphasis.

Symp. 210 b, καταστήμα τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἑραστήν, ἐνὸς δὲ τὸ σφόδρα τοῦτο χαλάσαι—where τοῦτο stands for καταστήμα ἑραστήν, and therefore becomes endued with the capacity of governing ἐνὸς (for which cf. Legg. 723 d, οὐδὲ γάρ ἄφαστος παντός δει τὸ τοιοῦτον ὄργαν).

Phileb. 37 d, μῶν οὐκ ὅρθην μὲν δάξαν ἐρόμεν ἀν ὀρθότητα ἵσχυ; ταῦτῶν δὲ ἡδονή; where ταῦτῶν stands for μῶν οὐκ ὅρθην ἐρόμεν ἀν ὀρθότητα ἵσχυ repeated from the other clause.

Gorg. 524 c, εἰ τινος μέγα ἢν τὸ σῶμα φύσει ἢ τροφῇ ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Phaedo 68 c, καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ἦτο τὰ ἑτέρα τοιῶν ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Hom. II. iii. 179, Ἀμφότερον βασιλεὺς τ' ἄγαθὸς κρατερὸς τ' αἰχμηρής.

§ 18. β. For a previously expressed whole sentence—

Legg. 658 d, τίς οὖν ὁρθῶς ἀν νεικηκὼς εὑρ,—τοῦτο μετὰ τοῦτο; (‘the next question,’—as Protag. 323 c).

Theax. 189 ε, λόγον οὖν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχῇ διεξέρχεται . . . τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἐνδέκειται . . . οὐκ ἀλλα τι ἡ διαλέγεσθαι.

Tim. 27 c, (A) σον οὖν ἔργον λέγεω . . . , καλέσατα κατὰ νόμον θεοῦ.

(B) Ἀλλ', δ' Σώκρατες, τούτο γε δή, πάντες . . . ἐπὶ παντὸς ὄρμη . . . πράγματος θεοῦ ἀεὶ που καλοῦσιν.

(In the two last instances we have the Neut. Pron. τούτο, which stands for the previous sentence, connected with a sentence succeeding, in which the Pronoun is virtually restated at large. Thus, as to meaning, τούτο is placed between the two sentences as a
symbol of equivalence: but as to grammar, its relations to each are different; it stands for the sentence preceding, and is in apposition with the sentence which are subjoined)—

Politic. 262 e, (A) κάλλιον δέ που κατ' εἰδή καὶ δίχα διαφορίν' ἂν, 
ei k.t.l. (B) 'Ορβότατα' αλλὰ γὰρ τούτο αὐτό, πῶς ἂν τις γένοις καὶ 
méros ... γνώι; 

Meno 90 d, οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ αἰλήσεως ... τά αὐτά ταῦτα, πολλὴ ἀνοιά 
ésti k.t.l. So Symp. 178 e.

Symp. 204 a, οὐδ' αὖ οἱ ἀμαθεῖς ... ἐπιθυμοῦν σοφοὶ γενέσθαι: αὐτό 
γὰρ τοῦτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὄντα ... δοκεῖν αὐτῷ ἐιναι— 
where αὐτό τοῦτο, standing for the sentence preceding, is in 
Apposition with τὸ μὴ ὄντα ... ἐιναι, which is also, as to mean-
ning, the virtual re-statement of the Pronoun.

As to the construction of this sentence, τὸ μὴ ὄντα—ἐιναι evidently 
contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία: only that it is expressed 
in the regular causal form, ὅτι τις οὐκ ἂν ... δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἐιναι, or 
παρὰ τὸ μὴ ... δοκεῖν, but under the form of the Apologetic Infinitive 
(see § 85).

It follows, that the αὐτό τοῦτο introduces the preceding sentence 
as a reason. In other words, αὐτό τοῦτο here stands in three rela-
tions; (1) to the sentence preceding it is related Pronominally, 
as standing for it; (2) to τὸ μὴ ὄντα ... ἐιναι it is related Appo-
sitionally; and (3) to ἐστὶ χαλεπῶν ἀμαθία it is related causally.

The explanation of this last instance will apply to all which 
follow under this head—the Neuter Pronoun introduces a pre-
ceeding sentence in a causal relation to the principal construction 
of the sentence to which the Pronoun is joined. The cause is not 
necessarily re-stated, but, if it is, the Pronoun is in apposition to it—

Protag. 310 e, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ('this is just what it is') ... ἤκω παρὰ 
σὲ ἵνα υπέρ ἐμοῦ διαλέξθης αὐτῷ.

Euthyphro 4 d, ταῦτα δὴ οὖν καὶ ἀγανάκτει ὁ πατήρ ... ὅτι ἐγὼ ... τῷ 
pατρὶ φόνου ἐπεξέρχομαι.

Symp. 174 a, ταῦτα δὴ ἐκκαλλωπισάμην ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἦν.

Cf. Arist. Nub. 335, Ταῦτ' ἀρ' ἐποίουν ἕγραυν νεφελᾶν ... ὀμμάν, 
353, Ταῦτ' ἀρ' ταῦτα κ.τ.λ. Ἀσχ. P. 165, Ταῦτα μοι διπλῆ 
μέριμν' ἀφραστὸς ἐστιν ἐν φρεσί, and Eum. 512, ταῦτα τοῖς τὰكن Ἀ 
pατήρ ... οἰκῶν οἰκτίσατε' ἐπειδή πιττᾶτε δόμοι δικας. 
Soph. O. T. 1004, (A) Καὶ μὴν χάριν γ' ἂν ἄξιων λάβοις ἐμοῦ. (B) Καὶ μὴν μά-
λιστα τοῦτ' ἀφικόμην, ὅπως Σοῦ πρὸς δόμοις ἐλθόντος εὕ πράξαιμι τι.
Eur. Androm. 209, Σὺ δ’ ἐν τῷ κυνάβθε, ... Μενελαες δὲ σοι Μείξων Ἀχιλλέως ταυτά τοι σ’ ἔχεις πόσις. 2 St. Pet. i. 5, καὶ αὐτὸ τούτο δὲ, σπουδὴν πᾶσαν παρεισενέγκαστε, ἐπιχορηγήσατε κ.τ.λ.

§ 19. γ. For a sentence expressed immediately after—

Phaedo 105 a, ὥρα δὴ εἰ ὄντως ὀρίζει, μὴ μόνον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκείνο,—ὁ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ... ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι.

Protag. 326 b, οὐ τ’ αὖ καθαρίσταί, ἑτερα τοιαύτα, σωφροσύνης ἐπιμελοῦται.

Rep. 334 b, τοῦτο μὲντοι ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ ἐτί, ὥφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἡ δικαιοσύνη κ.τ.λ.


Soph. 248 d, τὸ δὲ, ὅσ τὸ γεννώσκειν ἐπερ ἠσται ποιεῖ τι, τὸ γεννώσκέμενον ἀναγκαῖον ἀν συμβαίνει πάσχειν.

Legg. 630 d, τὸ δὲ,—πᾶς χρὴ ἡμᾶς λέγειν;

Ib. 803 d, τὸ β’,—ἢν ἐν πολεμῷ μὲν ἄρα οὐτ’ οὐν παῦσα πεφυκὼν οὐτ’ αὖ παύεια.

Apol. 23 a, τὸ δὲ,—κυνικοποεῖ ... τῷ ὑπ’ ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι.

Cf. St. Paul, 2 Cor. ix. 6, τούτο δὲ, ὁ σπείρων φειδομένος, φειδομένος καὶ θερίσει, St. Mark ix. 23, το, ἐν δύνασαι πιστεύσαι—(the τὸ throws emphasis on the succeeding words). Cf. also the common idiom τοῦτο μὲν—τοῦτο δὲ (each a pre-statement of the clause which it introduces).

§ 20. δ. Accusative of Neuter Pronoun (generally τις or ἄλλος) standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed—

Phaedo, 58 c, τι δὲ δὴ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τὸν θάνατον; τί ἢ τὰ λεχθέντα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 204 d, (A) ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν τὶ ἐρᾶ; (B) Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ—where τὶ stands for a whole dependent sentence, thus; ‘he who desires things beautiful desires that they should—what?’ The dependent sentence is thus left unexpressed, but that τὶ stands for it is proved by the answer, which supplies one.

Exactly parallel is Ἐσχ. Ag. 953, (A) Τί δ’ ἄν δοκεῖ σοι Πρίαμος, εἰ τάθ’ ἤρων; (B) Ὁ εὖ ποικίλοις ἄν κάρτα μοι βήμα δοκεῖ. So St. John xxi, 28, Κύριε, οὖσας δὲ τί;—where τί is the implicit completion of the sentence.
On this principle are to be explained the phrases which follow.

Apol. 26 d, ἡν τί ταύτα λέγεις; (similarly Symp. 205 a.)—There is no γένηται to be supplied; τί in itself is the full representatative complement of the sentence; the actual complement is of course suspended in the interrogation.

Meno 86 e, εἰ μὴ τί (similarly Rep. 509 c), and Symp. 222 e, εἰ μὴ τί ἄλλα. The sentence is complete; the τί and the τί ἄλλα stand for full propositions.

Symp. 206 c, (A) οὗ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔρως . . . . (B) ἄλλα τί μὴν; (A) Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ. Here the τί refers back to the words τοῦ καλοῦ, and itself stands for a similar phrase; which is proved by the answer Τῆς γεννήσεως. Except on the principle now before us, the phrase would have been variable, and we should in the present instance have found (what Steph. conjectures) ἄλλα τίνος μὴν; Similarly 202 d. The phrase may of course equally stand for a whole sentence, as Rep. 362 d, 438 b (‘and what then?’). The same explanation holds of the τί in the phrase of polite assent, τί μὴν; 2 (literally ‘if not, then what?’) The explanation of τί; in the sense of ‘why?’ is the same; and of the answering particle οὕτω ‘because.’

§ 21. In the following instances the significance of the τί is hinted in a second interrogation following.

Phdr. 234 c, τί σοι φαίνεται ὁ λόγος; —οὐχ ὑπερφυὼς εἰρήσθαι;
Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν ταύτης;—ἡ παρ’ ἐκάνου φαίνει;
Soph. 266 c, τί δὲ τήν ἡμετέραν τέχνην;—ἂρ οὐκ αὐτὴν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομικῇ φήσωμεν ποιεῖν;
Phaedo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . . ; ἢρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἢ κ.τ.λ.; (The genitive τῶν—καλῶν is suspended in a loose construction, which the second interrogation supersedes.)
Phileb. 27 e, τί δὲ ὁ σῶς [βίος] . . . . ;—ἐν τίνι γένει ἐν λέγοιτο;
So probably Phaedo 64 d, (A) φαίνεται σοι φιλοσόφου ἀνθρῶς εἶναι ἑσπουδακέαν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καλομεῖνας τὰς τοιοῦτα κ.τ.λ.; (B) Ἡκα-
στα, (A) Τί δὲ τάς τῶν ἄφροδισίων; (B) Οὐδαμῶς. (A) Τί δὲ τάς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τό σώμα θεραπείας;—δοκεῖ σοι ἑντίρως ἥγεισθαι τὸ τοιοῦτο; See more instances under Binary Structure (§ 207).
Legg. 630 c, οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ πρὸς τὴν μεγίστην ἀρετὴν μαλιστα βλέπων

1 Add τί μέλλει, as in Hipp. Mi. invariable, though attracted some-373 d, Rep. 349 d. μέλλει can be times into μέλλομεν.

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§ 22. The Adverbial Interrogatives ἀλλο τί ἤ and ἀλλο τι are instances of the same principle; and may conveniently be discussed here once for all.

They have the following points in common: (1) as to their use, they both expect an affirmative answer: (2) as to their construction, the ἀλλο in both (as in the instances heretofore given) is used proleptically; and (as we have said) both are instances of the Neuter Pronoun Accusative standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed.

But from this point we must investigate them separately.

*Ἀλλο τι ἤ challenges an affirmation with respect to some special portion of the sentence. It may be that it sometimes affects the whole; but (unlike ἀλλο τι) it can, and in most instances does, affect a particular portion of the sentence. And the interrogation is, in strictness, limited to the part affected.

Ἀπολ. 24 c, ἄλλο τι ἤ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ, ὅπως ὡς βελτιστοὶ οἱ νέωτεροι ἐσονται; The interrogation is made as to περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖ.

Ἀλλο τι ἤ σιτών τε ποιούντες καὶ ὑποδήματα; The interrogation is made as to σιτῶν τε π. κ. ὑποδήματα, to the exclusion of the Verb διατητόμονται.

Ἄλκ. Ι. 129 b, τῷ διαλέγεις σὺ νῦ; ἄλλο τι ἤ ἐμοι; The phrase gets its meaning thus; the speaker, about to name a certain fact or thing, gives it emphasis by first asking whether any other ought to be named instead of it.

Some doubt might be felt whether ἤ is 'than' or 'or.' Certain phrases would point to 'or,' such as
Gorg. 459 b, τοῦτο συμβαίνει ἡ ἄλλο τι; Politic. 266 b, (A) μῶν ἄλλως πως πέφυκεν, ἡ καθόπερ κ.τ.λ.; (B) ὁκ ἄλλως.
Legg. 683 e, βασιλεία δὲ καταλύεται ἢ καὶ τις ἁρχὴ πώποτε καταλύετη μῶν ὑπὸ τινων ἄλλων ἢ σφών αὐτῶν;
Protag. 330 c, τίν' ἂν ψήφον θείο; τὴν αἰτήν ἐμοὶ ἡ ἄλλην;

But more decisive for 'than' are

Protag. 357 e, διὰ τὸ ὁ̄κεσθαι ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁμαθίαν εἰναι, and the variations,
Soph. 220 e, τὰ τουαίνα μῶν ἄλλο τι πλὴν ἐρκη χρη προσαγορεύειν;
Phaed. 91 d, ἄρα ἂλλ δ' ταύτ' ἐστίν, ὃ κ.τ.λ.; and the common formula συμβεν ἄλλο ἢ and τι ἄλλο ἢ which are not ambiguous.

'ἄλλο τι challenges an affirmation with respect to the whole sentence which follows it.

Rep. 337 e, ἄλλο τι οὖν καὶ σὺ οὔτω παιήσεις;—you mean, do 'you, that you will do so?'
Ib. 369 d, ἄλλο τι γεωργὸς μὲν εἰς, ὃ δὲ οἰκοδόμος, ἄλλοσ δὲ τις ὑφαντίσ;—where the force of the ἄλλο τι cannot stop short of the whole sentence.

Gorg. 467 d, ἄλλο τι οὖν οὔτω καὶ περὶ πάντων,—εάν τις τι πράττῃ ἐκείνα του, οὐ τοῦτο βούλεται κ.τ.λ.;—where the interrogation must go on to the end; and, besides, the whole sentence is gathered up in the pre-anouncing clause οὔτω καὶ περὶ πάντων.

Phaed. 79 b, (A) Φρε δῆ, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐστι το δὲ ψυχή; (B) οὔδεν ἄλλο.
Symp. 201 a, ἄλλο τι ὁ ἔρως κάλλους ἄν εἴη ἔρως, αἰσχους δ' οὐ;
(In Euthyd. 286 c, ἄλλο τι ἡ ψευδή κ.τ.λ., the interrogation goes through several clauses: but here two MSS. omit ἢ.)

Thus ἄλλο τι affects the whole of the sentence, like the French n'est ce pas que. The interrogation it makes is not restricted to any particular portion of the sentence.

But how does it come to have its meaning? For there is no colour for supposing that it stands for ἄλλο τι ἢ.

It represents an unexpressed sentence (according to the use of the Neuter Pronoun at present before us);—namely, 'any different' proposition from that about to be enunciated. The speaker, by ἄλλο τι, 'puts the question' about this shadow of a proposition, but anticipates the judgment by offering simultaneously for acceptance his own view. Thus the interrogation strictly speaking belongs to
the ἄλλο τι alone, though it spreads from it to the whole sentence beyond.

§ 23. The last use to be mentioned of the Neuter Accusative of ἄλλος as standing for a sentence, or portion of a sentence, unexpressed, is in winding up an enumeration.

Symp. 176 a, ἰδανας τὸν θεόν καὶ τάλλα τὰ νομιζόμενα.
Theoct. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν δήλθομεν. (I class this passage under the present head, because by the sense πάντα must stand for τάλλα πάντα. Cf. § 249.)

In neither of these passages can the Accusative be said to be Cognate, as if it were subjoined by καὶ to the unexpressed Cognate Accusatives of ἰδανας and καθεύδοντα: for it is really other participles that are added, co-ordinate with ἰδανας in the one case and καθεύδοντα in the other.

Theoct. 145 a, ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικός καὶ λογιστικός τε καὶ μουσικός καὶ ὁσα παρείς ἔχεται;
Phdr. 227 c, πένθι μᾶλλον ἡ πλονσίῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ἡ νεωτέρῳ καὶ ὁσα ἄλλα ἐμοὶ πρόσεστι.
Ib. 246 c, τὸ δὲ θείων καλὸν σοφόν ἀγαθόν καὶ πᾶν ὦ τι ταύτων.3

§ 24. Idioms of Nouns:—Genitive Case.

A. Genitive of Exegeesis.

Apol. 29 b, ἀμαθία . . . αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἰεσθαί εἰδέναι ἂ οὐκ οἴδεν.
Phaedo 78 b, τούτο τὸ πάθος . . . , τοῦ διασκεδάζωσθαι. [So Oxon. and one other MS.]
Ib. 96 b, ὁ τὰς αἰσθήσεις παρέχων τοῦ ἁκούει καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι.
Ib. 97 a, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοὶς ἐγένετο δύο γενέσθαι, ἡ ἐώνδος τοῦ πλησίον ἄλληλων τεθηναι.

§ 25. B. Genitive of a Substantive with ὦ, loosely, denoting the agent to whom a particular effect is to be referred.

Symp. 212 c, καὶ ἔκαψεν τὴν ἀδελεον θύραν κρονομένην πολὺν ψόφον παρασχεῖν ὡς κομαστῶν—where ὦς κομαστῶν does not closely follow ψόφον, but characterises the general effect produced.

3 [Under these three examples is written in the MS. "Proof to be subjoined that these are Accusatives."]
§ 26. GENITIVE CASE.

Cf. Arist. Eth. I. xiii. 18, οὖτω δή καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς . . . φαμέν ἐχειν λόγον, καὶ οὐχ ἔστερ τῶν μαθηματικῶν—(‘not in the sense in which mathematicians use the expression.’) Åsch. Eum. 628, δειν . . . . . . . . . . . Τέκνοις ἐκπαίδευσαν, ὅστε 'Αμαξίων, Cho. 990, ἔχει γὰρ αἰσχυντήρος, ὅς νόμον, δίκην (the law being personified into an agent, as frequently elsewhere). Soph. Aj. 998, ὀδεία γὰρ σου βάζει, ὃς θεοῦ τιμῶς, Δίηλθ' Ἀχαίοις (‘like a theia φήμη, that is’) Trach. 768, προσπέπτασεται Πλευραίων ἄρτικελλος, ὡστε τέκνοις (‘like carver’s work.’) Ib. 112, πολλὰ γὰρ ὡς ἀκύμαντος ἦ γνώτο γὰρ βορία τις κύματα . . . ἰδοι—which points again to the Homeric τὸν ὁ οὐκοτα κύματα λείπει Παντοκός ἀνέμων, II. ii. 396.

§ 26. C. Genitive of a Noun with a Participle, after Verbs of knowing, seeing, shewing.

Apol. 27 a, ἄρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαρινευζομένων; Ib. 37 b, ὅν εὐ οἴος ὅτι κακῶν ὄντων.

Cra. 412 a, μηνύει ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς.

Rep. 558 a, ἡ οὕτω εἴδες . . . αὐτῶν μενόντων;


Probably of the use of these Verbs with a Genitive unaccompanied by a Participle there is no clear instance in Plato.

In Charm. 154 c, ἐδεασάμεθα . . . τού εἶδος, the Genitive is very possibly Partitive, as also in Rep. 485 b, μαθηματος . . . δ ἓ αὐτοίς δηλοὶ ἐκεῖνη τῆς οὐσίας.

In Legg. 646 d, καὶ τῆς περὶ τῶν οὐν ἀρα διατρῆσε ὡσαίτως διανοητέων, the Genitive has tacit reference to περὶ in the question previously put, οὐκοὺν χρή καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων περὶ διανοεῖσθαι τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον;

In Rep. 375 d, οἴσθη γὰρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν, ὅτι τοῦτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἢθος, κυνῶν is governed by ἢθος.

D. Genitive of a Noun, without any Participle, after Verbs of mentioning.

Men. 96 a, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεὶ ἄλλου ὄρους πράγματος, οὐ κ.τ.λ.;—Why

4 The passage, Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τούτου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν οὐ κ.τ.λ.; is to be construed otherwise; τοῦ τούτου is governed by χείρ. See under Binary Structure (§ 225).
this is not to be explained on the principle of Attraction of Antecedent to Relative, see under Attraction (§ 191.)

Legg. 804 c, καὶ οὐδὲν φοβηθεὶς εἶποι· ἂν τούτων τὸν λόγον οὔτε ἵππικης οὔτε γυμναστικῆς, ὥς ἀνδράσι μὲν πρέπειν ἂν εἴη, γυναιξὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν πρέπειν.

Cf. Soph. Λύ. 1236, Ποίον κέκραγας ἄνδρος ὡδὸ υπέρφρονα; and ib. 1257, O. C. 355, 'Α τοῦδ' ἑκρήσαθ' σώματος, Trach. I 122, Τῆς μητρὸς ἦκε τῆς ἐμῆς φράσων.

In Homer, Verbs of knowing &c. also thus govern a Genitive of a Noun without a Participle.

I. xii. 229, Πεθαίνοντα, Od. xxii. 36, Γνώστω τούληλων, and so xxiii. 109, Γνωσόμεθ' ἄλληλων. II. xiv. 37, ὑψεῖοις οὔτῆς, xvi. 811, διδασκόμεσθος πολέμου.

§ 27. E. Genitive of a Noun placed at the beginning of a construction, for the sake of premising mention of it, without any grammatical justification of the genitive.

Phædo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν . . . ὑπ' ἡμᾶς διὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἢ κ.τ.λ.; Gorg. 509 d, τί δὲ δὴ τοῦ αὐτοκειόμενος πότερον . . . ἢ κ.τ.λ.; Legg. 751 b, δῆλον . . . ὅτι . . . τοῦ πόλεων εἴπαρκος μὲν παρεσκευασμένην ἀρχής ἀνεπιπεδείκτης ἐπιστήμης τούτων εἴπαι κείμενος νόμως, . . . οὐδὲν πλέον εἴπαι τεθείτων [ἐκτιμαί].

Rep. 576 d, ἄλλα εὐδυαμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος, ὑπαγόμενος ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις;

Cf. Λ. Esch. Ag. 950, Τούτων μὲν οὕτως' and Eum. 211, Τί γὰρ γνῶσις ήτις ἄνδρα νοσφιᾶς; also Arist. Pol. I. iv. 1, ὁσπερ δὲ ἐν τοῖς σχισμέναις τεχνίς ἀναγκαῖον δὴ τοῖς ἐπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὅργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθεῖσθαι τὸ ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονόμων.

The principle seems to be that the intended mention of the thing is regarded from the side of the genitive as limited and occasioned by it. Near this use stands also

Legg. 969 c, τῆς πόλεως ἐκείνης τῆς κατοικίσεως.

§ 28. IDIOMS OF NOUNS:—DATIVE CASE.

Certain intensified uses of the 'Dative of Reference' are noticeable. a. Where the Dative is only justified by making the notion of Reference concentrated enough to include Possession.

a. Dative of Nouns.

Apol. 40 c, μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὐδα καὶ μετοίκησι τῇ ψυχῇ.
Phædo 62 b, ἡμᾶς τούς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τοῖς κτημάτων τοῖς θεοῖς εἶναι.
§§ 29, 30.] DATIVE CASE. THE ARTICLE. 135

Phileb. 58 c, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ἐπάρχειν τέχνη διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν.
Legg. 760 c, τῷ τόπῳ ἐκάστῳ τῆν ἐπικαλεῖν εἴναι τοιῶν τινά.
Ib. 820 e, ἀστρων . . . τῆν μάθησιν τοῖς νέοισ.

β. Dative of Pronouns.
Charm. 157 c, ἡ πατρίδα ὑμῖν οἰκία.
Legg. 624 b, ταῖς πάλαις ἡμῖν θέντοι τοὺς νόμους.
Theat. 210 b, ἡ μαεντικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη.
Phaedo 60 c, θεὸς . . . ξυνήψεν εἰς ταύτων αὐτοῖς τὰς κορυφὰς.
Ib. 72 c, ἢν ποῦ ἡμῖν ἡ ψυχή [Oxon.], and ibid. ἡμῖν ἡ μάθησις.
Cf. Thuc. 1. 6, οἱ πρεσβυτέροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐθαμβών. Isæus vi. 6.
 p. 56, τῷ μὲν ὄνω ἀδελφῷ αὐτῷ . . . ἐκεινηπατήν.

§ 29. b. Where the Dative is justified by making the notion of Reference include that of the Object.

α. In the case of the latter of two Substantives.
Symp. 194 d, ἐπιμεληθῆναι τοῦ ἐγκώμιον τῷ Ἔρωτι.
Rep. 607 a, ὑμοιοὶ θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.
Legg. 653 d, τὰς τῶν ἑορτῶν ἀμοιβάς τοῖς θεοῖς.
Ib. 950 c, ἀγώνων τούτων τοῖς θεοῖς.

β. In the case of the remote Object after a Verb.
This usage is partly owing to the force of Attraction, and the instances are given under that head (§ 183).

§ 30. IDIOMS OF THE ARTICLE.

α. As a Demonstrative Pronoun Antecedent.
Theat. 204 d, ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἥστι. So Protag. 320 d,
Phileb. 21 c.
Soph. 241 c, τεχνῶν τῶν ὅσα περὶ ταύτα εἰσί.
Phdr. 239 b, τῆς ἱδεν ἂν κ.τ.λ. (referring to συνονσία.)
Ib. 247 e, ἐν τῷ δέ ἐστιν ἄν ὄντως.
Phileb. 37 a, τὸ ὧ τὸ ἡδομένων ἦδεται.
Tim. 39 c, τῷ δέ ἐστι ζωον.
Critias 115 b, τῶν ὅσοι ξύλινος (referring to καρπός.)
Legg. 761 c, περὶ τοὺς ἄν ἐπιμελοῦνται.
Ib. 905 b, ἐκεῖνων τῶν οὗς κ.τ.λ.
Phædo 75 a, ἐκείνου ὀρέγεται τοῦ δ ἐστὶν ἵσιν.
Ib. 102 c, τῷ ὃτι Φαύδουν ὃ Φαύδουν ἐστίν.
Jelf, G. G. § 444, notices that "this idiom is peculiarly Platonic," adding however one or two instances from the Orators.

§ 31. b. Prefixed to Personal Pronouns, laughingly.
Theæt. 166 a, γιλωτα δή τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπείδευξε.
Soph. 239 b, τὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἐμὲ γε κ.τ.λ.
Phileb. 20 b, δεινὸν προσδοκάν αὐθέν δει τὸν ἐμὲ.
Ib. 59 b, τὸν μὲν δὴ σε καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίων καὶ Φιληθέων χρή συχνὰ χαίρειν ἕαν.
Lysis 203 b, παρὰ τίνας τοὺς ἄρας;
Phdr. 258 a, καὶ δὲ εἶπε, τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ λέγων, κ.τ.λ.
Jelf, G. G. § 452, says "this construction seems to be confined to the Accusative."

§ 32. c. When the Substantive has a plurality of Adjectives qualifying it, the order is disturbed, with a view of relieving the heaviness of the term, in various ways.

a. By postponing the Substantive, when one of the Adjectives ought to have followed it.
Crat. 398 b, ἐν τῇ ἄρχαιᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ φωνῇ.
Ib. d, τὴν 'Λυττικὴν τὴν παλαιὰν φωνήν.
Symp. 213 c, τὴν τούτων ταυτης τὴν θαυμαστὴν κεφαλήν.
Legg. 732 c, τὸ θυσίων πᾶν ἣδων.
Phædo 100 a, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων ἄντων [so Oxon. and seven other MSS.]—i.e. τῶν ἄλλων ἄντων ἀπάντων.

b. By bringing in the Substantive before its time.
Phileb. 43 a, τῶν λόγων ἐπισφερόμενων τούτων.
Legg. 659 d, τὸν ὕπο τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὀρθῶν εἰρημένων.
Ib. 790 c, τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μίθων λεχθέντων.
Ib. 793 b, ὃ νῦν δὴ λόγου ἡμῶν ἐπιπυθεῖς.

§ 33. Upon these principles are to be explained the seeming anomalies which occur, in the Tragic Poets especially, in the collocation of Substantives with a plurality of epithets preceded by the Article.

a. Æschyl. Cho. 496, φιλτατον τὸ σῶν κάρα (for φ. κάρα τὸ σῶ), Suppl. 9, αὐτογενή τῶν φυζάνωρα γάμου (for γάμον τῶν φυξ.). Soph.
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Philo. 133, 'Ερμής ὁ πέμπτων δόλιος (for Ἐ, δόλιος ὁ πέμπτων). Thuc. i. 126, ἐν τῷ τοῦ Δίως τῷ μεγίστῃ ἔργῳ. Lysias vii. 24. p. 110, ἐν ταῖς ἁλοίσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς χωρίοις. Ar. Eq. 1323, ἐν ταῖσιν ἱστοτέφανοιν οἰκεῖ ταῖς ἀρχαιαῖσιν 'Αθηναῖς (the last three instances from Jelf).

B. Εσχ. Agam. 1642, ὁ δυσφλεῖς σκότῳ θημὸς δύσοικος (where θημὸς is anticipated), Eum. 653, τὸ μητρὸς αἱμ᾽ ὁμοίων (perhaps, for the αἱμ᾽ ὁμοίον might otherwise be regarded as virtually a single word, as in Εσχιν. iii. 78. p. 64, ὁ γὰρ μισότεκνος, καὶ πατὴρ πανηρός, οἰκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο ἰδιαγωγὸς χρηστός, where πατήρ πανηρός is for the purpose of the sentence a single word), Suppl. 349, τῶν ἱκτίνων φυγάδα περιδρομῶν. Soph. Aj. 134, τῆς ἀμφιρῦτον Σαλαμίνος . . . ἀγχώλου, ib. 1166, τῶν ἀείχροστον τάφον εὐρώφητα, Phil. 394, τῶν μέγαν Πακτώλων εὐχρυσον, O. T. 671, τὸ σῶν . . . στόμα 'Ελευσῆ, ib. 1199, τὰν γαμψώνυχα παρθένων χρησιμοδόθην. Pind. Ol. V. 4, τῶν σῶν πόλιν . . . λαοτρόπον. Thuc. i. 96, ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθείς; v. 11, πρὸ τῆς νῦν ἀγορᾶς οὐοῆς (these two from Jelf).

The anomalies which remain unexplained are those in which a Possessive Pronoun is concerned,—in all the instances ἐμῦ. Εσχ. Agam. 1226, τῷ μολότῳ δεισπότη 'Εμφ. Soph. Aj. 572, ὁ λυμεών ἐμὸς, O. T. 1462, ταῦτ᾽ ὁ δολίαιον οἰκτρῶν τε παρθένων ἐμαῖς. Eur. Hipp. 683, Ζεὺς ὁ γεννητωρ ἐμῶς. All that can be said in explanation of the exceptional form of these passages, is that they are exceptional in meaning. Generally, where there is a Possessive Pronoun attached to the Substantive, it is that which makes it definite; here the Substantive is perfectly defined in its application independently of the Possessive Pronoun.

§ 34. d. Omitted with the former of two Substantives in regimen. Observe, that a different shade of meaning results from this deviation from the common form; a shade of meaning which would be rendered equivalently by attaching the second Noun more loosely to the former.

Rep. 395 c, δημιουργοῦς ἐλευθερίας τῆς πόλεως—'artificers of freedom for the city.'

Symp. 182 c, συμφέρει . . . φρονήματα μεγάλα ἐγγίγνεσθαι τῶν ἄρχο-μένων—'that high-spiritedness in the ruled should be strongly developed.'

Ib. 196 b, πρὶ μὲν οὖν κύλλους τοῦ θεοῦ—'beauty as attributable to the god.'

Theæt. 175 a, ἀτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας—'a marvel in the way of minuteness.'
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. \[\S\S\ 35—38.\]

Crat. 391 b, ὁρθότατη τῆς σκέψεως—'truest manner of viewing'—

ἡ ὁρθότατη would have been 'the truest part of the view.'

Hipp. Ma. 282 a, ἕθον τῶν ζωντων—'envy against the living.'

Cf. Thuc. iii. 82, τῶν τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωρῶν ἀτομία, vi. 76, ἐπὶ τοῦ Μήδου τιμωρία. Hdt. ii. 19, τοῦ ποταμοῦ δὲ φύσιος πέρι (φύσιος being a topic of enquiry).

Different are addresses, as Legg. 662 c, ὃ ἀριστοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, 817 a,

ἢ ἀριστοὶ τῶν ξένων, 820 b, ὃ βέλτιστοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, where the Vocative supersedes the Article.

§ 35. c. Omitted with the latter of two Substantives in regimen.

The meaning indicated by this peculiarity is the close union of the notions represented by the two Nouns.

Symp. 187 c, ἐν ἀετῇ τῇ συντάσσει ἁμονίας τῇ καὶ μυθοῦ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 92, τὸ ἐσχατον ἐγώνος. Hdt. i. 22, τὸ ἐσχατον κακοῦ.

§ 36. Different is the case where the latter Substantive is the name of a country or of the inhabitants of a country or city; for before such Nouns the Article is habitually omitted. This is worth observing, for the sake of precluding misapprehension of the construction, where there is a concurrence of Genitives.

Phædo 57 a, οὐτε γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν Φλασίων οὐδές ἐπιχειρίαζε τὰ νῦν Ἀθηναῖε—'for neither of the Phliasians does any citizen,' &c.

That is, Φλασίων is governed by οὐδές τῶν πολιτῶν.

Legg. 625 c, τὴν τῆς χώρας πάσης Κρήτης φύσω—where Κρήτης is governed by χώρας φύσω.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 109, τῶν ἐνυπτρατηγῶν Ἀκαρνάνων, vii. 30, διέθεσεν ...

... Θηβαίων τῶν Βιωτορχῶν Σκηφωνδιαν.

§ 37. f. Omitted after οὕτωs preceding a Substantive.

Rep. 399 c, ταύτας διὸ ἁμονίας.

Ib. 621 b, οὕτωs, & Πλαύκων, μέθος ἐσώθη.

Symp. 179 c, τοῦτο γέρας.

Soph. 237 d, τὸ τί τοῦτο ῥήμα.

Gorg. 489 b, οὕτωs ἀνὴρ.

Ib. 505 c, οὕτωs ἀνὴρ.

Phileb. 16 c, ταύτην φύμην.

Tim. 52 d, οὕτωs ... δεδόσθω λόγος.

§ 38. g. Omitted before ἀνὴρ or ἀνδρωπος standing (as Forster expresses it) "pronominis loco."
Phædo 58 e, εἰδαίµον γὰρ μοι ἄνὴρ [so Oxon. and three other MSS.] ἑφαίνετο, ὧν "Εξέκρατες—(ἄνηρ being the subject.)
Ib. 98 b, ἐπειδὴ προίνω καὶ ἀναγγελῆσων ὅρῳ ἄνδρα τῷ μὲν νῦν οὐδὲν χρώμενων.
Cf. Ἀσchin. ii. 57. ῅. 35, σκέψασθε δὴ δεινῷ ἀναισχυντῖν ἄνδρωπον—also iii. 99. ῅. 67, καὶ γὰρ τούτο ἄνθρωπος ἱδιον καὶ οὗ κοινῶν ποιεῖ, and 125. ῅. 71, ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τὴν πόλιν ἄνθρωπος οὕκ ἡδύνατο σφηλαῖ.
§ 39. h. (from Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 459) "Ταῦτα, θάτερον, sometimes take the Article, as, their original Article being lost in the Crasis, they are regarded as simple words:
Tim. 37 b, περὶ τὸ ταῦτα.
Ibid. δ τοῦ θατέρου κύκλος.
Ib. 44 b, τὸ το θάτερον καὶ τὸ ταῦτα."

§ 40. IDIOMS OF PRONOMINAL WORDS.
Dialogue gives great occasion for the use of Pronouns, and Plato has imparted to his use of them a great appearance of freedom and variety. It is like a skilful chess-player's use of his pawns.

A. Use of Neuter Pronoun to represent a sentence, or portion of a sentence. This has been treated of at length under the Accusative Case (§§ 15−23).

§ 41. B. Use of Plural Neuter Pronoun to express a singular fact. This usage contributes to the enrichment of the style; firstly, by varying it; and secondly, by representing the fact as a complex phenomenon, an aggregate of many parts, the sum of many constituents, the meeting-point of many relations.

Ταῦτα is so constantly thus used, that it is only remarkable in particular juxtapositions:—

Protag. 323 c, ὅτι μὲν οὖν ... ἀποδέχονται κ.τ.λ., ταῦτα λέγω ὅτι δὲ κ.τ.λ., τοῦτο σου μετὰ τοῦτο περάσωμαι ἀποδείξα.
Symp. 173 c, εἰ οὖν δει καὶ ὕμιν διήγησασθαι, ταῦτα χρὴ ποιεῖν.
Ib. 198 b, οὖν οὕς τ' ἐσομαι οὐδ' ἐγγὺς τοῦτων—where τοῦτων=τού οἴου τ' ἐίναι.
Ib. 204 b, "Ερωτα ... μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς. αἰτία δ' αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτών ἡ γένεσις.
Phædo 62 d, τά' ἄν αἰθήθη ταῦτα, φευκτένιον εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ δεσπότου.
Phædo 105 d, τὸ μὴ δεχόμενον ... τί νῦν δὴ ταῦτα [so Oxon. and Ven. II] ἀνομᾶχομεν; 'Ἀνάρτιον, ἐψι.

Tim. 87 b, ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ τρόπος ἄλλος λόγων.

Alcib. I. 109 c, πρὸς ταῦτ' ἀρα, τὸ δίκαιον, τοὺς λόγους ποιήσει.

Legg. 864 a, τὴν δὲ τού ἀρίστου δόξαν, ὅππερ ἀν ἔσεσθαι τοῖτων ἡγήσωνται πολίς εἰτε ἰδιωτὰ τινες.

Cf. Antipho vi. i. p. 141, ἥθετον ... μὴ γενέσθαι κ.π.λ., καὶ εὐχόμενον ἂν τις ταῦτα εὐξαμο. Ἀeschin. ii. 166. p. 50, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁ προ- δότης καὶ τὰ τοῦτοι δόμαι. And primarily Hom. II. viii. 362, οὐδὲ τι τῶν μέμνηται, δ' οἱ μάλα πολλάκις νῦν Τευρόμενον σώσεκον.

§ 42. Αὐτά.

Phædo 60 c, εἰ ἐνενόησεν αὐτὰ Λίσσωπος.

Τὰ ἐτερα, ἀμφότερα, πότερα, &c.

Phædo 68 c, τυγχάνει δὲ καὶ φιλοχρήματος καὶ φιλότιμος, ὅτι τὰ ἐτερα τούτων ἢ ἀμφότερα.

Crito 52 a, δυοῖν βάτερα. So Phædo 76 a [δυοῖν τὰ ἐτερα Οξον. and Ven. II].

Legg. 765 d, παθὴρ μάλιστα μὲν υἱῶν καὶ δυνατέρων, εἰ δὲ μὴ, βάτερα.

Cf. Isaæus i. 22. p. 37, δυοῖν τοῖν ἑναντιωτάτων βάτερα, iii. 58. p. 43, δυοῖν τὰ ἐτερα. Xen. Mem. II. ii. 7, πότερα οἶει θηρίου ἀγριότητα δυσφοριατέρων εἶναι ἢ μηρός; Antipho v. 36. p. 133, πατέρω χρή- σονται τῶν λόγων; πότερα ἰ πρώτων εἴπεν ἢ ὁ ὦστερον; Lysias iv. 15. p. 102, ἀ μὲν ἐκεῖνοι ἐδέσαν, ἐδίδοντας ἡμᾶς ὡς τοῦτον, καὶ ἡμεῖς ὁμολογούμεν.

§ 43. The same tendency is observable in the case of Adjectives which admit of it: a chance is represented as the sum of so many contingencies; a quantity as the sum of so many smaller units.

Tim. 69 a, οὐ δυνατὰ [ἑστὶ].

Alcib. I. 134 e, ὡς τὰ εἰκότα.

Legg. 828 a, ἕχομενα ἐστὶ τάξασθαι ... ἔορτᾶς.

Menex. 235 b, ἡμέρας πλεῖον ἢ τρεῖς.

Gorg. 512 b, ἐλάπτω δύναται σώζειν.

Apol. 30 c, οὖκ ἐμὲ μεῖξο βλάψετε.

Cf. Hdt. vii. 2, ὅτι νομιζόμενα εἰπ τῶν πρεσβύτατον τὴν ἄρχην ἕχειν. And primarily Homer.

§ 44. C. Use of Irregular Pronominal Correlatives.

As Pronouns form a prominent feature in contrasted or cor-
relative clauses, so they also contribute their share to the want of symmetry which such clauses often exhibit.

We find ὁ μὲν—ὁ ἄτερος, τίνες—οἱ δὲ, &c. as Correlatives: or by Anastrophe the former Correlative is omitted. For instances at length see below under Abbreviated Construction (§ 241).

§ 45. (The heads which remain treat of the uses of particular Pronouns.)

D. a. Use of ἄλλος and ἄτερος.

Though these words are not equivalent, they are often interchanged by Plato. Every ἄτερος is an ἄλλος, though the converse is untrue: and, under this limitation, the words circulate into each other’s place in every possible way. Wherever there is question of two parties or things, both words are liable to be called into requisition. Even when the number exceeds two, for the first two of the series either word is used. Or the whole former part of a series is thrown into an aggregate, to justify the use of ἄτερος in the latter part.

Legg. 872 a, ἐὰν Βουλεύσῃ θάνατόν τις ἄλλος ἄτερος (though equally we have 879 b, δε δ' ἀν ἄκων ἄλλος ἄλλον τρώψῃ.)

Critias 109 b, τὸ μᾶλλον ἄλλος προσήκον, τούτο ἄτερον αὐτοῖς κτάσθαι.

Euthyphro 2 b, (A) οὐ γὰρ ἔκειν γε καταγράσομαι, ὡς σὺ ἄτερον [γεγραψαι]. (B) οὐ γὰρ οὖν. (A) ἄλλῳ σὲ ἄλλος; (B) Πάνω γε.

Phileb. 61 d, ἡδονή ... ἄτερα ἄλλη ... ἀκριβεστέρα.

Politic. 262 a, τῶν μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἄτερα τις εἶναι, τῶν δὲ αὐθηρίων ἄλλη τροφή.

Soph. 224 c, τὸ μὲν ... ἄτεροφ, τὸ δὲ ... ἄλλῳ προσφητεύων [ὀνόματι].

 Ib. 232 d, (A) τὰ ... περὶ τῇ πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν ... (B) Καὶ πολλὰς γε ἄτερων.

Symp. 196 e, διὰ γὰρ τοῖς ἡ μὴ ἐχει ἡ μὴ οἴδαι, οὔ περ ἄτεροφ δοῖν οὔτ' ἂν ἄλλων διδάξει. Here it is possible that the words would have lost appropriateness by being reversed; because a thing can be given only to one, while it can be taught to any number.

Theat. 184 e, δι' ἄτερας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταύτ' αἰσθάνεσθαι.

§ 46. β. ἄλλος, ‘besides.’

Gorg. 473 c, πολιτών καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔσων.

Apol. 36 b, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ ὀπτατηγον καὶ δημογορίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ ξυνημοσίων καὶ στασίων.
§ 47. E. Uses of αὑτός.

a. Αὑτό. The Neuter Singular of αὑτός is used peculiarly in Apposition to express the essential nature of a thing, sometimes in the Platonic and sometimes in a more popular sense.

Phaedo 65 d, φαμεν τι εἶναι δικάων αὑτό ἢ αὑδέν;
Protag. 360 c, τι ποτ' ἐστιν αὑτό ἢ ἄρετή.
Crat. 411 d, αὑτό ἢ νόησις.

In the more popular sense, but not in the Platonic, αὑτός in Concord, and αὑτό τοῦτο in Apposition, are used also. E.g.

Phileb. 62 a, αὑτής περὶ δικαίωσιν.
Symp. 199 d, αὑτό τοῦτο πατέρα.
Phaedo 93 b, αὑτό τοῦτο . . . ψυχήν.

The remaining uses of αὑτός are not exclusively Platonic.

b. αὑτός in the sense of sponte.

The most noteworthy instances are with Semi-Impersonal Verbs, and will be found below (§ 99).

γ. αὑτός in the sense of sōlus.

Symp. 179 a, οὐδείς αὑτῶ κακός ὄντινα οὐκ ἂν αὑτός ὁ Ὑρως ἐνθεον ποιήσει πρὸς ἄρετίν.
Ib. 187 c, ἐν μὲν γε αὑτῇ τῇ συντάσσει ἄρμονίας τε καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὐδέν χαλεπῶν τὰ ἐρωτικὰ διαγιγνώσκειν.
Ib. 198 d, τάληθε λέγειν . . . , εἴ αὑτῶν δὲ τούτων τὰ καλλιστὰ ἐκλε‐
γομένους ὡς εἰπρεπέστατα τιθέναι.
Apol. 21 d, σμικρῷ τινὶ αὑτῷ τοῦτο σοφῶτερος.
Euthyd. 293 c, (Α) ὁδὸν ἔπιστήμων εἰ; (Β) Πάνι γε, τοῦτον γε αὑτῶν.
Legg. 836 b, αὑτῷ γὰρ ἐσμέν.
Rep. 437 c, αὑτὸ τὸ δεψῆν . . . ἐπιθυμία . . . αὑτῶν πώματος—'thirst, according to the simple notion of it:'—whence we see how Use a flows from this.

§ 48. δ. αὑτοῦ (Adverbial) in the sense of 'on the same spot as heretofore.'

Symp. 216 a, ἵνα μὴ αὐτοῦ καθήμενος παρὰ τοῦτο καταγηράσω—i. e. not 'here' nor 'there,' but 'rooted to the spot.'
Ib. 220 c, ξυνοίησας γὰρ αὐτοθύ ξωδέν τι εἰστήκει σκοπῶν. (The order is hyperbatic for ξυνοίησας ἑωδέν τι αὐτοθύ εἰστήκει σκοπῶν) —'stood without moving from the spot where he was.'
§ 49.

PRONOMINAL WORDS.

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Soph. 224 d, αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ἐν πόλει.

Cf. Hom. Π. ii. 237, τόνδε δὲ ἐώμεν Αὐτοῦ ἐνὶ Τροῖᾳ γέρα πεσαμέν, 332, ἅλλ' ἄγε, μιμεσεῖ πάντες, ἐκκυμίδες Ἀχαιοί, Αὐτοῦ, εἰσάκει ἂντι μέγα Πράμων ἐλοιμεν. Θυκ. iii. 31, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν ἰετῶν διέθειραν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, viii. 28, καὶ ἐς τὴν Μιλητον αὐτοῦ Φι- λιππον καθιστασι.

§ 49. F. Use of ἐκεῖνος.

Instances occur frequently in Plato, in which the same object is designated successively, in the same sentence or contiguous sentences, by οὗτος or the oblique Cases of αὐτός, &c., and ἐκεῖνος. This mobility of language serves as an index of the onward movement of the thought, and helps and incites the hearer (or us the readers) to keep pace with it. As new objects are brought into the centre of the field of observation, the objects which were just now full in front drop behind.

(Two or three of the following instances are quoted by Stallbaum.)

Phaedo 60 d, λέγε τοίνυν αὐτῷ . . . ὅτι αὐξ ἐκείνῳ βουλόμενος . . . ἀντι- τεχνος εἶναι ἑπίσης ταῦτα. Here ἐκείνῳ is identical with αὐτῷ.

Ib. 68 e, φοβούμενοι ἑτέρων ἠδονῶν στερηθήμεν, καὶ εἰπθυμοῦντες ἐκεῖ- νων, ἄλλων ἀπέχομαι ἐπὶ ἄλλων κρατοῦμεν. The ἐκεῖναι are identically the ἑτέραι.

Ib. 73 c, εὰν τις τι πρότερον ἂν ἱδὼν ἂν ἀκούσας . . ., μη μόνον ἐκείνῳ γνώ, ἄλλα καὶ ἑτέρῳ ἄννοησι.

Ib. 100 b, εἴ μοι δίδωσι τε καὶ ἐγγυχωρεῖς εἶναι ταῦτα . . . Σκέπει δὴ τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνους. Cebes' answer has intervened, and Socrates refers in ἐκείνους to the same things which he had just called ταῦτα.

Ib. 106 b, ᾧτιν μὲν τὸ περιτῶν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ἐπισώτας τοῦ ἄρτιν, ὅπερ ὠμολόγηται, ἀπολομένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνου ἄρτιν γεγονέναι. The αὐτοῦ and ἐκείνου both refer identically to τὸ περιτῶν, αὐτοῦ becoming ἐκείνου as ἄρτιν is brought forward.

Ib. 111 b, τὰς δὲ ὀφρα αὐτοῖς κράσιν ἔχειν τοιαύτην, ὡστε ἐκείνους ἄνωσους εἶναι καὶ χρόνον ζῆν πολὺ πλείον τῶν ἐνθάδε—where αὐτοῖς fades into ἐκεῖνους as mention τῶν ἐνθάδε approaches.

Crat. 430 e, δείξαι αὐτῷ, ἢν μὲν τίχῃ, ἐκείνου εἰκόνα.

Laches 186 b, εἴ τις ἡμῶν . . . ἔχει . . . ἐπιδείξαι τίνες 'Αθηναίων . . . δι᾽ ἐκείνων ὁμολογούμενως ὁγαθοὶ γεγονόσι. 

Politic. 277 e, τῶν στοιχείων ἐκκαθῶν ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ βάσταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἱκανῶς διασθάνοντο, καὶ τάληθ᾽ φράζειν περὶ ἐκείνα δυνατοί γίγνονται . . . ταύτα δὲ γε ταύτα ἐν ἄλλαις ὁμφαγοσύνετε
The εκείνα gives notice that our attention is to be presently turned to ταῦτα ταῦτα ἐν ἄλλαις.

Cf. Ar. Eth. IX. i. 4, διὸ γὰρ δείδεινος τυχάνει, τούτοις καὶ προσέχει, κάκεινον γε χάριν ταῦτα δώσει—where εκείνον is identical in reference with the preceding τούτοις,—and more capriciously, X. ix. 16, ἐπὶ τὸ καθάλου βαθιστέον εἶναι δόξειν ἃν, κάκεινον γνώριστέον ὡς ἐνδέχεται, εἶρηται γὰρ ὅτι περὶ τοῦτο 'αι ἐπιστήμαι—where first εκείνο and then τούτο refer to τὸ καθάλου.

§ 50. G. Uses of τις (indefinite).
In the sense of 'a particular this or that,' τις is made to contribute to give liveliness and variety to the language. Thus

a. In illustrations τις gives the force of 'for instance,' or rather the French 'par exemple.'

Symp. 199 d, εἰ [ἐρως] μητρός τινος ἢ πατρός ἐστὶ.
Phaedo 66 c, ἢς τινες νάσοι προσπεέτων.
Phdr. 230 d, θαλλών ἢ τινα καρπὸν προσεύντες.
Hyp. Ma. 292 a, δεσπότης τίς σου ὃ ἄνθρωπος ἐστί;

§ 51. β. Or it draws the attention away from the particular illustration given to the kind of notion intended by it,—thus softening the effect of it.

Phdr. 261 c, εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις, ἢ τινα Θρασύμαχον τε καὶ Θεόδωρον Ὄδυσσεα.
Phileb. 16 c, διὰ τινος Προμηθέως.
Cf. Αἰσχ. Agam. 55, ὡποτός δ' οἷον ἢ τίς Ἀπόλλων ἢ Πάν κ.τ.λ.
Ar. Ran. 912, 'Ἀχιλλέα τιν' ἢ Νιόβην κ.τ.λ.

§ 52. γ. In enumerations it has the force of 'this or that:' but, specially, added (capriciously, as one might say) to one member of the enumeration, it serves the purpose of creating variety, which in enumerations Plato specially affects for the purpose of keeping the attention alert.

Symp. 203 a, ὅ... περὶ τέχνος ἢ χειρουργίας τινάς [σοφός] βάναυσος.
Phaedo 65 c, μήτε ἀκόη μήτε ὑπνό μήτε ἀλγηδῶν μηδὲ τις ἡδονή. [So Hermann from Oxon.]
Apol. 27 d, εἰ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παιδεῖ εἰσί νόθοι τινές ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων.
Phdr. 235 c, ἢ που Σαπφοῦς... ἢ 'Ανακρέοντος... ἢ καὶ συγγραφέων τινῶν.
Politie. 305 b, μήθ' ἑπὶ τινων βώρων μήθ' ἑπὶ φῶβων μήτε οὐκτων μηθ' ἑπὶ τινων ἄλλης ἔχθρας μηθ' φελίας.
§ 53. H. Uses of τοιούτος.

a. Conversationally, for 'such as I am thinking of,'—but have not yet explained.

Symp. 210 d, ἐπιστήμην μίαν τοιούτην, ἣ ἐστι καλὸν τοιοῦτε... ὅσ γὰρ ἂν... παιδαγωγηθῆ... κατόφεται τι θαυμαστῶν τίνι φύσιν καλῶν κ.τ.λ.—the explanation of τοιούτην beginning immediately after it, with ἣ ἐστι.

Phaedo 73 c, ... ὅταν ἐπιστήμη παραγέγρηται τρόπῳ τοιοῦτῳ, ἀνάμνησιν εἰκα. λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπων; τόνδε... [so Stallb. and Herm.] εάν τις κ.τ.λ. The τοιούτῳ expresses that it is such as the speaker has in his mind; his explanation of it to others follows at λέγω δὲ.

§ 54. β. As a mere substitute or symbol for a particular word preceding, to avoid repetition of the same sound.

Phaedo 67 a, καὶ οὕτω μὲν καθαροὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενοι... μετὰ τοιούτων ἐσόμεθα—i. e. μετὰ καθαρῶν.

Pl. 80 c, εὰν μὲν τις χαριέστως ἔχων τὸ σώμα τελευτήσῃ καὶ εἰ τοιαύτη ἄρα—where τοιαύτη simply means χαριέσθη.

Pl. d, ἢ ψυχὴ ἄρα, τὸ αἰείδες, τὸ εἰς τοιοῦτον τόπον ἔτερον οἰχόμενον—where τοιοῦτον ἔτερον means αἰείδη.

Pl. 84 a, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον θεωμένη... οἶκεται... ἀπειδόν τελευτήσῃ, εἰς τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰθικομένη ἀπηλλάχθαι—where τοιοῦτον stands for τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀδόξαστον.

Pl. 79 c, πλανᾶται καὶ παράττεται κ.τ.λ. ἄτε τοιούτων ἐφαιταιμένη—where τοιούτων is a substitute for πλανώμενων καὶ παραττομένων.

Symp. 208 d, ἐπερ ἀρετὴς ἀδικάτου καὶ τοιαύτης δόξης.

Legg. 723 c, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄσματος παντὸς δεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον δρῶν—where ἄσματος is actually governed by τὸ τοιοῦτο δρῶν, because this is the substitute for προσθέσαν προοίμιον in the foregoing sentence: cf. Symp. 210 b, quoted above (§ 17).

§ 55. This Idiom extends to other kindred Pronouns.

Rep. 507 b, πολλὰ καλὰ καὶ πολλὰ ἄγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως—where οὕτως personates πολλά.

Legg. 853 b, νομοθετεῖν πάντα ὄπόσα γὰρ μέλλομεν τοιοῦτο δρῶν—where τοιοῦτο δρῶν represents εἰς δικαστὰς ἤγειν or the like, implied from ἢν δεὶ λαμβάνειν αὐτὸ τιμωρίαν καὶ τίνων ποτὲ δικαστῶν τυγχάνειν preceding.

L
Cf. Hdt. iii. 82, ἀνδρὸς γὰρ ἐνὸς τοῦ ἀρίστου οὖν ἁμαινον ἂν φανέη γνώσῃ γὰρ τοιαύτῃ χρείας—i. e. ἁρίστῃ. Ar. Eth. I. x. 11, ὑπάρξει δὴ τὸ ἐτοιμόν τῷ εὐδαιμον καὶ ἐσται διὰ βίου τοιοῦτος—i. e. εὐδαιμῶν, and VIII. iv. 1, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμων καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι ἄλληλοι οἱ ἄγαθοι—i. e. χρήσιμοι. Add IX. vii. 6, ήδιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ φιλητὸν ὁμοίως. Thuc. ii. 49, καὶ πολλοὶ τούτο καὶ ἐδρασαν εἰς φρεάτο—i. e. ἐρήμωσαν σφάς αὐτοὺς, and iv. 64, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δικαίω ταῦτα μοι πούσαν, ὡς ὑμών αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τούτο παθεῖν—i. e. ἰσασάθην. Ar. Eth. IV. i. 11, φιλοῦνται δὲ οἱ ἑλευθεροί ὁφέλομεν γὰρ, τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει—where τούτο stands for ὁφέλομεν εἰς, V. vi. 5, διὸ οὐκ ἐδώμεν ἄρχειν ἀνθρώπουν, ὅτι ἐαυτῷ τούτο ποιεῖ [sc. ἄρχει], VIII. xiii. 7, ἢ δ' ἡθικὴ οὐκ ἐπὶ ῥήτως, ἀλλ' ὡς φίλος δωρεῖται, ἡ ὀτιδήποτε ἄλλο.

§ 56. Idioms of Verbs.

A. Mood.

a. Indicative Constructions.

a. The meaning assigned to Indicative Imperfects, Aorists, or Pluperfects, with εἰ, depending on a similar Apodosis with ἦν, holds equally (1) when they depend on a simple Infinitive.

Crito 52 c, ἐξήν σοι φυγῆς τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἐβοῦλου.

Ib. 44 b, οὖς τ' ἄν σε σώζειν εἰ ἢθελον ἀναλόγως χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι.

Phaedo 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἑπιστάμην, ὁ βίος μοι δοκεὶ . . . οὐκ ἔσχατεν.

Soph. 246 d, [δοκεῖ δεῖν] μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ π' δυνατόν ἦν, ἔργον βελτίους ποιεῖν.

Legg. 790 c, οἰκεῖν [ξυμφέρει], εἰ δυνατόν ἦν, οἰον αἰ̄ πλεοντας.

§ 57. (2) In clauses connected by a Relative Adverb or Pronoun with an Indicative of unfulfilled past contingency.—The principle of Sequence here illustrated has not been observed except in the case of Indicatives following Relative Adverbs: whereas (besides the other outlying instances which come before us here) the principle applies equally to the Optative (see below, § 72).

Euthyd. 304 e, ἀξίων γ' ἦν ἂκούσα κ.τ.λ., ἦν ἑκουσας κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, εἰ γὰρ ὁφελον . . . οἷοι τε εἶναι κ.τ.λ., ἦν οἷοι τε ἦσαν κ.τ.λ.

Theoct. 161 c, τεθαύμακα ὅτι οὐκ ἑπίσεν κ.τ.λ., ἦν μεγαλοπρεπῶς . . . ἢρετο κ.τ.λ.

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Gorg. 506 b, ἥδεως ἂν Καλλικλεὶ τούτῳ ἐπὶ διελεγόμην, ἦς αὐτῷ . . . ἀπήδωκα κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 171 e, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἂν, οὗ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον—'this would have been that of which they had knowledge.'

In the next instance ἂνa heads a second clause in a different meaning.

Men. 89 b, οὖς . . . ἂν ἐφυλάττομεν, ἴνα μηδείς αὐτοὺς διεφθέιρεν, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἀφίκωντο έἰς τὴν ἡλίκιαν χρήσιμοι γίγνοντο.

In the next, ὅπως loses its power over the second of two clauses, and the meaning is supplied by ἂν.

Legg. 959 c, ζωτί ἔδει βοηθεῖν, ὅπως δ' τι δικαίωτας ἄν καὶ δυσώτατος ἐξι τε ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας ἀτμιώρητος ἄν ἐγίγνετο.

Instances need not be multiplied: as an illustration, we may notice in conclusion the virtually but not formally identical construction in Soph. El. 1022, Εἰδ' ἀφελείς κ.τ.λ. πάντα γὰρ κατεργάσω—where consequently we need not suppose an ellipse of ἂν. The usage begins with Homer: cf. Il. vi. 348, "Ενθα με κύμι ἀπόεροι.

§ 58. β. Future Indicative with ἂν.

Rep. 615 d, οἷς ἔπει, οὔδ' ἄν ἔπει δεύορ.

Apol. 29 c, ἦδη ἂν . . . ἐπιτηδεύομεν διαφθοράπτομαι.

Symp. 222 a, ἱδὼν ἄν τις . . . εὐρήσει.

Euthyd. 287 d, καὶ νῦν οὖδ' ἄν οὕτω ἄποκριναί.

Phdr. 227 b, οὔκ ἄν οὕτε με καὶ ἄσχολης ἐπιτρέπον πρῶγμα ποιήσονται;

The Future exceptionally retains this ἂν in Oratio Obliqua.

Legg. 719 c, τὸν αὐτὸν ἄν ἐπαινέσοι.

Cf. Isæus i. 32, προσημεῖλησεν ὅτι δηλώσοι ποι' ἄν.

§ 59. b. Conjunctive Potential Constructions.

The Conjunctive Potential has always a deliberative meaning, which however admits of further distinctions, according to various kinds of sentences.

a. In matters of abstract opinion, it is 8 Presumptive.

In matters in which the will is concerned, it is

β. Deliberative (in a more special sense) when the sentence is interrogative:

γ. Hortatory or dehortatory, when the sentence is not interrogative.

Only the first of these heads requires illustration by examples here.

8 This use is confined to negative sentences.

L. 2
a. Presumptive use.

With μή.

Gorg. 462 c, μή ἀγρουκότερον ἢ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν.
Rep. 603 c, μή τι ἄλλο ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα;
Symp. 194 c, ἄλλα μή οὐχ οὕτω ἢμεῖς ἤμεν.
Apol. 39 a, μή οὐ τούτ' ἢ χαλεπόν.

The Indicative is also used with μή and μή οὐ similarly: e.g.
Euthyd. 298 c, μή οὐ λίνων λίνῳ συνάπτεις; and (not interrogatively)
Protag. 312 a, ἄλλα ἄρα μή οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνεις—'but perhaps, then, you
do not suppose.'

With ὅπως μή.

Crat. 430 d, ὅπως μή ἐν τοῖς ζωγραφήμασιν ἢ τούτο, . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς
ἀνόμασίν όυ.

The Indicative is also used with ὅπως μή.

Meno 77 a, ὅπως μή οὐχ οἶος τ' ἐσομαι.
Phædo 77 b, ἐνεστηκεν δ νῦν δή Κέβης ἔλεγε . . . , ὅπως μή . . . δια-
σκεδάνυται ἢ ψυχή.

§ 60. With οὐ μή.

Passing by the common use (Aorist), we have the Present with
οὐ μή in

Rep. 341 c, οὐ μή οἶος τ' ἃς.
Phileb. 48 d, οὐ μή δυνάτος ἂ.

Zurich editors give εἰσί εἰς from Bekker's conjecture.] Xen.
Cyrop. VIII. i. 5, οὐ μή δύνηται. Soph. O. C. 1024 (some MSS.)
οὐ μή ποτε . . . ἐπεύχωνται.

The following is only a variation of the use with οὐ μή, πολλοῦ
dεὶ standing as a mere Adverb for οὐ.

Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεὶ μῆποτε τις τοιαύτα ἐργάσηται.

§ 61. c. Conjunctive Subjunctive Constructions.

The following alone need be mentioned.

a. After σκοπεῖν, ὥραν, and the like, with μή. (This is as it
were the Oratio Obliqua of b. a.)

Phdr. 260 a, σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι.
Gorg. 512 d, ὥρα μή ἄλλο τι τό γενναίον καὶ τὸ ἄγαθόν ἢ.

§ 62. This use is frequent in the Indicative: e.g.

La. 179 b, ὥραμεν μὴ Νικίας οἰεται τι λέγειν.
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Soph. 235 a, διστάζομεν ἐτι μὴ τυγχάνει κ.τ.λ.
Ly. 216 c, σκεφώμεθα μὴ . . . λαβθάνει κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 218 d, φοβοῦμα . . . μὴ . . . ἐνετευχήκαμεν.
Phædo 84 e, φοβᾶσθε μὴ δυσκολότερον . . . διάκειμαι.

§ 63. β. After πρίν, without ἄν, in negative sentences.

Phædo 62 c, μὴ πρότερον αὐτὸν ἀποκτενοῦν ναι, πρὶν ἀνάγκην τινὰ ὅ θεὸς ἐπιπέμψῃ. [So all the MSS.]
Thæt. 169 b, τῶν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίην πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃ . . . προσπαλαίσαι. [So all the MSS.]
Legg. 873 a, οὐδὲ ἐκπλητον ἐθέλειν γίγνεσθαι τὸ μανθέν πρίν φῶνον φῶν ὁμοίω ὄμοιον ἡ δράσασα ψυχῇ τίσῃ.

§ 64. γ. After σκπεῖν, ὃῤῥι, and the like with ἄν.

Crito 48 e, ὅρα τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἐὰν σοι ἰκανὸς λέγηται.
Phædo 100 c, σκόπει δὴ τὰ ἐξῆς ἐκεῖνοι, ἐὰν σοι ἵππος ὁπερ ἔρω.
Gorg. 510 b, σκόπει δὴ καὶ τόδε ἐὰν σοι δοκῇ ἑν λέγειν.
Charm. 167 b, σκέψαι εάν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορότερον φανῆς ἔρω.

Cf. Lysias xv. 5. p. 144, σκέψασθε εάν ἰκανὸν γένηται τεκμήριον.
Andoc. i. 37. p. 6, ἀναμμῆνουκεθαίε ἐὰν ἄληθή λέγω. And primarily Homer (Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 877), II. xv. 32, Ὡφρα ἵθη, ἢν τοι χραῖσῃ.

What is worth noticing upon this usage is, that ἔαν gives a different shade of meaning from the more usual εἰ. The question submitted is represented by it as a perfectly open one; whereas εἰ would hint the speaker's foregone conclusion, and give a certain appearance of positiveness. Ἐαν is therefore chosen for the sake of expressing more perfect courtesy, in contexts such as those just given, which relate to the conduct of the dialogue.

§ 65. δ. With ὃς ἄν.

The different shades of meaning presented by ὃς with the Indicative and ὃς ἄν with the Conjunctive are parallel with those just pointed out in the case of εἰ and ἄν after σκπεῖν. The meaning of ὃς ἄν bears upon a doubtful reading in Phædo 96 a, presently to be mentioned.

Ly. 217 c, οἶον ἄν ὃ το παρόν, τουατα ἑστι—where ὃοιν ἄν ἢ leaves it quite undetermined of what kind το παρόν is.
Phædo 98 e, ἐρω βέλτιον διδοκται ἐντεάδε καθησαθα, καὶ δικαιότερον παραμένοντα ὑπέχει τὴν δίσην ἢν ἄν κελεύσοσαι. Here it is not that ἢν ἄν κελεύσοσαι has any future force, for the penalty had
been awarded: but it gives the meaning 'that it is right to stay and abide the penalty, whatever it be, which they have awarded.'

Phædo 96 a, ἀν τί σοι χρήσιμον φαίνεται διν ἂν λέγω, πρὸς τὴν πειθώ περί διν ἂν λέγῃς χρήσει (taking for granted here the reading διν ἂν λέγῃς)—'you can apply it to satisfying yourself with respect to your objections, whatever they be.' It is true that the objections had preceded; but this only makes the instance parallel to the last: and what διν ἂν intimates is, that Socrates does not wish to bind Celebes to the precise case he has stated. As just before he had said ἔξεπτήθει πολλάκις ἀναλαμβάνα, ἵνα μὴ τι διαφύγῃ ἡμᾶς, εἰ τέ τι βούλει προσθηνῇ ἡ ἀφελής,—to which Celebes had guardedly replied ἄλλ' ὦδεῖν ἐγαγέ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄτε ἀφελεῖν ὄστε προσθέσεις δέομαι,—he now, by giving a general turn to the sentence, leaves a loophole open for future qualification.


a. Without ἂν, expressing simple possibility.

Legg. 777 c, πρὸς ἂ τίς ἰπαυνα βλέψας διαπορήσει.

Euthyd. 298 e, (A) οὐκόν τὸν σαντοῦ πατέρα τύπτεις; (B) Πολὺ μέντοι δικαίότερον τὸν ἴμιτερον πατέρα τύπτομι.

Gorg. 492 b, τι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἀλοχον καὶ κάκιον εἰς;

Phædo 88 c, μη ὀδηδων ἤξοι εἴμεν κρηταί, ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἰπιστα ἢ—where the Optative, as distinguished from the Conjunctive, denotes a transitory as opposed to a permanent contingency.

§ 67. β. Without ἂν, this being understood from a preceding coordinate sentence.


Symp. 196 c, κρατοῦντ' ἂν ὁπὸ ἐρωτος, ὤ δὲ κρατοῖ.

Phædo 99 a, εἰ . . . . Λέγωι, . . . . ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγωι ὃς μέντοι . . . . ποιώ, . . . . πολλῇ καὶ μακρὰ ῥαπημία εἴη τοῦ λόγου. [So Oxon. and three other MSS.]

Charm. 174 e, (A) . . . . ὥφελοι ἂν ἡμᾶς. (B) Ἡ καὶ ἕγαίνειν ποιώ;
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Rep. 382 d, (A) πότερον διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι τὰ παλαιὰ ἄφοροιν ὃν ψεῦδοι τῷ; (B) ... (Α) Ἀλλὰ δεδιώκει τόν ἐχθροῦς ψεῦδοι τῷ;

§ 68. γ. With ἄν in clauses where the ἄν adheres closely to the Verb, and not to the Relative Pronoun or Particle by which the clause is introduced.

Symp. 187 d, ὡς ἄν κοσμιμάτεροι γέρνουτο ... , δεὶ χαρίζεσθαι.

Hb. 190 c, δοκῶ μοι ἔχειν μηχανήν, ὡς ἄν εἶχεν κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 230 b, ἀκμὴν ἔχει τῆς ἀνθῆς, ὡς ἄν εὐωδοῦσθον παρέχοι τὸν τῶν τόπων.

Gorg. 453 e, ὡς ἄντῳ προῖ, ὡς μάλιστ' ἄν ἡμῖν καταφαίης ποιοῖ.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, σὺχ ὡς τ' ἡσθα πεῖθεν, ὡς ... ἄν ... ἐπιβιβαίεν.

Phado 82 e, δι' ἐπιθυμίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἄν μᾶλιστα αὐτὸς ὁ δεδεμένος σιλ- ληπτῶρ ἐι.

Protag. 318 c, εἰβούλια ... ὡς ἄν ἁριστα διακοί.

Ly. 207 e, προΘύμουνται ὡς ἄν εἰδαμονοῖς.

Crat. 395 a, κινδυνεύειν τοιοῦτος τις εἶναι ὁ Ἀγαμέμνον οίος ἄν δοξεῖν αὐτῷ διαπονεῖσθαι.

Hb. 398 e, οὔτ' ἐι τι οὔτ' τ' ἄν εἶπν εὐρεῖν, οὐ συντείνω.

Legg. 700 c, ἢδονὴ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χαίροντος, εἶτε βελτίων εἶτε χείρων ἄν εἶη τις, κρίνοιτο ὀρθότατα.

Cf. Antipho i. 17. p. 113, εἰβουλεύετο ἡ ἀνθρωπος ὡς ἄν αὐτεῖς τὸ φάρμακον δοθῇ, πότερα πρὸ δείπνου ἢ ἀπὸ δείπνου.

It may be noted, that these clauses are not Subjunctive, and that this difference marks off these instances from such as Rep. 412 d, θηλυκία, ... ὅταν οἴκοτο κ.τ.λ., Legg. 661 c, ἡλλήνων [ἔστι κακὸν] ἄν ὡς ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιθύμη, which must be separately accounted for.

§ 69. a. With ἄν, equivalently for the Future.

(α) Following a Future in the Protasis.

Phado 107 c, ὃ κίνδυνοιν νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξεῖν ἄν δεικνε ἐκαί, εἴ τις αὐτής ἀμελήσει.

Apol. 35 a, εἶ ἄν ἐσονται, αἰσχρῶν ἄν εἶη.

§ 70. (β) Following a Conjunctive with ἄν in the Protasis.

Rep. 556 a, ἄν τις προστάτη ... , χρηματίζωντο ἄν. So 402 d.

Symp. 200 c, ὅταν τις λέγῃ, εἴπομεν ἄν.

Phdr. 244 h, ἄν δὴ λέγωμεν ... , μηκύνωμεν ἄν.

Phileb. 55 c, ἄν τις ... χαρίζῃ ... , φαίλων ... ἄν γέρνουτο.
§ 71. (8) Following an Indicative, involving a Future meaning.
Symp. 208 c, ἐὰν ἐθέλησε εἰς τὴν φιλοτιμίαν βλέψαι, θαυμάζοις ἂν . . . , ἐὰν μὴ ἔννοεις κ.τ.λ.—where ἐὰν ἐθέλησε βλέψαι is a virtual Future.
Apol. 37 c, πολλῇ ἂν μὲ φιλοψυχία ἔχωι, ἐὰν οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι κ.τ.λ. because the fact is not so as yet.
Protag. 349 c, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομει, εἰ . . . ἔλεγες—because I do not know the fact as yet.
Crat. 428 b, εἰ μέντοι ἔχεις τι σὺ κάλλιον τούτων λέγειν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζομει.
Laches 186 c, εἰ δὲ Νικίας . . . μεμάθηκεν, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαμι.

§ 72. e. Optative Subjunctive Constructions.
a. Under principal Optative sentence with or without ἂν (see above, §§ 66, 67)—the Subjunctive sentence being
(a') Relative.
Gorg. 512 c, τίνι ἂν τρόπον τούτον ἂν μελλον χρόνον βιώναι ὃς ἀριστα βιώη;
Meno 92 c, πῶς ὄν ἂν εἰδεῖς περὶ τούτου τού πράγματος . . . , ὃν παντάπασιν ἀπειρος εἶης;
 Cf. Hom. Od. xiii. 291, Κερδάλεος κ' εἰη . . . ὅς σε παρελθοι, ἰ.ν. 222,
'Oς τῷ καταβράζειν . . . ὁδ κεν βάλοι, σ.ν. 358, Λευγαλέος θανάτῳ, ὃς μή θάνοι ὅστις ἐμογγ . . . φιλος εἰη.

§ 73. (a2) Adverbial.
Legg. 730 c, μετόχος εἰη, ἵνα ὡς πλείστον χρόνον ἄληθῆ ὃν διαβιοὶ.
Meno 98 c, ὀφελιμοὶ ἀρδεῖς ἂν εἰην, . . . ἐπερ εἰην.
Rep. 541 a, ὅς ἂν γίνοιτο, ἐπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς εὐ εἰρηκέναι.
Polit. 295 c, εἰπωμεν . . . ἵατρων μελλοντα . . . ἀπέσεθαι . . . συχρόν, ὃς σῶνο, χρόνον, ἂν ἐθέλειν κ.τ.λ.;
Cf. Hom. Il. v. 214, ἀτ' ἐμεῖι κάρη τάμαι ἄλλοτρος φῶς, Εἰ μή ἐγὼ τάδε τάξα φαινὼ ἂν πυρὶ θείνην, ὁδ. xii. 106, μή σο γε κεῖθι τύχους, ὃτε ῥοβθήσειν, ἵ. 114, Τίν δὲ κ' ἀμναίμην ὅτε μοι σίννοῡ γ' ἐταῖρον, σσ. 114, ὅτι κ' μοι ἀκνυμέω τάδε δόματα πότνα μήτηρ λείποι δὲ ἂλφ ιوس 'ὅτ' ἐγὼ κατόπισθε λιπόηθν.

§ 74. β. Under principal Indicative sentence, when the dependent Verb is intended to belong to all time—the Subjunctive sentence being
(β2) Relative.
Legg. 759 b, ὅσ μὴ καθεστήκοι καταστατέον [ἐστίν] ἰερέας.
§ 75. (§) Adverbial.

Rep. 410 e, όπως ούκ ἐνεκά τινες οἴονται καθοστάσιν, ἦν ... θεραπεύοντο.

Euthyd. 296 e, ούκ ἐκώ ἤμιν πῶς ἀμφισβητοῖν ... ὡς οὖ πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.

Gorg. 448 e, οὔδε ἐρωτῆ, ποία τις εἶν ἡ Γοργίας τέχνη. [So most if not all of the MSS.]

Alc. I. 135 a, τυραννοῦντι δὲ, ὅσ μηδὲ ἐπιπλήττοι τοις αὐτῷ, τί το συμβαίνομεν;


§ 76. (§) Adverbial with εἰ.

Politic. 268 d, τοῦτο ... [ἐστὶ] ποιητέων, εἰ μὴ μελλομεν κ.τ.λ.

Meno 80 d, εἰ ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἰσεί ὁτι τοῦτο ἐστιν;

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὁρα γάρ, εἰ ... τοῦτο φαίμεν εἰναι καλόν.

Legg. 642 a, ὃρατε τί ποιῶμεν, εἰ ταῦτα μὲν ἔσασαι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 658 c, εἰ ... τὰ πάνω συμβρα κρίνου παιδία, κρινοῦσι τὸν τὰ βαῦματα ἐπιδεικνύτα.

Charm. 173 c, εἰ δὲ βουλοῦ γε ... συγχωρήσωμεν κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 91 a, οὐ γὰρ ὡς ... δόξει ἄλλῃ εἶναι προδεψηθοῦμα, εἰ μὴ εἰὶ πάρεργον. Cf. the same phrase, but under an Infinitive sentence, Rep. 411 e; and Ar. Eth. Nic. V. iv. 5, λέγεται ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰσίν ἐπὶ τοῖς τουτού τοίς, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὅνομα εἰ, τὸ κέρδος.


§ 77. γ. Under an Infinitive sentence—which necessarily leaves the time of the Dependent Verb, as under the last head, undefined.

Charm. 164 α, εἰ δοκεῖ τις ἀφέλιμα καί ἐαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἕκειν ὅν ἱστο.

Lysias 212 d, εἰ ὁ ἄτερος φίλος, φίλος εἰναι ἄμφω.

Theest. 164 a, δεῖ γε μέντοι [τοῦτο φάναι], εἰ σώσομεν τῶν πρόσθε λέγον.
Phædo 95 d, prosoêkev phûs foðeiòlai, ei, µη ânovatos eï, τῷ µη eîdôti.

Protag. 316 c, òíeíai toûto gevêsbsai, ei, oí ol ãvugvianótai.

Legg. 927 e, òon vovn, Ï kal brachv ëneí, prosoêkantai evêrgêtetv.

Phædo 85 d, kvndwvounvta diaplevwsai òon blwv, ei, µη tìs dûvato sôphaleôterov . . . diasporeivbna.

Cf. Hom. II. iv. 262, ñov dê plèion dépas aieî "Eôsth", ósper émai, πiêin òte ðumos ânovos, Od. xxiv. 253. Tovoutû dê ðakas, ëpei loûsasato fâgai te, Eîdêmêvai mañakwos. Thuc. i. 120, ãndràw sôphrûnov êstiv, ei, µη adîkîouto ësuvçâev.

§ 78. Note that the principle of the Optatives classified under (β) and (γ) is the same essentially. Hermann (De Part. ãv) notices the usage under (γ): but the extent of the principle has not attracted attention.

§ 79. f. Infinitive Constructions.

Infinitive after Relative Pronouns and Adverbs.

Rep. 415 e, eîvûs . . . toûvántas, òiaç ñeîmovos te stêgev kai bêrous íkavâs eîmai.

Gorg. 457 d, eîpôntes toûvánta, òia kai toûs parówntas ãkhesthâi.

Protag. 334 c, ãrhôthai ëlaiô . . . ñosov mónon tîn dûsçhêrían kataôbsiâi.

Theæt. 161 b, ouddên ëpîstamai plêion, plên brachvôs, ñosov lógon par' étérwv sòphov lâbêv.

Protag. 330 e, fávâi tîs ðrêthîs mòria eîvai ñôstos ëxovnta . . ., òs ouk eîmai k.t.l.

Symp. 213 a, paracarhêsai tîn ñakrâtî ãs ëkêivov kathîvew.

Euthyd. 306 e, kai, ìô mi dòkêi . . . allôkotov eîvai, òs ge prôs se tâlthês eîrôsthâi.

Apol. 29 c, âfhîevn se, ëf' òte mnêkêîtî sôphosofîn.

Phdr. 269 d, tò dûvnasthâi òÔste ãgnwisthn têleov gevêsbsai.

Protag. 338 c, advûnasov ìàvôn òÔste Prowtagôrôn toûdê sòphôterov tîna ëlésthâi.

Politic. 295 a, íkavos gêvnot' ãv . . . òÔste ëkástôvw prôostáttev tò prôso- ëkîvov.

Phædo 103 c, ëstîn ðra peri ëvna tîwv toûîtûwv, òÔste µη mónon avtò tî ëâdos ãxîôvsthâi k.t.l.

Cf. Thuc. i. 2, vêômêvov tâ avtôn ékastov, ñsonv âpôçhî. And likewise
§§ 80—82.

VERBS.

Soph. Ant. 303, χρώνει παρ’ εξεπραξέων ὡς δοῦσαι δίκην, Aj. 378, Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτο ἂν ταῖς ὀπως οἷς δος ἑκεῖν, 924, Ὡς καὶ παρ’ ἐκθείρους ἀνίας θρήνων τυχεῖν.

§ 80. g. Infinitive Uses.

a. Future following οἷος τε, δυνατός, &c.

Phaed. 73 a, οὐκ ἂν οἰοὶ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τούτῳ ποιῆσεν.

Phdr. 277 d, οὐ πρότερον δυνατόν τέχνη ἔσεσθαι.

Cf. Lysias xxvii. 2. p. 178, ὅπως ἂν δοκήσῃς αὕτως εἶναι ψηφιεῖσθαι ἡμῖν. Isoc. xiii. 2. p. 291, ἢμῖν ἐνδειξεσθαι βουλόμενοι. [The Zurich editors give ἐνδείξεσθαι.]

§ 81. β. Aorist equivalent in meaning to Future.


Euthyd. 278 c, ἐφάτην ἐνδείξεσθαι τὴν προτερυτικὴν σοφίαν.

Protag. 316 c, τούτῳ δὲ οἰεῖται οἱ μάλιστα γενέσθαι, εἰ σοι ἔγγενος.

Cf. Hom. II. ix. 230, ἐν δοῦι δὲ σασωσίμην ἢ ἀπολέσθαι Νῆσας, xiii.

656, Πολλάκις γὰρ ὃι ἐκεῖ σεργόν ἄγαθος Πολύδοξος Νοῦσον ὑπ’ ἀργαλείᾳ φθίνοντα, xxii. 119, ὅρκων ἐλωμάτω Μὴ τι κατακρύψῃς ἄλλ’ ἀνδρικὰ πάντα δάνασσαν, Od. ii. 171, φημὶ τελευτηθῆναι ἁπάντα, iv. 253, "ἔμοισα μὴ μὲν πρὶν ἢ ἀναφθῆναι, ix. 496, φάμεν αὐτόθ’ ὀδίσσωκα.

Thuc. i. 26, προεῖπον ... ὡς πολεμίως χρῆσασθαι, 81, ἐκὸς Ἀθη-

ναίοις ... μὴ τῇ γῇ δουλεύσα (so with οὐκ εἴκος iii. 10, iv. 85, viii. 46), iii. 46, τίνα ἀισθήθη ἡμίνα οὐκ ἀμεινον παρασκευάσασθα; v. 22, οἱ δὲ ... οἰκ ἐφασαν δέξασθαι, ii. 3, ἐνόμωσαν ἐπιθέμενοι ῥαβδὸς κρατήσα, iv. 63, τὸ ἐλλήκη ... ἱκανῶς νομίζασας εἰρχθῆναι, i. 126, τῷ Κίλων ... ἀνελεῖν ὁ θεὸς, καταλείπεις τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. Αἰςχρ. Pers. 173, ἢθοῖ ... μὴ σε δι φράσας, Agam. 1622, ἐπεύ-

χεται ... ἀντιτίσασθαι (not 'prays' but 'boasts'). Soph. Phil. 1329, παῦλον ἵσθι τῆσθε μὴ ποτ’ ἐντυχεῖν Νάσου, Aj. 1082, Ταῦτα τὸ μόνος τὴν πόλιν χρὼν ποτὲ Ἑξ οὐρίων δραμοῖσαν εἰς βεβην πεσεῖν (not aor. of custom, as Herm. and Linw.). Eur. Andr. 311, κοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέρας θεῖες βρεῖτας σώσαι τόδε. Hdt. i. 53, προλέ-

γονσά ... μεγάλην ἀρχὴν μὲν καταλυσα, vi. 62, τὰ ἄλλα ἐκ κατανέσαι. Lysias xiii. 15. p. 131, οὐκ ἐφασαν ἐπιτρέψαι, ib. 32. p. 132, οὐ γὰρ οἰμαὶ σε ἐξαρον γενέσθαι, xxxiii. 2, ἡγησατο τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενέσθαι. [So Bekker: the Zurich editors have γενέσθαι.] Ar. Nub. 35, ἐνεχειρίσασθαι φασίν.

§ 82. γ. Present equivalent in meaning to Future.

Crito 52 c, ὄρμολόγες καθ’ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύεσθαι.

Gorg. 520 ε, μὴ φάναι συμβουλεύειν, εἲν μὴ τις αὐτῷ ἀργύρων διδύς.
§ 83. b. Infinitives following certain Verbs (of saying, thinking, &c.) sometimes contain a Dictative force. They are in fact Infinitives Oblique of the Deliberative Potential. In consequence of this force of the Infinitive in these cases, the governing Verb gets a different and a stronger meaning: to ‘say’ becomes to ‘recommend’ or to ‘pray:’ to ‘think’ becomes to ‘think fit,’ or to ‘give counsel.’ But it is through the Infinitive, as being an Infinitive of the Potential, that the meaning of the governing Verb is strengthened; and not vice versa.

Protag. 346 b, Συμωνίδης ἡγήσατο καὶ αὐτὸς ... τύραννον ... ἐπανέσαι—‘thought fit’—lit. ‘thought it-was-incumbent-on-himself to-praise.’

Crat. 399 d, ψυχὴν λέγεις ἐπισκέψασθαι.

Hip. Ma. 291 a, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ ... ἤμας μᾶλλον φάναι κ.τ.λ.—not ‘that we say’ but ‘that we should say.’

Phaedo 83 e, οἱ δικαίοις φιλομαθεῖς κόσμοι τʼ εἰσὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι οὐχ ὥσ πολλοί ἔνεκά φασί. Here the meaning is not ‘for the reason which the world attributes to them,’ but ‘for the reason for which the world says people ought to be [temperate].’ That is, φασί is followed by κοσμοὺς εἶναι understood, and this εἶναι contains the Dictative force.

Ib. 104 e, δ τοῖνυς ἔλεγον ὀρίσασθαι—‘what I proposed that we should define.’

Cf. Hom. II. iii. 98, φρονεῖον δὲ διακρινθήμεναι ἤδη Ἀργείων καὶ Τρώας (‘I think good’). Thucyd. iii. 44, νομίζω περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἤμας βουλεύσασθαι, ἰν. 86, οὐδὲ ἀσάφη τὴν ἑλευθερίαν νομίζω ἐπιφέρειν, vii. 42, νομίζας, οὐχ οὖν τε εἶναι ... , οὐδὲ παθεῖν ἀπέρι Νικιάς ἐπαθεῖν (where the Dictative force is possessed by the second Infinitive only), ii. 42, τὸ αἵμασθαι καὶ παθεῖν μᾶλλον ἠγησάμενοι ἦ τὸ κ.τ.λ., V. 40, ἡγούμενοι, ὅτι ἐν ἡγεῖσῃ, ἡσυχίαν
§§ 84, 85. VERBS.

84. ε. Infinitive as a Noun Substantive, without the Article.


In Apposition.

Apol. 23 a, ὅνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφός εἶναι.

Protag. 323 b, ὃ ἐκεί σωφροσύνην ἡγούντο εἶναι, τάληθι λέγειν.

Under government.

Rep. 429 b, κύριον ἄν εἶν ἦ τοῖν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἦ τοῖν.

Symp. 209 b, εἰπορεί λόγων περὶ ἀρτῆς καὶ περὶ οἶνον χρῆ εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρα.

85. ɟ. An Accusative7 of the Infinitive, with the Article, sometimes occurs subjoined in justification of some expression of feeling just preceding. The "τὸ indignantis" is included in this use (it is exemplified in the first two passages following); but a more commensurate designation would be the 'Apologetic Infinitive.'

Phædo 99 b, πολλὴ ἄν καὶ μακρὰ ῥαθυμία εἰθ τοῦ λόγου. τὸ γὰρ μὴ διμηᾶθαι οἷον ῥ' εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 177 a, οὐ δεινῶν, ἄλλως μὲν τοις θείων ὑμιῶν κ.τ.λ..prevent.

Ἡρακλέως καὶ ἄλλως ἐπάινους . . . ἄλλος ἐπάινον ἔχοντες . . . καὶ ἄλλα τοιαύτα συχνὰ ὕδως ἄν ἐγκεκωμεσμένα. τὸ οὖν τοιαύτω μὲν περί πολλὴν σπουδὴν ποιήσοντα, ἔρωτα δὲ μηδένα παῖ ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ.

The speaker justifies the warmth with which he has spoken by subjoining a studiedly dispassionate statement of the case.

Compare Eur. Med. 1051, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐμῆς κάκης, Τὸ καὶ προίσθαι μολομοκες λόγους φρενί; and, exactly parallel, Alc. 832, ἀλλὰ σοῦ, τὸ μὴ φράσαι κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 60 b, ὡς θαυμασίας πίφυκε τὸ ἰδίʾ τρός . . . τὸ λυπηρόν, τὸ ἀμα μὲν αὐτῷ μὴ ἔθελεν παραγίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. The τὸ ἄμα k.τ.λ. (taking for granted the reading here) is the justification of the expression ὡς θαυμασίας. τὸ is the reading of Oxon. and one other MS.]

7 If an opinion must be hazarded as to the force of this Accusative, it must be that it is Causal. See § 18 above.

Sypm. 204 a, αὐτὸ γὰρ τούτο, ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία, τὸ μὴ ὁντα καλῶν κἀγαθῶν μὴ δὲ φρόνιμον δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ικανὸν. Here τὸ μὴ κ.τ.λ. contains the reason for ἐστὶ χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία: but, put as it is not in the common Causal form, but under this apologetic form, it also justifies the tone of impatience in which ἀμαθία has been mentioned.

§ 86. η. The Accusative of the Infinitive, expressing the result, in negative clauses, is common.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν ... ἄλλα τε μοι πολλὰ ἀναμβάλλειν κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 74 d, ἦ ἐνδεί τι ἐκένων τὸ μὴ τοιοῦτον εἶναι; [So Hermann without MS. authority.]

This use would seem to be confined to negative clauses.

Lach. 190 e, ἐγὼ αἰτίως ... τὸ σὲ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὴ τοῦτο δ ἀναγνώσωμεν ἥρομων ἄλλ᾽ ἔτερον, is no exception, since the negative is but postponed.

The Genitive of the Infinitive expresses the cause or purpose primarily, rather than the result, in both affirmative and negative clauses.

§ 87. B. Voice.

a. "Third sense of Middle Voice." The ascription to the Middle Voice of this meaning,—'to get a thing done by another,'—is proved to be erroneous, and that in its favourite exemplification (διδάσκεσθαι), by some passages in the Meno.

Meno 93 d, ἦν ὁ δὲ θεαστής ὦτὶ Θεοματοκλῆς Κλεόφαντος τῶν ὑδῶν ἵππεα μὲν ἐνδιάφατο ἄγαθον; and, just after, ἐπιτεύγασε—where the whole point of the passage lies in the education of the son by the father himself distinctively.

On the other hand, we have

Meno 94 c, Θουκυδίδης αὖ δῶ νις ἐθρέψε ... , καὶ τούτου ἐπιτεύγασε τά τε ἄλλα εὖ καὶ ἐπιλαμανώ κάλλιστα 'Αθηναίων τῶν μὲν γὰρ Θανάτα ἔωσκε τῶν δὲ Εὐδίώραφ—where the Active ἐπιτεύγασε is as distinctively used of the father's getting his sons taught by others. Similarly ib. h, d, ἐδίδαξε.
VERBS.

§ 88. As the favourite example, διδάσκωσθαι, thus falls to the ground, so do the rest. Δανείσθαι, for instance, is 'to take a δανεῖον,' as δανείζεω is 'to give a δανεῖον' that is, the general meaning of the Verb being 'to deal in δανεῖα,' the Middle means 'to deal in them for oneself.' So it is with other Verbs expressing transactions to which there must be two parties: κρησὶν and κρησθαι express the active and passive side of 'dealing in oracles.' So, rather differently, 'bringing a man to justice' becomes, on the disinterested side, the office of the judge, κρίνειν, and, on the interested side, the office of the prosecutor, κρίνεσθαι.

The fact is, that the Active Voice is quite as susceptible as the Middle of the meaning 'to get a thing done by another;' neither Voice, however, by any proper inherent force, but in virtue solely of the common principle that "qui facit per alium facit per se."

Examples of the Active Verb having this meaning may be found in Aesch. Ag. 594, "Όμως 6' έθνων,—where Clytæmnestra attributes to herself the same action which was in ν. 87 described by the words περίπεμπτα θυσικεία,—in Hdt. iii. 80, [ἀνήρ τύραννος] κτείνει ἀκρι- τους, &c.

§ 88. b. There is a genuine inherent sense of Verbs, which deserves more distinct notice than it has received. It stands halfway between the Middle and the Passive.

'To allow oneself to be,' 'to expose oneself to be,' 'to get oneself,—subjected to this or that, may be designated the Semi-Middle sense. The following are examples.

Crito 48 d, εξάγουσε καὶ εξαγόμενοι—'allowing ourselves to be carried across the border.'

Phædo 67 a, ἀπαμπλώμεθα—'allow ourselves to be infected.' And so Hip. Ma. 291 a.

Soph. 253 b, [φθόγγους] τοὺς συγκερασθέντας τε καὶ μή—'which allow themselves to be united'—i. e. 'which harmonise.'

Men. 91 e, μηδένα ... τοσαίτη μιαία λάβοι, ὥστε παρὰ τούτους ἀλφήνα λαβηθήμινα—'get himself into disgrace.'

Phileb. 58 c, ἀπεχθήσας Γοργία—'you will incur the hatred of Gorgias.'

* διδάσκωσθαι also means 'to take a pupil.' So Pind. Ol. viii. 77, τὸ διδά- σκωσθαί δὲ τοι εἰδήτε βιτέρον, Simonid. ap. Gaisf. Fr. liv. p. 377, διδασάμενοι χορὸν ἀνδρῶν, Arist. Nub. 783, 'Τῆλείαν ἀκρίβ', οίων ἦν διδασάμην σ' ἐντι (Socrates speaks.)
Apol. 35 c, χρή σωτε ύμας εδίψειν ύμας επιορκείν, ουδ' ύμας εδίψεσθαι.

Equally marked is the existence of this use in other authors.

Hom. Od. ii. 33, ἀνήμενος—‘one that earns a benefit,’ iv. 373, 'Ως δὴ δὴ' ἐν νήσῳ ἔρυκει—‘allowest thyself to be detained’ by Calypso. Thuc. i. 77, ἔλασσούμενον εν ταῖς Ἕμβολαιαις δίκαις, ‘letting ourselves be curtailed of our due,’ similarly iv. 64, δον εἰκός ἵππασθαι. Eur. Phæn. 602, (A) Καὶ σε δεύτερον γ’ ἀπαιτῶ σκηπτρα καὶ θρόνους χθονὸς. (B) Οὐκ ἀπαιτούμενος. Soph. Aj. 217, νῦκτερος Άιας ἀπελαβήθη. Dem. de Cor. 277. p. 318, τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα . . . εἰρήσετε πάντες εν τοῖς κονοῖς ἐξεταζομένη ὑπὲρ ύμῶν ἂν, c. Dionys. 14. p. 1287, ἡγούμενοι δεῖν ἐλαττοῦνται τι καὶ συγχωρεῖν. Add στεφάνωσθαι, so common in Piudar (e.g. Ol. vii. 15, Nem. vi. 19) for ‘winning a crown.’

Hence also the double sense of Verbals in -τος, as γνωστός, from γνωρίσκειν, ‘known:’ γνωστός, from γνωρίζεσθαι, ‘capable of being known’ (lit. ‘allowing itself to be known’). And in privatives— ἀληθός, from λευκόν, ‘unbroken;’ ἀληθός, from λυεῖσθαι, ‘that does not allow itself to be broken,’ ‘unbreakable.’

The same sense extends into Latin. Livy iii. 42, Natura loci ac vallo, non virtute aut armis, tutabantur, lit., ‘let themselves be protected by the strength of their position’—i. e. ‘were fain to let their natural and artificial defences protect them.’ So Juv. xv. 157, defendier isdem Turribus, Virg. AEn. ii. 707, cervici imponere nostræ. So juris consultus is ‘one who lets himself be consulted in matters of law.’

§ 89. C. Tense.

A Dependent sentence following a Main Past Construction is not affected (in Tense or Mood) by the Tense of the Main Construction in the following cases.

a. When a fact contemplated in the Dependent clause as already extant continues so at the time of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Phædo 98 b, ἀνὴρ ἑαυσαυστῆς ἐπίδος χιώμην φερόμενος, ἐπειδὴ ὅρω ἀνδρα τῷ μὲν νῷ οὐδὲν χρώμενον κ.τ.λ. The fact of which Socrates had become aware was one which, with its consequence of disappointed hopes, still remained in full force at the time at which he was speaking.

Ib. 99 d, ἐδοξέ τοῖνν μοι μετὰ τάντα, ἐπειδὴ ἀπείρηκα τὰ δύτα σκοπών,
k.t.l. The pursuit then already renounced had never since been resumed.

Apol. 21 b, ἡπόρον τί ποτε λέγει. The judgment of the Oracle once uttered is regarded as remaining on record for all time.

Phædo 88 c, ἐδόκουν ... εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν ... , μὴ οὐδὲνδο ἄξιον εἰμεν κριτάει, ἢ καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ ἀπεστάλτηκαν. There are here two Dependent clauses: the former, expressing a transitory contingency, is affected by the Main Construction and thrown into Oratio Obliqua; the second, expressing a hypothetical fact which if verified must be permanent, is not affected.

Tim. 32 c, ἄνεστησαν ὁ ἄνεστάσας ... τὰ δὲ διανοηθέντα, πρῶτον μὲν ἑνα ... τέλεον ... εἴη, ... ἢ τί δὲ ἑνα ἄγαρ ὑπὲρ καὶ ἄνοσον τῇ. Cf. Lysias i. 6. p. 92, ἐπειδὴ ... γνωσέα ἡγαγόμην ... ἐφύλαττον ... ἐπειδὴ δὲ μοι παιδίων γέγενται k.t.l.

§ 90. β. When the event contemplated as future in the Dependent clause is still in the future at the moment of its being alluded to by the speaker.

Apol. 17 a, ἔλεγον, ὡς χρῆ ἤμας εὑλαβείσθαι μὴ ἔπρεπεν ἐξεπαγγεῖτε—because the deception threatened was to be looked for in the speech which was now but begun.

Symp. 193 e, πάνω ἄν ἐφοβοῦμαι, μὴ ἀπορήσωσι λόγων ... νῦν δὲ ὅμως θαρρῶ. At the moment at which this is said, the point of time when the contingency of ἀπορήσωσι will be decided is still future.

Apol. 29 c, ἐφη ... λέγων πρῶς ἤμας ὡς, εἰ διαφευγόμην, ἦδη ἄν ἤμῶν οἱ νιεῖς διαφαρησοῦνται. The reason why διαφευγόμην is affected by the Oratio Obliqua, though equally future with διαφαρησοῦνται which remains unaffected, is that the Protasis describes an event purely hypothetical, not one assumed as about to happen at all. εἰ διαφευγόμαι would have implied an assumption that Socrates would be acquitted.

Symp. 198 b, ἐνθυμομένος ὅτι οὐχ οὐδὲς τι ἐσομαί ... οὐδὲν καλὸν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἢς ἄνθρωπος ἐλάγου ἀποδίαμερος φύσιν. He has still the task before him, and still the feeling that he will be unequal to it.

Il. 198 e, προορίζει γάρ, ὡς ἤπαιν, ὅταν ἐκάστος ἴδιων τῶν ὁμοίων ἕκκομαί τίνι βοellidos. Cf. Dem. de Cor. 85. p. 254, ὁ νῦν οὗτος ἐφη συμβησθεῖσθαι, ὡς εἰκε ὁμοίωμα.
§ 91. The use of this construction is in Plato so carefully restricted to the cases just specified, that it would be unjustifiable to confound it with the simple irregular recurrence to the Oratio Recta, which is so common in other writers.

Symp. 190 c, ἐπουλεύοντο δ' τε χρὴ αὑτῶς ποιήσαι would be an exception to the rule, if χρὴ were an ordinary Verb.

The rule seems to hold in Homer, II. v. 127, Od. iii. 15, and v. 23, and viii. 44, and xiii. 417, &c. Nietzsche (on Od. iii. 76) denies that the principle here pointed out is the true one. He points out two passages, II. v. 567 and xv. 596, as refuting it. But in both these (1) the reading varies between Optative and Conjunctive, and (2) in both two purposes are mentioned, so that if the Conjunctive is the right reading it may well have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing the nearer and the remoter purpose.

§ 92. b. Imperfect Tense used for the Oratio Obliqua of the 'Prophetic Present.'

Symp. 190 c, οὕτε γὰρ ὅπως ἀποκτείνανεν εἶχον . . ., αἱ τιμαὶ γὰρ αὐτῶς καὶ τερα τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡφανίζετο—where, just as οὕτε εἶχον is the Oblique Narration of the thought οὐκ ἔχομεν, 'they could not, they thought,' so ἡφανίζετο represents them thinking αἱ τιμαὶ ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. ἡφανίζεται. Now ἡφανίζεται would have been a 'Prophetic Present,' and so ἡφανίζετο is the Oblique Narration of this.

Cf. Antiphon ii. Λ. β. 9. p. 117, ἀλούς μὲν γὰρ τὴν γραφὴν τῆς μὲν οὐσίας ἔδει έκατερομένοις, τῆς δὲ πόλεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἐστερούμεν—'I felt I could not be.' Andoc. i. 58-60. p. 8, φονεὺς οὖν αὐτῶν ἐγινόμην κ.τ.λ. ταύτα δὲ πάντα σκοπῶν εὑρίσκου κ.τ.λ.—where the σκοπῶν shews that ἐγινόμην means 'I felt I was on the way to become.'

§ 93. c. Aorist.

a. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the construction in which it stands.

Phdr. 249 a, αἱ δὲ ἄλλα, ὅταν . . . τελευτήσωσι, κρίσεως ἔτυχον.

Gorg. 484 a, ἐὰν . . . φύσιν λειαν γένηται ἔχων ἀνήρ, . . . ἐπανεστᾶς ἀνεφάπτη δεσποτής ἡμέτερος ὁ δούλος.

Phileb. 17 d, ὅταν γὰρ ταύτα λάβῃς οὕτω, τότε ἐγένον σοφός.

Lysis 217 d, ὅταν δὴ τὸ γῆρας αὐτάς ταύτων τοῦτο κρώμα ἐπαγάγῃ, τότε ἐγένοντο . . . λευκαί.

The Subjunctive construction with ἄν, not admissible with a past
Teuse, constrains us to see in the Aorist the expression of an action instantaneously complete, rather than of an action necessarily past.

§ 94. β. Its meaning strongly exhibited by force of the context.

Phædo 88 d, πήγαρῆς μετῆλθε τῶν λόγων; lit. ' overtook ' (same metaphor as 89 c, εί...με διαφεύγω [Hermann from first hand of Oxon.] δ λόγος). Cf. Pind. Ol. vi. 62, μετάλλοσέν τέ μν. Antipho ii. A. a. 3. p. 115, ἦως δὲ διώχθη, ' until he is caught.'

Ib. 108 c, [ὑ μὲν] φέρεται εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πρέπουσαν οἶκησιν ὡς δὲ...ἀφικεν τῶν αὐτῇ ἐκάστῃ τόπῳ προσήκοντα—the good soul, without a moment of suspense, or sensible lapse of time, ' at once finds a home in ' &c.

Symp. 172 a, οὐτος, οὐ περιμένεις; Κάγω ἐπιστάς περιμένεια—not ' waited for him to come up with me,' but ' let him come up with me.'

Ib. 173 b, τι οὖν οὐ διηγήσω μοι; Same phrase Protag. 310 a, ' why not at once relate it to me? ' So Phædo 86 d, Soph. 251 e, &c. Cf. Arist. Vesp. 213, τι οὐκ ἀπεκαμήθης;

Symp. 209 a, ὁ γενέθη τὸ προσῆκε καὶ κυήσαι καὶ κεῖν. κυήσαι is the first moment of the state κεῖν.

Hence Apol. 21 c, 22 d, ἔδοξε, ἔδοξαν, ' I came to think.'

§ 95. D. Impersonal Verbs.

Impersonal Verbs in the same rigid form as in Latin do not exist in Greek. Even those which express the processes of inanimate nature, as ἔει, νέφει, ἐσισε (Thuc. iv. 52), are only impersonal in that particular use, and not always so even then.

We find, however, in addition to these,

§ 96. a. Passive Impersonals (the nearest approach in Greek to strict Impersonals).

Phdr. 232 a, οὐκ ἄλλως αὐτοῖς πεπάνηται.

Ib. 261 b, λέγεται τε καὶ γράφεται.

Polit. 299 a, δὲν δ' ἄν καταγρηφισθῇ.

Legg. 914 a, δεσμευθέντων (Genitive Absolute).

§ 97. b. Quasi-Impersonals (as we may call them), where a vague Nominative, such as ' the circumstances,' ' the event,' ' the course of events,' is understood. The common words ἐνδιέχεται, παρίχει (Thuc. iv. 85 &c.), the phrase οὕτως ἐχεῖ, &c., are such cases. We do not know always whether the vague understood Nominative is Plural or Singular, except where the Verb is represented by a periphrasis
(as Hom. II. iv. 345, φιλ' [ἡγ'], xiv. 98, Τρωϊ μὲν εὐκτὰ γένηται, xvi. 128, οὐκέτι φυκτὰ πέλωνται, xxi. 533, ὅπω λοίγε ἐσεθάν, Od. ii. 203, ἵνα ἐσσεται, viii. 384, Ἡδ' ἀρ' ἑτοίμα τέτυκτο, xi. 455, οὐκέτι πιστὰ γυναιξιν, Thuc. ii. 3, ἐπεὶ ἑτοίμα ἦν, i. 102, τοῦτον ἐνδεῖ ἐφαινετο, i. 7, πλοῖματέρων ὄντων, Hdt. vi. 52, δὴ καὶ ἕστατα, the common ἀδώνατα ἐστιν, &c.), or where (as in several of the following) an Adjective stands in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Rep. 580 d, δέστατα, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν ἀπόθεξιν—'the case will admit.'

Ib. 452 d, καὶ τοῦτο ἐνεδείχατο—'the result made this plain also.'

Phaedo 73 b, εἰν τις ἐπὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἄγγι ἑνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ ὅτι τοῦτο ὀφθαλμὸς ἐξεῖ—'what ensues is proof positive,' &c.

Apol. 28 b, οὐδέν δεινον μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στρ—lit. 'lest the course of events should come to a stand-still.' 'There is no danger of the rule breaking down in my case.' Cf. Ar. Eth. VI. viii. 9, στήσεται γὰρ καίει—'for there too demonstration must stop.'

Hdt. iii. 82, ὁ δὲ τοῦ φώνου ἀπέβη ἐς μουναρχίαν.

Phileb. 25 d, ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ νῦν ταῦτον δράσει—'perhaps it will do equally well now.'

Phaedo 118 a, ἐπεὶ δὲν πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ γένηται—'when the action of the poison reaches the heart.'

§ 98. In the next instance, we find an Impersonal clause representing the Verb.

Tim. 24 e, εξ ἦτε ἐπίβατον ἐπὶ τὰς ἄλλας νῆσους . . . ἐγένετο.

§ 99. In the following instances we find an Adjective or Participle in agreement with the vague understood Nominative.

Phileb. 20 c, προϊόν δ' ἐπὶ σαφέστερον δείξει—'the sequel of the argument will make this yet clearer.'

Phaedo 117 b, καὶ οὕτως αὐτῷ ποιήσει—'the agent left to itself will complete its work.' There is delicacy in the vagueness with which both the deadly agent and its effect are designated.

Theæt. 200 c, ὁ τῶν ποταμῶν καθηγούμενος ἐφι ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό. A man who goes first through a stream, if asked, "How deep is it?", says, "How can I tell beforehand? we shall see." From this passage we gather that the expression was in popular use.

Critias 108 c, τοῦτο μὲν οὖν οἷς ἐστιν, αὐτῷ σοι τάξα δηλώσει.

§ 101. We find also Non-Impersonal sentences on the model of some of the foregoing, e.g.

Crat. 393 c, τον άνωμα, δ' αυτο ήμιν δηλώσει κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 402 c, τοιτο γε (τον άνομα) άλληγον αυτο λέγει δει κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 237 b, και μιαστά γε δη πάντων ον λόγοι αυτος αν δηλώσεις.


Hel. 146 sqq., (A) Συμπροένεισον, ου τυχο μαντευμάτων "Οπη νεός στελλαμη' αν ο ομοιον πτερον κ.τ.λ.—(B) Πλούς, δ' έξιν', αυτος σημανει.

§ 102. E. Intransitive use of Verbs Transitive.

Some Verbs Transitive recede, in particular significations, into Intransitive Verbs. At the same time, they do not cease to be Active; neither do they become strictly Reflexive.

This happens in two cases.

§ 103. a. When that, to which the action was originally represented as passing on, is, or comes to be regarded as, a part of the Agent; and when further the mention of it can be dropped without marring the sense. "Εξευν, in several of its senses, exemplifies this process.

From έχεω governing an Accusative of part of the Subject we have, e.g. Hom. Od. xix. 38, κινεις ύψος' έχοντες—'holding,' properly not themselves, but their heads, or, vaguely, parts of themselves, aloft. So Hdt. i. 181, άνάβασις ες αυτοις έξωθεν κύληρ περι πίνας τοις πύργοις έχουσα πεποίηται—where έχουσα has for its Object each part of the άνάβασις in succession.

From έχεω governing an Accusative of that which comes to be regarded as part of the Subject, we have e.g. Od. iii. 182, αυτορ έρωγε Πύλον' έχον—'held my ship on her course for Pylos;’—the
ship, as following the will of her captain, is, when we are speaking of his movements, virtually part of him;—whence simply 'I held on for Pylos.'

On the other hand, in the following passage κατέχειν has for its Object that which is literally a part of the Subject.

Phædo 117 c, οἷοι τ' ἦσαν κατέχειν τὸ μὴ δακρύειν—'to keep themselves,'—but properly those parts of themselves which had to do with the particular affection in question.

So again the common ἔχε δὴ (Crat. 439 a, Gorg. 490 b, Lach. 198 b, Legg. 639 d) is 'hold,' scil. your foot from advancing—your tongue from speaking—your thoughts from running on—as the case may be.

Gorg. 475 d, τῷ λόγῳ ὄσπερ ἑαρῷ παρέχον—'offering,' not strictly oneself, but the particular limb or part needing treatment.

§ 104. Other examples in Plato are

Rep. 388 e, ὅταν τις ἐφῆ ἵσχυρῷ γελώτε. So 563 a, ξυγκαθιέναι.

Ib. 422 c, ἀναστρέψειν. So Lach. 191 e.

Ib. 467 b, ἀναλαβεῖν.

Ib. 473 b, μεταβάλειν.

Ib. 540 a, 591 c, παρακανεῖν. So 573 c, ἵπποκανεῖν.

Phædo 65 a, ἑγγὺς τι τείνειν τοῦ τείνουσιν.

Ib. 98 d, χαλώντα καὶ ἕπτελοντα τὰ νεῦρα.

Phdr. 228 e, παῦε. Jelf instances this also in Hom. Od. i. 340, iv. 659. [In Od. i. 340 the reading seems doubtful.]

Politic. 258 a, Θεατήτω, . . . ἐννέμμενα.

Phædo 72 b, εἰ τὸ καταδραμένει μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ δ' ἀνεχείρεσθαι μὴ ἀντα-ποδοδοθῇ—lit. (as we might say) 'put in an appearance on the other side.'

§ 105. This Intransitive use of these Verbs becomes so natural, that, after it is established, when in particular cases it is convenient that the Object should be expressed, it is expressed in the Dative.

E. g. Il. xxiii. 686, ἀνασχέσθαι χερῶι στιμπαρθησι. The language had been accustomed to ἀνασχέσθαι Intransitive for holding up the hands; so that when, in order to characterise the hands, the poet desires to express the Object, it falls more naturally into the Dative.

So Od. ix. 489, ἐμβαλεῖν κόπρες—ἐμβαλεῖν being used alone, e. g. in Aristoph. Ran. 206, for 'dashing in the ears.' (An erroneous interpretation of this last passage arises from neglect of the principle we are noticing.)

So Od. x. 140, νὺ κατηγαγόμεσθα.
§ 106. b. When the Accusative of the Object, not being in any way referable to the Agent, is nevertheless so natural a sequence to the Verb, that the Verb itself will suggest it if omitted.

Symp. 196 d, περαστών μη ἔλειπεν—'to fall short'—lit. 'to leave a deficiency of so much in a given quantity.'

Phdr. 237 d, θέμενοι ὄρον, εἰς τούτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιόμεθα. ἀναφέροντες, 'referring,' scil. our assertions and reasonings.

Gorg. 512 e, ἐπιτρέψαντα περὶ τούτων τῷ θεῷ—'entrusting,' scil. the decision.

§ 107. Some uses of ἔχεω illustrate this process also.

We find, Thuc. iii. 89, τῶν σεισμῶν κατεχόντων—there is no need to express what they pervaded or occupied, since σεισμοί (so used) must be σεισμοί τῆς γῆς. Or when ἔχεω is used of an army occupying a position, the Verb alone suffices to express this. And (as we have seen in the parallel case) so fixed may this use become, that when the position occupied needs to be expressed, another construction is found for it; cf. Thuc. iii. 34, ἐν διαστείρισματι ἔχεω: so viii. 28. Similarly a general moving his army is said ἔχεω, without any Object expressed: whence the next step is that the whole army, which strictly ἄγεται, is said ἔχεω: cf. Thuc. v. 54, Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον, ἐσιβάλλον. [So Arnold: ἐσιβάλλον Poppos and Goller].

§ 108. This is the account of a variation, which might else be taken merely for one of government:—

Phaedo 58 e–59 a, οὔτε γάρ ὡς ἀνάκτορ παράντα με ἀνδρός ἐυστηθείν ἔλεος εἰσήσει...: διὰ δὴ ταύτα οὐδὲν πάνυ μοι ἔλεεων εἰσήσει. An emotion may be said either to enter the person himself (as in ἔλεος με εἰσήσει), or to enter his soul; but in this case if the reference to the person be made clear the mention of the soul may be spared; that is, the Verb becomes Intransitive, and is followed by a Dative of the person (as in the latter sentence of the passage quoted).

§ 109. F. Uses of the Participle.

a. Periphrastically, with Auxiliary Verb Substantive.

Politic. 273 b, πολλῆς ἦν μετέχον ἀταξίας.

Ib. 274 c, εἶναι γεγονός. 289 a, ἦν ἄν τεθέν. 308 e, ἐστὶ τείνωτα.

Tim. 38 c, ἐστὶν ὅσ. 68 d, ἱγκαπὼς ἄν εἴη. 77 e, εἴη διαδιδόμενων.
§ 110. B. Peculiar Intransitive use of ἐξων with Verbs.
Euthyd. 295 e, ἐξων φλυαρεῖσ.
Phdr. 236 e, τί δήτα ἐξων στρέφει;

§ 111. Idioms of Prepositions.

Ἀνά.

In Composition.

Phædo 87 a, ἀναρίθμησαι. Of withdrawing any deed or word. Not a metaphor from draughts particularly, though capable of being so applied—as in


Ἀπό.

Of the use of the bodily members.

Rep. 613 b, δρόσων ὁσπερ οἱ δρομῆς ὁσοὶ ἐν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μη—‘who run fairly with their legs, but with the upper part of their bodies (head, neck, arms) in bad form.’ (Even supposing that κάτω could refer to the starting point and ἄνω to the turning point, which can scarcely be supported by instances, the absolute use of τὰ κάτω and τὰ ἄνω in this meaning is inconceivable.)

Legg. 795 b, ὁ τελέως παγκράτιον ἧσκηκός . . . οὐκ ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἁριστερῶν ἀδύνατος ἐστὶν μάχεσθαι κ.τ.λ.


§ 112. Διὰ.

a. With Accusative; ‘by help of.’ This is the use so common afterwards in the Orators.

Rep. 352 c, εἰπὼν τίς αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, . . . δι’ ὑν ἐπραξαν ἐπραξαν.

b. With Genitive.

Phædo 82 e, τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἀναγκαζομένην . . . σκοπεῖσθαι τὰ δοτα . . . μη αὐτήν δι’ αὐτῆς—‘acting only by and through itself,’ independently of anything external to itself.

So Rep. 510 b, αὐτοῖς εἴδεις δι’ αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιομένη, and similarly 511.
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Rep. 493 e, εἴ ὁνόματα διὰ τῶν στορμάτων μόνον φθέγγοντο.

Ib. 580 b, ὥ διὰ πάντων κρίτης ἐποφαίνεται—'the paramount judge decides absolutely.' An ordinary sense of διὰ πάντων, beginning with Homer.

Meno 74 a, τὴν μιαν, ἢ διὰ πάντων τούτων ἐστὶ—'which is out beyond all these,' i.e. 'which all these run up to,' 'which is paramount to all these.'

Rep. 343 b, διὰ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας—'night after night and day after day.'

Ib. 621 a, πορεύεσθαι διὰ καύματος τε καὶ πνίγους δεινοῦ.

Symp. 220 b, ἀνυπόδητος διὰ τοῦ κρυστάλλου ἐπορεύετο. This use of διὰ in prose is unique: see Bernhardy’s Syntax, p. 234. It obtains in poetry, beginning with Homer’s διὰ νῆσου ἱων in Od. xii. 335. Is its employment in the text intended for the sake of grandiloquence?

c. In Composition.

Symp. 221 b, διαπορεύεσθαι, and Critias 106 a, διαπορεία—of traversing a certain interval of space between two defined points, —'doing the distance.' Cf. διαθέειν, Protag. 335 e.

§ 113. Etc.

a. Of progress along or in a certain route.

Phædo 114 b, φέρονται . . . εἰς τοὺς ποταμοὺς—not ‘into’ but ‘along’ or ‘down’ the rivers.

§ 114. β. ‘To the number of.’

Legg. 704 b, ἀπέχει διαλύμας εἰς τινας ὄρθοκοντα σταδίους.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 124, ὀλίγον εἰς χιλίους. So Xenophon and Demosth.

§ 115. γ. ‘In regard to,’ ‘in the point of,’ ‘with a view to.’

Symp. 184 b, εἴεργετούμενος εἰς χρήματα.

Ibid. d, ὥ μὲν δυνάμενοι εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἐμβαλ- λεσθαι, ὥ δὲ δεόμενοι εἰς παῦλες καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σοφίαν κτάσθαι.

Ib. 196 c, εἰς γε ἀνθρίαν "Ερωτε ὦ οὐδὲ "Αρης ἀνθισταται.

Ib. 219 d, ἀνθρώπων τουτούρα ὡφ ἑγὼ ὡδὶ ἀν ὀμνὺν ποτὲ ἐντυχεῖν εἰς φρόνησιν καὶ εἰς καρπαῖν.

Theæt. 169 a, ἱκανοὶ εὐνοοί εἰς ἀστρονομίαν.

* [Under this example is in the MS. “Cf. Odysa.”]
Theaet. 178 c, τὸ περὶ λόγου πιθανῶν ἑκατὸρ ἡμῶν ἐςμένων εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτθου ἂν προδοξάσαι ἰ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὀφτισθεῖν;
Legg. 635 a, ἵστι ταύτα οὕτως, εἰς ἃ καὶ μεθὲν γε ἄνθρ ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς νόμοις ἡμῶν.

Euthyd. 305 d, τὰ νικηθῆρα εἰς δόξαν οἰκεθαι σοφίας πέρι.


§ 116. 'Εκ.

a. Euthyd. 282 a, εκ παντὸς τρόπον παρακενάξεσθαι.

b. Apol. 23 a, ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο—‘hereupon’: the notion is of sequence of time rather than consequence. Cf. Ἀσχ. Ευμ. 2, ἐκ ἐς τῆς Ὁμών, Choroph. 1055, Ποταίμων γὰρ αἰμά σοι χεροῦ ἔτε. 'Εκ τῶνθε τοῦ ταραγμὸς ἐς φρένας πίνει.

§ 117. 'Εν.

a. ‘In the point of.’

Rep. 402 d, ἐν τῷ εἴδει ὁμολογοῦντα—‘agreeing in their aspect.’

Symp. 213 c, μικῶντα ἐν λόγοις πάντας ἀνθρώπων.

Theaet. 206 a, τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ δόσει διαγνωσκέις πειρώμενος.

b. Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 457 a, ἐμβαρχύ. Cf. the form καθεὺς in St. John viii. 9, ἐπηχοῦτο εἰς καθεὺς.

§ 118. 'Επὶ.

a. With Dative;—‘in connection with’—signifying a more material connection than it signifies with the Genitive.

Rep. 376 c, ἓστι δὲ ποὺ ἦ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστικῆ, ἦ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῆ μοναστικῆ.

Ib. 408 b, οὖθ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τῆν τέχνην δεῖν εἶναι.

Ib. 532 c, ἐπὶ ἀδυναμία βλέπειν.

Symp. 186 a, ['Ερως] οὐ μόνον ἐστίν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

Ib. 184 c, ἐπὶ τούτω καὶ ἐξαπατηθήσαι οὐδὲν αἰσθητῶν.

Ib. 186 b, ἄλλος μὲν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ἑγεμονὶ 'Ερως ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσόδει.

Ib. 210 a, τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ ὀφθαλῶν σώματι.

Ibid. b, τὸ ἐπὶ εἴδει καλῶν.

Soph. 247 d, τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦτοιν ἀμα καὶ ἐπὶ ἐκείνοις ξυμφωνεῖς γεγονός.

Polit. 310 a, ἐπὶ τούτοις δὴ τούτ' εἶναι τέχνη φαρμακον.
§§ 119—122.]

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Tim. 48 e, ἵκανὰ ὡν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐμπροσθεὶν λεχθεὶσσων.

Cf. Andoc. i. 25. p. 4, τῶν φευγώνων ἐπὶ τοῖς μυστηρίοις.

§ 119. b. Adverbially compounded.

Legg. 697 e, ἐπὶ ἔτι χείρους.


§ 120. c. In Composition.

Crito 43 ἐπιλύσει—'exempts.' Perhaps the meaning of ἔπι is 'with a further result' or 'condition,' and so ἐπιλύσευθαι would be to obtain a man's release, under the condition of a ransom to be paid. Similarly would ἐπαγγέλευθαι be 'to announce so as to bind oneself in time to come,' and so 'to offer,' 'promise.'

Symp. 172 a, ἐπιστᾶς περιέμενα. ἐπιστήμαι is to stop in the course of progress from one point to another. στήμαι is to stop, without any reference to moving again. So ἐπιλέγεσθαι is to pick out, e.g. in passing along a line. ἐπιστᾶς περιέμενα is equivalent to the one word ἐπέμενα. For ἐπιμένειν see under peri, § 127.

Phaedo 62 e, ὁ ζωκράτης . . . ἐπιβλέψας πρὸς ἤμασ. From the notion of succession here again we should get 'looking [from Cebe] to us,'—'turning to us.' Cf. Apol. 31 d, ἐπικωμιαδὼν.

§ 121. Katá.

a. With Accusative.

Legg. 918 a, ἐπεταὶ κατὰ πόδα—'in close succession.'

Soph. 243 d, κατὰ πόδα γε, ὁ θεαίτης, ὑπέλαβες—'you have caught at once the train of the thought.' This is of course a pregnant use of the Preposition, implying κατὰ πόδα ἐπόμενον.

b. With Genitive, in Attributive sense.

Men6 74 b, μίαν ἄρτην λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων.

Ib. 76 a, κατὰ παντὸς σχῆματος τούτῳ λέγω.

Ib. 77 a, κατὰ δλου εἰπών ἄρτην πέρι.

Phaedo 70 d, μὴ τοῖνος κατ’ ἄνθρώπων σκόπει μόνον τούτῳ—'consider this not as an attribute of mankind only.' The κατὰ, in a pregnant use, stands for ὧν κατ’ ἄνθρωπων λεγόμενον.

Phdr. 260 b, συντιθεῖσι λέγον ἔταυν κατὰ τοῦ ὄνομον.

§ 122. c. In Composition.

a. Symp. 219 c, καταβαρβάνεω—'to earn by sleeping.'

b. Of doing a thing without regard to other considerations.
Apol. 33 c, οὖν ἂν ἐκεῖνὸς γε αὐτοῦ καταθεθεῖ—implying the request to be unprincipled or arbitrary.

Legg. 861 b, δοὺς δὲ ουδένα λόγου ὡς ὀρθῶς εἴρηκε, κατανομοθέτησε.

Cf. Lysias vi. 3. p. 103, ἢ κατελέξαται ἢ καταχαρίσασθαι Ἀνδοκίδη.

Isaeus vii. 38. p. 67, τοὺς ἔχουσας ἀποδοῦναι τὰ δι᾽ αὐτῷ κατανογκάσαται—'peremptorily compelling.'

This κατὰ often, but not always or necessarily (see the last instance), gives an unfavourable meaning to the word.

§ 123. Μέχρι.

Adverbially compounded.

Gorg. 487 ε, μέχρι ὅποι.

§ 124. Παρά.

a. With Accusative.

a. Soph. 242 a, παρὰ πόδα μεταβαλῶν ἐμαυτῶν.


β. Apol. 36 a, οὕτω παρ᾽ ἀλέγοι—literally, 'up to so little' difference from the other quantity compared, i.e. so near it.

γ. In Comparison; signifying not 'beyond' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put coordinate with').

Phdr. 276 ε, παγκάλην λέγεις παρὰ φαύλην παιδίαν.

Theext. 144 a, ἀνδρεῖον παρ᾽ ὀντινοῦν.

For other instances see Idioms of Comparison, § 174. Cf. Thuc. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ σῖκασον τὸ ἔμμερον λέγειν ὑπέθεσθε.

b. With Dative.

Rep. 366 b, καὶ παρὰ θεοὶ καὶ παρ᾽ ἀνδρῶποι πράξομεν κατὰ νοῦν—'our dealings both with gods and with men will be what we desire.'

Symp. 186 d, ὃ περὶ τάγωθα μετὰ σωφροσύνης . . . ἀποτελούμενος καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ παρὰ θεοὶ ['Ερως']—'temperance exercised in dealings between ourselves (men) and with the gods.'

§ 125. c. With Genitive;—'obtained from' or 'proceeding from,'—of a sentiment or opinion.

Legg. 733 a, τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρῆ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν.

Soph. 226 d, λέγεται παρὰ πάντων καθαρμός τις.

Legg. 692 b, τὸ δὲ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν γιγαντοκεφαλὰ ταύτα . . . ουδεν σοφόν—'that these things should receive recognition from us.'

Crat. 412 e, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται.
§§ 126, 127.] PREPOSITIONS.

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Politic. 296 a, λόγον τὸν παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν λέγόμενον. Critias 107 b, τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἤμων ῥηθίντα. Protag. 312 b, ἐ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις. Symp. 182 d, ἵ παρακελεύσεις τῷ ἐρωτεθέν παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστὴ. (παρὰ πάντων follows parakaleusis.)

Cf. Andoc. i. 140. p. 18, παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογουμένως ταῦτα ὑμῖν ἔπαρχει.

§ 126. In the remaining instances the Preposition has a pregnant force: that is, the fact that an opinion or sentiment is referred to is left to be understood from the παρὰ.

Rep. 362 c, παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων τῷ ἀδίκῳ παρεσκευάσθαι τῶν βιῶν ἄμεινων.
Ib. 461 c, βεβαιώσασθαι παρὰ τοῦ λόγου.
Ib. 612 c, μισθὸς ... ὅσους τε καὶ οἴκους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν.

Ibid. d, ὁπερ ἵκει δέξις καὶ παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώπων.
Tim. 52 d, οἷος ... παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς λογισθεὶς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ δεδομένῳ λόγος.

With this use of παρὰ cf. that of πρὸς, Hdt. iii. 137, ἵνα φανῇ πρὸς Δαρείου ἐων καὶ ἐν τῇ ἑστασεί δόκιμος. Antipho i. 25. p. 114, καὶ γὰρ ἀν δικαιοτέρον καὶ ὁσιότερον καὶ πρὸς θεῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων γένοιτο ὑμῖν.

§ 127. Περί.

b10. With Dative—‘in the sphere of,’ literally.

Protag. 314 a, ἄρα μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλτάτοις κυβερνῆσῃ τε καὶ κυβερνήσῃς.
Phædo 114 d, βαρβαιν κρή περὶ τῇ ἐπιστολῇ νῆτω τυφόντας. The feeling is represented as locally watching over its object.

d. In Composition.

Phædo 59 c, καὶ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ὁ θυρωρὸς ... εἰπε περιμένειν, καὶ μὴ πρότερον παρίειν κ.τ.λ. The meaning of περιμένει shows will be elucidated by distinguishing it from εἰπέμενειν. εἰπέμενειν is to stop in the course of a progress from one point to another until somebody comes or something happens. The εἰτ, as in εἰπετηρίνειν, is local, and it also presumes that the progress is to be resumed. It answers to the Latin prestolari. περιμένειν is to defer any intended proceeding, to remain in statu quo, until

10 [In the MS. the uses of περὶ with the Dative are lettered b, its uses in Composition d. Apparently uses with the Accusative and the Genitive were to have come in, lettered a, and c.]
a certain future moment. The περὶ has reference simply to
the lapse of the interval of time. Hence περιμένειν here is ‘to
wait a certain time,’ which time is specified in the next words.
ἐπιμένειν would be unsuitable, as the admission of the visitors
into the prison could hardly be regarded as a continuation of
their walk to the prison.

Symp. 172 a, ὁ Φαληρεύς, ἔφη, οὗτος Ἀπολλόδωρος, οὗ περιμένεις;
Καῦρ ἐπιστάς περιμένειν. Here the addition of the local ἐπιστάς
in the second sentence shows that περιμένειν is not local. οὗ
περιμένεις; ‘wait a moment’ is more civil than ‘wait there.’

§ 128. Πρὸς.

a. With Accusative. Pregnant force;—i. e. not ‘for’ but ‘in
regard of fitness for’: in other words, the Preposition is related to
the sentence, in which it stands, not immediately, but through the
medium of an unexpressed clause.

Phædo 117 b, τὶ λέγεις περὶ τούτῳ τοῦ πώματος, πρὸς τὸ ἀποστείασι
ti;—‘what sayest thou as to this draught admitting of a
libation to a deity?’ lit. ‘in regard of its fitness for a libation.’

Protag. 328 b, νοθαῖ τινα, πρὸς τὸ κάλον κάγαθον γενέσθαι—‘to notice
a person [favourably] in regard of his fitness for becoming’ &c.

Symp. 177 b, νοθαῖ δὲς ἐπαινόν θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὀφθελον.

Legg. 757 c, νέμει τιμᾶς μείζονε μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀεὶ μείζονε κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 69 a, ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγῆ—lit. ‘right in regard of
fitness for making men good.’

Rep. 581 c, ἀμφισβητούνται ἐκάστου τοῦ ἐδοὺς αἱ ἡδοναὶ . . . πρὸς τὸ
κάλλιον καὶ ἄσχοιν ἔτη.

b. With Dative.

Phædo 112 c, ἀναντες γὰρ πρὸς ἀμφισβητοί τοῖς ῶμῖνας τὸ ἐκατέρωθεν
gίγνεται μέρος. [So Oxon.]

Ib. 84 c, πρὸς τῷ εἰρημένῳ λόγῳ ἢρ—‘absorbed in.’


§ 129. c. In Composition with a Verb πρὸς sometimes has the
general meaning of ‘additionally;’ and therefore rather qualifies the
whole sentence than unites with the Verb, and does not affect in
any way the meaning of the Verb.

Rep. 521 d, δεὶ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα—‘to have in
addition.’

Ib. 607 b, προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῷ—‘and let us say to her moreover.’
Theaet. 208 e, τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἀλλων προσλάβη—'apprehends in addition its difference from other things.' So 209 d, προσ-

Apol. 20 a, σφίσι ἐξνεώναι χρήματα διδόντας, καὶ χάριν προσεδέναι.

Phædo 7.4 a, τόδε προσπάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν.

Gorg. 516 d, Θεμιστοκλέα ταῦτα ταύτα ἐποίησαν καὶ φυγή προσέξῃ-

§ 130. 'Ὑπέρ.

'With a view to.'

Phædo 107 c, ἐπιμελείας δέιται οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτον μόνον ἐν ὕπὲρ τοῦ νεανίσκος καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦτον ἔρωτων.

Protag. 318 d, εἰπε τῷ μελικεῖ ἀποθεοῦσα Θερμάνουν ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ποιημα.

Cf. Lysias xii. 78. p. 127, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἑμῶν ἀποθεοῦσαν ὑπηκοόντως Θερμάνουν ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτοῦ ποιημα.

§ 131. 'Ὑπό.

a. Adverbially compounded.

Phdr. 242 d, ὑπὸ τι ἀσεβῆ [λόγον]—'somewhat impious.'

Gorg. 493 c, ὑπὸ τι ἀτοπο.

b. In Composition.

a. ὑπολογίζονται.

Apol. 28 d, Crito 48 d, Phdr. 231 b.

Similarly,

Protag. 349 c, ἦγογε οὐδὲν σου ὑπόλογον τίθεμαι.

Lach. 189 b, λέγεν αὖ μηδὲν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐλλίκιαν ὑπόλογον ποιήσατο.

Note, that ὑπολογίζονται is not restricted to an unfavourable sense; cf. Lysias xxx. 16. p. 184, οὐδὲν εἰκός αὐτῷ τούτῳ ὑπόλογον γενόσατο [so Bekker; οὐδένα... τούτου Zurich editors]—where αὐτῷ means 'in his favour,' and xxviii. 13. p. 180, οὐδὲ ἀδίκως τούτως φησί ἂν εἶναι ὑπόλογον τὴν ἑκείνων φυγήν;—not, as Taylor, 'honesta excusationem in suo exsilio habere,' but 'non injuria iis laudi imputandum.'

The word does not mean 'to subtract,' according to our notion of the operation; but 'to reckon against,' 'per contra'—the same meaning of ὑπὸ which we get in ὑπαναῆν, ὑπωμοσία ('an affidavit to stop' proceedings), ὑπογιασθαι (equivalent to ἀντιμιασθαι).

β. ὑποίκειν.

Rep. 372 d, μετρῖος ὑποίκειν.
§ 132. Idioms of Particles.

A. Καὶ expletive,—preceding and indicating the emphatic word.

a. In Relative Interrogative or Conditional sentences. Here Καὶ may generally11 be rendered ‘at all.’

Phaedo 77 b, πρὶν καὶ εἰς ἄνθρωπον σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι—‘before it came at all.’

Ib. 88 a, πρὶν καὶ γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς—‘before we came into being at all.’

Ib. 110 a, ὅποι ἂν καὶ γῇ γ᾽—‘exists at all.’

Apol. 22 a, ἵνα μοι καὶ ἄνελεγκτος ἢ μαντεία γέρνωτο. Here καὶ fastens itself to the latter portion of the compound ἄνελεγκτος—‘not to be called in question at all.’

Phaedo 66 d, εάν τις ἡμῶν καὶ σχολὴ γένηται.

Ib. 108 d, εἰ καὶ ἡπιστάμεν—‘if I even had had the knowledge.’

Ib. 110 b, εἴ δει καὶ μοῦν λέγειν καλόν—‘if it is allowable to narrate a fiction at all.’

Cf. Thuc. i. 15, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμι παρεγένετο.

This καὶ frequently enters into a set phrase with the Adjective σμικρός.

Apol. 28 b, ὅσον τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὀφελός ἐστὶν.

Soph. 247 c, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἑθελονσι συγχωρεῖν.

Ib. 261 b, ταραεῖν χρή τὸν καὶ σμικρὸν τι δυνάμενον.

Phileb. 58 a, ξύμπαντας ὅσους νῦν καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρχητα.

Politic. 278 d, πῶς . . . δύσκακτ' ἂν τις ἀρχυμένος ἀπὸ δόξης ψευδούς ἐπὶ τὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ μεικρὸν μέρος ἀρχηγὸνος κτήσασθαι φρονήσων;

The remaining passages shew the καὶ entering into Interrogative phrases.

Euthyphr. 3 a, τί καὶ ποιοῦτα σὲ φησι διαφθείρειν τοὺς νέους;

Ib. 6 b, τί γὰρ καὶ φόσομεν;

Phaedo 61 c, τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοὶ ἄλλο;

Laches 184 d, τί γὰρ ἂν τις καὶ ποιοὶ;

11 Perhaps it is better to say that the key to these passages is e. g. Thuc. ii. 11, ὅτεν χρῆν, εἰ τῷ καὶ δοκοῦμεν πλήθει ἱππέα, τούτοις ἐνεκα ἀμελέστερον τι παρεσκευασάμενοι χωρεῖν—‘if any one considers that we are a numerous force, as we are,’—or rather ‘if we are a numerous force, which it might strike any one we were.’ So Arist. Eth. Nic. V. xv. 9, εἰς η δῆ βλέπωςι καὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄδικα πρὸς αὐτόν—‘upon this view there is, what we are inclined to think there is, injury of oneself.’
§ 133. [PARTICLES.

There is a latent affirmation in a simple Interrogative sentence with τι. The καὶ neutralises this affirmation. ‘What have you done?’ implies that you have done something: the first instance above shows how this implication is neutralised. It is not so with πῶς καὶ, πῶς καὶ, &c., where the καὶ affirms the implied Proposition: Ἀesch. Choeph. 528, Πῶς καὶ τελευτᾷ...λόγος; ‘what was the issue?’—implying expectation of one. [Dindorf with the MSS. reads Καὶ ποῦ. Cf. however Eurip. Phæon. 1354, Πῶς καὶ πέπρακται διπτέχων παῖδων φόνος;]

β. In Affirmative Independent sentences. Here the force of καὶ is often difficult to render by a word, but it seems to be always identical with the emphasis.

Phileb. 23 a, πανταπασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη.
Euthyd. 304 c, οὔτωσι γὰρ πως καὶ εἴπε τοὺς ὄνομασι.
Rep. 328 c, διὰ χρόνου γὰρ καὶ ἐωράκεν αὐτῶν.
Ib. 395 c, πολλοῦ καὶ δεψόμεν. This phrase often recurs.
Symp. 177 a, φάναι δὴ πάντασ καὶ βούλεσθαι.
Ibid. b, καὶ τούτο μὲν ἤττον καὶ θαυμαστῶν—where Stallbaum well compares Thuc. vi. 1, ἦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπέθετο, but wrongly joins καὶ, both there and here, with the Adverb. [So Stallbaum, but his reference is wrong. He seems to mean Thuc. iv. 1, where the old editions have ἦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἐπέθετο, Poppo and Göller with most of the MSS. ἦ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπέθετο.]

Phædo 107 c, ὥ τίνυνος καὶ δόξειεν ἄν δεινὸς εἶναι.
Phileb. 25 b, σὺ καὶ ἐμοὶ φράσεις, ὡς αἰμα.

§ 133. Adverbs of intensity are often thus emphasized.

Apol. 18 b, καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἦ γάρ.
Rep. 342 c, συνεχῶρησεν εὐταῦθα καὶ μάλα μογῖς.
Symp. 189 a, ἐφί εἶπεν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι καὶ μᾶλ’ ἐπαύσατο.
Ib. 194 b, εὖ καὶ μᾶλ’ ἀν φοβοῦσι.
Phædo 117 b, καὶ μάλα ἐλεως. Ibid. c, καὶ μάλα εὐχερώς.
Protag. 315 d, στρώμασι καὶ μᾶλα πολλοῖς.
Legg. 832 a, καὶ μᾶλ’ ἐκίστε οὐκ ἁφεῖν εὑρασ.
Phædo 61 c, καὶ γὰρ ἢσσω καὶ μάλιστα πρόπει μελλοντα ἐκείνη ἀποθη-μεῖν διασκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.
Rep. 404 b, ἀπλὴν ποὺ καὶ ἐπιεικῆς γυμναστικῆ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον.

N
Legg. 773 c, ἀ μὴ βουλόμεθα ἐξουβαίνειν ἢμῖν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐξουβαίνει ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι.

Euthyd. 293 e, (A) 'Αλλ' ὁδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστασθον; (B) Καὶ μᾶλα, ἂν δὲ—on the contrary.'

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 318, Δῶρον... δόμεναι οἴκον δεῖ | φέρεσθαι, Καὶ μᾶλα καλὸν ἐλών, ib. 46, Καὶ λίγον κεῖνος γε εὐκοτί κεῖται ὀλέθρῳ, II. xiii. 638, Τῶντέρ τις καὶ μάλλον ἐέλθεται εἰ τρόον εἶναι, Od. viii. 154, ἦδεια μοι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔνι φρεσίν ἤπερ ἄεθλοι. Hdt. ii. 69, οἱ δὲ περὶ Θῆβας καὶ κάρτα ἤγγιναι αὐτῶν εἶναι ἵππους (where of course καὶ κάρτα goes with ἤγγιναι). Æsch. P. V. 728, ἄταί σ' ὀδηγήσουν καὶ μαλ' ἀσιμένως, Choeph. 879, καὶ μαλ' ἣβάντος δὲ δεῖ, Eum. 373, δοξάζαι τ' ἄνδρών καὶ μαλ' ὑπ' αἰθέρι σεμκαί κ.τ.λ. Soph. El. 1455, Πάραστη δήτα καὶ μαλ' ἄξιός θεά.

§ 134. Καὶ is subject to Hyperbaton in this use as in others. In the foregoing examples the καὶ indicates the stress laid on the word next following it: but when the word to be emphasized begins the clause the καὶ is sometimes postponed.

Phædo 63 c, εἰσπερ τι ἄλλο τῶν τουτών, διαχυρασίμην ἄν καὶ τοῦτο—where the καὶ emphasizes διαχυρασίμην.

Ib. 68 c, ἢ σαφροσύνη, ἢν καὶ οἱ πόλλαι ὀνομάζουσι σαφροσύνην—where the stress of καὶ includes ἢν.

Gorg. 620 b, μόνοις & ἔγογκε καὶ ὄμην τοῖς δημηγόροις καὶ σοφισταῖς οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖν μέχρεσθαι τούτῳ—where καὶ emphasizes μόνοις.

Cf. Hdt. i. 191, ἐσ ὁ δή καὶ τὸ κάρτα ἐπίθυμο—i.e. (if the order allowed it) τὸ καὶ κάρτα.

§ 135. ἡ.

a. In Indicative sentences expressing a negative supposition.

Theet. 192 e, Σωκράτης ἐπιγενόσκει...; ὅρα δὲ μηδέτερον—'but sees, by the supposition, neither.'

Phileb. 18 e, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἢμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ πῶς ἐστιν ἄν καὶ πόλλα αὐτῶν ἐκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἀπειρα εὐθὺς ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Phædo 106 d, σχολὴ γὰρ ἄν τι ἄλλο φθορὰν μὴ δέχοιτο. The meaning is not 'of all things that exist scarce anything could be, in such a case, exempt from corruption,' but 'there could hardly exist anything not admitting corruption.' The existence of the whole class 'incorruptible' becomes questionable.

Hip. Ma. 297 e, ὥν χαίρειν ἢμᾶς ποίη, μὴ τι πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς, ἄλλο ὥν δὲν διὰ τῆς ἁκοῦς—'suppose we say, not.'
§ 136—139.] PARTICLES. 179

Hipp. Ma. 299 d, ἀρ' οὖν ἦδο ἥδεα... διαφερεῖ τῷ ἦδω εἶναι; μὴ γάρ εἰ μετίου τις ἔδωκεν ἢ ἐλάττων.

Polit. 292 ε, περιτευται τοσοῦτοι οὐκ ἐν γένουτό ποτε, μὴ τι δὴ βασιλεῖς γε—'let alone kings.' Comparing this with the last instance but one, we see how the force of μὴ τι is enhanced by its following the clause with which it is contrasted.

Tim. 26 c, λέγειν εἰμὶ ἔτοιμος, μὴ μόνον ἐν κεφαλαιοῖς ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Polit. 295 ε, μὴ ἐξεστῷ δὴ παρὰ ταῦτα ἐπειράπτουσιν; ('is he to be forbidden?')

Cf. Αἰσχ. iii. 21, p. 56, ὅτι ἥρξα, μὴ ἄποδημήσω; ('am I not to &c.?)

The μὴ in the Brachylogical combination μὴ ὅτι comes under this head; for instances see below, § 154.

§ 136. β. In the Deprecatory form of contradiction.

Euthyd. 294 c, (A) οὐκ ἐξαρκεῖ σοι ἢκούσαι κ.τ.λ.; (B) Μηδαμίως ἄλλα κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 300 a, (A) τι δὲ; (B) Μηδέν.

Protag. 318 b, τούτο μὲν οὐδὲν βαφμαστόν λέγεις· ἄλλα μὴ σὺνεις.

Men. 75 a, (A) πειρᾶ εἰσέπειν. (B) Μῆ, ἄλλα σὺ εἰπέ.

Cf. Aristoph. Vesp. 854, (A) ὄφεσον σο, ποί θεῖς; ἐπὶ καθίσκους; (B) Μηδαμίως.

§ 137. γ. In the sense of 'whether.'—For instances see above, § 61.

§ 138. δ. In the sense of 'perhaps'—from which the sense of 'whether' just mentioned flows. See above, § 59.

Euthyd. 298 c, μὴ γάρ, ο Ἐβδόμης, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐ λίνω λίνω συνάπτεις;—'are you perhaps not joining' &c.? i.e. 'perhaps you are not joining.'

Protag. 312 a, ἄλλα ἄρα μὴ οὐκ ὑπολαμβάνεις—'perhaps, then, you on the contrary do not suppose.'

§ 139. Οὐ πάνυ.

The universal meaning of οὐ πάνυ is 'hardly,' 'scarcely.'

Theaet. 149 d, οὐ πάνυ τούτο οἴδα.

Ib. 172 b, οὐκ' ἄν πάνυ τολμήσεις φήσαι.

Symp. 180 c, οὐ πάνυ διεμνημόνευν.

Ib. 204 d, οὐ πάνυ ἐφην ὅτι ἔχειν ἐγὼ προχείρως ἀποκρίνασθαι.
Phædo 63 a, οὗ πάνω εὐθέως εἴδεις πείδεσθαι.

Ibid. c, οὐκ ἂν πάνω διωκρισαίμην.

Ib. 85 d, οὗ πάνω φαίνεται ικανῶς εἰρήσθαι.

Ib. 100 a, οὐ πάνω εὐγχωρῶ.

Theæt. 145 a, οὗ πάνω ἀξίων τῶν νοῶν προσέχειν.

Ib. 176 b, οὗ πάνω ῥάδιον πείσαι.

Phædo 59 a, οὐδέποτε πάνω μοι ἐλεεινὸν εἴσηκε.

Apol. 41 d, καὶ ἐγώ γε τοῖς καταψηφισμαμένοις μοι καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὗ πάνω χαλεπάνω.

The following three instances are decisive for the meaning 'scarcely.'

Euthyphro 2 b, οὖθεν αὐτὸς πάνω τῇ γεγυμνότητι, ὡς ἑιδοθέρον, τὸν ἀνθρα.

Protag. 331 e, οὐ πάνου οὐτωσ, οὐ μέντοι οὐδὲ ἂν ὥς σὺ μοι δοκεῖς οἰσεῖν.

Phileb. 41 a, σχεδόν γὰρ τῷ ψεύδει μὲν οὗ πάνω πονηρᾶς ἀν τις λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς θεῖη, μεγάλη δὲ ἄλλη καὶ πολλὴ συμπυκνώσας πονηρία.

The following three are to be interpreted on the principle of Litotes.

Symp. 195 c, κρανίων, ἃ ἐστιν οὗ πάνω μαλακὴ—'skulls, which can hardly be said to be soft things.'

Apol. 19 a, ὅμως δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπῶν εἶναι, καὶ οὗ πάνω με λανθάνει οἶνον ἐστι—'I can hardly say I do not know.'

Ib. 41 d, καὶ ἐγώ γε τοῖς καταψηφισμαμένοις μοι ... οὗ πάνω χαλεπάνω—'I can scarcely say I am displeased'—'I have no sufficient cause to be displeased.'


§ 140. Different is Laches 183 c, οὗ πάνω δλίγοις ἐγώ τούτων παραγένον—where πάνω goes closely with δλίγοις. Quite different also are πάνω οὗ, παινόμασιν οὗ, &c.

§ 141. οὖθεν.

The use of οὖθεν for καὶ οὗ in the sense not of 'and not,' but of 'also not' is worth pointing out in cases where the οὖθεν qualifies specially not a Substantive (the common case) but some other Part of Speech.

Phileb. 23 b, σχεδόν δὲ οὖθεν ράδιον—for σχεδόν δὲ καὶ οὗ ράδιον.
Legg. 730 d, τίμιος μὲν δὴ καὶ ὁ μηδὲν ἀδικών ὁ δὲ μηδ’ ἐπιτρέπων τοῖς ἀδικοῖς ἀδικεῖν πλέον ἢ διπλασιάς τιμῆς ἄξιος ἔκεινον—'but he who beyond this does not allow' &c.

Euthyphro 15 b, μέμνησαι γὰρ ποι ὦτε κ.τ.λ. ἢ οὐδὲ μέμνη;—for ἢ καὶ οὐ μέμνη;—'or on the contrary,' lit. 'or, which is also an alternative.'

Phædo 72 a, ἵδι τοίνυν οὔτως ὦτε οὐδ’ ἄδικως ἀμολογήκαμεν—i. e. ἱδί τοίνυν καὶ οὔτως ὦτε οὐκ ἄδικως ὡμ.

Crito 44 b, ὡς ἐμοι, ἐὰν σὺν ἀποθάνῃς, οὐδὲ μὲν ξυμφορά ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. Taking this reading now for granted [Oxon. and one other MS. have ὄσθεμα], it will be explained by resolving the οὐδέ, and attaching the καὶ to ὥς, 'since moreover the event of your death is to me not one misfortune, but' &c.

Ib. 45 a, καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πολὺ τάργύριον ἐστὶ—for καὶ γὰρ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 45 c, ἐτί δὲ οὐδὲ δίκαιον—for ἐτί δὲ καὶ οὐ δίκαιον.

Cf. Isoer. xviii. 65. p. 383, δ’ οὐδ’ οὔτω ράνθιν ἥν—'when, besides, it was not easy.' Ar. Eth. V. viii. 10, ἐτί δὲ οὐδέ—for ἐτί δὲ καὶ οὐ.

§ 142. Ἀλλά.

a. Introducing a supposed objection.

Rep. 365 c–d, we have seriatim ἀλλὰ γὰρ—ἀλλὰ δή.

Apol. 37 b–c, we have the series πότερον—ἀλλὰ—ἀλλὰ δή.

β. Introducing an instance.

Symp. 196 d—197 a, we have the series πρῶτον μὲν—καὶ μὲν δὴ... γε—ἀλλά.

§ 143. ἔυθες, νῦν, αὐτικά, πολλάκις, &c.

a. ὑθες, 'from first to last,' Phdr. 259 c.

β. νῦν, 'as the case now stands,' Crito 54 b, Apol. 38 b.

γ. αὐτικα, 'for instance,' Theaet. 166 b, Protag. 359 e, Phdr. 235 c, Legg. 727 a, Gorg. 483 a, ὅσπερ αὐτικά, Laches 195 b, ἡτει αὐτικα.

δ. πολλάκις, 'perchance,' after μῆ, Protag. 361 c: after εἴ ἂρα, Phædo 60 c, Laches 179 b, 194 a, Politic. 264 b, εἴ των πολλάκις ἂρα διακόψασι, Phdr. 238 d, ἡν ἂρα πολλάκις νυμφολητώς γένεμαι. And perhaps Phædo 73 d, ὅσπερ γε καὶ Συμίαν τις ἰδών πολλάκις κέβητος ανεμύφση.

ε. ὅτε, 'wheresoe,' 'Or' οὖν δή equivalent to ἐπειδῆ οὖν, Soph. 254 b, Tim. 69 a. So ὅποτε, Euthyd. 297 d, Laches 169 d.
§ 144. The remaining heads treat of Particles in combination.

B. In order to understand and to interpret certain combinations of Particles, regard must be had to the fact, that they enter *simultaneously* into the sentence, as it were speaking at once rather than in succession.

a. A familiar instance is the combination καί—δε, e. g.

Rep. 573 b, ἦσος ἀν καθήη σωφροσύνης, καὶ μανίας δε πληρώση ἐπάκτον. The δε and the καί enter into the meaning abreast of one another.

§ 145. b. Καί μέντοι only differs from καί—δε in that the μέντοι is stronger than the δε, and that the two Particles are not necessarily separated by the intervention of other words.

Symp. 214 c, καί μέντοι οὐνωσι ποίησον.

Ib. 222 a, καί μέντοι οὐκ ἐμὲ μόνον ταῦτα πεποίηκεν, ἄλλα καὶ Χαρ-μίδην κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 17 c, καί μέντοι καὶ πάντα τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι.

Ib. 26 c, ἀπιστός γ’ εἰ, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι σαυτόφ.

Ib. 31 b, καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τοῦτων ἀπέλαυνον κ.τ.λ.

Euthyd. 289 c, καὶ μέντοι σῴζειν θαυμαστῶν.

Alc. I. 113 c, καὶ μέντοι καὶ εὖ λέγεις.

§ 146. c. Such a combination again is καὶ οὖν καὶ.

Protag. 309 b, καὶ γὰρ πολλὰ ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ εἰπε, βοηθῶν ἐμοί, καὶ οὖν καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἀπ’ ἐκείνου ἔχομαι.

d. Such again is δ’ ἄλλα.

Soph. 235 d, σ’ δ’ ἄλλ’ εἰπε πρῶτον.

e. And again δε—μέντοι.

Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρεια δε οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτ’ ἄττα;

§ 147. f. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ.

Here we must observe that there is no Ellipse, such as is involved in the supposition that, whereas the γὰρ refers to the clause immediately subjoined to it, the ἄλλα belongs either to a clause understood or to a clause following at a greater distance. The sense forbids such a supposition: for the ἄλλα sits much closer to the clause immediately subjoined than the γὰρ does. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ has two meanings: one when it introduces an objection, and is therefore ironical; the other, which alone needs illustration, when it has the force of 'but be that as it may,' or 'but the truth is.'
PARTICLES.

Symp. 180 a, Δίσχυλος δὲ φιλιαρεὶ κ.τ.λ.: ἄλλα γὰρ τῷ ὀστὶ κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 228 a, εἰ εὖς Φαίδρον ἁγνῶς, καὶ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπιλέξσαι: ἄλλα γὰρ οὐδέτερα ἦστι τούτων.

Phædo 87 d, μέτρι ἂν μοι φαίνομαι λέγειν, ὡς ἢ μὲν ψυχὴ πολυχρόνων ἦστι, τὸ δὲ σώμα ἀθενείστερον καὶ ἀλγοχρωνιστερον. ἄλλα γὰρ ἂν φαίνῃ ἐκάστην τῶν ψυχῶν πολλά σώματα κατατρίζειν . . . ἀναγκαίον μὲν ἂν εἰπῃ κ.τ.λ.—'but, he might say, be that as it may,' &c.

Ib. 95 c—d, μηνύειν . . . ὅτι πολυχρόνων ἦστι ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ. ἄλλα γὰρ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἦν ἄθανατον.

Meno 94 c, ἄλλα γὰρ, ὡ ἐταῖρε, μή οὐκ ὧ διδακτῶν ἄρετη—'but the truth is.'

Apol. 19 c, καὶ οὖχ ὡς ἀτιμαζόντων λέγων κ.τ.λ. ἄλλα γὰρ ἐμοί τούτων, ὡ ἀνθρώπου Ἀθηναίοι, οὐδέν μέτεστι. So Ibid. d, Ib. 25 c, &c.


§ 148 g. ἌΛΛΟς ἦ, πλὴν ἦ.

The joint meaning is 'except.' By the ἄλλα the exception to the negative which has preceded is stated flatly: the ἦ allows the negative statement to revive, subject to this exception alone.

Symp. 189 e, νῦν δ' οὐκ ἐστιν [ἀνθρόγυνον] ἄλλα ἦ ἐν ὑπενδεὶ οἰσμαί κείμενον.

Phædo 82 b, μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι οὐ θέμεις ἀφικνεῖσθαι ἄλλα ἦ τῷ φιλο—

μαδεί.

Ib. 81 b, ὅστε μυρίου κακεῖν εἰσαὶ ἀληθεῖς ἄλλα ἦ τῷ σωματοειδεῖς.

Ib. 97 d, οὕδεν ἄλλα σκοπείν προσηκεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἄλλα ἦ τῷ ἄριστον.

Protag. 329 d, οὐδέν διαφέρει ἄλλα ἦ μεγέθει καὶ σμικρότερι.

Ib. 334 c, μὴ χρησιμοὶ ελαίῳ, ἄλλα ἦ δ' τι σμικροστερῷ.

Ib. 354 b, ἢ ἔχετε τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, . . . ἄλλα ἦ ἡδονᾶς τε καὶ λύπας:—The interrogative is equivalent to a negative; so that the rule stands good that ἄλλα ἦ occurs only after a negative in the main construction. The ἄλλα is anticipatory of the exception, and this is also pleonastic.

Apol. 42 a, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἦ τῷ θεῷ—again a virtually negative sentence, the ἄδηλον παντὶ being equivalent to ἄδηλον οὐδενί. The analogy of ἄλλα ἦ perfectly justifies, so far as Syntax is concerned, the disputed reading πλὴν ἦ. The πλὴν and the ἦ enter the meaning simultaneously, introducing the exception
each in its own way; πλὴν implies 'it is known to none—saving that [in contradiction to this] it is known to God;' ἦ, less harshly, 'it is known to none, or however [only] to God.'

Cf. Thuc. v. 60, οὐ μετὰ τῶν πλείονοι βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ’ ἦ ἐνι ἀνδρὶ κοινώσας, 80, ἔψηφίσατο ... μη ἐμβαίνει τῷ ἀλλ’ ἦ ἀμα, vii. 50, οὐκέτι ὁμιῶς ἤπνωτο, ἀλλ’ ἦ μή φανεράς γε ἄξιων ψηφίζεσθαι, viii. 28, οὐ προσδεχομένων ἀλλ’ ἦ Ἀττικᾶς τὰς ναὸς εἶναι.

§ 149. h. νῦν δὲ ... γὰρ. This combination is always preceded by a hypothesis of something contrary to facts, and is parallel to the Protais of that sentence, which it contradicts. The δὲ and the γὰρ exercise a simultaneous force; δὲ represents that the condition stands differently in fact from what it is in the supposed case, and γὰρ further represents that the inference must be different.

The combinations νῦν δὲ ... γὰρ and ἀλλὰ γὰρ approach each other in meaning as well as in structure. Νῦν δὲ ... γὰρ is however only used in contradicting the Protais of a hypothetical proposition. There is of course no Ellipse to be supplied; that is, we are not to look on to a sentence beyond to supply a clause to the νῦν δὲ. The δὲ sits as close to the clause immediately subjoined as does the γὰρ: the νῦν ('as the case actually stands') belongs to both Particles equally. Some of the instances which follow would admit of the Elliptical explanation of the νῦν δὲ but none of them necessitate it, and some others do not admit of it.

Euthyphro ii 1 c, καὶ εἰ μὲν αὕτη ἐγὼ ἠλέγα, ὅσα ἂν μὲ ἐπίσκοπος, νῦν δὲ σαλ γὰρ αἰ ὑποθέσεις εἰσίν. ἀλλον δὴ τινος δὲι σκάμματος.

Ib. 14 c, δι ἀπεκρίνο, ἵκανος ἂν ἡδὴ ἐμεφαθή. νῦν δὲ ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἔρωτόν ταῖς ἐρωτομένῳ ἀκολουθεῖν· τὶ δὴ αὐτ λέγεις κ.τ.λ.;

Apol. 38 a, εἰ μὲν ἂν μοι χρήματα, ἐτυμησάμην ἂν· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν.

Protag. 347 a, σὲ οὖν, καὶ εἰ μέτωπι ἠλέγας ἐπίσκοπη καὶ ἄληθῇ, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἠφεγον. νῦν δὲ σφόδρα γὰρ ψυχοῦμενος δοκεῖς ἄληθῇ λέγειν·

Charm. 175 a-h, οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποῦ ... ἀνομφολέσ ἑράθη, εἰ τί ἐμοῦ ὄρθος ἦν. νῦν δὲ πανταχῇ γὰρ ἑττώμεθα.

Laches 184 d, εἰ μὲν γὰρ συνεφερέσθην τάδε, ἤππου ἂν τοῦ τοιοῦτον ἠδε, νῦν δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν γὰρ Λάχης Νικία ἑθετο, εὖ δὴ ἐχει ἀκούσαι καὶ σοῦ.

Ib. 200 c, οὐ μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ., δίκαιον ἂν ἂν κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ ὁμοίως γὰρ πάντες ἐν ἄπορίᾳ ἑγερόμεθα, τὶ οὖν ἂν τις κ.τ.λ.;
Legg. 875 c, ἐπει ταῦτα εἰ ποτὲ τις ἄνθρώπων... παράλογες δυνάτες εἰπ. νόμων οὐδέν ἂν δεύτερον κ.τ.λ. νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οὐδέποτε οὐδεμῶς ἢ κατὰ βραχύ. διὸ δὴ τὸ δεύτερον αἴρεται.

Cf. Lysias xii. 61. p. 125, ἀμοι δ’ εἴγο γὰρ δέομαι ἀναπαύσασθαι.

§ 150. i. The cases of οὐ μὴ and μὴ οὖ, when they make one negative, must be explained upon this principle of simultaneity of force. The resulting negation, though single, is both subjective and objective.

Of οὐ μὴ a single instance may suffice.

Laches 197 d, καὶ γὰρ μοι δοκεῖς οὐδὲ μὴ ἔσεθησαι ὑπεκ. k.τ.λ.

Of the uses of μὴ οὗ Mr. Campbell, Theaetetus, Appendix B, has given a happy analysis and explanation. But it may be noticed that in a peculiar instance his restriction of μὴ οὗ to a Dependent clause, with the Infinitive or Particle, does not apply.

Phileb. 12 e, πῶς γὰρ ἡδονὴ γε ἡδονὴ μὴ οὐχ ὀμοίωτατον ἂν εἰπ.; which however is virtually equivalent to πῶς γὰρ ἂν εὐδίκιοτο, ἡδονὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ οὐχ ὀμοίωτατον εἶναι;

§ 151. C. Many combinations of Particles are Elliptical. Such are those of a Negative with ὅτι or ὅπως which follow.

a. οὐ μόνον ὅτι—′ I was not only going to say′ (parenthetically).

Symp. 179 b, ἐθέλοντον, οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἀνδρες, ἄλλα καὶ κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 751 b, οὐ μόνον οὐδέν πλέον εὑ τεθέσειν, οὐθ’ ὅτι γῆλος ἂν πάμπολος ἄμφεται, σχέδον δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. iv. 85, καὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἄνθρωποι ἂν, ἄλλα καὶ οἷς ἂν εἶπο, ἔσθον τις ἐμοὶ πρόσετοι.

§ 152. b. οὐχ ὅπως has a similar meaning in Negative sentences. Whence moreover οὐχ ὅπως is said to be equivalent to οὐχ ὅπως οὐ which means that the Negative which follows extends its meaning backwards over the οὐχ ὅπως clause.

Meno 96 a, οἱ φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἰναὶ οὐχ ὅπως ἅλλων διδάσκαλοι ὀμολογοῦνται, ἄλλ’ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπισταθαί.

Cf. Thucyd. i. 35, οὐχ ὅπως κωλυταὶ... γενήσεσθε, ἄλλα καὶ... περιφέρετε (where the Negative is borrowed by κωλυταῖ γενήσεσθε from περιφέρεσθε, which being its opposite is a virtual Negative), iii. 42, οὐχ ὅπως ἡμοῖον ἄλλα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν.

§ 153. c. οὐχ ὅτι—′ not but that ′; lit. ′ I was not going to deny
that' (parenthetically). Occurring in sentences of Negative form, it borrows their Negative. It is quite different from ὁ μᾶν ὅτι.

Theæt. 157 b, ὅστε ἐς ἀπότων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐς ἀρχής ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὑτὸ ... τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἔξαιρετον, οὐχ ὅτι ἤμει ... ἵππακάμεθα ... χρήσαθαι αὑτῷ.

Protag. 336 d, Σωκράτης ἐγγυώμαι μὴ ἐπιλήψεσθαι, οὐχ ὅτι παῖζε—'for all it be true that' &c.

Gorg. 450 c, οὐδεμιᾶν οἷμαι σε βούλεσθαι ἡγαρικὴν καλεῖν, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ ῥήματι οὕτω εἴπες.

Lysis 219 e, πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη ἱπποδή οὐκ ἔτι τούτως ἔστιν ἑπονοδησμένη ... οὐχ ὅτι πολλάκις λέγομεν κ.τ.λ.

§ 154. d. μὴ ὅτι—'necum,' 'much less' or 'much more,' according as the sentence is Negative or Affirmative: 'not to say,' i. c. not supposing us to say.

Symp. 207 e, μὴ ὅτι ... ἀλλὰ καί. So 208 a.

Apol. 40 d, μὴ ὅτι ..., ἀλλὰ.

Protag. 319 d, μὴ τοιῶν ὅτι ... ἀλλὰ.

Legg. 799 c, τὰς ποὺ νέος, μὴ ὅτι πρεσβύτης.

Crat. 427 e, ὁτιων πράγμα, μὴ ὅτι τοσοῦτον.

Phileb. 60 d, καί ὁτιων εἶναι ἡ γέγενσεθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονήν.

Phdr. 240 c, δ' καὶ λόγῳ ἀκοῦειν οὐκ ἑπιτερτεῖς, μὴ ὅτι δή κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 512 b, δ' οὖτε στρατηγῷ, μὴ ὅτι κυβερνήτου, οὐτε ἄλλου οὐδενὸς ἑλάττω ἐνιστε δύναται σῴζειν.

§ 155. D. Elliptical also, but in a still greater degree, are the combinations which now follow.

a. ὁὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ—'yet, so far from the contrary.' After ὁὐ μέντοι is to be understood a proposition the contrary of that which follows the ἀλλὰ.

Symp. 199 a, χαριτῶ δ' οὐ γὰρ ὅτι ἐγκαμμάζω τούτων τῶν τρόπων οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ τα γε ἄληθὶ ... ἐθέλω εἴπειν—'yet not so that I am unwilling,—on the contrary I am willing,—to utter the truth.'

Meno 86 c, (A) βούλει οὖν κ.τ.λ.; (B) Πάνω μὲν οὖν, οὐ μέντοι, ὁ Ἐλκρατεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐγὼν ἐκεῖνο ἐν ἡδίστα σκεψάμην—'yet not so that it would not,—on the contrary it would be,—most to my taste to' &c.

Crat. 436 d, ἐκεῖνης δὲ ἐξετασθείης ἰθανός, τὰ λοιπὰ φαίνεσθαι ἐκείνη ἐπίμενα. οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ θαυμάζομ' ἐν εἰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα συμφωνεῖ αὑτὰ αὐτοῖς—'yet I do not mean by this, that I should not wonder,—on the contrary I should wonder,—if' &c.
§ 156. b. Of ὑπὸ ἄλλα the same explanation holds;—'for not the contrary, but,' i. e. 'for, so far from the contrary.'
Euthyd. 305 ε, τί οὖν; δικοσία σοι τι λέγειν; οὐ γὰρ τοι ἄλλα ὅ γε λόγος ἐκεῖ τινὰ εἰπρέπειαν—'for I must say,' &c.: more literally, 'for, do you know, so far from the contrary,' &c.
Ib. 286 b, πᾶς λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ τοι ἄλλα τούτων γε τὸν λόγον ... ἢ ἀπαντᾶ—'for, do you know, I must say I' &c.
Phaedo 83 ε, κάσμοι τ' εἰσι καὶ ἄνδρειοι, οὐχ ὃν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐνεκά φασιν ... οὐ γὰρ ἄλλ' οὕτω λογίσατ' ἐν ψυχῇ ἄνδρὸς φιλοσόφου—'for, so far from the contrary,—i. e. 'for, most assuredly.'

§ 157. c. Οὐ μόνον γε ἄλλα.
Phaedo 107 b, οὐ μόνον γ' ἄλλα ταύτα τε εὐ λέγεις, καὶ τὰς ἱππόθεσεις τὰς πρῶτος, καὶ εἰ πιστὰς ἰμών εἰσιν, ὅμως ἐπισκέπτεαι. The full construction is οὐ μόνον γε ταύτα εὐ λέγεις, ἄλλα ταύτα τε εὐ λέγεις καὶ κ.τ.λ.—'not only is what you say true, but a further observation in the same direction is true,' namely τὰς ἱππόθεσεις κ.τ.λ.

§ 158. What is to be noticed as to all the three expressions, οὐ μέντοι ἄλλα, οὐ γὰρ ἄλλα, and οὐ μόνον γ' ἄλλα, is, that the οὐ is not retrospective but proleptic, referring to a proposition which is not expressed but is indicated by its contrary expressed in the ἄλλα clause.

§ 159. E. Other noticeable combinations of Particles are such as follow.
a. Μέν γε answered by δέ, in working out a contrast between two characters.
Symp. 180 d, πῶς δ' οὐ δύο τῷ θεά; ἦ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. ἢ δέ κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 215 b, πολύ γε βαθμασιότερος ἐκεῖνον ῃ μέν γε κ.τ.λ. οὐ δέ κ.τ.λ.
b. καὶ μήν οὔτε ... γε.
Legg. 728 d—c, τίμον οὖν σῶμα οὐ τὸ καλὸν οὔτε ἰσχυρὸν κ.τ.λ., καὶ μήν οὔτε τὰ τούτων γ' ἐναντία, τὰ δ' ἐν τὰ μέσῳ.

§ 160. The following are various combinations with δή, to which γε is often subjoined.
c. Kai μὲν δή, with and without ye subjoined.


Symp. 156 c, ὥ δὴ πρέπει ἡμᾶς μαρτυρίᾳ χρησθαι, ὅτα ποιηθῆ ὃ Ἔρως . . . πῶςαν ποίησαν τὴν κατὰ μονοικίαν . . . καὶ μὲν δὴ τὴν γε τῶν ξώων ποίησαν τίς ἐναντιώσεται κ.τ.λ.;

Soph. 217 b, καὶ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τύχην γε, ὥ Σώκρατες, λόγων ἐπελάβου παραπλησίων κ.τ.λ.

Phdr. 231 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ εἰ μὲν κ.τ.λ. εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ. So 232 b, 233 a.

d. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή, without or with ye.

Crat. 428 b, ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ—'well, no doubt,'

Crito 48 a, ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ . . . γε—'well, but then' (in the mouth of an objector).

Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d, ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ . . . γε—'but further'—in a consecutive proof.

e. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δῆ . . . γε. Politic. 269 d.


g. οὐ γὰρ δῆ . . . γε. Phædo 92 b.

h. ὡς δῆ τοι—'how true is it that.' Rep. 366 c, Tim. 26 b.

i. ὡς δῆ σὺ—ironical. Gorg. 468 e, 499 b.

j. Kai δὴ καὶ—'then, I suppose,' ironically. Apol. 26 d.

§ 161. F. Correlative Particles.

a. It is worth observing that in the Laws of Plato οὐ has more frequently δὲ contrasted with it than ἀλλὰ.

b. Instead of the common ἀλλως τε καὶ we find sometimes καὶ ἀλλως καὶ, as Laches 181 a, 187 c.

c. Irregular Correlatives.

Tim. 20 d, μάλα μὲν ἀτόπον, παντάπασι γε μὴν ἀληθοῦσι.

Legg. 927 b, δὲ μὲν ἀκοῦσοι, βλέποσι τε ὅ.δυ.

Symp. 205 d, τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιον, κ.τ.λ. ἀλλ’ οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 177 b, καὶ τούτῳ μὲν ἃττον καὶ βαθμαστόν, ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 38 d, ἀπαρίτη μὲν ἐδεικνύα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων.

§ 162. Note, that μέντοι is used, and not δὲ, (1) when particular emphasis has to be given to the opposition; (2) where, as in the instance here quoted, δὲ could not be conveniently used; (3) in expressing opposition to a clause which is itself introduced by δὲ..
§ 163. Idioms of Comparison.
A. Syntax of words of the Comparative Degree.
B. " " words of the Superlative Degree.
C. " " other Comparative words and formulae.

A. Comparatives.

a. Ordinary form.

The only case needing remark under this head is that of a clause compared by ἃ, while its pronominal pre-statement (see above, § 19) is compared in the Genitive.

Phædo 89 d, οὐκ ἂν τις μείζων τούτου κακῶν πάθοι, ἃ λόγους μασήσας.
Crito 44 c, τίς ἂν αἰλουρίων εἰς ταύτης δόξα, ἃ δοκεῖν κ.τ.λ.;
So Lysias xxv. 23. p. 173, οὐδεν γὰρ ἂν εἴη αὐτοῖς χαλεπότερον τούτων, ἃ πυθαγόρασθαι. We trace the Idiom back to Homer, Od. vi. 182, οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο κρείσσον καὶ ἀρειαν, Ἡ δὴ ὁμοφρονεόντε νομίσαι οἷον ἢκτισ τοῦ Ἀνήρ ἢδε γνω. So Hdt. i. 79, ὡς οἱ παρὰ δόξαν ἐπιρ τὰ πρίγγματα, ἃ ὡς αὐτὸς κατεδάκεεν.

§ 164. b. Rarer forms.

a. ἃς as the Conjunction of Comparison.

Rep. 526 c, ἃ γε μείζων πόνον παρέχει οὐκ ἂν μαθήως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὑροι ὡς τοῦτο.
Apol. 36 d, οὐκ ἐσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον πρέπει οὕτως ὡς ... συνέσθαι.

§ 165. β. Comparative followed by Prepositions.

Παρά. Note, that the parà in this construction is not 'beyond,' but 'contrasted with' (lit. 'put co-ordinate with.') Cf. Phdr. 276 ε, παγκαλήν λέγει παρὰ φαύλην παιδίαν. And Thucyd. v. 90, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον τὸ εὐμφέρον λέγειν ὑπέδεισθε.

Politic. 296 b, εἰ τις γεγονότα τοῖς τῶν ἐμπρωσθέν βελτίως νόμους.
Legg. 729 e, ἐστὶ τὰ τῶν ξένων καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους ἀμαρτήματα παρά τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν εἰς θεῶν ἀνηρμήνων τιμωρῶν μᾶλλον.

Πρό.

Phædo 99 a, δικαιότερον ... ἐκαὶ πρὸ τοῦ φεύγειν ... ἐπέχειν ... δίκην.
Crito 54 b, μήτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μήτε τὸ ζην μήτε ἄλλο μηθὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου.
Cf. Hdt. i. 62, οἷς ἡ τυφώσεσ πρὸ ἐλευθερίης ἦν ἀσπαστότερον.
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'Aντί.

Rep. 619 c, αἰτιᾶσθαι τῶν κακῶν πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ.

'Εν.

Euthyd. 303 c, πολλὰ μέν οὖν καὶ ἄλλα οἱ λόγοι ύμῶν καλὰ ἔχουσιν, ἐν
dὲ τούτα καὶ τούτῳ μεγαλοπρεπέστερον.

Κατὰ ἄφετη.

Phædo 94 c, πολὺ θειοτέρου τυψὸς πράγματος ἢ καθ' ἄρμονίαν.

§ 166. c. Irregularities.

a. Pleonastic form.

Crat. 433 d, ἔχεις τυν καλλίω τρόπον ... ἄλλον, ἡ κ.τ.λ.;

Gorg. 482 b, οὕμαι τὴν λόγαν μοι κρείττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν ... μᾶλλον

ἡ ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀνίμηθεν εἶναι.

Charm. 159 e, Politic. 286 a, Tim. 87 c, Legg. 729 c, 854 c;—all

instances of a Comparative Adjective or Adverb with μᾶλλον or

ἡττον.

§ 167. β. Comparative in regimen twice over.

Protag. 350 b, βαρραλεύτεροι εἰσίν αὐτὸι ἑαυτῶν, ἐπειδὰν μᾶθωσιν, ἡ

πρὶν μαθεῖν.

Symp. 220 e, προβομότερος ἐγένου τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐμὲ λαβεῖν ἢ σεαντών.

A compendious way of saying two things; one, that Socrates

was anxious that Alcibiades should be chosen rather than

himself; the other, that, though the generals too were anxious

for this, Socrates was more anxious than they. This con-

struction is illustrated by the other simpler instance.

Exactly parallel is Thuc. vii. 66, τὸ γ' ὑπόλοιπον τῆς δόξης ἀσθενέστερον

αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔστιν ἢ ei μυδ' φθόησαν.

§ 168. γ. Case after ἡ assimilated to the Case before it, by Attraction.

Phædo 110 c, ἐκ [χρωμάτων] λαμπροτέρων καὶ καθαρωτέρων ἡ τούτων.

Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἡ τοσαῦτης γραμμῆς.

This does not appear to be the regular construction. Compare

the constructions with ὡσπερ, §§ 175, 176, below. The Homeric use

with ἡ varies: on the one hand we have, II. i. 260, καὶ ἀρείσσων ἥπερ

ὑμῶν 'Ανδρίσων ὑμίλησα, on the other hand, II. x. 557, ἰμείνονα, ἡ

περ οἰδὲ, ἵππους διαρῆσαι', Od. xvii. 417, σὲ χρή δούμειν καὶ λόγον ἡ

περ ἄλλοι, II. xxiv. 486, Μνήσαι πατρὸς σείο ... Τηλίκου ὡσπερ ἐγών.

In Demosth. also there are both constructions with ἡ e.g. F. L. 27.

p. 349, οὐδὲν ἐλάττωνος ἡ τούτων' but De Cor. 162. p. 281, τῶν πρότερων
§ 169. a. Omission of η.
Legg. 956 a, υφίν δὲ μὴ πλέων ἐργον γυναικὸς μιᾶς ἐμηροῦ.
Ib. 958 e, υψηλότερον πέντε ἄνδρῶν ἐργον.
Phædo 75 b, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἂνοῦ... μᾶλλον τι καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ.
[Oxon. alone omits η here. The other MSS. and the edd. have ἦ καί.]

§ 170. e. Omission of μᾶλλον.
Rep. 370 a, ἀλλ' ἂν οὐτό ῥᾴδιον ἦ' κεῖνος.
Tim. 75 c, ἐνεδοξεῖ τοῦ πλείονος βίου φανερότερον δὲ τὸν ἐλάστονα ἀμέινον ὡντα πάντα πάνω αἵρετον.

§ 171. B. Superlatives.
a. Ordinary form.
b. Rarer forms—with Prepositions.

Ἐπὶ Tim. 23 b, τὸ καλλίστον καὶ ἀριστόν γίνος ἐπ' ἄνδρώπους.
Perhaps this is consciously Homeric: cf. e.g. Od. xxiii. 124, οἵν γὰρ ἀριστὴν Μήτην ἐπ' ἄνδρώπους φαύς ἐμενεῖ.
Periphrastic with ἐν.
Legg. 742 e, τοὺς κεκτημένους ἐν ἀλλοι τῶν ἄνδρώπων πλείστοτο νομίσματο ἄξια κτήματα.
Ib. 892 a, ἡς ἐν πρώτοις ἠποτε σωμάτων ἐμπροσθεν πάντων γενομένη.

§ 172. c. Irregularities.

β. Pleonastic.
Symp. 218 d, τοῦ ὡς ὦ τι βελτιστον ἐμε γενέσθαι.
Legg. 731 b, πράον ἥς ὦ τι μάλιστα.
Ib. 908 a, ἡς ὦ τι μάλιστα ἀγριώτατος.
§ 173. C. Other Comparative words and formulae.
a. With ὑπ'.

Rep. 330 c, οί δὲ κτησίμεναι διπλὴ ἤ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά.

Ib. 534 a, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίων λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἡ ὁσῶν οἱ παρε-

ληθαῖοι.

Ib. 455 c, διαφερόντως ἔχει ἡ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Phædo 95 c, διαφερόντως ἢ εἶ ἐν ἄλλῳ βίῳ βιοὺς ἐτελεύτα.

Phdr. 228 d, διαφέρειν τὰ τοῦ ἐρώτους ἢ τὰ τοῦ μή.

Crat. 435 a, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου γε ἢ ὁ διανοούμενος φθέγγομαι.

Phileb. 35 a, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἑαυτῶν ἢ πάσχει. So Phdr. 275 a.

Gorg. 481 c, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἰδίων τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι.

Crito 53 e, τί ποιῶν ἢ εὐνοχούμενος ἐν Θεταλίᾳ ;

§ 174. b. With παρὰ.

Rep. 337 d, ἐτέραν ἀπόκρισιν παρὰ πάσας ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης,

βελτίω τούτων.

Phædo 105 b, παρ' ἢν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἄλλην.

Laches 178 b, ἄλλα λέγουσι παρὰ τὴν αὐτῶν δόξαν.

Ib. 181 d, εάν δ' ἔχω τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ λεγόμενα.

Legg. 927 e, ποικιλουσθεὶσαν ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἰδίως τῶν τῶν ὄρφανῶν βίων

παρὰ τῶν τῶν μή.

And, with παρὰ simply, Theæt. 144 a, ἀνδρέων παρ' ὀντινοῦν.

§ 175. c. With ὁσπερ and the like Adverbs; and with correlative

Adjectives of likeness.

Phædo 86 a, εἴ τις διασχυρίζοντο τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ ὁσπερ σὺ.

Ib. 100 c, εἶναὶ σοὶ ἕνωσακῇ ὁσπερ ἐμοι.

Gorg. 464 d, ἐν ἀνδράσιον οὕτως ἀνοίγοις ὁσπερ οἱ παῖδες.

Apol. 17 b, κεκαλλιεπημένους λόγους ὁσπερ οἱ τοῦτων.

Political. 274 d, ἐδει τὴν ἐπιμελείαν αὐτοῦ αὐτῶν ἐχειν καθάπερ δόλος ὁ

κόσμος.

With Adjectives.

Gorg. 458 a, οὐδὲν αἷμα τοσοῦτον κακῶν, ὅσον δόξα ψευδῆς.

Tim. 78 b, πλέγμα εἴ ἀέρος καὶ πυρὸς οἷον οἱ κύρται ἑπιφθανάμενοι.

Protag. 327 d, ἀγροὶ τίνες, οὐοπέρ οὐς πέριους Φερεκράτης ἐδίδαξεν

ἐπὶ Δραίοις. So Crat. 432 e.

Cf. Hom. Od. xx. 281, Πάρ δ' ἄρ' Ὀδυσσῆι μοῖραν βέσαν . . . "Ισθμ

ὡς αὐτοὶ περ ἐλάχχανον."
§ 176. Note, that where the Noun brought into comparison by ὁσπερ is the Subject of the Relative clause, there is a preference for the Nominative, in spite of such an Ellipse of the Verb as might have led to an Attracted Construction.

Cf. Hom. II. xxiv. 486, Μνῆσαι πατρὸς σείο, θεοὶ ἐπεικελ' Ἀχιλλεύ. Τηλίκου, ὁσπερ ἐγὼν. Lysias vi. 32. p. 106, λυπομένω ὁσπερ οὖτος. Isocr. xviii. 47. p. 380, τοὺς ὁσπερ Καλλίραχου βεβιακότας. This non-admission of Attraction often secures the meaning; as Ἀσέχιν. ii. 120. p. 44, τοὺς μικροπολίτας, ὁσπερ αὐτῶς, φοβεῖν τὰ τῶν μειζόνων ἀπόρρητα. [So Bekker: αὐτῶς Zurich ed.] Jelf (Gr. Gr. § 869) notices, as rare instances of Attraction, Thuc. vi. 68, οὖκ ἀπολέκτου ὁσπερ καὶ ἡμᾶς, Soph. O. C. 869, δοῖ βιον Τοιούτων οἷον καὶ γηρᾶναν ποτε, Lys. 492. 72, [i. e. xiii. 72. p. 136] οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἦσιν Ἀγράπων Ἀθηναίου εἰναι ὁσπερ Θεσφίόου. We may add, however, from Plato, the instance in Apol. 17 c, οὐ γὰρ ἂν πρέποι τῇ ἐκ τῆς ἐκκυρίας ὁσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντε λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰδίναν,—where μειρακίῳ is affected by Attraction to πλάττοντε.

§ 177. d. Comparison of one Sentence as a whole with another.

Syrp. 179 c, διὰ ταῦτα δίκην αὐτῷ ἐπέθεσαν, ... οὖ χρήσεω Ἀχιλλεύ ἐτίμησαν.

Ib. 189 c, δοκοῦσι ... θυσίας δὲ ποιεῖν ... , οὖ χρῆσαι νῦν τοῦτων οὐδὲν γέγενεται.

Ib. 213 b, ἄλλοιον ἀν μὲ ἕνανδρα κατέκεισα, ὁσπερ εἰς ῥήματος ἐξαίφνης ἀναφάεσθαι.

Ib. 216 d, ἐρωτικῶς διάκειται ... , καὶ αὐτὸ ... οὐδὲν οὐδέν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τοῦτο οὖ Σελεψίδης; This sentence becomes an instance under the present head by the removal of the stop after τοῦτο. The liveliness of the passage gains by this, as much as it suffers by the common punctuation. The conversion of a categorical sentence at its close into an interrogative one is natural and common. [The Zurich editors have the common punctuation.]

Theaw. 187 b, χρῆ, & θεαίτηρε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἄκειν αποκρίνεσθαι.

Apol. 39 c, τιμωριάν ὑμῶν ἤζειν ... , χαλεπωτέραν νῦ Δί ἦσαν ἐμὶ ἀπεκτώτατο.

Cf., perhaps, Thuc. i. 19, ἐγενετο αὐτοὶς ἢ τῶν πρὸτερον ἡ ἰδία παροακενε μεῖνων ἢ ὡς τὸ κράτιστα ποτε μετὰ ἀκραφονοῦ τῆς ἄρμαξας ἠθήναν—taking ὡς to be not 'when' but 'how'; but
Οὐχ ὡς Τυνδαρέων κούρη κακά μήπως ἐργά.

§ 178. We may notice the graceful use of the vague Comparative expressing a modified degree.

Symp. 176 c, ἥττον ἄν εἰπῃ ἄρης.

Politic. 286 b, ἐσχε μῆκος πλέον.

Phædo 115 b, ἀπερ αὲλ λέγω, οὐδὲν κανώτερον.

Charm. 174 c, ἥττον τι, Euthyd. 293 c, ἥττον οὖν τι, in Interrogative sentences, are a soft οίκ and οὐκοῦν.

Cf. the Latin si minus.

§ 179. Idioms of Sentences:—Attraction.

A full scheme of all the varieties of Attraction may be constructed upon the instances found in Plato. The varieties which are treated of here include all but some of the most common.

A. Attraction of Dependent sentences.

a. Infinitival sentences.

a. The ordinary form of Attraction here is that to be seen in Ar. Eth. III. v. 3, ἔφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικεῖα καὶ φαίνει εἶναι, or Lysias xxviii. 10. p. 180, τοῖς ἄρχοντες . . . ἐπιδείξετε πότερον χρή δικαίου εἶναι,—in distinction from the unattached form, e. g. Ἀesch. Choeph. 140, Λυπὴ τέ μοι δόσ σωφρονεῖτας πολὺ Μητρὸς γενέσθαι.

Crat. 395 c, κατ' ἐκείνου λέγεται οὐδὲν οἷον τε γενέσθαι προσονηθήναι.

Hipp. Men. 292 c, τὸ καλὸν, ὃ παντὶ, ὃ ἀν προσγείνηται, ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνος καλὸν εἶναι.

It will be seen here that to present an opportunity for Attraction, there must be Ellipse of the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, and moreover its Copula and Predicate must be in distinct words. Where the subject of the Infinitival sentence is also the subject of the principal sentence, Attraction is invariable, and the construction cannot be conceived without it,—as θυμήμαν ὕμων προβημών εἶναι, Thuc. i. 71; where notwithstanding there is Attraction (though Lobeck denies it).

β. A form, which in one or two particular Idioms is common, is developed in greater variety in Plato: where the Infinitival sentence is dismembered, and the Subject or some other prominent Noun of the Dependent sentence is placed in advance, under the direct government of the principal sentence.
One common type is (e. g.) Ἰδ. τ. 38, ἔδει ἔμμαχις οἱ μεγάλης ἔξυμφεθναι. And primarily Homer, Il. xviii. 585, οἵ δὲ γὰρ δακέων μὲν ἀπετρωπῶντο λέῳντων, and vii. 409. Another common, though peculiar, type is ἕνω δικαϊνος εἰμὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν which stands for δικαϊνον ἔστιν ἐμὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν—the em being attracted out of the Infinitival government into that of the principal sentence. Cf. Ἰδ. ix. 77, ἦςοι ἐφασαν εἶναι σφέας ἑμισωσάι.

§ 180. Of the Platonic type only specimens need be given here; for the rest cf. ‘Binary Structure,’ §§ 214, 220, below.

Symp. 207 a, εἰπερ τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἔστιν—where τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, is separated from it, and placed under the government of ἔρως ἔστιν in the principal construction.

In the following it is not the subject, but some other Noun, of the Infinitival sentence, which is attracted.

Rep. 443 b, ἄρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζεω.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρητέος ἦμῖν ἔστι τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίταις θεραπεύειν.

Legg. 790 c, τρόπον ἀνπερ ἡγιμεθα τῶν περὶ τὰ σώματα μύθων λεχθέντων διαπεραίνειν.

§ 181. γ. In the following the two forms above exist together. The Subject of the Infinitival sentence suffers Attraction in the manner just mentioned, and secondly the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence is attracted into agreement with it.

Rep. 459 b, δεὶ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἄρχότων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οίων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτροπικῶν λόγων εἶναι.

§ 182. Note, however, that when both constructions have the same Subject, the Predicate of the Infinitival sentence reverts to the main construction.

Legg. 773 b, τῶν αὐτῷ ξυνεδύτα φερόμενον.

Charm. 169 a, οὐ πιστεύω ἔμαυτῷ ἰκανὸς εἶναι.

§ 183. 8. In another type, affecting the same class of sentences as the last, we have the Subject of the Infinitival sentence, after δικαῖον ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη ἔστιν, οἱὼν τε ἔστιν, and the like, or after Verbs of judging, turned into a forced Dative of Reference after δικαῖον &c. Doubtless, the Dative of Reference often finds its place in the meaning as well as the syntax; but this is not always the case,
e.g. in the passages from Hip. Ma. 294 b, Meno 88 c, and Crat. 392 a: whence the true account of it is Attraction.

Rep. 334 c, ἄλλ' ὄμως δίκαιον τότε τούτοις τοὺς μὲν ποιητῶς ὀφελεῖν κ.τ.λ.
Crito 50 c, καὶ σοὶ ταῦτα ἀντιποιεῖν οἶει δίκαιον εἶναι;
Phædo 75 c, ἀνάγκη ἦμων αὕτην εἰληφθαι.
Hip. Ma. 289 e, τὸ ὀρθὸς λεγόμενον ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ἀποδέχεσθαι.
Ib. 294 b, ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς μεγάλοις εἶναι.
Charm. 164 b, γιγνώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἴατρῷ.
Meno 88 c, εἰ ἄρα ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῇ ἔστι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ ὀφελίμον εἶναι.
Laches 196 e, ἀναγκαίον οἷα τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι μηδενὸς θηρίον ἀποδέχεσθαι ἀνδρίαν.
Menex. 241 a, οἷόν τε ἀμύνεσθαι ἁλόγιος πολловός.
Phædo 106 b, ἀδύνατον ψυχή ἀπώλυσθαι.
Phdr. 242 b, αὕτως γεγενήσθαι λόγῳ τιν ῥήθηναι.
Phileb. 33 a, τῷ τῶν τῶν φρονεῖν ελομένῳ βίον οἰσθ' ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὖθεν ἀποκολυτεί ἐξ.]
Crat. 392 a, ὀρθότερον ἔστι καλεῖσθαι χαλκίς κυμίδιδος τῷ αὐτῷ ὀρνεύον.
Phædo 92 c, πρύτει ξυνωδῆ εἴναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας [Λόγῳ].
Soph. 231 e, έθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχαρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμποδεῖν μαθήμασι περὶ ψυχῆς καθαρτήν αὐτὸν εἶναι.
Rep. 598 d, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι εὑρῆση.
Apol. 34 e, δεδογμένον ἔστι τῷ Σωκράτει διαφέρειν τινί τῶν πολλῶν ἀνδρώσων. [So Oxon. See note on the text, p. 90, above.]
On the other hand we have, unusually,
Gorg. 458 d, ἀδύνατον δὴ τῷ λοιπῷ γέρνεται ἐμὲ γε μὴ ἔθελεν.

§ 184. b. Attraction of Participial clause attached to the Infinitival sentence.

Here the unattracted form would be e.g.

Crito 51 d, προαιρείσθων Ἀθηναίων τῷ βουλορέφῳ... ἔξειναι λαβοῦσα τὰ αὐτῶν ἀπόκρια.
Cf. Hdt. ix. 78, καὶ τοίς θεοῖς παρέδωκε ῥυσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα κλέος καταβίβασθαι, and Hom. II. x. 187, τῶν ὑπὸς ὀλόλει Νύκτα φυλασσομένοισι.
§§ 185—187.]

**ATTRACTION.**

Instances of the attracted form are

Apol. 17 c, oide γὰρ ἂν πρέποι τῇ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ... πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ἡμῖν εἰσείναι—where πλάττοντι is attracted into correspondence with ἡλικίᾳ' though the Gender follows the thought, as in Legg. 933 a, ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων δυσφωτομέναι πρῶς ἄλληνοις. Cf. Hom. II. iv. 101, ἑβχεο ... ἔξεϊν ἐκατόμην ... , Οἰκάδε νοστήςας.

§ 185. Reference to the unattracted form explains such places as

Symp. 176 d, οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐθελήσαμι ἀν πείν, οὔτε ἄλλος συμβολευόσαμι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κρασπαλώντα—where κρασπαλώντα agrees regularly with the subject of the πείν understood after συμβολεύσαμι. And somewhat similarly

Phdr. 276 c, τοῦ δυσαμένου παίζειν ... μνθολογοῦντα—this Accusative arising from a mis-recollection of the Infinitive construction last preceding.

§ 186 c. Dependent sentences introduced by Conjunctions or Oblique Interrogatives.

a. Here, too, as in the Infinitival sentence, the sentence is torn asunder, and a portion of it, consisting of a Noun or a Noun-phrase, brought under the direct government of the principal construction.

This Attraction manifests itself in an ordinary type in e.g.

Laches 196 a, τοῦτον οὗ μαθάνω δ ἂν βούλεται λέγειν.

More remarkable Platonic forms are e.g.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, τι ποτ' ἔστιν—where λόγον has been attracted into the principal construction, although this can supply only a loose government for it.

Phædo 64 a, κινδυνεύουσιν δοσι τυχάνουσιν ὣρθός ἀπότομοι φιλοσοφίας λειτυόσαι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐκπειθεῖοσιν ἢ ἀποτυχήσειν. This is an Attraction for κινδυνεύει λειτυόσαι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐκ ἂν Κ.Τ.Λ.

§ 187. In the following it is not the Subject, but some other Noun or Noun-phrase, of the Dependent sentence, which is attracted.

Phædo 102 b, ὄμολογες τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς τοὺς ἰῆμαι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν—where τὸ ... Σωκράτους is the Accusative attracted under government of ὄμολογες (compare δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι, above).
Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα νυν, ὅτι οἱ οἱ τ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὔ τὰ συμκρότα τῶν κακῶν ἐργάζεσθαι—i.e. δῆλον ἐστὶν ὅτι οἱ αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα ἐργασάμενοι, οἱ πολλοὶ, οἱ τ' εἰσὶν οὔ τὰ κ.τ.λ.

Plato 82 a, δῆλα δὴ καὶ τῆλλα οὐ ἂν ἐκάστη Ἰοι—i.e. δῆλον ἐστι δή, οὐ ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη Ἰοι.

For the rest of the instances under this head see 'Binary Structure,' §§ 213, 218, below.

§ 188. β. Comparative sentence introduced by ἦ, attracted, after omission of the Copula, into agreement with the principal construction.
Meno 83 c, ἀπὸ μείζονος ἡ τοσαύτης γραμμή.
(See the remarks under 'Idioms of Comparison,' § 168, above.)

§ 189. B. Attractions involving the Relative.

a. Attraction of Relative to Antecedent.

a. From Accusative into Genitive.

Apol. 29 b, κακῶν ἂν οἶδα ὦτι κακὰ ἐστίν.
Phdr. 249 b, ἄξιωσ ὦ έξώσας βίον.
Cf. Hom. II. v. 265, Τῆς γάρ τοι γενέθης, ἢς Τρωὶ περ εὐρύσα τα Ζεὺς Δᾶκε.

β. From Accusative into various cases before θούλει. 12, which with the Relative forms almost one word, like Latin quivis.

Crat. 432 a, τὰ δέκα ἡ διότι θούλει ἄλλος ἀριθμός.
Gorg. 517 a, ἔργα ... ἢ τοῦτων ὃς θούλει εἰργασται.
Phileb. 43 d, τρία ἄντων ἄντων θούλει.
γ. From Dative into Genitive.
Legg. 966 e, πάντων ἂν κίνησις ... οὐσίαν ἐπόρισεν.
δ. From Nominative into Genitive.

Theaet. 165 e, ξυμποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενος ... ἂν εὐτρποὺ.
Cf. Dem. de Cor. 130. p. 270, οὐδὲ γάρ ἂν ἐτύχεν ἢ—i.e. τοῦτων ἀ ἐτύχεν.

12 Compare (though these do not involve the Relative)

Rep. 414 c, ἡ δ' ἡμῶν δ' οὐ γεγονός οὖθ' οἶδα εἰ γεγονόμενον ἂν.
Symp. 216 d, ἐνδοθεν δὲ ἀνοιχθεὶς πόσης οἰς συνεχείς γέμει σαφροσύνης;
Euthyphro 15 a, τὶ δ' οἴει ἄλλο ἢ τιμή τε καὶ γέρα;
Phaedo 59 c, τίνες φίλες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι;
Dative.

Rep. 402 a, ἐν ἄπασιν οἷς ἦστι περιφερόμενα.

Phædo 69 a, τούτο δ' ὁμοιών ἡσιν ὃ τὸν ἤλέγετο.

Accusative.

Cf. Thuc. v. iii, perhaps, περὶ πατρίδος βουλεύονται [βουλήν] ἦν μᾶς πέρι . . . ἡσια. (The same interpretation is suggested as "possible" in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 822 note.)

§ 190. ε. Preposition, by which the Relative is governed, absorbed by Attraction.

Rep. 520 d, ἐν πολεί ἡ ἡκιστα πρόνυμαι ἄρχειν οἱ μελλοντες ἄρχειν.

Ib. 533 d-e, οἷς τυσαύτων πέρι σκέψεις ἄτον ήμῖν πρόκειται.

Laches 192 b, τίς οὖν δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἄπασιν οἷς τῶν δὴ ἥλεγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, ἑπεκτα ἄνδρα κίελιται—where ois must be for ἐν ois.

Crat. 438 e, ἄρα δὲ ἄλλον τοῦ ἐδίκερ εἰκός;

Gorg. 453 ε, πάλιν δ' εἰ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τεκρῶν λέγομεν ἄνεπρ τῶν δή.

Stallbaum (on Apol. 27 d) cites other instances from Plato, but he is not warranted in giving them the same interpretation. Thus Apol. 27 d, ἢ ἐκ τινων ἄλλων δὲ καὶ λέγοιμαι is simply 'or [sprung] from some other beings, whose children accordingly they are called.'

Phædo 76 d, ἐν τούτῳ [τῷ χρόνῳ] ἀπαθάλμυν ψιπερ κ.τ.λ. Here the best and most MSS. have ἐν ψιπερ.


§ 191. b. Attraction of Antecedent to Relative.

Meno 96 a, ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν ἄλλον ὅπως ἑπιγράμματος οὐ οἱ μὲν φάσκοντες διδάσκαλοι εἶναι κ.τ.λ.;

Political. 271 c, τῶν βίον δὲν κ.τ.λ. πότερον . . . ᾧ κ.τ.λ.;

Meno 96 c, ἅμαιογίκαμεν δὲ γε, πράγματος οὐ μὴτε διδάσκαλοι μήτε μαθηταὶ εἰμέν, τοῦτο μηδὲ διδάκτου εἶναι.

Crito 45 b, πολλαχοῖ τοῦ ἄλλος ὅποι ἄφικη.

The last of these instances is of a peculiar type, though the
former are common, and have their prototypes in Homer: cf. II. x. 416. φυλακάς δ' ἃς ἥρεω, ... ὁ περ' ἀκολούθην ρήμα μέτα στρατῶν, Od. viii. 74, ... διεισείκειν κλέα ἀνδρῶν, ὁμοίης τῆς τότ' ἀρα κλέως στ.λ., xxii. 6, ἵππου ἄρα μὲν ὁποῖος τις βιότεν ἀνήρ ἔσομαι αἱ κε τύχωμε, xxiii. 356, Μῆλα δ' ἄ μοι στ.λ., Πολλά μὲν αὐτός ἐγώ λησόμουμεν, ἄλλα δ' 'Ἀχαιοὶ Δώσονος' (where μῆλα represents ἀντὶ μῆλων). On Od. viii. 74 Nitzsch holds ὁμοίης to be attracted from ὁμή not ὁμην' because elsewhere the attracted word is the forerunner of a principal sentence to be completed, whereas here it is in sense but part of the exegetical Relative sentence. Thus the sentence would be one on the model of Od. i. 50, ἦν ἃν ἄμφιμίτη ... ἦνος δευδρήσσα, or II. vi. 396, 'Ἡτίώνοι' 'Ἡτίων, ὅ ἐναὶ στ.λ.

§ 192. c. Construction changed after Relative clause by Attraction to the Relative clause as the nearest construction.

N.B. This principle, of Attraction to the nearest construction, extends also to other cases where there is no Relative clause. See §§ 201–203, below.

Rep. 402 b, οὖθε μουσικὸν πρότερον ἐσομέθα ὡτε αὐτοὶ ὡτε ὡς φαμεν ἡμῖν παντεύετο εἴναι τοὺς φύλακας.

Phaedo 66 c, ἥμιν ἔσται ὡς φαμέν ἐρασταί εἴναι φρονίσεως.

Protag. 342 b, σοφία τῶν Ἔλληνων περίκεισθαι, ὥσπερ ὡς Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, τούς σοφιστάς.

Crito 48 c, ὥς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις ... μὴ ὡς ἄληθῶς ταύτα σκέματα γ' στ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 281 c, ἕκεινοι δὲν ὡνόματα μεγάλα λέγεται ἐπὶ σοφία, Πιτακοῦ στ.λ.

Symp. 200 d, ἕκεινος ἑρὰν ὡς ὠποῖο ἄτομον ἄτοφον ἴσιν ὡδὲ ἵκει, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ταύτα εἴναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρόντα.

Apol. 41 a, εὑρίσκει τοὺς ἄληθῶς δικαστάς ὡπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως στ.λ.

Cf. Hom. II. ix. 131, μετὰ δ' ἐσοτείρει ἧν τῶν ἀπηύων, Κούρην Βρισήν.

§ 193. It is not to be supposed that the Nouns which follow the Relative clauses in the first three of these examples are Antecedents to the Relatives. As in the fourth example the Relative has an expressed Antecedent ἕκεινος, so in the others it has one understood; and the Nouns τῶν φυλακας, τῶν σοφιστάς, ταύτα, are respectively exegetic of the understood Antecedent. (Ταύτα represents a Feminine Noun by another Attraction, which see below, § 201.)
§§ 194—196.

ATTRACTION.

Cf. Hom. Od. i. 69, Κύκλωτος κεχόλωται ὑν ὀφθαλμοῦ ἄλωσεν, 'Αντίθεων Πολύψηφων. Also II. xii. 18—20. To this explanation must be also conformed that of Soph. Antig. 404, ὅν σὺ τὸν νεκρὸν 'Απείπας.

§ 194. The same principle accounts for the following also.

Symp. 206 a, οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὗ ἐρώσιν ἀνθρωποί, ἤ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

Phaedo 89 a, τὸ μὲν οὗ ἔχειν ὅ τι λέγει ἔκεινος οὐδέν ἄποινο—where ἔκεινος is attracted from ἔκεινον, since it is ἔχειν and not λέγει, which requires this Pronoun as its Subject.

Symp. 199 c, καλῶς μοι ὑπόθεσα καθηγήσασθαι τοῦ λόγου, λέγων ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν δεύ αὐτῶν ἐπιδείξει ὅποιός τις ἐστίν ὁ Ἐρωτ, ὕστερον δὲ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶ—where we should have had αὐτῶν . . . τῶν Ἐρωτα but for the intervention of ὅποιος τις ἐστιν, which prevented recurrence to the Accusative.

The same bias shows itself abnormally in Lysias xxv. 18. p. 173, οἴεσθε χρήμα, οὗ ἔκεινον παρέλιπον . . . , ὑμεῖς ἀπολέσατε.

§ 195. d. Attraction of the entire Relative clause (i.e. of Subject and Predicate,—Copula having been omitted) to the Antecedent.

a.

Symp. 220 b, ὅντος πάγου οὗ οὐκ ἔστατον.

Phaedo 104 a, τοῦ περιττοῦ ὅντος οἷς οὔπερ τῆς τριάδος.

Soph. 237 c, οὗρ γε ἕμοι παυτάπασιν ἄπορον.

Legg. 674 c, οὗτ' ἀμπελών ἐν πολλών δειί οὔθ' ἤτιν πόλει.

Rep. 607 a, ὅσον μόσον ὑμνοῦν ποιήσεως παραδεκτόν εἰς τὴν πόλιν—

for ὅσον ποιήσεως ἐστίν ὑμιν.


§ 196. β. More peculiar (because the Relative is made to agree with the Subject of the Relative clause—contrast οὗ ὁπέρ τῆς τριάδος above) are
DIAGNOS OF IDIOMS. [§§ 197—199.

Sop. 246 c, ἵππος τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας—i. e. ἵππος τοῦ ἰτίθενται τῆς οὐσίαν εἶναι.

Gorg. 477 a, (A) ὡφελεῖται ἀρα; (B) Ναι. (A) ἄρα ἦτερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τῆς ὡφελείαν;—i. e. ἀρα ὡφελεῖται τοῦτο] ὦτερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τῆς ὡφελείαν εἶναι;

§ 197. γ. In the following the Relative clause is represented by the Relative word only, the Subject being identical with that of the main sentence and being therefore, with the Copula, omitted.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 209, Εὐφράμαξ ἰδὲ καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι μνηστήσερς ἁγαναί, —i. e. ἄλλα μνηστήσερς ἁγαναί, ὅσοι ἔστει and Hdt. iv. 28, ἀφόρητος οἴος κρυμός—'frost which was insufferable,—to such a degree was it;' and ib. 194, οἱ δὲ σφί ἄφθωνοι ὅσοι ἐν τοῖς ὀὔρεσι γίνονται: in all which instances there is no patent Attraction, but it is made possible by the Ellipse, after the Relative, of its Subject and the Copula.

Euthyd. 275 c, σοφίαν ἀμήχανον ὅσην—'inconceivable, so great was it.'

Gorg. 477 d, ὑπερφυεῖ τινὶ ἀρα ὅς μεγάλη βλάβη καὶ κακὸς θαυμασίω ὑπερβῆλλουσα.

Cf. the common Idiom ἰδοκεῖν αὐτῷ πλείστα ὅσα—'things superlatively many, so many were they'—where ὅσα is doubtless an Accusative.

The same explanation applies, though Attraction does not find place, in the Adverbal expressions ἀμήχανος ὅς (Rep. 527 e, Phdr. 263 d), ὑπερφυνός ὅς (Symp. 173 c, Gorg. 496 c), θαυμαστῶς ὅς (Phædo 92 a, Symp. 200 a).

§ 198. The Homeric Idiom with τοῖος differs—e. g. in Od. i. 209, θαμᾷ τοῖον, iii. 321, Ἐς πελάγος μέγα τοῖον, iv. 371, Ὅπις ἄλος τόσον, ib. 776 and vii. 30, σιγῆ τοῖον, xi. 134, Ἀβδήχρος μάλα τοῖον, xv. 450, Κερεδλέων δῆ τοῖον, xx. 302, Σαρδάνων μάλα τοῖον—'to that degree,'—indicating an imagined, and therefore an intense, degree.

Τοῖον expresses the degree of the epithet preceding; our οἷος justifies the epithet being there at all.

§ 199. e. Attraction of the entire Antecedent clause (Copula omitted) to the Relative.

Charm. 175 c, οὐδενός ὅσον οὐχὶ ᾠδογάτερον. So Protag. 317 c.

Pol. 308 b, οὐδαμῶς ὅς οὐ φήσομεν.

§ 200. f. Attraction of the Relative into agreement with the Predicate of its own clause.

Phdr. 255 c, ἡ τοῦ ἰδίματος ἐκέινων πηγή, δὲ ἵμερον Ζεὺς ἀνόμασε·

(where the Antecedent of δὲ is ἰδίματος.)

Cf. the Homeric ἔριμι ἐστίν. Π. ix. 276, &c.

§ 201. C.

a. Attraction of a Neuter Pronominal Subject into agreement with the Predicate.

Apol. 18 a, διόμαι . . . τούτῳ σκοπεῖν, κ.τ.λ.; δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἀρετή—

—where of course αὐτὴ refers to τούτῳ σκοπεῖν κ.τ.λ.

Soph. 240 b, οὐκ ὃν ἁρα ἔστιν ἄντως ἂν λέγομεν εἰκόνα;

Crat. 386 c, εἰ . . . ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἡ ἀλήθεια (referring to what had just been agreed upon).

Minos 317 a, πολιτικὰ ἁρὰ ταῦτα συγγράμματα ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἀνθρωπος νόμος καλουρὸς.

Crito 48 c, ὃς ἐς σὺ λέγεις τὰς σκέψεις . . ., μη ὃς ἀλήθως ταῦτα σκέψαμα ἦ—where ταῦτα represents τὰς σκέψεις, but has been assimilated to σκέψαμα, the Predicate of its own sentence.

Cf. Hom. Π. i. 239, σκῆπτρον . . . ὃ δὲ τοι μέγας ἔστηται ὅρκος, ν. 305, ἔθα τε μηρὸς Ἰσχίως ἐνστρέφεται, κοσμήν δὲ τέ μυν καλέουσιν. Ἱδτ. i. 86, ἀκροβίνα ταῦτα (sc. τῶν Κροίσων) καταγιέν. Ἀesch. P. V. 753, Ὀνεὶθεν μὲν ἔστιν οὐ πεπρωμένον ἀρτή γὰρ ἂν διὶ πημάτων ἀπαλλαγῇ. Σο Virg. AEn. x. 328, Si qua est ea cura.

§ 202. b. Attraction of the Copula into agreement with the Predicate.

Meno 91 c, οὐδένι γε φανερὰ ἐστι λάβῃ.

Legg. 735 e, τοὺς μέγαστα ἡμαρτηκόσας ἀνάγως δὲ ἄντας, μεγίστην δὲ ὁμοι βλάβην.

Parmen. 134 b, πάντα, δ ὤν ὃς ἰδεῖς αὐτὰς οἴσες ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

Politic. 271 e, θεὸς ἑνεμεν . . ., ζῶον δὲ ἑτέρων ὑειστερον.

§ 203. c. Attraction of the Article of an Infinitival clause into agreement with a word preceding, with which that clause is in Apposition.

Charm. 173 c, ἐμμένουμεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐθαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ξωντα.

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεῶν ἔρημα εἶναι πάντα.

§ 204. Idioms of Sentences:—Binary Structure.

Certain Idiomatic affections of the Sentence are the grammatical result of expressing in two parts a conception which exists in the speaker's mind as one.

The immediate use of this artifice is to present the conception to the hearer in two parts, which, after entering his mind separately, will there reunite.

The ulterior use is (1) to facilitate a clear expression of a complex conception, and (2) to set before the apprehension two images of the object, as it presents itself at two successive moments; and by this means to give it the same kind of fulness with which the image of material objects is invested by "binocular vision."

This Idiom has been, in certain of its forms, ranked under Apposition. But it does not resemble it except in a nakedly grammatical point of view. Apposition forms but one description of the object, and therefore is no Binary Structure at all: in other words in Apposition the two representations are simultaneous; whereas in the Idiom before us they are substitutive; the thought has moved in the interval between them; and though the one is in some sort a repetition of the other, they are not identical.

§ 205. Examples of this Idiom in its main forms are to be found in all Greek literature; but its applications in Plato are preeminently various and subtle. These are embodied in the following classification.

A. When the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact. The mark of the Binary Structure is that the two sentences are grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton.

Note, that the first-placed sentence always contains something which is unfolded more fully, or restated in another way (sometimes with anacoluthic redundancy of construction) in the latter.

B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

Note, that the first-placed expression is sometimes the less emphatic, or at least the more general, and is introductory to the other; sometimes it is the more emphatic and sufficient, and the other follows epexegetically.
C. When a Dependent sentence has been resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction, and placing in advance of it, a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts coordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.

§ 206. Note, that (1) the forestalled portion thus has a degree of attention ensured to it, which, not being always self-evidently emphatic, it might otherwise fail to obtain: and (2) grammatically, the forestalled portion may be said to suffer Attraction,—Attraction, that is, out of the Dependent construction into the Principal construction.

§ 207. A. Where the Binary Structure embraces two different sentences, both descriptive of the same fact, and grammatically coordinated by Asyndeton. (Note, that the effect of Asyndeton is always to make the connection closer; it is its office to denote simultaneity or rapid sequence.)

a. Common type of instances.

Apol. 41 a, θαυμαστή δε ειη ἡ διατριβή αὐτῶς,—οπότε ἐντύχομε Πα- λαμίδης κ.τ.λ., ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαντὸς πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων, ὡς ἑγὼ ὦραι, οὐκ ἄν ἀπῆδες εἰη.

Symp. 198 b, τὸ τοῦ Ὄμηρου ἑπετώθη,—ἐφοβοίησθαι κ.τ.λ.

Phaedo 67 e, εἰ φοβοῦντο καὶ ἀγαπακτοίειν, οὐ πολλὴ ἄν ἐλογία εἰη,—εἰ μὴ ἅσμενοι ἐκείνοι ἵπποι οἱ κ.τ.λ. ;

Ib. 68 d, οὐ ταῦτα τούτο πεπόνθασιν,—ἀκολασία τινὶ σάφρονες εἰσιν ;

Ib. 73 b, αὐτὸ ταῦτο δέομαι παθεῖν περὶ οὐ ὁ λόγος,—ἀναμενήσθηναί.

So too 74 a, Gorg. 513 c, 519 b, Phileb. 46 c, Menex. 235 b,—in all of which the first-placed expression is formed with πάσχειν.

Ib. 70 a, [ψυχῇ] ἐκείνη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ διαφθειρηταί τε καὶ ἀπολύνῃ, ἡ ἄν ἄνθρωπος ἀποθάνῃ,—εὐθὺς ἀπαλλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος . . . . ὁχήσαται διαπομείναι καὶ αἰῶνι ἐτὶ οὐδομοῦ ἡ. Here the sentence εὐθὺς . . . . ἡ is the complete double of the sentence ἐκείνη . . . . ἀποθάνῃ.

Ib. 86 b, τουτοῦτο τι μάλιστα ἡπολαμβάνομεν . . . . εἰναι,—ἀποπερ κ.τ.λ., κράσιν εἰναι τούτων κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 505 c, ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἑπιχάρμου γίνεται,—ἄ πρὸ τοῦ δέῳ ἄνθρω- πος ἢγοιν, εἰς ἄν ἰκανόν γένομαι.

Phileb. 35 c, (A) τί δ', ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίνεται; (B) Πῶς ἐν μέσῳ; (C) Διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀληθῆ κ.τ.λ.;
Legg. 607 a, τὸ δὲ τριχῇ διελεῖν ..., πειραθῶμεν,—διατεμεῖν χωρὶς τὰ τε μέγιστα καὶ δευτέρα καὶ τρίτα.

Ib. 708 b, ὅταν μὴ τῶν ἔσμων [ὁ κατοικισμὸς] γίγνηται τρόπον,—ἐν γένος ἀπὸ μᾶς ἰδών χώρας οἰκίζεται.


Virtually similar is

Apol. 20 c, οὐ γὰρ δήπον σοῦ γε ὀυδὲν τῶν ἀλλῶν περιτότερον πραγματευόμενον ἔπειτα τοισαύτη φήμη ..., γέγονεν,—εἰ μή τι ἐπράττει ἀλλοιον ἢ αἱ πολλοὶ; (for σοῦ ..., πραγματευόμενον is a virtual protasis, of which εἰ ... πολλοὶ is the double.)

Cf. Thuc. v. 97, καὶ τὸ ἄσφαλές ἦμιν διὰ τὸ καταστραφῆναι ἢν παράσχοιτε ..., εἰ μὴ περιγένοιοθε.

§ 208. b. 13 Instances involving anacoluthic redundancy.

Phileb. 13 b, οἶε γὰρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι,—θέμενον κ.τ.λ., εἰτα ἀνέξεσθαι σου λέγωντος κ.τ.λ.;

Crito 45 ε, μὴ δόξῃ ἂπαν τὸ πράγμα ..., ἀνανδρία πεπράχθαι ..., —κακία καὶ ἀνανδρία διαπεφυγέναι Ἦμις δοκεῖν.

Apol. 26 ε, οὔτωσι σοι δοκῶ,—οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἰναι; [So Oxon. alone. See note at p. 69, above.]

Legg. 859 δ, εἰναι τοὺς δικαίους ἄνθρωπους, ἐν καὶ τυγχάνωσι κ.τ.λ., —κατ' αὐτό γε ... παγκάλους εἰναι.

Ib. 933 b, ἐπικεφεῖν πείθεν, ἂν ποτε ἄρα ἰδοσι κ.τ.λ., —διηγορεῖν τῶν τοιούτων διακελεύσθαι.

§ 209. c. In Similes or Comparisons. In such cases there is great tendency to the Binary Structure: the fact illustrated is stated (perhaps only in outline) before the illustration, and re-stated after it. Note, that in these cases the pre-statement is often broken off or merely hinted at, so that the full sense is first expressed in the re-statement. (This is especially noticeable in expressions involving δοκεῖ or the like.) The instances in other authors begin with Homer: e. g. II. ix. 13, ἃν δ' Ἀγαμέμνων ἰστατο δακρυχέων, ὡς τε κρίνῃ μελανύδρος ..., —"Ως δὲ βαρῶ στενάχων ἔπε Ἀργείαςι μετηύδα. Cf. also Soph.

13 [In the margin of the MS. is written—"Quere. Are these really distinct from those given in § 2071"]
210. As a variation, the Binary Structure is sometimes developed in the illustration, and then there is no re-statement of the illustrated fact,—this being implied sufficiently in the re-statement of the illustration.

Phaedo 60 c, φ διν τὸ ἔτερον παραγένται ἐπακολουθεῖ ὠστερον καὶ τὸ ἔτερον ὁστερον οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἔοικεν, ἐπειδή κ.τ.λ.,—ἡκεν δὴ φαίνεται ἐπακολουθεῖ τὸ ἦδο.

Charm. 156 b, ἐστὶ γάρ τοιαύτη [ἡ ἐπιφάνη] οἷα μὴ δύνασθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν μᾶνον ἐγὼ ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἐσω ήδη καὶ οὖ ἀκίκοας τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀτρότων, ἐπειδὰν κ.τ.λ.,—λέγουσι ποι ὁτι κ.τ.λ.
the double. The Pronominal part is the Interrogative τί, which represents the Predicate, or part of the Predicate, of the re-statement. These Binary Interrogative sentences therefore follow the general principle of Double Interrogatives in Greek; which is, that the one introduces the other,—the first-placed being always the less precise and definite.

Phdr. 234 c, τί σου φαίνεται ὁ λόγος; οὐχ ὑπερφεύως εἰρήσθαι;—where τί foreshadows ὑπερφεύως εἰρήσθαι. (Cf. Symp. 204 d, ὁ ἐρών τῶν καλῶν τί ἐρή; Γενέσθαι αὐτῷ.)

Ib. 269 a, τί δὲ τὸν μελίγηρν "Ἄδραστον αἰώμεθα ή καὶ Περικλέα, εἰ ἀκαύτειν κ.τ.λ.; πότερον χαλεπῶς ἢν αὐτοῦ... εἰτείν κ.τ.λ.;

Charm. 154 d, τί σου φαίνεται ὁ νεανίσκος; οὐκ εὐπρόσωπος;

Phileb. 27 e, τί δὲ ὁ σῶς [βίος]; ἐν τίνι γίνετι ἢν λέγοιτο;

Ib. 56 c, τί δὲ λογιστική κ.τ.λ.; πότερον ὡς μία λεκτέων;

Phdr. 277 d, τί δ’ αὖ περὶ τοῦ καλῶν ἢ αἰσχρῶν εἶναι τὸ λόγους λέγειν κ.τ.λ.; ἄρα οὖν δεδήλωκε τὰ λεχθέντα... ὡς κ.τ.λ.;—τί foreshadows ὡς κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 309 b, τί οὖν τὰ νῦν; ἡ παρ’ ἑκείνου φαίνει;

Soph. 266 c, τί δὲ τὴν ἡμετέραν τέχνην; ἄρ’ οὐκ αὐτήν μὲν οἰκίαν οἰκοδομήκη φῆσομεν ποιεῖν;

Phaedo 78 d, τί δὲ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν...; ἄρα κατὰ ταύτα ἔχει, ἡ κ.τ.λ.; (where the Genitive is suspended in a loose construction, which the re-statement superseded.)

Gorg. 474 d, τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα εἰς οὐδὲν ἀπαθλέπων καλεῖς ἐκλάστοτε καλά; Here the virtual Subject of the re-statement is foreshadowed by τόδε, which therefore is Nominative; and the Predicate by τί, which (as in all the other instances) is Accusative.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 101, τί γάρ δὴ παῖς ὧ τοῦ Λαερτίου; Ποῦ σου τύχης ἔστηκεν;

§ 212. The passages also (quoted under ‘Accusative Case,’ §§ 15—19, above), in which a Pronoun Accusative is in Apposition to a whole sentence following, are virtually of Binary Structure: for the Accusative is the shadow of a sentence.

§ 213. B. When the Binary Structure, not extending to the Verb, consists of two successive expressions describing the same thing.

a. Where the first-placed expression is the less logically specific, or the less emphatic, and is introductory to the other.
a. Where it is a Noun-phrase.

Apol. 37 c, τῇ ἀκεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἐνδεκα.
Phaed. 65 d, λέγω δὲ περὶ πάντων, οἰον μεγέθους περὶ κ.τ.λ.,—τῆς ὁδεγίας, δ ἐνεχώνει ἑκαστῷ ὦ.

Ib. 81 e, τοῦ ξυνεπακολουθοῦντος, τοῦ συμματειοῦντος, ἐπιθυμία.
Ib. 82 b, εἰς ταῦτα, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος.

Ib. 113 a, τῶν τετελευτηθέντων, τῶν πολλῶν.
Symp. 215 b, τῷ Σατύρῳ, τῷ Μαρσύᾳ.
Euthyd. 274 c, τὸ πράγμα, τὴν ἀρετήν, μαθητῶν εἶναι.
Crat. 415 a, τὸ ὄνομα ἡ μηχανή.

Ib. 435 c, τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρήσθαι, τῇ ξυνθήκῃ.
Protag. 317 b, εἰδάληκαν ταύτην οἷα βελτίων ἑκέινης εἶναι, τὸ ὁμολογεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξαρον εἶναι.

Charm. 173 e, ἐρμηνευον τῷ λόγῳ, τῷ εὐδαιμονε εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως 

Legg. 908 c, τῇ δόξῃ, τῇ θεών ἐρήμα εἶναι πάντα.
Gorg. 462 c, οὐκοῦν καλῶν σοι δοκεὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ εἶναι,—χαρίζεσθαι οἴον τὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπους;

§ 214. β. Where it is Pronominal.

Euthyphro 8 c, τοῦτο μὲν ἀληθὲς λέγεις, τὸ κεφάλαιον.
Apol. 24 e, αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἴδας, τοὺς νόμους.

Crat. 423 c, αὐτὸ τοῦτο μεμεῖσθαι δύνατον ἑκαστῷ, τὴν οὐσίαν.
Gorg. 500 c, οὐ τῷ ἐν μᾶλλον σπουδασεῖς τις, ἢ τοῦτο, ὡστινα χρῆ τρόπων ἄν; (the two expressions are αὖ and ἢ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.)

Ib. 518 a, ταῦτα μὲν δουλοπρεπεῖς εἶναι, τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας.

Phileb. 38 b, ἔπεται ταῦτας... ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη πολλάκις, ἀληθεὶ καὶ
ψευδεὶ δόξῃ λέγω.

Tim. 22 d, αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς δρεσι διασώζονται, βουκόλοι νομεῖς τε.
Protag. 351 a, τὸ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἐπιστήμης γένεσθαι, τὴν δύναμιν.

Rep. 396 c, ὁ μὲν μοι δοκεῖ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μέτριος ἄνηρ, ἐβελήσειν.

Legg. 861 d, τῶν δυνῶν τὸ μὲν οὐκ ἀνέκτον ἐμοί, τὸ γε μὴ λέγειν κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 198 d, τὸ δὲ ἄρα ὧν τουτὸ ἢν, τὸ καλῶς ἐπαινεῖν ὁτιοῦν.

Ib. 207 d, δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον, τῇ γενέσει.

Ib. 222 a, ἐντὸς αὐτῶν γνωρίμενοι... νοῦν ἐχοντας μόνον εὑρήσει, τῶν λόγων.

Add to these the frequently-recurring expression ἡ δ' ὀς ὁ Σωκράτης.

§ 215. Under this head come also the instances of αὐτὸ in its peculiar Platonic meaning.
Symp. 199 d, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πατέρα.
Phædo 93 b, αὐτὸ τοῦτο... ψυχήν.
Protag. 360 e, τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἢ ἄρετή.
Crat. 411 d, αὐτὸ ἢ νόησις.
Rep. 363 a, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπισκοπέστε.

§ 216. γ. Where it is a Relative clause.

Rep. 402 b, οὕτω αὐτοὶ οὕτε οὕς φομεν ἡμῖν παιδεντέον εἶναι, τοὺς φόλακας.
Phædo 74 d, οἷς νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῖς ίσοις. Similarly Hip. Ma.
291 c, Gorg. 469 a, Protag. 342 b, Crito 48 c, Legg. 653 e, &c.
Crat. 422 b, δὲ ἔρωτις, τὰ ὀνόματα. Similarly Phileb. 42 e.
Tim. 33 a, δὲ ἔξωστά, τὰ σώματα.
Hip. Ma. 294 a, ὃ πάντα τὰ μεγάλα ἔστι μεγάλα, τῷ ὑπερέχοντι.
Symp. 200 d, ἐκεῖνον ἐρῶν, δ ὀφθών ἔτοιμον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν οὐδὲ ἐξεί, τὸ εἰς τὸν ἑπείτα ἀρχόν ταῦτα εἶναι αὐτῷ σωζόμενα τὰ νῦν παρώνα.
Theet. 167 b, δὲ τίνες τὰ φαντάσματα... ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν—‘and these, I mean their opinions, some call true.’
Tim. 40 b, εἴ ἦς δὴ τῆς αἰρίας γέγονεν ὅσα... ἀεὶ μένει—‘and hence, from this cause namely, arise,’ &c.
Legg. 647 a, φοβοῦμεθα δὲ γε πολλάκις δόξαν... ἐν δὴ καὶ καλοῦμεν τὸν φόβον ἡμεῖς γε... αἰσχύνην.

Another explanation might have been conceived of some of these passages, that they are simply cases of Antecedent and Relative in reversed order. But this would not apply to the last five; consequently, all must be referred to the principle of Binary Structure. It is to be noticed, that the operation of Attraction, probably in the three last instances, certainly in two of them, complicates the case; i. e. that the Relatives agree not with their Antecedents, but respectively with τὰ φαντάσματα, and τῆς αἰρίας. See ‘Attraction,’ § 201, above.

Cf., as instances in other authors, Ἀeschin. i. 72. p. 10, δν... ἡκούσατε τῶν νόμων. And Soph. Ant. 404, ἐπάντουσαν δν σὸ τῶν νεκρῶν Ἀπεινας—‘him whom thou forbadest to bury, namely that corpse’ (the order is hyperbatic).

§ 217. Not to be identified with the foregoing are the following, which contain an implicit sentence, though it has been operated on by Ellipse, and in the first two by Attraction also.

Soph. 246 c, ὑπὲρ ὑς τίθενται τῆς οὐσίας—i. e. ὑπὲρ [τοῦ] δ τίθενται τῆν οὐσίαν εἶναι.
§§ 218—220.\] BINARY STRUCTURE. 211


Phædo 78 d, ἦς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι—where ἦς is the Predicate and τοῦ εἶναι the Subject of a sentence of which the Copula is suppressed.

§ 218. b. Where the first-placed expression is the more emphatic and sufficient of the two.

a. Common type of instances.

Gorg. 503 e, τὼν ἄλλου πάντας δημιουργοὺς, ὀντινα βούλει αὐτῶν, Critias 110 e, πάνθ' ὄσα ξύννομα ἦσα... τὰν δυνατὸν πέφυκεν.

Phdr. 246 c, ή δὲ... [ψυχή]... σῶμα γῆσαν λαθούσα, ἦσον τὸ ξύμ- ταν ἐκλήθη.

Phædo 61 b, οἷς προχείρους εἶχον μὲθος..., τοῦτος ἐποίησα, οἷς πρῶτοι ἐνέτυχον.

Ib. 69 b, χωρίζόμενα δὲ φρονήσωσ, ..., μὴ σκιαγραφίᾳ τις ἢ τουαίτη ἀρετή.

Ib. 105 a, δ ἄν ἐπιφέρῃ..., αὐτὸ τὸ ἑπιφέρον τὴν ἐκατοντήτη µηδέ- ποτε δέξαισαι.

Crat. 408 a, τὸ ἐρμηνεία εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον κ.τ.λ., περὶ λόγου δύναµιν ἐστὶ πάσα αὐτὴ ἡ πραγματεία.

Legg. 668 d, τῶν µεµµηµένων δὲ τοι ποτὲ ἐστὶν, ἐκατόν τῶν σωµάτων.

Ib. 734 e, καθάπερ οὖν δὴ των ἐξουσιών ἡ καὶ πλέγµ' ἄλλ' ὀτιοῦν οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν οἶον τ' ἐστὶ τὴν τ' ἐφικήν καὶ τὸν στίµωνα ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

Cf. Soph. Aj. 1062, αὐτῶν... σῶμα τυμβίζειν τᾶφο, 1147, Οὔτω δὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὸ σῶν λάβρον στόµα... τὰχ' ἄν τις... Χειµὼν κατασβέ- σει τὴν πολλὴν βοήν.

§ 219. A curious variation occurs in

Protag. 317 a, τὸ ὁποδιδράσκοντα µὴ δύνασθαι ὁποδράναι..., πολλὴ µωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος.

Phædo 99 a, εἰ τις λέγοι... ὡς διὰ ταῦτα ποιῶ ἢ ποιῶ,... πολλὴ ἄν καὶ µακρὰ ραβδιαία εἰς τὸν λόγον.

§ 220. b. Where the first-placed expression is collective, the other distributive.

Symp. 178 a, τούτων ὑµῖν ἐρῶ ἐκάστου τὸν λόγον.

Ib. 190 d, αὐτοῖος διασεῖµο δίχα ἐκαστον.

Tim. 32 b, πρὸς ἄλλην... ἀπεργαζόµενον, δὲ τί περ πῦρ πρὸς ἄερα τοῦτο ἄερα πρὸς θῦµον, καὶ δὲ τι ἄερ πρὸς θῦµον θῦµον πρὸς γῆν.

We may trace this back to Homer: e. g. Od. i. 348, ὡστε διδοὺν
§ 221. γ. Where the latter expression is restrictive of the former, being in fact only a re-enunciation of part of it.

Phaedo 64 b, οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν δὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς .... ξυμφάναι ἂν, τοὺς μὲν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀνθρώπους καὶ πᾶν.

Gorg. 517 e, δόξαι καὶ αὐτῷ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεραπευτὴν εἶναι σώματος, παντὶ τῷ μὴ εἰδοτί δι’ θ.κ.λ.


§ 222. δ. Where the latter expression is merely pronominal, and resumptive.

Grammatically, the pronominal resumption is (where no change of construction intervenes) a pleonasm: but rhetorically it is not redundant. Its function is to recall to the thoughts in its proper place an expression which has, for a special purpose, been set in advance of the main portion of the sentence, or which has been held in suspense by the intervention of some Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause, or some change of construction.

Instances of main portion of sentence intervening.

Theax. 155 c, ἓν σοι ἀνδρῶν ὄνομαστὼν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτών.

Apol. 40 d, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἴδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήσωμεν ἂν εὑρείν αὐτοῦ ταύτα.

Rep. 375 d, οἶσθά γὰρ που τῶν γενναίων κυνῶν ὅτι τούτο φύσει αὐτῶν τὸ ἱδος.

Legg. 700 c, τοῖς μὲν γεγονόσι περὶ παίδευσιν δεδογμένον ἂκούεις ἣν αὐτοῖς.

Phileb. 30 d (though the pronoun here has more force), ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ τοῖς μὲν πάλαι ἀποφημάμενοι ὡς ἔδει τοῦ παντὸς νοῦς ἄρχει εὐμμαχος ἐκεῖνος.

Rep. 353 d, τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα πάντα, ἐστ’ ὅτι οἱ ἄλλοι ἡ ψυχὴ δικαίως ἂν αὐτὰ ἀποδὸμένει;

Cf. Soph. O. T. 717, Παιδός δὲ βλάστασα οὐ διέσχον ἡμέραι Τρεῖς καὶ νῦν κ.τ.λ.
§ 223. Instances of Adjectival, Adverbial, or Relative clause intervening.

Symp. 200 a, πότερον ὁ Ἔρως ἐκεῖνον, οὗ ἐστίν Ἔρως, ἐπιθυμεῖ αὐτοῦ;
Similarly Charm. 195 a.

Theaet. 188 b, ᾧ μὴ οἴδεις, ἥγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἔτερα;

Phaedo 104 d, ἃ τι ἂν κατάσχῃ, ἀναγκάζει... αὐτὸ ἰσχεῖ, and similarly in the next sentence.

Ib. 111 e, τοὺς δὲ, βαθύτερον ὄντας, τὸ χάραμα αὐτοῦ ἔλασσον ἔχειν.

Alcib. I. 115 e, τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν...; ἥ μὲν καλὸν κ.τ.λ., καλὸν αὐτὸ προσείπας;

Legg. 625 a, τοῦτον οὖν φαίμεν ἄν ἥμεις...; ἐκ τοῦτο διανέμειν κ.τ.λ., τοῦτον τὸν ἔπαινον αὐτῶν εἰληφέραι.

§ 224. Instances of change of construction intervening.

Tim. 37 d, ἡμέρας γὰρ καὶ νύκτας καὶ μέρας καὶ ἑναυτοὺς οὐκ ὄντας πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, τότε ἂμα ἐκεῖνος ἐξουσιασμένος τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανάται.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὁπόσοι... ἀνοίχτως δοξάζοντες, καθάπερ ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαῖωταν ἔπεσθε τοὺς μὲν κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 13 b, κακὰ δὲ ὄντ' αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἁγαθὰ δὲ, ὅμως σὺ προσαγορίζεις ἁγαθὰ αὐτά. [For it is αὐτῶν, not τὰ πολλά, which is represented by αὐτά.]

Hip. Ma. 292 d, ὃ παντὶ ὧν προσγίνηται ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνος καλὸς εἶναι.

§ 225. Note, that caution is needed before applying this explanation of the resumptive Pronoun. For instance, in Phdr. 265 c, τούτων δὲ τινων... ἵπτεντον δυὸν εἰδοῖν, εἰ αὐτῶν τὴν δύναμιν κ.τ.λ., the τούτων... εἰδοῖν is a Genitive Absolute. So Symp. 195 a, φημι οὖν ἐγὼ πάντων θεών εὐδαιμονίαν ὄντων Ἐρετα... εὐθαυμοῦσταν εἶναι αὐτῶν,—πάντων... ὑπὸν is a Genitive Absolute. (For the construction, cf. Laches 182 b, ἐπειδήμερον ἅλλου ἀμίνοσθαι αὐτῶν.) Again, Laches 182 d, τὸ ὀπλικὸν τοῦτο εἰ μὲν ἐστὶν μάθημα... ἐρη ἄν το ὀπλικὸν is Nominative. (Cf. a similar construction Symp. 202 b.) Again, Rep. 439 b, τοῦ τούτου οὐ καλῶς ἐχει λίγειν, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἄμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τέλος ἐπωβοῦνταί τε καὶ προσελκύοντα, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἅλλη μὲν ἢ ἄπωβοσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.,—τοῦ τούτου belongs to the sentence ἅλλη μὲν ἢ ἄπωβοσα χείρ, κ.τ.λ.

§ 226. C. Dependent sentence resolved into two parts, by disengaging from its construction and premising a portion of it consisting of a Noun or Noun-phrase, and bringing both parts co-ordinately under the government of the Principal sentence.
a. The premised expression may be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

Euthyd. 294 c, ὅσθα Εἰσύδημου, ὁπόσος ὡδόντας ἔχει;
Hipp. Ma. 283 a, τεκμήριον σοφίας τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσον διαφέρουσι.
Phædo 75 b, ἐληφθότας ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἱσοῦ, ὅ τι ἐστίν.
Theaet. 162 d-e, βεβάς ... ὃς ἐγώ ... ὃς εἰσίν ὃς ὑπὸ ὡκ εἰσίν, ἔξαρα.
Phædo 86 d, Κέβητος ἀκούσαι, τὶ αὐτῷ ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ λόγῳ.
Ib. 95 b, ταῦτα δὴ ὡκ ἀνθαμάσασμι καὶ τῶν Κάδμου λόγων εἰ πάθω.
Laches 179 e, εἰσηγήσατο ὅτι τι τῇ ἡμῖν καὶ τούτῳ τῷ μάθημα, ὅτι καλῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ μάθεσαί το τὸ ὑπὸ ὠκω ἐκεῖνοι.
Gorg. 449 c, δηλοῦσι τοὺς κάμμας, ὡκ ἀν διατάζωμεν ἐγώ ὕμνοιν.
Note, that a very loose government suffices for the premised expression, as in the three instances following.

Soph. 260 a, δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διωμαλογήσασθαι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν.
Ibid. d, τὴν εἰδωλοποιήσῃ ... διαμάχητ' ἄν ... ὃς παντάπασιν ὡκ ἐστιν.
Protag. 354 a, οὐ τὰ ταύτα λέγετε, οἶον τα τε γυμνάσα καὶ τὰς στρα- 


teias κ.τ.λ.,—ὅτι ταύτα ἄγαθά;

In the two remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the principal sentence.

Gorg. 448 d, δήλος γάρ μοι Πάλοις ... , ὅτι τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν 

... μεμελέτηκεν.
Phædo 64 a, κυνικεύοισιν ὅσοι κ.τ.λ. λειπθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐπιπήδευοις.

The form illustrated by some of the above examples is of course common enough in all authors, beginning with Homer: cf. Od. xvii. 373, Λυτῶν δ' οὐ σάφα οἶδα, πόθεν γένος εὑχεται εἶναι, xviii. 374, Τῷ κε μ' ἱδίως, εἰ διάκα διηρκεία προταμομίουν. The looser governments are illustrated by Thuc. iii. 51, ἐξοικεῖτο δὲ Νικιάς ... τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις, ὅπως μᾶ ποιγώνται ἐκπλους, Aristoph. Av. 1289, Δεινῶ γε τὸν κήρυκα, τὸν 


παρά τοὺς βροτούς Οἰχόμενον, εἰ μηδέποτε νοστήσει πάλιν.

§ 227. β. The Dependent sentence being an Infinittival one.

Legg. 653 a, φρόνησιν δὲ [λέγω, εἶναι] εὑτύχεσ ὅτα καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας 


παρεγίνετο.

Crat. 419 d, οὐδὲν προσδείται τοῦ διότι μηθήμα.
Phdr. 242 b, αἳτους γεγεινησθαι λόγῳ τοῖς μηθήμα.
Symp. 207 a, τοῦ ἅγαθον ἑαυτῷ εἶναι αἰτὶ ἔρως ἐστίν.
§§ 228, 229. [BINARY STRUCTURE.]

In the remaining instance the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Charm. 153 b, ἡγελται ... ἡ μάχη πάνω ἵσχυρά γεγονέναι.

§ 228. Note, that Attraction occurs, where possible, in the residuary Dependent sentence also; as in the remaining instances.

Phædo 90 b, ἐπειδὴ τις πιστεύσῃ λόγω τούτῳ, ἀληθεί εἶναι.

Crat. 425 b, ὅπειροι πιστεύεις σαυτῷ, οἷος τ' ἀν εἶναι—attracted for οἰόν τ' ἀν εἶναι σε.

Hip. Ma. 283 e, ἐφθάνουν τοὺς ἑαυτῶν παισίν, ὡς βελτίστως γενέσθαι.

Rep. 459 b, δει άκρων εἶναι τῶν ἄρχόντων.

Euthyd. 282 d, οἴων ἐπιθυμῶ τῶν προτρεπτικῶν λόγων εἶναι.

§ 229. b. Or the premised expression may not be the Subject of the Dependent sentence.

Consequently redundancy, implicit or explicit, often occurs, as in some of the instances which follow, in which † is prefixed to the words in which the redundancy lies.

a. The Dependent sentence being one with a Finite Verb.

Phædo 58 e, εὐδαιμὸν μοι ἂνηρ ἐφανετο καὶ τοῦ τρόπου καὶ τῶν λόγων, ὡς ἀδύνατο καὶ γενναίως ἔτελεύτα. [ἀνηρ Herm. with Oxon. and most of the other MMS.]

Crito 43 b, σὲ ... εὐδαιμονία τοῦ τρόπου, ὡς ῥαδίως αὐτὴν φέρεις.

Phdr. 264 d, τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τῶν πτερῶν ἀποθολής, δὲ ἢν ψυχῆς †απορρεῖ.

Symp. 172 a, διαπυκνᾶθαι τὴν Ἀγάθωνος ἐξουσίαν ... περὶ τῶν ἱρωτικῶν λόγων, τινὲς ἦσαν.

Euthyd. 272 b, οὐ φοβεῖ τὴν ἡλικίαν, μὴ ἡδη πρεσβύτερος ὑπ';

Politic. 309 d, τῶν δὴ πολιτικῶν ... ἄρ' ἱσμεν, ὅτι προσήκει μόνον δυνατον εἶναι τῇ τῆς βασιλικῆς μούσῃ †τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἐμποιεῖν;

Protag. 318 e, εὐθυλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἄν ... †οἰκίας διώκοι.

Tim. 24 c, τὴν εὐκρασίαν τῶν ὄρων ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονεμωτάτους ἀνδρας οἴσω—(εἰ. ὁ τόπος, referred to in αὐτῷ.)

Critias 108 b, προλέγω σοι τὴν τοῦ θεάτρου διάνοιαν, ὅτι θανατοῦσ' ὁ πρότερος εὐδοκιμήκεν ἐν †αὐτῷ ποιήσῃ.

Apol. 25 c, ἀποφαίνει τῆν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι †μεμέληκε.

Men. 96 e, ὑμολογήκαμεν τούτο γε, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλως ἐξοι.

Phædo 65 d, τῆς οὐσίας, δ' τυχάνει ἐκαστὸν †τὸν. (Cf. § 213, above.)

Men. 72 b, μελιτθῆς περὶ οὐσίας, δ' τι ποι' ἐστί.
Cf. Thuc. v. 16, Πλειστοάιναξ... ἐς ἐνθυμίαν τοῖς Δακεδαμανίοις ἀεὶ προβαλλόμενος, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἠ' ἐκείνου κάθεδον παρανομήθεισαν ταῦτα ἐξημβαίνοι.

In the three remaining instances, the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Phaedo 82 a, δῆλα δῆ καὶ τάλλα, οἴ τιν ἐκάστη τις, κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιωτάτας τῆς μελέτης—which means δῆλον δῆ οία καὶ τάλλα ἐσται, τούτεστιν οἴ τιν ἐκάστη τις κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 d, αὐτὰ δῆλα τὰ παρόντα, ὅτι οἰοὶ τ' ἐσιν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ συμπρόστατα τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι—which means δῆλον ὅτι οἰοὶ τ' ἐσιν... ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἔργον ἐστίν αὐτὰ τὰ παρόντα.

Ib. 45 c, μὴ δύξῃ ἄπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περί ὁι ὀνανδρία τω̄ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράχθαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης ἐς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς τ' εἰσήλθε, κ.τ.λ.

§ 230. β. The Dependent sentence being In infinitival.

Symp. 197 α, τὴν τῶν ἐκών ποίσην τίς ἑναιστώσηται, μὴ οὐχὶ Ἐρωτος ἐστιν σοφίαν ἣ ἃ γίνεται τε καὶ φύσει πάντα τὰ ζώα;

Phaedo 102 b, ὁμολογεῖσ τὸ τῶν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους, οὐχ ὅτι τοὺς βήμασι λέγεται οὔτω καὶ τὸ ἄλλης ἔξειν.

Legg. 641 d, τὸ ἄλλης διασχυρίζεσθαι, ταῦτά οὖτως ἔξειν.

Rep. 489 c, δήμου τὴν φύσιν, οἶνον ἀνάγκη φύναι τῶν καλῶν τε καγαθῶν ἐσόμενη.

Ib. 443 b, ἄρχομενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν.

Gorg. 513 e, ἐπιχειρησέων ἡμῶν ἐστὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πολίτεις θεραπεῦειν.

Legg. 790 c, ἡργμέθα τῶν περί τα σώματα μιθῶν λειτυδιῶν διαπεραιών.

Political. 285 c, τοῖς μὲν τῶν δυτῶν, μηδείς καταμαθέως, αἰσθηταί τινες ὁμοιώτητες πεφύκασι.

Hipp. Ma. 294 e, οἴσχεται ἃρ' ἡμῶς διαπεραιῶς τὸ καλὸν, γνῶναι δ' ἐς τοὺς ἐστίν.

Crito 52 b, οὐδ' ἐπισκηνία σε ἄλλης πόλεως ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι.

Critias 115 d, ἐως εἰς ἐκπλήξιν μεγέθεσι τε κάλλεσι τε ἔργων ἴδειν τὴν οἰκονομίαν ἀπεργάσαντο.

Phaedo 84 c, ὡς ἵδειν ἐφαίνετο.

Apol. 33 b, παρέχω ἐμαντὸν ἔρωτῆν.

Virtually similar is

Phileb. 26 b, εἰσηκύρω ηῷς θεῷς, πέρας, ὅταν δὲν ἔμν.

In the remaining instances the premised expression becomes the Subject of the Principal sentence.

Apol. 37 d, καλὸς ὑπὸ ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εὑ, εἰσδεδώται ἓ ᾧ.

Protag. 313 a, εἰν ς πώς ἐστὶ τὰ σά, ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττειν—(sc. σέ)

Rep. 525 b, προσήκον τὸ μάθημα ἃν εἰς νομοθέτησαι καὶ πείδειν τούς μελλοντας ἐν τῇ πολεί τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ ἕ κογιστικὴν ἴναι.

Gorg. 449 b—c, εἰσὶ μὲν ἐναὶ τῶν ἀποκρίσεων ἀνυγκαία διὰ μακρῶν τῶν λόγων ποιεῖται.

Euthyd. 281 d, κυδυνεύει εὖμπαντα δ κτ.λ., οὐ περὶ τούτου ὁ λόγος αὕτως εἰναι ὁποι κτ.λ.

Cf. Thuc. viii. 46, εὐπελάστερα δὲ τὰ δεινα, ἔπραξε κυρίον τῆς δαπάνης, καὶ ἀμα μετὰ τῆς έαυτοῦ ἀσφαλείας, αὕτως περὶ έαυτούς τούς Ἐλλήνας καταρίφαι.

§ 231. Idioms of Sentences:—Abbreviated Construction.

A. Antecedent and Relative clauses supplying each other’s Ellipses.

Symp. 212 c, δὲ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ χαίρεις ὑνορίζων, τούτῳ ὑνομίζει—where we must supplement the Antecedent sentence thus—τούτῳ καὶ ταύτῃ ὑνομίζει.

Phædo 98 a, ταύτα καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν ἀ πάσχει—where the Relative sentence intended is fully ἀ πάσχει καὶ ποιεῖ.

Symp. 178 a, δὲ μάλιστα καὶ δὲν ἵδοξὲ μοι ἀδειαμμήνουντον, τούτων ἕμϊν ἐρω ἑκάστου τῶν λόγων—where the Antecedent sentence fully is τούτων ἑκάστου τῶν λόγων, καὶ ταύτα, ἕμϊν ἐρω.

§ 232. B. Ellipses supplied from parallel constructions in co-ordinate clauses.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει . . . ἐστὶν ὅτε καὶ οἰς βελτίων τεβάναι ἢ ᾧ. οἰς δὲ βελτίων τεβάναι, θανατόν . . . εἰ τούτως τοῖς ἁνθρώποις μῇ ὅσιν ἐστι κτ.λ.,—where after oïs δε must be supposed to be repeated καὶ ὅτε, and after τούτως τοῖς ἁνθρώποις similarly καὶ τότε.

Ib. 69 b, τούτου μὲν πάντα καὶ μετά τούτου ὁνομένα τε καὶ πιπρασκό-μενα . . . μετὰ φρονήσεως—where must be supplied φρονήσεως καὶ before μετά φρονήσεως, parallel to τούτου καὶ μετά τούτου.
§ 233. C. Dependent Noun silently supplied from one of two co-ordinate clauses to the other, in a new and different government.

Apol. 19 d, δεξίω ύμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν—where ἀλλήλους is to be supplied to φράζειν.

Laches 187 d, διδόντες τε καὶ δεχόμενοι λόγον παρ’ ἀλλήλων—where ἀλλήλους is to be supplied to διδόντες.

Legg. 934 c, διδασκέτω καὶ μανθανέτω τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦντα—τὸ μανθανέτω supply para τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος.

Protag. 349 a, οὐ παρακαλεῖν . . . καὶ ἀνακοινοῦσθαι—sc. σοί.

Phdr. 238 e, τῷ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἀρχομένῳ, δουλεύοντι τε—sc. ἐπιθυμίᾳ.

Ib. 278 e, πρὸς ἀλληλα κολλῶν τε καὶ ἀφαίρων—sc. ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων.

Symp. 195 b, μετὰ δὲ νέων ἀδι ξύνεστι τε καὶ ἔστιν, i. e. καὶ ἐστὶ τῶν νέων.

Cf. Xen. Hell. I. iiii. 9, ἄρκους ἀλαβόν καὶ ἐδοσαν παρὰ Φαρναβάζου.

§ 234. D.1 New Subject in the second of two clauses silently supplied from the former.

Rep. 333 c, ὅταν μηδεν δεγ αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ κέωσθαι—sc. αὐτό.

Symp. 212 c, βύμαν φόρον παρασχεῖν, . . . καὶ αὐτηρίδος φωνῆν ἀκούειν—sc. αὐτοῦς, from αὐτοῖς implied by παρασχέν.

Ib. 187 e, ὅπως ἀν τὴν μὲν ἥδωρν αὐτοῦ καρπάσχῃ, ἀκολασίαν δὲ μηδεμίαν ἐμπούσῃ—sc. ἡ ἥδωρ.

Rep. 414 d, ἐδόκουν ταῦτα πάσχειν τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι περί αὐτοῖς—sc. ταῦτα.

Phædo 58 b, νόμος ἑστίν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ καθαρεύειν τὴν πολίν, καὶ δημοσίᾳ μηδένα ἀποκτινούναι—sc. αὐτοῦς.

Ib. 72 c, λήρου τὸν Ἔνδυμιῶνα ἐνδείξει καὶ οὐδαμοὶ ἄν φαινομεν—sc. Ἔνδυμιῶν.

Apol. 40 a, ἣ γε δὴ οἰδήκῃ ἀν τόσ καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχατα κακῶν εἶναι—where the Nominative to νομίζεται is ἄ supplied from the preceding Accusative ἄ. (This is an instance of the next head also.)

[Under this section is written in the MS. "Illustr. from Homer:"
and so under §§ 235, 269, 300, 301, 308, "Illustr.:" but the illustrations were never put in.]
\[\text{§ 235. E. Relative Pronoun, in a new and different government, supplied to the second clause.} \]

Symp. 200 d, ὃ ὁπω ἐπομον αὐτῶ ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐχει.
Ib. 201 a, οὐ ἐνδειξ ἔστι, καὶ μή ἔχει.
Phædo 65 a, ὃ μηδὲν ἡδον τῶν τοιούτων, μηδὲ μετέχει αὐτῶν.
Gorg. 482 b, ὅ σὺ νῦν βαθμάζεις, παρηγορά δὲ καὶ αὐτῶς λεγομένους.
Menex. 243 c, ὃν χρὴ ἄξι μεμνησθαι τε καὶ ἐπανεῖν.

\[\text{§ 236. In the following passages, the force of the Relative is still to be supplied, although a Demonstrative Pronoun fills its place in the construction.} \]

Rep. 357 b, ὡςοι αδβλάβεις καὶ μηδὲν διὰ ταῦτα γίγνεται.
Ib. 395 d, δῶν φαμεν κήδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοῦς ἄδρας ἀγαθὰς γενέσθαι.
Phædo 100 b, ὅ εἰ μαί διδὼς τε καὶ ἐγχωρεῖς εἶνα ταῦτα.

Virtually similar is Rep. 337 e, πρῶτον μὲν μὴ εἰδὼς, ... ἔπειτα ... ἀπειρημένον αὐτῷ εἶν, where μὴ εἰδὼς is the equivalent of δὲ μὴ εἰδείν.

\[\text{§ 237. F. Common part supplied from a preceding to a subsequent clause.} \]

a. Definite Article.

The brackets indicate where Articles have to be supplied. The complete irregularity with which they are expressed and omitted shews that the object is, next to conciseness, to produce variety of expression and sound.

Rep. 344 c, τὸ μὲν τῶν κρείττονος ἐμφάρον τὸ δίκαιον τυγχάνει δὲν, τὸ ὅ ἀδικον [ ] ἐμφάρο λυστελοῦν.
Ib. 438 b-c, τὰ πλεῖον πρὸς τὰ ἐλάστω ... καὶ αὐ [ ] βαρότερα πρὸς [ ] κουφότερα καὶ [ ] βάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα.
Ib. 477 a, ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ ὄντι γνώσει, ἀγνώσει δ’ ἐπὶ [ ] μὴ ὄντι.
Ib. 544 c, ἂ τε ... ἐπαινομένη, ἂ Κρητική ... καὶ [ ] δευτέρα ..., καλομυκή δ’ ὀλιγαρχία.
Ib. 545 a, τῶν φιλόνεικου ... καὶ [ ] ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὐ καὶ [ ] δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τῶν τυραννικῶν.

Phædo 67 d, χωρισμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ [ ] σώματος. [So Oxon.]
Gorg. 469 c, καὶ τὰ γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ [ ] τρύπεις καὶ τὰ πλούς, [So most MSS.]
Symp. 186 e, ἂ τε ἱστορίη ... ἀσάντων δὲ καὶ [ ] γυμναστική καὶ [ ] γεωργία.
Phdr. 253 d, ἄρετή δὲ τίς τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ, ἦ [ ] κακοῦ κακία, οὐ διείπομεν.

Phileb. 45 a, μείζον γίγνονται περὶ τούς κάμνοντας . . . , ἦ περὶ [ ] ἐγκαίνοντας;

Legg. 789 c, τοὺς μὲν ἐλάττωνες εἰς τὰς χείρας, [ ] μείζον ὥς ὑπὸ τὴν ἀγαλῆν.

Ib. 960 c, [ ] Δάκεσιν μὲν τὴν πρώτην, [ ] Κλωδὼ δὲ τὴν δευτέραν, τὴν "Ἀτροπον δὲ [ ] τρίτην.

§ 238. b. Preposition.

Syrmp. 209 d, καὶ εἰς Ὄμηρον βλέψας καὶ Ἡσίοδον.

Apol. 25 b, καὶ περὶ ἱππῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. So Phædo 111 d, &c.

§ 239. c. Some larger part of the clause.

Politic. 308 e, τοὺς μη δυναμένους καυσωνεῖν . . . δόσα εἰς τείνοντα πρὸς ἄρετήν, ἄλλ' εἰς ἀθέοτητα.

§ 240. G. Anastrophe; that is, the supplying of a word from a subsequent to a former clause. The object is, as Dissen (Pind. Nem. x. 38) remarks, to give liveliness to the sentence by strengthening the later clauses of it.

The use of this figure is more extensive in poetry than in prose; the following species of it, however, occur in Plato.

a. Anastrophe of Definite Article. (This is the converse of the usage considered under the last head.)

Rep. 491 d, εἴτε ἔγγειον εἴτε τῶν ζώων.

Phileb. 35 ε, δόσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τ' ἐστὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῆν φθορὰν.

Legg. 795 b, διαφέρει μαθῶν μὴ μαθήνοι, καὶ ὁ γυμνασάμενος τὸ μὴ γεγυμνασμένον.


Rep. 455 e, καὶ γυνῇ ἰατρική, ἦ δ' σε. So 451 e.

Syrmp. 207 d, νεός ἀδεὶ γεγομένος, τὰ ἀδεὶ ἀπολλὸς—where we must supply τὰ μὲν to νεός γεγομένον.

Phædo 105 d—e, (A) τὸ δὲ δίκαιον μὴ δεχόμενον καὶ δ ἐν μονοσίκον μὴ δέχονται [τὶ ὁμοιότην]; (B) "Ἀμουσον, τὸ δὲ ἄδικον—where before ἀμουσον must be supplied τὸ μὲν. So Soph. 221 e, 248 a, Phileb. 36 e, &c.
Theat. 191 ε, ἐφίκευον ἐκμαγείον, . . . τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κομψοδιάτερου, καὶ ἑλπητήρει, ἐνίοις δὲ ἱγρυτέρου—where before ἑλπητήρει must be supplied ἐνίοις μεν.

Apol. 18 d, ὦτι δὲ φθόνῳ . . . χρώμενοι ύμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλος πείθοντες—where before φθόνῳ must be supplied οι μὲν.

Cf. Hom. II. xi. 536, ὥς ἐπτείνω ὅπλεων ὀβαλύμμους ἐβαλλόν, Αἰ δ' ἄπ' ἐπισφάλτων, xxii. 157, παραδραμένη, φεύγων, ὁ δ' ἐπισθε διώκων, ix. 511, Εἰ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δώρα φέροι, τὰ δ' ὑπίσθ' ἀνιμάζοι, Od. iii. 33, κρίνα ἄπτων ἄλα δ' ἐπειρών, xiv. 232, Τῶν ἐξαιρεύμην μενοείκα, πολλὰ δ' ὀπίσω Λάγχανον (i.e. πολλὰ μὲν μενοείκα).

§ 242. c. Anastrophe of Correlative Adverbs.

Theat. 192 δ, ἄκοιω, . . . τότε δὲ αἰσθησιν οὐδεμιὰν ἔχω.

Phaed. 116 a, διαλεγόμενοι περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ἀνακοποῦντες, τότε δ' ἀδ' περὶ τῆς ἐμφορᾶς διεξακόμισται—where τότε must be supplied before διαλεγόμενοι. So also Critias 119 d, Philob. 35 e, Tim. 22 e.

The leaving μὲν to be supplied from an expressed δ' in the Correlative clause is common: e.g. Rep. 357 c, 358 a, 572 a, Symp. 199 b, 201 e.


Soph. 217 e, κατ' ἑμαυτόν, εἶτε καὶ πρὸς ἐτέρων.

Gorg. 488 d, διόρισον, ταὐτὸν ἡ ἑτέρον ἐστι κ.τ.λ.

Theat. 169 d, ἐδωμεν, ὁρθῶς ἡ οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἐδυσχεραίνομεν. So 161 d.

Ib. 173 d, εἰ δὲ ἡ κακῶς . . . μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθην.

Cf. Hom. Od. ii. 132, ζώει δ' ὡς ἡ τέθυκε.

§ 244. e. Anastrophe of Prepositions.

Philob. 22 c, τῶν μὲν οὖν εὐκερτίριων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βιον οὐκ ἁμφὶ σβητῷ πα ὑπὲρ νου, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερεύων ὰρμὸν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι τί δράσομεν.

This kind of Anastrophe is as common in Homer as it is in later poets.

The converse usage is noticeable in peculiar instances: cf. Hom. Π. xi. 374, Ὁτιο δ μὲν θώρηκα 'Αγαστρόφου ἱφθίμου λίγωτ' ἀπο
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. §§ 245, 246.

στήθεσθι παναιολον ἄσπίδα τ' ὁμον. And Theocr. i. 83, Πάσας ἀνὰ κρᾶνας, πάντ' ἄλσα, ib. 117, Ὅν' ἔτ' ἀνὰ δρύμωσι, οὐκ ἄλσεα.

§ 245. H. Verb supplied from a co-ordinate clause either preceding or subsequent.

Symp. 213 a, κελεύειν εἰσίναι, καὶ τὸν 'Ἄγαθων καλεῖν αὐτῶν—in the second clause is to be supplied λέγειν out of κελεύειν.

Apol. 38 b, κελεύοντι με τριάκοντα μνὼν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ θ' ἐγγυ-άσθαι.

In the following instance the Verb is supplied after an intervening complete clause.

Symp. 183 a, ἢ χρήματα βουλόμενοι παρά τον λαβεῖν ἢ ἄρχην ἄρξαι ἢ τιν' ἄλλην δύναμι—where to the last clause must be supplied λαβεῖν from the next but one preceding.

In all the following it is the Substantive Verb that has to be supplied.

Symp. 186 a, ὡς μέγας καὶ βαθμαστός καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει—where ἐντι is to be supplied to μέγας καὶ βαθμαστός.

Soph. 256 e, ξύμπαντα... ἐροῦμεν... εἶναι τε καὶ [supply 'are'] ὄντα.

Phdr. 234 e, σαφῆ καὶ στρογγύλα καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐκαστα τῶν ὄνομάτων ἀποτελοῦνται.

Tim. 22 d, ὁ Νειλὸς εἰς τε τὰ ἄλλα σωτήρ καὶ τότε ἐκ ταύτης τῆς ἀπορίας σώζει.

Ib. 56 b, οὗτος ὡς καθ' ἐν ἐκαστον μὲν... οὐδὲν ὄρωμεν, ξυναθροι-σθέντων δὲ... ὀράσθαι.

Legg. 872 a, ἑνὶ δὲ αὐτόχειρ μὲν μὴ, βουλεύσῃ δὲ θάνατον τις ἄλλος ἐτέρφ.

§ 246. I. Verb or Participle supplied from subordinate construction to main construction, or vice versa.

Phdr. 330 d, ὄσπερ οἱ τὰ θρέμματα θαλλὼ... προσέινοντες ἀγονσι—where to οἱ τὰ θρέμματα must be supplied ἀγονσι.

Phaedo 114 b, οἱ ἀν δέξωσι διαφέρωσι πρὸς τὸ δύσως βιώσαι—where to διαφερόντως must be supplied βιωσόκειναι.

Theaet. 180 a, ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὖθ' οüδὲν πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμακρὸν ἐνειναι—where to τὸ οὖθ' οὐδὲν must be supplied ἐνεῖναι.

Cf. Isocr. ix. 28. p. 194, παρακαλέσας ἀνθρώποις, ὡς οἱ τοὺς πλει-στούς λέγοντες, περὶ πενήκοντα—where to οἱ... λέγοντες must be supplied λέγοντιν. (Cf. Epist. ad Hebr. x. 10.) Hdt. ii. 86,
§§ 247—249. ] ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION. 223

οὐτὼ μὲν τοῦς τὰ πολιτελέστατα σκευάζουσι νεκροὺς. Thuc. ii. 53,
μᾶς γὰρ ἔστιν τις ἡ πρὸς τὸν ἀπεκρίπτετο μὴ καθ’ ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν—
ἔστι θε. καθ’ ἡδονὴν ποιεῖν.

§ 247. J.

Apol. 18 c, ὑ ἐπὶ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οἰδ᾽ ἕτοι πάντων ἕνδοκα—
which is to be supplemented thus—ὑ ἐπὶ πάντων ἐστίν ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι τούτο, ὅτι ῥ.λ.

Symp. 183 b, ὑ ἐπὶ δεινώτατον, ὅτι γε λέγουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ, ὅτι καὶ ὁμοίω τὸν μόνη συγγνώμη.

Still more elliptical is

Phdr. 248 b, ὑ ἐπὶ ὑπὲρ ἕποισαν συνοπτή, ἔτι προσέκουσα ... νομῇ ἐκ
tου ἑκεὶ λειμάνων τυχόντες οὐδεὶς—i. e. ὑ ἐπὶ ὑπὲρ ἕποισαν συνοπτή ἐστίν, ὅτι τούτο, ὅτι ἔπ. κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Xen. Mem. II. vi. 17, ὅ ταράττει σε, ὅ Κριτόρες, ὅτι πολλάκις ...
ἔρις κ.τ.λ. Isocr. iv. 176. p. 77, ὑ ἐπὶ πάντων καταγελαστῶ-
tatóton, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. Lysis xxx. 29. p. 186, ὑ ἐπὶ πάντων δεινώτατον, ὅτι κ.τ.λ. [So Bekker : Zurich edd. omit ὅτι.] We have also the following variations:—Isocr. vi. 56. p. 127, ὑ ἐπὶ πάντων σχε-
τικώτατον, ἔτι κ. τ.λ. (and similarly xviii. 18. p. 375), xv. 23. 
p. 314, ὑ ἐπὶ πάντων δεινώτατον, ὅταν κ. τ.λ., Lysis xix. 25. p. 154, 
ὑ ἐπὶ μεγαλον τεκμήριον. Δήμος γὰρ κ. τ.λ.

§ 248. K. Of two Nouns in regimen, the governing Noun left
to be supplied by the context, while its place in the construction is
taken by the governed Noun.

Symp. 214 c, μεθύνωτα άνδρα παρὰ νήφωταν λόγους παραβάλλειν—
where μεθύνωτα άνδρα stands for μεθύνως άνδρός λόγους.

Ib. 217 d, τῇ ἔχομεντι ἐμοῦ κλίνῃ—where ἐμοῦ stands for κλίνῃ τῆς
ἕνης.

Protag. 310 e, ὅστι ἐν τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιλύομαι οὔδεν οὔτε τῶν φίλων.

This natural idiom begins with Homer: cf. II. xvii. 51, κόμαι <χαρι-
tεσσων ὁμοίων.

§ 249. L. Complementary ἄλλος omitted.

Theet. 159 b, καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἄ ν για διήλθομεν—where
πάντα stands for ‘all besides.’

Ib. 145 a, ἀστρανομικὸς καὶ πολιτικὸς ... καὶ δάσα παυδείας ἔχεται.

Phaedo 69 b, τούτου πάντα ... παρασκόμενα—‘all other things
being parted with for this.’

So τί μὴν; ‘what, if not what you say?’
§ 250. M. Contrasted clause to be mentally supplied.

Rep. 475 e, oídámós [φιλοσόφους φήσμεν], ἀλλ' ὁμοίως μὲν φιλοσό-
φοις—sc. φιλοσόφους δ' οὖ.

Theoret. 201 b, oídámós ἔγωγε οἶμαι [δύνασθαι διδάξαι], ἀλλὰ πέισαι
μὲν—sc. διδάξαι δ' οὖ.

Crito 43 d, οὐ δὴ τοι αὐτίκατ, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν [sc. Οξόν. and two more
MSs.] μὲν μοι, ἥξεων τίμερον—sc. 'but I am not sure.'

Phdr. 242 c, εἴμι μάντις μὲν, οὗ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ', ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ
γράμματα φαίλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἐμανττὰ μόνον ἰκανός.

Cf. Andoc. i. 22. p. 4, ταυτὶ ἔλεγεν ἂν, ἦ ὁ οὖ; ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι—sc. 'but
another might not.' (οἶμαι μὲν ἐγὼ would have been 'I think,
but am not sure.'

§ 250*. MM. Disjunctive clause to be mentally supplied.

Crat. 389 c, ἦς ἂν τὴν αὐτήν ἰδέαν ἀποδιδό, εἶν τε ἐν ἀλλῷ σιδήρῳ,
[εἰν τε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] ὁμοὶ ὀρθῶς ἔχει τὸ ὁργανόν.

§ 251. N. Protasis of a hypothetical reason left to be mentally
supplied.

Symp. 236 b, (A) ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; (B) Οὐ μαντ' ἂν . . . ἐφοίτων παρὰ σέ
—i. e. 'No: for else I should certainly not have; &c.

Phdr. 227 d, εἴδε γράψειν κ.τ.λ.: ἡ γὰρ ἂν ἀστείοι καὶ δημοφιλεῖσι εἰσ
οἷ λόγοι.

Euthyd. 280 a, οὐ γὰρ ἄπειρον ἀμαρτάνοι γ' ἂν ποτὲ τις σοφία . . .
ἡ γὰρ ἂν οὐκέτι σοφία εἰπή.

§ 252. O. Hypothetical sentence;—εἴπερ representing the Pro-
tasis.

Euthyd. 296 b, οἰκουν ἡμᾶς γε [σφάλει], ἀλλ', εἴπερ, σέ.

Rep. 497 e, οὐ τὸ μὴ βουλεύεσθαι, ἀλλ', εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακο-
λύσει.

Legge. 667 a, οὐκ, δ' γαθέ, προσέχων τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν δρόο τούτο, εἴπερ.

Ib. 900 e, καὶ τῶν μὲν προσήκειν ἢμῖν, εἴπερ, ὅπωσα φλαύρα.

Cf. Arist. Eth. VIII. iii, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, σώζεσθαι βουλέται αὐτῶν, ἵνα
αὐτὸς ἑξρ' also ib. IX. vii, X. iii. And Aristoph. Nub. 227,
"Ερευν ἄπο ταρρῶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπερφονεῖς, 'Αλλ' οὖκ ἄπο τῆς γῆς,
εἴπερ.

§ 253. P. Hypothetical sentence;—εἴ δὲ representing the Pro-
tasis.

Symp. 212 c, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ὃς ἐγκώμιον εἰς "Ερευν νόμων εἰρήσθαι:
εἴ δὲ, δ' τι καὶ δὴ χαίρει σοφιστήν οὐρανῷ, τότε οὖναζε.
Euthyd. 285 c, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθαι, ἐφέτω, εἰ δ', ὥς τι βούλεσθαι τούτο ποιεῖται.

Legg. 688 b, εἰ μὲν βούλεσθε, ὡς παίξων εἰ δ', ὥς σπονδάζων.

Alc. I. 114 b, τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας, εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν μὲ ἄσπερ ἐγὼ σέ εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτός ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διεξέλθε.

This εἰ δὲ does not stand for εἰ δὲ μὴ, in reference to the βούλει of the former clause; but refers to a βούλει of its own, with reference to the coming clause.

The usage is common in Homer: cf. Π. vi. 376, Εἴ δ', ἡγε, xxii. 381, Εἴ δ', ἡγετε, ix. 46, εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ, Ψευγόντων κ.τ.λ., 262, Εἴ δὲ, σὺ μὲν μὲν ἀκούσων.

§ 234. Q. Hypothetical sentence;—suppression of Apodosis.


Gorg. 520 c, εἰ εὖ ποιήσας ταύτην τὴν ἐνεργεσίαν ἄντ' εὐ πείσεται—εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὦ.

More commonly the form is εἰν μὲν . . . εἰ δὲ, as also in Thucydides.

Symp. 185 d, εἰν μὲν σοι ἐθῆλη παύσεσθαι ἡ λύγξ—εἰ δὲ μὴ, κ.τ.λ.

Legg. 854 c, καὶ εἰν μὲν σοι λωφὴ τι τὸ νόσημα—εἰ δὲ μὴ, κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 325 d, εἰν μὲν ἐκὼν πείθηται—εἰ δὲ μὴ, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 311 d, ἄν μὲν ἐξικνήται . . .—εἰ δὲ μὴ, κ.τ.λ.

Hipp. Ma. 287 a, ἵνα . . . ἀντιλαμβάναμαι—suppose I’ &c.

Symp. 199 e, ἀπόκριναι διάγρ πλείον, ἵνα μᾶλλον καταμάθηση δ βούλησθαι: εἰ γὰρ ἐρωτήματι κ.τ.λ.—suppose I were to ask, now,’ &c.

Rep. 440 d, ἄλλ' εἰ πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τόδε εὐθυμεῖ . . ., ὅτι κ.τ.λ.—Symp. 177 b, εἰ δὲ βούλει αὐτὸ σκέψασθαι κ.τ.λ.—

With εἰ βούλει, or εἰ βούλεσθε, the Protasis also is often curtailed.

Symp. 220 d, εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε εἰν ταῖς μάχαις κ.τ.λ.—where εἰ βούλεσθε represents εἰ βούλεσθε σκέψασθαι τὸν Σωκράτη ὅπως οὖν ἐστίν.

Crat. 392 a, εἰ δὲ βούλει περί τῆς ὀρθός.

Theaet. 196 e, εἰ δὲ βούλει, . . . κεχρήμεθα.

Cf. Hom. Ι. i. 580, Εἴπερ γὰρ κ' ἐθῆλησιν κ.τ.λ., xvi. 559, ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄκεισασαίμηλθ', κ.τ.λ., xxii. 487, Εἴ δ' ἐθῆλες πολέμου δαμάσκει κ.τ.λ., Od. xv. 80, Εἴ δ' ἐθήλεις. Suppression of the Apodosis is also common in Homer after έπει,—as Ιι. iii. 59, Od. iii. 103, viii. 236.

§ 255. R. Form of Apodosis of a Hypothetical represented by ἄν, the Verb or Participle being understood.

Phaedo 98 c, ἐδοξεῖν ὦροιστατον πεπονθέναι ἄσπερ ἄν εἰ τις . . . λέγοι.

Q
In this common phrase the ἄν represents not so much a particular sentence, such as e.g. here πεπονθὼς ἄν εἴη τις, but rather a vague sentence such as τὸ πράγμα ἄν εἴη.

Apol. 29 b, τούτῳ καὶ ἑσταθεὶς ἵως διασφέρο... ... καὶ εἰ δή τῷ σοφώτερῷ τούτῳ φαίην εἰναι, τούτῳ ἄν—σ. σοφώτερος ἄν φαίην εἰναι— but this suppression is a graceful escape from the appearance of self-assertion.

Polit. 308 c, εἴ τις πράγμα ὁτιων,... κἂν εἰ τὸ φαύλοστατον, ..., ἐκνιστην. Here the κἂν... φαύλοστατον is exegetic of ὁτιων—‘any whatever, so that even if you understood it of the vilest it would mean that.’ The κἂν is hyperbatically placed, and belongs to the εἰ clause.

Symp. 221 e, ὁνόματα καὶ ρήματα ζέωθεν περιαμπέχοντα, Σατύρον ἄν τῶν υβριστῶν δορᾶν—‘something [like] what a satyr’s hide would be.’ In this instance, as also in the last, it is a Participle, not a Verb, which is to be understood.

Rep. 468 a, τί δὲ δή τὰ περὶ τῶν πολέμων; πῶς ἐκτέων κ.τ.λ.; Λέγ’, ἔφη, ποῦ ἄν;

§ 256. S. Condition or Reason referring to an implicit Proposition.

Phædo 61 b, Εὐθὺς φράζε... ... ἄν σοφρόνη ἐμε διώκειν—‘tell him to follow me,—which he will do if he is wise.’

Symp. 173 d, ὡπὸν... ... τὴν ἐπαυσμίαιν ἐλαβίς... ... οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε ἐν μὲν γάρ τοῖς λόγοις ἄν εἰ... ... διὸ ἐμοί ἂν—‘I do not know how you came by it, but at all events it fits you; for’ &c.

Theaet. 158 a, οὐκ οἴπειν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω δ τι λέγω—ἐπεὶ κ.τ.λ.

Protag. 333 c, αἰσχυνομένην ἄν ἔγωγε τούτῳ ὁμολογείν ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ γί φασι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 335 c, εἰμι επεὶ καὶ ταῦτ ἄν ἱσως οὐκ ἀνήδως σου ἤκουν.

§ 257. T. Direct conjunction of one or more particulars with a clause covering the rest.

a. In summarily breaking off enumeration of particulars.

Phædo 100 d, ἡ ἐκεῖνον τοῦ καλοῦ εἰτε παρουσία εἰτε κοινωνία εἰτε ὅπως δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσαγωγημένη.

Legg. 834 c, εἰτε τριετερίδες εἰτε ὁδίδαι πέμπτων ἄν εἴθ ὅπως καὶ ὅπως ἄν... διανεμήθωσι.

Tim. 48 c, τὴν μὲν περὶ ἄπαντων εἰτε ἀρχήν εἰτε ἀρχὰς εἰτε ὅπως δοκεῖ.

Crito 50 a, εἰτε ἀποδιδόσκειν, εἰθ ὅπως δὲ οὖνομάσαι τοῦτο.

Apol. 41 b, Ὄδυσσεια ἢ Σισυφὸς ἢ Ἀλλοὺς μμίλους ἄν τις εἴποι.
§§ 258, 259.] ABBREVIATED CONSTRUCTION. 227

Phaedo 70 c, οἷον τὸ καλὸν τῷ αἰσχρῷ ἑναυτὸν [τυχόνει ἄν], καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία οὕτως εἶχε. Similarly Phaedo 73 d, 94 b, Gorg. 483 d, Legg. 944 b.

Protag. 325 a, δικαιούσῃ, καὶ συφροσύνῃ, καὶ τὸ δείκνυ έίναι, καὶ συλλέξθην ἐν αὐτῷ προσαγορεῖσθαι εἶναι ἀνδρὸς ἄρετήν.

The peculiarity of these contracted forms of expression may be appreciated by comparing the following regularly composed sentence:

Protag. 358 ε, εἰτε γὰρ ὡδὺ εἰτε τερπνῶν λέγεις εἰτε χαρτόν, εἰτε ὁπόθεν καὶ ὁποῖς χαίρεις τὰ τωνάυτα ὄνομάζων, δο βελτιστε Πρόδικε, τούτο μοι πρὸς δο βούλομαι ἀπόκριναι.

The contracted forms give us always the feeling of abbreviation, as if the speaker was himself impatient of prolixity.

Gorg. 494 d, (A) φημὶ τῶν κτώμενον ἤδεως ἄν βιώναι. (B) Πότερον εἰ τὴν κεφαλὴν μῶνον κηποτῷ, ἢ ἢτι τί σε ἑρωτῶ; Apol. 20 d, οὗτο δὲ τὰς ἄν . . . μείζω τινα ἡ κατ᾽ ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶλεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω.

§ 258. b. In summary transitions to one particular.

Legg. 715 c, τοὺς άρχοντας . . . ὑπηρέτας . . . ἐκάλεσα οὕ τι καινοτομίας ὄνομάτων ἔσκα, ἀλλ' ἥγούμαι κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 36 a, τὸ μὴ ἀγανάκτειν . . . ἄλλα τε μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ ὅλοι ἀνθλιπτῶν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τούτο.


Hip. Ma. 281 c, (A) τί ποτε τὸ αὐτών ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ . . . φαίνονται ἀπεχώμενοι . . .; (B) Τί δ' οἴει ἄλλο γε ἡ ἀδύνατο ἠθαν.; Phaedo 63 d, (A) σκέφτομεθα τί ἐστιν δο βούλεσθαι μοι δοκεῖ πάλαι εἰσίν. (B) Τί δὲ ἄλλο γε ἡ πάλαι μοι λέγει ὁ μέλλων κ.τ.λ.;

§ 259. U. Use of πολλοῦ δεὶ instead of οἱ.

In the regular or full construction πολλοῦ δεὶ is either interjected parenthetically, or subjoined, to strengthen a negation. But, in the instances which follow, a Negative is dropped out, and the πολλοῦ δεὶ is made to fill the same place in the construction which the Negative filled.


Symp. 203 c, πολλοῦ δεὶ ὑπαλός . . ., ἄλλα σκληρός. Fully and regularly this would have been οὐχ ὑπαλός,—πολλοῦ γε καὶ δεὶ,—ἀλλὰ σκληρός.

Q 2
Gorg. 517 a, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ μήποτε τις τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται. Φυλλοὺ μήποτε τις (πολλοῦ γε δεῖ) τοιαῦτα ἐργάσηται.

§ 260. V. Extension of the government of a Verb, irrationally, so as to admit of the addition of an afterthought to a Participial clause without a new construction.

Politic. 276 e, εἰς ταὐτὸν βασιλεία καὶ τύραννον ξυνέθηκεν, ἀνομοιοτάτους διότι αὐτός τε καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἑκατέρον τρόπον—where there is no justification in the sense for bringing τῶν τρόπων under the government of ξυνέθηκεν.

§ 261. W. Two Participles, representing the reciprocal action of two parties, made to agree each of them with both conjointly,—to avoid specification in set terms.

Crito 48 d, ἐξαγωνίζει τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι—i.e. σὺ τε ἐξάγων, ἐγώ τε ἐξαγόμενος.

Cf. Isocr. vi. 47. p. 125, ἀπείπουμεν ὧν ἀκούστηκα τε καὶ λέγοντες—i.e. ἵμαστι τε ἀκούστηκα, ἐγώ τε λέγω. Somewhat similarly Arist. Categ. vi. 13, ὅρος μὲν μικρὸν λέγεται, κέγχροι δὲ μεγάλη, τῷ τῶν ὁμογενῶν μείζονα εἶναι—where however μείζονα, still more brachylogically, stands for τὴν μὲν μείζω, τὸ δὲ ἐλαττων.

§ 262. IDIOMS OF SENTENCES:—PLEONASM OF CONSTRUCTION.

From instances of Pleonasm must be excluded

1. Cases in which the force of a word has been attenuated by its frequent use in that particular connection; e.g. εἶναι subjoined to ἐκὼν and the like:

2. All cases in which redundancy has resulted from Change of Construction, or from Binary Structure:

3. Cases of fullness of Construction: e.g.

Phædo 62 a, τοῦτο μόνον τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων—which is simply the full form of which μόνον ἀπάντων would have been an abbreviation; as 'distinct from all the rest' is more accurate than 'distinct from all: '

Or the use of ἀστε with the Infinitive, following δύναμι &c.

Or the use of a deliberate form of speaking, as in

Apol. 19 b, τί δή λέγοντες διεβαλλον οἱ διαβιβάλλοντες;

Ib. 34 d, ἐπισκέπτει ἄν μοι δοκῶ . . . λέγειν λέγων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 36 a, οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τούτῳ.
§ 263. A. Pleonasm of particular words.

a. Of the Negative.

a. In the same clause.


Ib. 389 a, οὐκοῦν ὁμήρου οὔδε τὰ τοιαύτα ἀποδεξάμεθα.

Crito 43 b, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι' οὔδ' ἂν αὐτὸς ἤθελον.

Euthyd. 279 a, οὔδε σεμνοῦ ἄνδρος πάντες τι οὔδε τοῦτο έοικεν εἰνα λὴτορεῖν. So Phaedo 115 c.

Politic. 300 c, μηδὲν πλήθος μηδ' ἡμιώνοιν δυστατόν λαβεῖν τέχνην.

Phaedo 100 a, οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία οὐ σφόδρα.

Hip. Ma. 292 b, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, δ' Ἰππία, οὐκ, εἰ ταῦτα γε ἀποκριναίμην.

Lyssis 221 c, οὐκ ἄν, εἰ γε τὸ κακόν κ.τ.λ., οὐκ ἂν ἦν κ.τ.λ.

Crat. 398 e, οὔτ' εἰ τι οἶδ' τ' ἂν εἴην εὐρείν, οὐ συντείνω.

Euthyphro 4 d, οὔτ' εἰ τι μάλιστ' ἀπέκτεινεν, . . . οὐ δεῖν.

Cf. Hom. II. i. 36, &c.

The usage is common, of course, where the Negative is distributed to subdivisions of the sentence, as in

Theæt. 163 a, ἀλλ' οὔ δἰκαιον οὔτε σὺ οὔτ' ἂν ἤμεις φαίμεν.

The object of the Pleonasm is, after premising the Negative as an announcement of the general form of the sentence, to place it also in close contact with the word which it immediately concerns.
§ 264. §. Not in the same clause. In this case the repetition seems almost irrational.

Apol. 27 e, ἂνος δὲ σὺ τινα πείθεις ἃν ὡς οὐ, κ.τ.λ., οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστι.

Legg. 747 d, μηδὲ τοῦθ' ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τόπων, ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄλλοι τινες διαφέροντες ἄλλων πρὸς τὸ γεννάν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνους καὶ χείρον' οἷς οὐκ ἐναντία νομοθετήτην. οἱ μὲν γε ποι διὰ πνεύματι κ.τ.λ.

Cf. Antipho vi. 10. p. 142, οὔτε ὅστις οὐκ ἄλλα καθηγορεῖ ἢ ἄλλος διὰ πράγματι ταύτης, πιστεύει δὴποι αὐτῷ ἀξιώτερον ἠστιν· ἥπιστήσαι —where οὐκ is irrational.

§ 265. §. Of Prepositions.

Phdr. 278 a, εν δὲ τοῖς διδασκομένοις ... εν μόνοις το ἐναργεῖς εἶναι.

Cf. Thuc. iii. 53, εν δικαστᾶς οὐκ ἐν ἄλλαις δεξάμενοι γενέσθαι ἢ ἴμην.

§ 266. §. Of Conjunctions.

Symp. 210 b, καὶ εάν ἐπιεικῆς ἃν τὴν ψυχήν τις καὶ εάν συμμέτοιχος ἄνδρος ἔχῃ.

d. Of ἄν.

Phdr. 276 b, τῇ γεωργικῇ χρώμενος τέχνῃ ἃν σπείρας εἰς τὸ προσήκον ἀγαπηί ἃν, κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 31 a, κρούσαντες ἃν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνάρτος, μαῖδιος ἃν ἀποκτειναῖε.

e. Of ἐφ, &c.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι Ἐδ ἃν ἔχου, φάναι, ὥ 'Αγάθων.

Ib. 190 c, λέγει ὅτι Δοκῶ μοι, ἐφη, κ.τ.λ.

§ 267. §. Resumption of a Noun, where no Change of Construction has intervened, by Oblique Cases of αὐτός.

See under 'Binary Structure,' § 222, above.

§ 268. §. Pleonasm in sentences of Contrast.

Politic. 262 a, τὸ ζητούμενον ἐν διπλασίαις τὰ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἡμίσεισιν εἰς τότε ποιήσει ζητεῖσθαι.

Legg. 805 a, ἡμίσεια πάλιν ἀντὶ διπλασίας.

Tim. 39 c, ἄλογοι τῶν πολλῶν.

Phaedo 58 a, πάλιν γενομένης αὐτῆς πολλῷ ύστερον φαίνεται ἀποθανόν.

Ib. 7 e, ἔκ μελίζουν δῶτοι πρότερον ύστερον ἐλαττην γενήσεται.

12 Cf., perhaps, Thucyd. iii. 36, πόλιν ἐδρυ ἀδαιρεῖραι μᾶλλον ἢ νὰ τωδα αἰτίου.
§§ 269—271. CHANGED CONSTRUCTION.

Soph. 219 b, ὅπερ ἄν μὴ πρῶτερον τις ἐν ὑστερον εἰς οὐσίαν ἄγη. So 265 b.

Cf. Lysias xxi. 24, p. 189, τοιαύτου πρῶτερον βελτίων γενόμενος περὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὑστερον βουλεύειν ἀξιούτως.

Phaedo 64 c, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ σοι ἔνδοκῇ ἄπερ καὶ ἐμοί.

Ib. 76 e, ἀναγκαῖον, οὕτως ὅπερ καὶ ταύτα ἐστιν, οὕτως καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

Cf. Xen. Anab. II. i. 22, καὶ ἡμῖν ταύτα δοκεῖ ἄπερ καὶ βασιλεί, Hom. II. vi. 476, δότε δὴ καὶ τόνδε γενέαθαι Παίδ' ἐμῶν, ὡς καὶ ἐγώ περ, ἀμπρεσία Τρώεσσι, (and more in Heindorf, on Phaedo 64 c).

§ 269. D. Pleonasm in stereotyped phrases.

Phaedo 91 d, πολλὰ δὴ σώματα καὶ πολλάκις καταρίψασα.

Ib. 99 b, πολλῇ καὶ μακρὰ ῥαβμία.

Ib. 79 c, ἄλφ καὶ παντὶ (perhaps).

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐγρηγορόσι μήτε εὐδοκεί κύρτοις ἄργων θήραν διαπονομένος. (This perhaps approaches nearer to Hyperbole—for which see § 317, below.)

§ 270. Idioms of Sentences:—Changed Construction.

A. As to Cases of Nouns.

a. Nominative Absolute—in exposition.

Soph. 266 d, τίθημι δύο διχῇ ποιμηνεῖς εἶδας θεία μὲν καὶ ἀνθρωπίνη κατὰ βάτερον τιμήμα, κατὰ δὲ βάτερον τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἄν, τὸ δὲ ὁμοιόμον τινὸς γένημα.

Ib. 218 e, τί δήτα προτεταξίμεθ' ἄν εὐγνωστον καὶ συμκρόν ...; οἴον ἀσπαλιευτῆς.

§ 271. b. Inversion of government.

Theoc. 192 a, δεῖ δεῖ δέ λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ἄρχης διορίζομενος.

Apol. 21 c, διαλεγόμενοι αὐτῷ, ἔδωκέ μοι οὕτως ο ἀνήρ ἑκτ. ἡ.

Legg. 811 e, ἀποβλέψας πρὸς τὸν λόγον ... ἔδωκαν ... μοι ... εἰρήνωθαι.

Ib. 922 b, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶπεν, δίδωσας κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 49 b, πάντες ὁπόσι κ.τ.λ., ἀναγκαίσατον ἐπεσθαί τοῖς μὲν ρώμην αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

Theoc. 173 d, σπουδάδ' ἐταιρεῖσθ᾽ ἐν' ἄρχας καὶ σύνοδος καὶ δείπνα καὶ σὺν αὐλητρίσι κόμαι, οὔδε δὲπράττειν προσίσταται αὐτώς.
Symp. 208 e, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν—εἰσί γὰρ κ.τ.λ.—τούτων ὤταν τις κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 474 e, καὶ μὴν τὰ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους . . . οὗ δὴπον ἐκτὸς τοῦ·

τῶν ἐστὶ τὰ καλά.

Rep. 565 d—e, ὁς ἀρά ο ἐγευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχνου . . .

ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι:

Euthyd. 281 d, κινδυνεύει σύμπαντα . . . οὐ περὶ τούτου ο λόγος αὕτως ἐσται.

Critias 107 e, ἐκ δὴ τοῦ παραχρῆμα νῦν λεγόμενα, τὸ πρέπον ἃν μὴ

dινώμεθα πάντως ἀποδιδόναι, συγγιγνώσκειν χρεών.

§ 272. d. Different governments, either of them regular, brought
together into one sentence.

Rep. 378 d, τουαῦτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὐθὺς καὶ γέρουσι.

Ib. 566 e, ὅταν πρὸς τοὺς ἐξω ἐχθροὺς τοὺς μὲν καταλαγῇ τούς δὲ καὶ
dιαφείρῃ.

Symp. 203 a, διὰ τούτου πᾶσα ἐστὶν ἡ ὁμιλία . . . θεὸς πρὸς ἀνθρώ-

πους, καὶ ἐγγεγορόσι καὶ καθεύδουσι—the words καὶ ἐγγεγορόσι και
catheudousi referring to anthrwitous.

Phaedo 88 e, εἰς ἀπιστίαν καταβαλεῖν οὐ μόνον τοὺς προειρημένους

λόγους, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰ υστερον μέλλουσα ῥηθήσεσθαι.

§ 273. d. Change to a previous construction.

Rep. 413 e, τὸν ἀκήρατον ἐκβαίνοντα καταστατέον ἀρχοντα . . . , καὶ
timais doteias kai zoini kai telenthsantos . . . gera laqhamonta.

§ 274. e. Change to a Genitive Absolute.

Rep. 590 d, ἀρεινον παρι . . . ἀρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἐχοντος
k.τ.λ.

Legg. 755 d, τούτους εἶναι στρατηγοὺς . . . , δοκιμασθέντων καθάπερ οἱ

νομοφόλακες.

§ 275. f. The following are simple Anacolutha, reducible to no

principle whatever.

Legg. 823 d, εἴτ' ὡμίας μήτε τις ἐπιθυμία . . . , πατὲ λάβοι . . . , μήτε

ἐγγεγορόσι μήτε καθεύδουσι κύριστοι ἄργων θηραν διαποικυμένοις.

Critias 116 d, νεώς ἦν σταῦλον μὲν μήκος, εὔρος δὲ τριαὶ πλέθρους.

§ 275*. ἈΑ. As to Number of Nouns and Pronouns.

a.

Phædo 62 a, τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ . . . ἔστιν οὖ τε καὶ οἰς βελτιών.
Phædo 82 a, οἵ ἀν ἐκάστη ἴοι κατὰ τὰς αἰτῶν ὁμοίοτητας τῆς μελέτης.
Symp. 207 b, ἐρωτικόν διατιθέμενα περὶ τὴν τροφήν τοῦ γενομένου, καὶ ἐγωμα ἐστὶν ὑπὲρ τούτων διαμάχεσθαι—where τούτων = τοῦ γενομένου.
Protag. 345 e, οὖχ δὲ ἄν μὴ κακὰ πονῆ ἐκὼν, τούτων φησὶν ἐπαίνετης εἶναι.
Rep. 426 c, ὡς ἀποθανομένους, ὡς ἄν τοῦτο δρᾷ.
Conversely to the last two instances
Symp. 187 e, προσφέρειν ὦς ἄν προσφέρῃ, ὅπως ἄν τὴν ἴδινην καρπώσηται.
b.
Rep. 554 a, θησαυροφώς ἄνηρ, οὐς δὴ καὶ ἐπανεῖ τὸ πλῆθος.

§ 276. B. As to Verbs.

a. Original construction abandoned, after interposed clause, in favour of that of the interposed clause. (For other applications of the same principle, see 'Attraction,' §§ 192–194, above.)

Phædo 107 b, τάς ἐποθάσιμα τὰς πρῶτας, καὶ εἰ πισταὶ ὑμῖν εἰσίν, ὅμως ἐπισκεπτεῖ ταυτότητον.
This change is commonest after such interposed clauses as express saying, seeming, or thinking.

Crat. 384 e, ὅτι δὲ οὐ φησὶν κ.τ.λ., ὡσπερ ὑποπτεύω, αὐτῶν ἀκόμην.
Phdr. 272 d, παντάπασι γάρ, ὅ καὶ κατ' ἄρχας ἐπομέν, ... ὅτι αὐθεν ... δέοι κ.τ.λ.
Gorg. 493 b, τὸ δὲ κόσκινον ἀρα λέγει, ὡς ἠφὴ ὁ πρὸς με λέγων, τὴν ψυχήν εἶναι.
Legg. 728 d, τὸ δὲ τρίτου, πᾶς ἄν τοῦτο νοησεῖ, τὴν τοῦ σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμῆ.

§ 277. b. Construction changing from Infinitive to Finite Verb.

Symp. 177 c, τὸ ... Ἔρωτα μηδένα πω ἀνθρώπων τετολμηκέναι αξίως ὑμήσαι, ἄλλ' οὕτως ἤμεληται.
Ib. 184 b, ἐστὶ ... νόμος, ἄσπερ κ.τ.λ., οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἄλλῃ μέ μόνῃ βουλεία ἐκάστως λειτεῖται οὐκ ἐπονείδιστος.
Apol. 19 e, τούτων ἐκείστω οὖς τε ἐστὶν ἵνα οἱ εἱκάστη τῶν πολεῶν τούς νόμους, οἷς ἔξοδοι τῶν οὐσίων πολιτῶν προϊσιν ἐντείνασα ὅ ἄν βουλευσονται, τούτους πείδουσι κ.τ.λ.
Theaet. 190 d, οἱ μαίαι δύνανται τὰς ὄδύμα μαλακωτέρας ποιεῖν, καὶ τίτισεν το δῆ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὅν δάξῃ ἀμβλύσκειν, ἀμβλύσκουσι.
§ 278. c. Construction begun afresh with Conjunction or Relative, after intervention of a Participial or Adverbial clause.

Legg. 810 d, κελεύεις γὰρ δὴ με, τῆς αὐτῆς ὀδοὺ ἔχοντος γεγονότις πολλοῖς, ἵσω δ’ οὖν εὐλάττοις ἑτέροις προσφίλοις... μεθ’ ὦν διακελεύει με κ.τ.λ.

Crito 44 b, χωρὶς μὲν τοῦ ἐστερησθαί τουλάχιστον ἐπιτηδείου, οὖν ἐγὼ οὖνδένα μὴστο εὑρῆσω, ἔτι δὲ καὶ πολλοῖς δόξῳ κ.τ.λ.

Gorg. 457 b, ἐὰν δὲ, οἴμαι, ῥητορικὸς γεγομένος τες κάτα ταύτη τῇ τέχνῃ ἀδική.

Rep. 530 b, ἄτοπον... ἡγήσεται, τὸν νομίζοντα... καὶ ἔτειν κ.τ.λ.

Critias 114 e, ἣ νῦνοι αὐτῇ παρείχετο... τὸ νῦν ἄνωμαζομένον μόνων, τότε δὲ πλέον ὁνόματο ἢν τὸ γένος ἐκ γῆς ἀρπατόμενον ὀρειχάλκου.

§ 279. d. Construction begun with ὅτι, after Verbs of knowing or saying, and finished without regard to it.

Gorg. 481 d, αἰσθάνομαι σον ἐκστοτε... ὅτι ὁπόδ’ αὐν φη σου τὰ παιδικα καὶ ὁπως δὲν φη ἔχειν νῦν δυσμένου ἀντιλέγειν.

Legg. 892 d, εἰπὼν ὅτι πρῶτον ἐμὲ χρήναι περαιδήναι καὶ ἐμαυτόν.

Crito 50 b, ἐρωμέν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι Ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις;

Protag. 356 b, εἰ γὰρ τις λέγει ὅτι Ἀλλά πολὺ διαφέρει.

§ 280. Often, from the frequency of this use with οἴδα, and with λέγω or εἰπὼν, ὅτι becomes in such contexts a mere expletive.

Rep. 501 a, οἰδόδ’ ὅτι τούτῳ ἀν διευγενεῖν.

Apol. 37 b, δὲν εὖ εἰδ’ ὅτι κακῶν ἄνωτον.

Symp. 175 d, καὶ εἰπεὶν ὅτι Ἐδ᾽ ἐὰν ἔχοι κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 189 a, εἰπεὶν τὸν Ἀριστοφάνη ὅτι Καὶ μᾶλ’ ἐπαύσατο.

§ 281. C. As to Oratio Obliqua.

a. Change from Indicative to Infinitive Oratio Obliqua.

Gorg. 517 c–d, σε... οἴμαι... ἐγνωκέων ὡς... ἥ μὲν ἑτέρα διακονίκη ἐστίν, ἥ δυσμένοι εἰσορίξειν κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 391 c–d, μηδ’ ἔωμεν λέγειν, ἢς Ὑπερέα... ἀρμησεν οὖτος ἐπὶ δεινάς ἀπτομάς, μηδὲ τιν’ ἄλλον... ἢρω τολμῆσαι ἄν κ.τ.λ.

Charm. 164 d, δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακεύσθαι... ἀντὶ τοῦ χαίρε, ὡς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὅρθον οὕτος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δειν τοῦτο παρακελεύσθαι ἀλλήλους.

Laches 198 b, ἑγούμεθα... δεινὰ μὲν εἰσορί εἰκ.τ.λ.; δέος δὲ παρέχει κ.τ.λ.; δέος γὰρ εἰσορί εἰκ.τ.λ.
§ 282. b. Change from Indicative to Optative Oratio Obliqua.

Protag. 327 c-d, εἰ δέω αὐτῶν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἁνθρώπους, οἷς μὴ παι-
δεία ἐστίν, ἀλλ' εἰ εἴειν ἀγροι.

Phædo 95 c-d, οὐδὲν καλεῖν φῆς πάντα ταύτα μηνεύειν . . . ὅτι πολυ-
χρόνων τε ἐστι ψυχή κ.τ.λ.' ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐδὲν τι μάλλον ἢν ἁδάνατον κ.τ.λ.' καὶ ταλαιπωροῦμεν . . . ζωῆ κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 96 b, ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοτῶν . . . πότερον τὸ αἷμα
ἐστιν κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοιτο μνήμη.

Phdr. 241 b, ὁ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον εἰς κ.τ.λ., ἡγοσκόπω . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἄρα ἦλθεν
ποτὲ ἐγώντι . . . χαρίζεσθαι . . ., εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀναγκαῖον εἰς κ.τ.λ.

Hip. Ma. 301 d, δόξαν εἴχομεν περὶ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ, ὅσ' ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν
ἔστι, τούτῳ δέ, ὁ ἐκάτερος ἡμῶν εἰς, οὐκ ἄρα ἦλθον ἀμφότερος.

Gorg. 512 a, λογίζεται ὅτι οὐκ εἰ μὲν τις . . ., τούτῳ δὲ βιωτέον ἐστίν
καὶ τούτων ὁνήσετε.

Phileb. 41 d, [εἴρηται] ὅσ το μάλλον τε καὶ ἔμπων ἀμφότερος, καὶ
ὅτι τῶν ἀπειρῶν εἰς τη.

Charm. 156 d-ε, Ζάμολξις, ἔφη, λέγει ὅτι . . . οὔ δέ κ.τ.λ., ἀλλὰ τούτο
καὶ αὐτῶν εἰς κ.τ.λ.

It should be observed, however, that the Optative in these pas-
sages is not simply the effect of Oratio Obliqua: for some of the
passages are in Present time. The emergence of the Optative marks
the transition from fact to inference; it indicates that we are not
called upon to accept an additional assertion, but only to follow
one step further in the direction already supposed. This is the
principal account to be given of this change of construction: it
may be, however, that a subsidiary cause is the increasing need, as
the sentence unwinds, of marking the dependence upon the main
construction of the later and therefore more remote clauses.

§ 283. c. The contrary change, from the Optative Oratio Obliqua
to the Indicative, is in Plato very uncommon; such as is found in
Tim. 18 c, ετίθησεν, μηχανώμενο ὅπως μηδεῖς . . . γνώσοιτο, νομοθέτη δὲ
πάντες κ.τ.λ.

§ 284. d. Change from Optative Oratio Obliqua to Infinitive
Oratio Obliqua.

Phædo 96 b, ἐμαυτὸν ἄνω κάτω μετέβαλλον σκοτῶν . . . ἃρ', ἐπειδαν
κ.τ.λ., δε τως ἔλεγον, τότε δὴ τὰ ζῶα ξυντρίφεται καὶ πότερον
κ.τ.λ., ἐκ τούτων δὲ γίγνοντο μνήμη καὶ δάκα, εἴ δὲ μνήμη καὶ δάκης
gίγνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην. This passage exemplifies b. also (where it
is quoted). The justification of this further change to the Infinitive lies in the parenthetical ὡς τινες ἐλεγον, which usurps here the influence properly due to πότερον.

§ 285. e. Participial clause, in a sentence of Infinitive Oratio Obliqua, changing into Infinitive.

Phaedo i11 c, τότους δ' ἐν αὐτῇ εἰναι, τοὺς μὲν βαθυτέρους καὶ ἄνα-
πεπταμένους μᾶλλον ἦ ἐν φ' ἤμεις οἴκουμεν, τοὺς δὲ τὸ χάσμα . . . .
ἔλαττον ἔχειν.

Politic. 293 e, λεκτίον μεμμημένας . . . δ' μὲν ὡς εὐνόμους λέγομεν
ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, τάς δὲ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσχίνα μεμμημέναι.

Cf. Hom. ll. xviii. 535, Ἕν δ' ἔρει ἐν δὲ Κυθηικῷ ὁμίλευο, ἐν δ' ἑλά
Κήρ, Ἀλλον ζωὸν ἔχοσα νεώτατον, ἄλλον άντιον, Ἀλλον τεθνεῶτα
cατὰ μόδον ἔλκε ποδοῦν, Od. vii. 125, ὅμφακες εἰσίν Ἀρθος ἀφιείσαι,
ἔτεραι δ' ὑποσηλάζουσιν.

§ 286. D. Inversion of the Antecedent clause, so that the Pronoun in it does not refer to the Relative foregoing, but to some other word in the Relative clause.

Theæt. 201 b, οἷς μὴ παρεγένωτο τινὲς . . . , τούτους δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ.,
where τούτους refers to τινές.

Phaedo 70 c, ὅρα ἄναγκαιον, ὅσοις ἐστὶ τι ἐναντίον, μηδαμόθεν ἄλλοθεν
αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ. — αὐτὸ refers to τι.

Lysis 219 d, δ' ἄν τίς τι περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆται . . . , ὅρα καὶ ἄλλο τι ἄν
περὶ πολλοῦ ποιῆτο;

Phaedo 105 b, φ' ἄν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται, θερμών ἐσται; — sc. τὸ
σῶμα.

Symp. 204 b, ὅν δὲ σὺ φήσης "Ερωτα εἰναι, θαναστῶν οὐδὲν ἐπαθεῖς.

§ 287. Idioms of Sentences:—Arrangement of Words and Clauses.

A. Hyperbaton.

The displacement of the natural order of words, which is called Hyperbaton, is not of capricious adoption. Its use is 1. to increase the facility of regulating the emphasis; and 2. to enable language to represent, in a degree, the rapidity of thought, by making one expression literally catch up another.

The Hyperbaton which results from the close adherence of Pre-
positions to their cases (see below, § 298) is to be excepted from the account just given. It is the result simply of a grammatical exigency.
288, 289.] ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 237

The name Hyperbaton had been given, and the fact recognised, in Plato’s own time. Socrates in the Protagoras (343 e), in rectifying the explanation of the passage of Simonides, says ἵππονται δὲ ἰδιοὶ τὸ ἀδαμνέως.

§ 288. a. Clauses intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 693 c, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλά ἴμαται ταυτί ἀν γίγνεται ἰματα μὴ διαταγαίτειν.

Th. 860 d, ἀκούσιος δὲ ἱκούσιοι οὐκ ἵπποι πράττεσθαι ποτε λόγον—
where the two clauses οὐκ ἵπποι λόγον and ἀκούσιος ἱκούσιοι πράττεσθαι are counterchanged.

Apol. 26 a, οὐ δεύτηρ νόμος εἰςάγειν ἐστὶ.

Instances frequently occur in clauses incidental to the machinery of the dialogue,—as in

Phædo 71 c, ἐγώ σοι, ἐφη, ἐρῶ, ὁ Σωκράτης.

Symp. 214 c, ἀλλά, φάναι, ὡς ἐρωτάμενοι, τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην.

Apol. 25 c, εἰπεὶ ὁ πρὸς Δίὸς Μῆλης. Similarly 26 e, Μενο 71 d.

Symp. 212 e, ὡς ἐρῶ τοῦ σοφωτάτου καὶ καλλίστου κεφαλῆς—
ἐὰν εἰπω οὕτως—ἀναθέσω ἄρα καταγελάσασθε μου ὃς μεθύσατος;

Two sentences are here counterchanged. As Alcibiades rehearses the form of words with which he intends to accompany the crowning of Socrates, he interrupts himself to justify them, and does his best to carry on the two sentences together. These, if one had been postponed to the other, would have run—“That from my own head to the head of the wisest and handsomest of men I may transfer this garland—Well! and if I shall say that,—what then? will you make fun of me?”

In trying to carry on both together, he breaks and counterchanges them, distinguishing them doubtless by difference of tone.

Even so violent a trajectory as this has its parallels in Homer.

§ 289. b. Grammatical governments intermingled by Hyperbaton.

Laches 195 a, πρὸς τί τούτ’ εἰπὲς βλέψαι;

Symp. 191 d, ἡσυχ. . . . ὁ ἔρως ἐμφάνου ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

Phdr. 249 d, ἐστι δὴ οὗν δεύτηρ ὁ πᾶς ἦκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης μανίς.

Politic. 309 a, ὑπὸ καθὲς βία φύσεως ἀπωθοίμενα.

Phileb. 19 e, παύσαι τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπατών τούτων.
Cf. Andoc. i. 30. p. 5, τούτων οὖν ἐμοὶ τῶν λόγων ἢ τῶν ἄργων τι προσήκει; Ἰδ. ii. 134, ἔτεσι γὰρ κάρτα πολλοὶ ὑπερον τούτων τῶν βασιλέων τῶν τὰς πυραμίδας ταῦτα ἡ λεπτομένων Ῥωδώνει.

§ 290. c. Pronouns (unemphatic) postponed by Hyperbaton.

Politic. 261 b, τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἄψυχων γενέσειν αὐτοῦ τάσσοντες —where αὐτοῦ belongs to τὸ μὲν.

Theat. 166 d, τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐτὴ τῷ ῥήματι μου διώκει—where μου belongs to τὸν λόγον.

Gorg. 469 d, κἂν τινα δόξη μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν κατεγέναι δεῖ—where αὐτῶν belongs to τινα.

Phaedo 60 b, ὃς ἄτοπον . . . ἔακε τι εἶναι τοῦτο—where τι would normally have found its place beside ἄτοπον.

A common type is the postponement of an Antecedent τις.

Theat. 188 a, ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάσω τοὺς δοξάσεως ἢ δὲν τι oideν ἢ μὴ oideν. Crito 53 b, εἶν eiς τῶν ἐγγύτατά τινα πάλεων ἐλήνει.

§ 290*, cc. Correlative Conjunctions,—the former postponed by Hyperbaton.

Apol. 18 d, ὠσπερ σκαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν.

Ib. 28 d, οὐ ἂν τις ἑαυτῶν τάξη ἢ ἡγησάμενος βελτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὅπ' ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ.

§ 291. d. Adverbs and Particles displaced by Hyperbaton.

Ὅτω.

Legg. 747 b, ὡς οἴδην ὁτῳ δύναμιν ἵκει παθεῖν μάθημα μεγάλην—where ὁτῳ belongs to μεγάλην.

Theat. 169 c, ὁτῳ τις ἐρως δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε—where ὁτῳ belongs to δεινός.

§ 292. Ἰσως.

Legg. 640 c, τάχ' ἂν ὄρθως Ἰςως μεμφαίτο.

Symp. 194 c, τάχ' ἂν αἰσχύνοι αὐτοὺς ei τι Ἰςως οἴου κ.τ.λ. That this is a trajectory of Ἰςως we have ground for inferring, 1. from the analogy of the preceding instance, 2. from the familiarity of the combination τάχ' ἂν Ἰςως, and 3. from the perfect unfamiliarity of ei Ἰςως.

§ 293. "Ετι.

Symp. 187 b, οὐ γὰρ δήποτε ἐκ διαφερομένων γε ἔτι τοῦ ὄζεως καὶ βαρέως ἁρμονία ἂν εἴη—where ἔτι is constructed with οὐκ ἂν εἴη.
§ 294. Μέντοι intrusive, i. e. displacing rather than displaced.
Phdr. 267 c, Πρωταγόρεα δέ, ἦ Σωκράτες, οὐκ ἦν µέντοι τοιαύτα ἀττα; Apol. 35 ε, µή οὖν άξιοντε µε τοιαύτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν, . . . ἄλλως τε µέντοι νή Δία πάντως καὶ ἀνεβίας φεύγοντα. The phrase ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ is rent asunder to admit the words µέντοι νή Δία, which could have found no other convenient place. It is because ἄλλως τε πάντως καὶ had become a fixed phrase that it can suffer this Tmesis without bringing the sense into doubt. In the disengaged µέντοι νή Δία another familiar sequence (as pointed out by the Zurich editors, coll. Phædo 65 d, 68 b, 73 d, Rep. 332 a,) is to be recognised. Cf. Ar. Nûb. 788, Τίς ἦν εὖ ἣ ματρόµεθα µέντοι τάλφια;

§ 295. Τε intrusive.
Crito 48 a, ἄλλα µέν δή φαίν γ' ἄν τις οἶδι τ' ὑπίν ἡµάς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτινώναι. It might seem at first sight improbable that this γε should not belong to the clause within which it stands. But we have ground for recognising a trajectory here ἄν in the sense, which is not helped by γε with φαίν γ' 2. in the familiarity of the sequence ἄλλα µέν δή . . . γε, coll. Phædo 75 a, Euthyphro 10 d, Gorg. 492 e, 506 d: and 3. in the consideration that φαίν ἄν is not consciously to the speaker a separate clause; that is, it is a parenthesis so familiar that it does not interrupt the thought. It is parallel to Phædo 59 c, τίνες φησὶ δέ οὐκ οἱ λόγοι; Euthyphro 15 a, τί δ' οἶει ἄλλο ἣ τιµή; Symp. 216 d, πόσης οἶοσθε γέμει . . . σωφροσύνης; and to the instance next following. (It is plain that in all these cases the meaning does not admit of separating off the parenthetic Verb by commas.) Moreover we find the δή preceding the φαίν, as in Phædo 87 a, τί οὖν, ἄν φαίν δ λόγος, ἢν ἀπίστεις; but ἄν could not commence the clause if it were consciously regarded as distinct.
Gorg. 492 e, ἄλλα µέν δή καὶ ὡς γε σὺ λέγεις δεινὸς δ βίος.

§ 296. "Ἀν, anticipated Hyperbatically with οἶμαι and the like.
Apol. 32 c, ἃρ' οὖν ἄν μὲ οἶεσθε τοσάδε ἢ τη διαγωνίσθαι;
Phædo 64 b, οἶμαι γὰρ ἄν δὴ τοῖς πολλοῖς . . . δοκεῖν.
Soph. 223 a, τὸ προσήκον οὖν ἄν ἠγούμαι καλεῖν αἰτών.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 297—299.

Soph. 224 d, ὁμοί αὐτε, κάν εἰ τις... προστάξετο, καλεῖν ὁδεῖν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ. where ὁ belongs to καλεῖν.

Euthyd. 294 d, οὐκ ἂν οἱ οἱ ὁμολογήσαι ἡμᾶς;

Phdr. 234 e, οἱ ἂν τινὰ ἔχειν;

Tim. 26 b, οὐκ ἂν οἷδα εἰ δυναῖρην.

Cf. Isæus viii. 20. p. 71, μηδε οἷος ἂν, εἰ κ.τ.λ., μήτ' ἂν τὸν πατέρα...

eιενεγκέιν. Thuc. iv. 28, οὐκ ἂν οἴομεν αὐτὸν τολμήσα, vi. 11, Σικελιώται δ' ἂν μοι δοκοῦσιν, ... καὶ ἢ ἂν ἤσον δενοὶ ἡμῖν 

§ 297. e. Prepositions postponed by Hyperbaton.

Legg. 711 e, ἡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ξειπάσης δυνάμεως ὁ αὐτὸς πέρι λόγος.

Soph. 265 a, καὶ τισιν ἐν τοιούτοις εἶδεν.

Phædo 83 e, οὐχ δὲν οἱ πολλοὶ ἑνεκά φασί.

Cf. Andoc. i. 117. p. 15, δὲν ὡς αὐτῶν εἶνεκα ἐπεβουλέθθην.

§ 298. f. Prepositions intrusive; that is, retaining their place next to the Adjective prefixed to their Substantive, to the exclusion of Adverbs and the like which qualify that Adjective.

Rep. 391 d, ὠτως ἐπὶ δενᾶς ἀρπαγάς.

Ib. 395 b, ἐτὶ τοῦτων εἰς σμυκρότερα.

Ib. 397 b, ὀλγον πρὸς τὴν αὐτήν.

Symp. 195 e, ἐξῆς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ψυχαῖς—for ἐν ἐξῆς πάσαις.

Theae. 205 c, ὀλγων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν.

Phædo 70 c, οὐ περὶ προσηκότων.

Ib. 110 c, πολὺ ἐτὶ ἐκ λαμπροτέρων.

Apol. 40 a, πάντως ἐτὶ σμυκροῖς.

Phdr. 245 d, μοῦδ' ἐξ ἐνός. So Politic. 310 c.

Gorg. 449 c, ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων.

Legg. 376 b, δ' τι περὶ σμυκρότατα.

Cf. Thuc. i. 63, ὡς ἐς ἐλάχιστου κχιρίων, iii. 46, ἐτὶ ἐν βραχυτάτης, ibid. ἐτι ἐν' ἐλάχιστον, i. 23, ἐτι παρ' οἰς, 35, πολὺ ἐν πλείουν αἰτή, vii. 36, οὐκ ἐν πολλῷ, 79, οὐκ ἐπ' ὀλγων ἀσπίδων, 42, οὐδὲ ... καθ' ἔτερα, and so 59, μηδὲ καθ' ἔτερα, and on the same principle vii. 72, ἐτὶ τὰς λοιπὰς for τὰς ἐτὶ λοιπᾶς.

§ 299.

Note, that Plato not unfrequently admits Tmesis: e.g.

Phdr. 230 c, ἐν ἢρέμα προσάντει.

Hip. Ma. 297 b, ἐν πατρός τινος ιδέα.
§ 300, 301. ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 241

Legg. 797 d, εν, ὃς ἐστο ἐπιείν, οὗ τοῖς μὲν τοῖς δ᾽ αὐ.
Apol. 19 a, and 24 a, εν σῶτως ὄλιγω χρώμψ (cf. Isæus vi. 33. p. 59,
ἐν πάνω ὄλιγω χρώμψ).
Phileb. 20 b, πρὸς δὲ αὖ τοῖς.
Legg. 666 c, εἰς μὲν γε τὸ προϊόνων.
Ib. 729 d, εἰς μὴν πάλιν.
Ib. 832 c, σὺν δὲ τινι βία.
Phædo 59 a, διὰ δὴ ταῦτα.
Phileb. 35 c, διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος.
Rep. 371 d, ἀντὶ αὖ ἄργυριον.
Phdr. 238 c, ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν ... ἐπιθυμίων.

§ 300. B. Primary intention of a sentence suspended by inter-
position of clause of (a) Contrast or (b) Explanation.

a. Clause of Contrast interposed.

Rep. 401 c, καὶ ὅρθως δὴ δυσχεραίνω, τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοὶ κ.τ.λ., τὰ δὲ
αισχρὰ ψέγου τ' ἀν ὅρθως καὶ μετοι—where ὅρθως δὴ δυσχεραίνων is
continued in τὰ αἰσχρὰ ψέγου.
Symp. 173 c, ὅπερ ἑδεύσει σου, μὴ ἄλλως ποιήσῃς ἄλλα δήγγησαι.
Ib. 179 c, ἔργον οὔτω καλῶν ... ὡστε ... εἰσαρθήσοτοι δὴ τῶν ἔδοσαν
tοῦτο γέρας οἱ θεοὶ, εἰς Αἰδοὺς ἀνέιναι πάλιν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄλλα τὴν
ἐκείνης ἀνείσαι—where ὡστε being continued at τὴν ἐκείνης ἀνείσαι.
Theaet. 145 d, ἄλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν
δὲ τι ἀπορῶ—where ὅμως appertains to σμικρὸν τι ἀπορῶ.
Phædo 69 d, οἱ περιφλοσοφικότες ὅρθώς. ἡν δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ κατὰ γε τὸ
ἐνυπατὸν οὔδὲν ἀπέλιπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ἄλλα παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμήσθην
γενίσθαι—where the construction of ἄν is continued at παντὶ
tρόπῳ.
Ib. 87 d, ἄλλα γὰρ ἂν φαίη, ἐκάστην ... . ἀνυφαίοι, ἀναγκαῖον μὲντ' ἂν
εἰ, κ.τ.λ. The objection started by ἄλλα γὰρ ἂν φαίη is
suspended, while allowance is made for opposite truth, until
ἀναγκαῖον μὲντ' ἂν κ.τ.λ.
Ib. 106 b, τι καλεῖ, ἄρτιν μὲν τὸ περιτῶν μὴ γίγνεσθαι ... , ἀπολο-
μένου δὲ αὐτοῦ ἀντ' ἑκείνου ἄρτιν γεγονεία;
Legg. 822 c, ἄρ' οὖν οἴμοθελα γελοῦν τε καὶ οἶκ ὄρθων, ἐκεὶ γεγράμενον
ἤν ἂν τότε, νῦν ἐσπαυδοὶ καὶ ἐν τούτως γίγνεσθαι;

§ 301. b. Clause of Explanation interposed.

Symp. 206 b, οὐ μὲντ' ἂν σὲ ἐδαύμαζον ἐπὶ σοφία καὶ ἐφοίτων παρὰ σε
—where, in meaning, οὐ μὲντ' ἂν goes with ἐφοίτων, the ἐδαῦ-
μαζον ἐπὶ σοφία being explanatory.
Protag. 335 e, τῶν δολεοδορῶν τῷ διαβείν τε καὶ ἐπεσθάι.
Phdr. 244 d, ἡ μανία ἐγγενομενὴ καὶ προφητεύσασα οἷς ἦδει.
Logg. 648 e, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐσχάτην πόσιν ἀπακλάττατο πρὸς ἀφικνεῖσθαι.
Gorg. 512 a, λογιζεται ὅτι οὐκ κ.τ.λ.—an elaborate instance.

§ 302. In other writers we have as illustrations

Of a.

Thuc. vi. 68, ἐξ ὃς κρατεῖν δὲ ἢ μὴ ῥήδιος ἀποχωρεῖν. Xen. Hell.

Of b.

Thuc. i. 39, ἢν γε οὗ τὸν προσχωντα καὶ τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦσι προκαλούμενον κ.τ.λ., ii. 91, περὶ ἢν ἢ Ἀττικὴ ναῖς φθάσασα καὶ περιπλέυσασα. Hom. II. x. 307, ὡστις τε τὰ λαῖα, οἱ τ’ αὐτῷ κίδος ἄρτο, Νηὸν ἄκτυρον ὁχεὺν ἐλθέμεν. Æsch. Pr. V. 331, Πάντων μετασχόν καὶ τετομικῶν ἐμοί. Soph. Ant. 537, Καὶ ἐυμμετίχομαι καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας, 1279, τὰ δ’ ἐν δόμοις Ἐοικες ἥκειν καὶ τὰ’ ὑψοθεῖται κακὰ, El. 1154, ἢς σὺ πολλάκις Φήμες λάθρα προσπέμετε ὡς φανεῖμενος Ἰμωρός, O. T. 717, Παιδὸς δὲ βλάστας οὐ διόσχον ἡμέραν Τρεῖς καὶ νῦν ἄρθρα κεῖνος ἐκείνας ποδοῦ. Theocr. Id. xxv. 72, τὸν δὲ γέροντα . . . κλαζόν τε περιςαυνυν τ’ [Alii κλάζοντε], Epigr. xix. I, Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ στάθη καὶ εἰσώθη.

§ 303. C. Primary Intention of a sentence expressed apart from the Verb—(i.e. the virtual Primary Predicate to be sought in some other word, or in a Participial clause.)

Rep. 495 d, οὗ δὴ ἐφείμενοι πολλοὶ ἀπελείη . . . τυγχάνουσιν—where ἐφείμενοι is the virtual Primary Predicate.

Theoct. 142 c, δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι ὄλγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ.
Ib. 173 b, πότερον βούλει διελθῶντες ή ἐκάτευρε . . . τρεπόμεθα ;
Phaedo 63 c, ὅτι παρὰ θεὸς δεσπότας πάνι ἀγαθοῖν [ἐπιτίκῳ] ἥξειν . . . διαίσθεραις μὴν. The virtual Primary Predicate is δεσπότας πάνι ἀγαθοῖν.
Ib. 63 d, σκέψομεθα τι ἄτων δ’ ἀβούσταθαι μοι δοκεῖ πῦλαι εἰσὶν. The virtual Primary Predicate is βούλεσθαι, not δοκεῖ.
Ib. 65 b, ἢ . . . καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . ἐρυθοῦσιν, ὅτι . . . ἀρώμεν. The
Primary Intention, with which ḫ connects itself, is in the ὀρῶμεν clause.

Ib. 69 c, ἄλλα τῷ ὅρτι πάλαι αἰνίστεθαι ὅτι ... καίστει. The ἄλλα τῷ ὅρτι connects itself with the καίστει clause.

Ib. 88 b, οἴδεις προσήκει θάνατον θαρροῦντι μὴ οὐκ ἀροῦτος θαρρεῖν. Of the Infinitival sentence θάνατον ... θαρρεῖν the virtual Primary Predicate is θάνατον θαρροῦντι—in other words, it would normally be θάνατον θαρρεῖν, but is changed into a Participial clause for the sake of linking a further sentence to it.

Symp. 207 d, οὗτοι μέντοι οἴδεστε τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχων ἐν αὐτῷ ὡμέν ὁ αὐτὸς καλίται. The Primary Intention of the sentence is satisfied at ἔχων.

Soph. 224 d, οἴμαι γάρ, κἂν εἴ τις αὐτοῦ καθιδρυμένος ... προϊτάξατο, καλεῖν οἴδειν ἄλλο πλὴν ὑπερ τῶν δή.

Apol. 31 b, τούτῳ γε οἵ οὖν οὐῃ τε ἐγένοντο ἀπανασχυντήσατε παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα. The οἷς οὖν τε connects itself with παρασχ. μάρτ.

In illustration, we have in Thuc. i. 2, ἄδηλον δὲ ὅποτε τις ἐπελθὼν, καὶ ἀπειχότων ἄμα δὴν, ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται. Hell. ii. 134, οἴδει ὅποτε οἴδεις μοι φαίνονται λέγει, ix. 105, τούτων δὲ κατέλαβε ὑστερον τοῖς ἀποδιανόντα καίστει. Hom. Od. iv. 739, Εἰ δὴ ποῦ τινα κείνος ἐνὶ φρεσί μῆτιν ὁφθαν 'Εξελθὼν λαοίσιν ὀδύρεται. Æsch. Ag. 479, τὶς δὲ παινόν χαί ... παραγγέλμασι νέοις πυρωθεῖσα καρδίαν, ἄλλαγά λόγου καμπί; (the virtual Predicate in the Infinitival sentence being πυρωθεῖσα), 740, παρ’ αὐτὰ δ’ ἀλθεῖν εἴ ’λιον πώλην λέγουμ’ ἃν φρονύμα νημίου γαλάς (‘there came what I should call a spirit.’ &c.—virtual Predicate not ολθεῖν ‘but φρόνημα ν. γ.’). 796, οἷον ἔστι λαθεῖν ὁματὰ φωτὸ τὰ δοκοῦν’ εὐφρονος ἐκ διανοίας ὑπαρεί σαίνειν φιλότητι (where in the Infinitival sentence depending on δοκοῦντα the virtual Predicate is εὐφρονος, not σαίνειν—‘which with seeming-kindly heart fawn’ &c.). Soph. Aj. 798, τίρε δ’ ἔξοδον ‘Ολεθρίαν Λιαντός ἐπιτίθει φέρειν—‘he fears that this foray, which [by me his messenger] he interprets, will be fatal to him.’ Here ὀλεθρίαν is the virtual Predicate.

§ 304. D. Chiasmus, or Inverse Parallelism of clauses and sentences.


Ib. 494 c, πᾶν μὲν ἔργον πᾶν δ’ ἔπος λέγουσα τε καὶ πράττοντας.
Rep. 597 d, ἄνως κλίνῃς ποιητής ἄνως οὐσις· ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνῃς τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποίει τις.

Symp. 186 a, οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ ταῖς ψυχαῖς . . . πρὸς τούς καλοὺς· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ib. 196 b, οὕτ' ἀδικεῖ, οὕτ' ἀδικεῖται, οὐθ' ὑπὸ θεοῦ, οὔτε θεῶν.

Theat. 173 d, νόμους δὲ καὶ ψυχήσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα, οὔτε ὀρώσιν οὕτ' ἀκοινοῦμι.

Symp. 218 a, δεδηγμένος τε ὑπὸ ἀλγεινότερον καὶ τὸ ἀλγεινότατον δὲν ἂν τις δηχθεῖ, τὴν καρδίαν ἡ ψυχήν γὰρ δηχθεῖσι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων.

Soph. 231 a, καὶ γὰρ κνῖ τούτος ἀγριώτατος ἣμεροτάτῳ.

Gorg. 474 c, καλὸν τε καὶ ἅγαθον, καὶ κακόν καὶ αἰσχρὸν.

Phædo 102 c, συμκρότε τε καὶ μέγας . . . τοῦ μὲν τῷ μεγίθει υπερέχειν τὴν συμκρότητα υπερέχων, τῷ δὲ μέγεθος τῆς συμκρότητος παρέχειν υπερέχον.

Ib. 69 b, τούτου καὶ μετὰ τοῦτου ὁδώμενα τε καὶ πιπρασκόμενα.

§ 305. So in Dialogue.

Gorg. 453 d, (A) πότερον . . . πείθει, ἥ οὖ; (B) οὐ δήτα [sc. οὐ πείθει]. ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα πείθει.

Ib. 496 d, (A) πότερον οὖν ἐτί πλεῖον ἐρώτῶ, ἥ ὁμολογεῖς κ.τ.λ.; (B) ὁμολογῶ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐρώτα.

In Dialogue, however, the Parallelism is often Direct, instead of Inverse.

Rep. 337 c, (A) ἄλλο τι . . . ποίησες; δὲν ἐγὼ . . . ἀποκρινεῖ; (B) οὐκ ἂν βαρμᾶσαίμι· εἴ μιο σκεφταμένοι οὕτω δόξειε. οὐκ ἂν βαρμᾶσαίμι· εἴ μιο σκεφταμένοι οὕτω δόξειε.

Ib. 428 d, (A) τίς, καὶ ἐν τίσιν; (B) Ἀὔτη, ἡ φιλακική, καὶ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἀρχαῖοι.

Soph. 267 a, (A) Μιμητικοὶ δὴ . . . ἀποκειμένωμεν· τὸ δ' ἄλλο πάν ἀφόμον κ.τ.λ. (B) Νευεμίσσω, τὸ δὲ μεθείσθω.

Cf. Hom. Od. vi. 170–197, where Odysseus is answered in order by Nausicaa,—170–4, corresponding to 187–190, and the remainder to the remainder. And Δ. Esch. Ag. 622, 623, and ib. 1202–5, Κλ. Μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων τῷ' ἐπέστησεν τέλει· Προτὸν μὲν αἰδώς ἢν ἐμὸι λέγειν τάδε. Χ. Μῶν καὶ θεὸς περ ἴμερος πεπληγμένος· Ἀβρυγεῖαι γάρ πᾶς τις εὖ πράσσων πλέον.

§ 306. Often, also, of two points put by A, the former only is taken up by B.
§§ 307, 308.] ORDER OF WORDS AND CLAUSES. 245

Rep. 341 b, (A) ὀβετ γὰρ ἂν μὲ λάθοις κακούργην, ὀβετ k.t.l. (B) οὐδὲ γ' ἂν ἐπιχειρήσαμι.

Phaedo 79 b, (A) τί δὲ ἡ ἰπχή; ἥρατον, ἡ ἀείδες; (B) οὐχ ἦπ' ἀνθρώ- πων γε.

Hip. Ma. 293 c, (A) τὸ πρῶτον ἀρα τοῦτο λέγομεν ὁ παραγενόμενον ποιεῖ ἕκαστα φαίνεσθαι καλὰ, ... δὲ εἶναι ποιεῖ, ἡ οὐδέτερα τούτων; (B) "Εμοὺς ἄκει (sc. δ.—φαίνεσθαι).

Gorg. 462 b, (A) ἐρώτα ἡ ἄποκρίνου. (B) 'Ἀλλὰ ποιήσω ταῦτα. καὶ μοι ἄπόκριναι, ἢ Σάκρατες.

§ 307. E. Comparative emphasis in co-ordinate expressions marked by the order (which is often the reverse in Greek of what it would be in English).

Symp. 173 e, καὶ ἐξελὼν γε ἢ δὲ αὐτῷ διανοούμενοι καὶ περὶ ἐμαυτόν καὶ περὶ ὑμῶν μαίνομαι. The emphasis is on ἐμαυτόν, and the ὑμῶν is quite faint.

Ib. 175 b, τίνι οὖν νομίζοντες καὶ ἐμὲ ὑπ' ὑμῶν κεκλησθαί ἐπὶ δεύτερον καὶ τούσδε τοὺς ἄλλους, θεραπεύετε—'I your master, as well as the others.'

Ib. 185 c, τούχειν δὲ αὐτῷ τινὰ ἢ ὑπὸ πλησιονὴς ἢ ὑπὸ τινὸς ἄλλου λύγγα ἐπιστηκοκιών—'from some cause, most probably reple-

Ib. 189 e, καὶ εἶδος καὶ ὅνομα—'the class as well as the mere name.'

Euthyphro 3 d, εἰτ οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἰτε δὲ ἄλλο τι—'for whatever cause, most probably for envy.'

Apol. 39 b, καὶ ἐγὼ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὕτω—'I as well as they.'

§ 308. F. Hysteron Proteron: where (in other words) the order of expression, following that of thought, reverses the order of occurrence of facts.

Theet. 162 b, εἴπερ μέλλοιεν μοι ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι.

Apol. 19 d, ἀλλὰς διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν.

Gorg. 474 b, γέλωτο παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπιστάμην ἐπιψηφίζειν.

Phaedo 80 c, συμπεσον τὸ σῶμα καὶ ταριχευθεῖν.

Ib. 100 b, ἐπιδείξειν καὶ ἀνευρήσειν.

Ib. 87 c, πολλὰ καταρτίσας τοιαῦτα ἴματα καὶ ἐφηράμενος.

Symp. 190 c, τάς ... ἰτιδίας τὰς πολλὰς ἐξελείαις καὶ τὰ στήθη διήμβρου.
Syrp. 209 c, τίκτει καὶ γεννᾷ.
Tim. 73 c, γῦν ἐφύρασε καὶ ἔδευσε.
Apol. 32 b, ἡμαντίωθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐφησομήν.
Cf. Hdt. viii. 114, ὅ δὲ γελάσας τε καὶ κατασχαίνοι τολλῶν χρῶνοι . . . εἶπε.

§ 309. G. Interrogation emerging late in the sentence. By this arrangement, so common in Plato, the sentence generally gains animation, and its emphatic part is distinctly indicated.

a. With Negative.
Phædo 80 e, εἰς μὲν καθαρὰ ἀπαλλάττηται κ.τ.λ.—οὐκοῦν ὦτω μὲν ἐχουσα κ.τ.λ.;
Rep. 402 a, ὁσπερ ἄρα γραμματίων πέρι τότε ἴκανως εἴχομεν ὅτε κ.τ.λ.—οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴκόνως κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 581 e, τῶν δὲ φιλόσοφον ποιόμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἱδονὰς νομίζειν . . .
τῇ ἱδονῇ οὐ πάνω πόρρω κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 587 a, πλεῖστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὁσπέρ νόμον καὶ τάξεως;
Ib. 590 a, ἢ δ' αὐτάδεια καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ λεοντάδε . . .
αὐστία;
Legg. 830 d, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ φοβηθεῖς . . . μὴ φαίνηται ταὐ σελόεια, οὐκ ἄρα νομοθετήσει;
Protag. 351 c, ἐγὼ γὰρ λέγω, καθ' ὃ ἡδέα ἐστίν, ἄρα κατὰ τούτο οὐκ ἀγαθά;
Ib. 78 c, ἀγαθά δὲ καλεῖς οὐ τὰ ἱδονῆς μετέχοντα;
Meno 78 c, ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὔχὶ οἶναν ἐγγείων κ.τ.λ.;
Ib. 88 d, καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τάλλα, ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν . . . εἰναι, ἃρ' οὐχ ὁσπέρ κ.τ.λ.;
Symp. 216 d, καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖ πάντα καὶ οὐδὲν οἴδειν, ὡς τὸ σχῆμα αὐτοῦ τούτο οὖ σειληνῶδες; [The Zurich editors give τούτο. οὐ σ.;]

§ 310. b. Without Negative.
Soph. 233 c, δρώσι δὲ γε τοῦτο πρὸς ἄπαντα, φαμέν;
Hip. Ma. 301 c, ἔπει καὶ νῦν, πρὶν ὑπὸ σου ταῦτα νουθετήσῃν, ὡς εὖθεος διεκείμεν, ἔτι σοι μᾶλλον ἐγὼ ἐπιδείξω κ.τ.λ.;
Gorg. 496 c, τὸ πεινήν ἔλεγες πότερον ἥδυ ἢ ἄναρπον εἶναι;
Phileb. 44 d, οἴμαι τοιώνδε τι λέγειν αὐτούς, ὡς εἰ βουληθέημεν ὅτουον εἴδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδείν, πότερον κ.τ.λ.;
§§ 311, 312. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

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1. Enclitic recommencing, or even commencing, a clause.

Phileb. 16 c, δείων μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἓποι, ποιεῖν ἐκ θεών ἐρήμη.

Ib. 25 b, καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τις, ὡς Πρώταρχε, αὐτῶν φίλος ἢμῖν νῦν δὴ γεγονέναι.

Ib. 46 c, ὅπωσι τις τὰναντία ἀμα πάθη πάσχῃ, ποτὲ μιγών θέρηται καὶ δερμανόμενος ἐνίοτε ψύχηται.

Phaedo 65 d, τί δὴ οὖν; πόσοτε τι... eius; [So Oxon. But the edd. give ὃδι οὖν πόσοτε τι eius;]

Cf. Dem. de Cor. 44. p. 240, περὶ οἷς ὁ Φιλίππος Ἰλλυριῶν καὶ Τριβαλλόν, τινὰς ἄλλοις καὶ τῶν Ἐλλήνων, κατεστρέφετο.

Similarly δὲ commences a parenthetic clause.

Phaedo 87 a, τί οὖν, ἄν φαϊν ὁ λόγος, ἔτι ἀπιστεῖς; (See above, § 295.)


[So one Paris MS. τις ὧν Zurich editors.]

§ 312. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

A. Metonymy.

Rep. 497 d, ὅν ὑμεῖς ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι διδαλόκατε — of those [objections], your allegation of which has shewed me that' &c.

Symp. 177 b, ἐνεχθαν ἂλες ἐπίσω ἐχοντες — equivalent to ἐνν ἐπίσω ἂλες: διδόμενος. A strange instance.

Ib. 205 b, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ ὄν λόγῳ ὄργων αἰτία — that is, ἢ τοῦ ἴναι ὄργων αἰτία.

Theet. 167 c, ἄντι πονηρῶν ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν.
DIGEST OF IDIOMS. [§§ 313, 314.

Theæt. 190 e, ἀλχυνυόμην ἀν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀναγκαζόμενων ὁμολογεῖν—
'I should be ashamed at our being compelled' &c.

Apol. 33 e, χάιρουσιν ἐξεταζόμενοι τοὺς οἰκίνοις ἐλνας σοφοῖς.

Phædo 88 d, ὁ λόγος . . . ἀσπιε ὑπεμνησε μὲ ῥῆθεις—'the recital of the argument as it were reminded me.'

Ib. 68 a, τούτου ἀπηλλάχθαι ἔσωντος αὐτοῖς—'be rid of the company of this.'

Charm. 173 b, ἐκ τούτων οὐτοὺς ἔχοντων. So Legg. 959 c.

Legg. 959 c, καλὸν ἐστο καλῶς καὶ μετρίως τὰ περὶ τὸν τετελευτηκότα γεγονόμενα—'let it be a credit to have the obsequies handsomely or decently performed.'

§ 313. B. Catachresis.

'Ὑποπτεύων for 'to expect,'

Theæt. 164 a, καὶ ἐγὼ, νη τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν ἰκανός γε συννοώ.

'Ἀμφίχανος of number.

Phdr. 229 d, καὶ ἄλλων ἀμφιχάνων πλήθη ρεταστολόγων τινῶν φυσέων.

Δαιμόνιος.

Critias 117 b, κάλλος ὦψος τε δαμάνον ἔχοντα.

§ 314. Θαυμαστός, θαυμάσιος, has many gradations of Catachrestic meaning.

a. 'Strange,' 'eccentric.'

Symp. 182 c, θαυμαστὰ ἐργα. So 213 d, θαυμαστὰ ἐργάζεται.

β. 'Incomparable,' 'capital;'—only the intention of superlativeness being retained.

Apol. 41 b, θαυμαστὴ ἀν εἶν ἡ διατριβή αὐτοῦ.

γ. Of a recommendation or a feeling or an assertion,—'decided,' emphatic,' 'positive.'

Symp. 182 d, ἡ παρακελευσις τῷ ἐρωτο παρὰ πάντων θαυμαστή—
'most positive is the encouragement given by all.'

Tim. 29 d, τὸ μὲν οὖν προσίμων θαυμασίως ἀπεδεξαμεθα σου—'most decidedly approved.'

Euthyd. 283 c, θαυμαστῶς σπουδάζομεν—'were particularly anxious.'

Phædo 74 b, (A) φώμεν τι εἶναι ἡ μηδέν; (B) Φώμεν μεντοι νη Δία, θαυμαστῶς γε, θαυμαστῶς qualifies φώμεν not εἶναι—'say Yes most positively.'

Ib. 92 a, θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπείσθην—'was most decidedly convinced.'
§§ 315—318. RHETORICAL FIGURES.

§ 315. Ὑπερφυώς, καλῶς, σφόδρα, are also in the same way used to express decided assertion or assent to an assertion.

Gorg. 496 ε, (A) ὁμολογούμεν ταύτα; ... (B) 'Ἀλλ' ὑπερφυώς ὡς ὁμολογώ—' I agree most decidedly.'

Phaedo 76 ε, ὑπερφυώς δοκεῖ μοι ἡ αὐτή ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

Phileb. 26 a, (Α) ἀρ' ὑπ ταύτα ἐγγυνώμενα ταύτα ... μονοιηκὴν ξύμπασιν τελεώτατα ἐνυστήσατο; (B) ἐλλιστά γε. Probably an intermediate step to this Catachresis is the use of καλῶς λέγειν for 'to say truly,' e. g. Phdr. 227 b.

Ib. 24 b, (Α) ἀτελῇ δ' ὄντε δῆπον παντιάπαιν ἀπείρῳ γίγνεσθον. (B) Καὶ σφόδρα γε. So 39 e.

Phdr. 263 d, (Α) εἰπὲ ... εἰ ᾤρισάμην ἔρωτα ἀρχόμενος τοῦ λόγου. (B) Νη Δί' ἀμηχάνως γε ὡς σφόδρα—'most decidedly you did.'

§ 316. Μέγας.

Phaedo 62 b, ὁ ... λόγος ... μέγας τε τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ οὐ ράδιος οὕτως, 'cumberome,' i. e. 'perplexing.'

Euthyd. 275 d, τὸ μεράκιον, ἀνε μεγάλου ὄντος τοῦ ἐρωτήματος, ἑρυθρίασε τε και ἀπορίσας ἐξέστη eis ἐμε. So Hip. Ma. 287 a.

§ 317. C. Hyperbole.

Euthyd. 303 b, ὑλιγον καὶ οἱ κίωνε οἱ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ ἐθαρέβησαν τ' ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἔθαβαν.

Hip. Ma. 295 a, ἀκριβεστέρον τῆς ἀπάσης ἀκριβείας.

Legg. 823 e, μήτε ἐγγυρισάτε μήτε εὐδοκεῖσθαι κύριοις ἄργοι θύραν διαπονομένοις—the supposition of the alternative εὐδοκεῖ, in order to make the denial total, is hyperbolic. Cf. Arist. Eth. X. ix. 11, δεῖ ... μήτ' ἄκουστα μήθ' ἠκόυστα πράττειν τὰ φαύλα. Soph. Antig. 1108, ἵτ' ἵτ' ὀπάσως Οἱ τ' ὄντες οἱ τ' ἀπόντες.

§ 318. D. Formule expressive of Contempt.

a. ὃτιος.

Apol. 23 d, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφῶν πράξεων ταύτα λέγουσιν.

Cf. Ar. Nub. 296, οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες ὃτιοι, 969, τὰς κατὰ Φρύων παίτας τὰς δυσκολοκάπτους [καμπάς].
§ 319. b. Poios;
Gorg. 490 d, (A) ἄλλη ἵσως ἰματίως [τὸν βελτιών πλέον δεῖν ἵχειν φής]
.... (B) Ποιῶν ἰματίων;— "Clothes, forsooth!"
Charm. 174 b, (A) ἰρὰ γε ἡ [οἰδὲ] τὸ πεπεντικόν; (B) Ποιῶν
πεπεντικόν;

§ 320. c. Plural of Singular Terms.
Menex. 245 d, οὐ γὰρ Πέλαπτες οὐδὲ Κάδμοι κ.τ.λ.
Phædo 98 c, ἀέρας καὶ αἰθέρας καὶ ἱδατα αἰτιώμενον.
Symp. 218 a, Φαῖδρους, Άγάθωνας, Ἐρυξιμάχους.
Rep. 387 b, Κωκυτοῦς τε καὶ Στῦγας καὶ ἑνήρους καὶ ἀλήβατας.
Cf. Ἀσχ. Αγ. 1439, Χρυσηίδων μελιγμα τῶν ὑπ' Ἡλίῳ. It is fre-
quent in Aristophanes: cf. Ecclez. 1069, ο Ἐανες, οι Κορίβαντες,
Δείχ. 270, καὶ Διαμάχων ἀπαλλαγεῖς, Ραμ. 963, Κύκους ποιῶν καὶ
Μέμνομας. It is equally used with a sense of dignity,—as in
the dithyrambic fragment of Pindar [p. 224 ed. Dissen], γὼν
ὑπάτων μὲν πατέρων μελτέμεν γυναικῶν τε Καδειάν ἕμοιον, ἑκ.
Βακχος the son of Zeus and Semele.

Legg. 953 e, βρέμματα Νείλου—for Egyptians.

§ 322. E. Simile introduced as a Metaphor,—i. e. with the
Particle of Comparison omitted.
(See this noticed by Aristotle, Rhet. III. x–xi, where he charac-
terises it as πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν.)
Euthyphro 11 c, οὐκ ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ ἑντιβείς, ἄλλα σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ὁ Δαίδαλος.
Cf. Soph. Aj. 169, μέγαν αἰγυπτίων δ᾽ ὑποδεικνύεις τάς' ἄν ἐξάφθεις
ei σὺ φαινεῖς σειγὴ πτήζειν ἄφωνοι, Ἀσχ. Ρ. Β. 856, οἱ δ᾽ ἐπτο-
μένοι φρένας Κύκοι πελείων οὐ μακρὰν λελειμμένοι "Ηξουσι,
Ἀγ. 394, ἐπεὶ διόκει ποῖας ποσανὸν ὅρπυν, Eurip. Βακχ. 1114, Πρώτη δὲ μήτηρ
ἠρέων ἱερία φώνω.

§ 323. F. Play upon Words.
Rep. 621 b, μύθος ἑσόθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπόλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀν σώσειν.
Symp. 185 c, Παυκανίου δὲ παυσαμένου,—διδάσκουσι γὰρ μὲ ἑσα
λέγειν οὕτωσι οἱ σοφοί.
Ib. 198 c, Γοργίου κεφαλὴν δεινοὺ λέγειν.
Ib. 174 b, ὡς ἵππο καὶ ἄγαθον ἐπὶ δαίτας ἱασιν αὐτοματος ἄγαθοι—in
allusion to Agathon.
Rhetorical Figures. 251

Apol. 25 c, ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ Μέλητε, . . . σαφῶς ἄποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἄμελειαν.

Theæt. 194 c, κιάρ, ὦ ἐφὶ Ὀμηρος αἰνιτόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ ὁμοίω-τητα.

Phædo 80 d, εἰς . . . τόπον . . . ἀειδή, εἰς Λίδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.

Ib. 89 b, εἰάντερ ἦνιν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώ-σασθαι. The play upon the words lies in their reference to the subject of the discussion.

Ib. 92 c, πρέπει γε εἴπερ τῷ ἀλλῷ λόγῳ ἑυσωδὸν εἶναι καὶ τῷ περὶ τῆς ἀρμονίας.

Legg. 802 e, δεινὸν γὰρ ὅμη γε ἀρμονία ἀπάθεια ἢ ῥυθμόφ ἀρρυθμειν.

Ib. 803 d, ἢν ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν ἄρα οὔτ' οὖν παιδα πεφυκύια οὔτ' οὖν παιδεία.


§ 324. G. Hendiadys.
The Hendiadys which occurs in Plato (belonging to the last of Lobeck's four kinds,—cf. note on Soph. Ajax, I.45) is that where Synonyms are set side by side with the view of expressing the idea more forcibly. This might be called Rhetorical Hendiadys. With Demosthenes it is a favourite instrument of δεισώσις.

Phædo 98 b, τῷ μὲν νῦν οὐδὲν χρώμενον οὐδὲ τινας αἰτίας ἐπαιτίωμεν.

Ib. 111 d, συντετηρήθαι τε πολλαχῇ καὶ διεξόδους ἐχειν.

Crito 47 b, γυμναζόμενος ἀνήρ καὶ τούτο πράττων.

Gorg. 472 b, ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσιας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς.

Tim. 87 d, ἦν οὐδεν σκοποίμεν, οὐδ' εὐνοούμεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Phileb. 23 a, τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὕτη προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ εξελέγχατα.

Legg. 953 a, ἐπιμελείσθαι καὶ τημελείν.

§ 325. H. Interrogation answered by the speaker himself.
This may be called Rhetorical Interrogation. Its object is to awaken the attention.

Phædo 73 c, λέγω δὲ τίνα τρόπον; τῶς ἐών τίς κ.τ.λ.

Rep. 360 e, τίς οὖν ἢ διάστασις; ἤδη. μὴ δὲν ἀφαιρώμεν κ.τ.λ.

Apol. 34 d, τί δὴ οὖν οὐδέν τοῦτων ποιήσο; οὐκ αὐθαδεξίωμεν, ὡς Ἀδηνίου, κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 40 b, τί οὐν αἰτίαν εἶναι ἵπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ἐμῶν ἐρω.

Protag. 343 b, τοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω; ἡτὶ κ.τ.λ. So Gorg. 457 e.
Gorg. 453 c, τοῦ οὖν ἐνεκα δὴ αὐτὸς ὑποπτεύων σε ἑρήσομαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτὸς λέγω; οὐ σοῦ ἐνεκα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου.

Ib. 458 a, ἐγὼ δὲ τίνοις εἰμὶ; τῶν ἥδεως μὲν ἄν ἐλεγχθέντων κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 487 b, καὶ ἐμοί εἰ εὖνοις. τίνι τεκμηρίω χρῶμαι; ἐγὼ σοι ἐρῶ, οἶδα κ.τ.λ.

Meno 97 c, πρὸς τί οὖν δὴ λέγω ταῦτα; πρὸς τὰς δύος τὰς ἀληθεῖς.

Logg. 701 c, τίνος δὴ καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν αὖ χάριν ἑλέχθη; δεῖν φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.

Ib. 780 a, τίνος δὴ χάριν ταῦτα εἴρηται; τούθε, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

Tim. 31 a, πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔνα οὕρανον προσειρήκαμεν, ἥ πολλοὺς καὶ αἵπεροις λέγειν ἢν ὀρθότερον; ἐνα, εἴπερ κ.τ.λ.

Critias i i a, πῶς οὖν δὴ τούτο πιστῶν, καὶ κατὰ τί λείψανον τῆς τότε γῆς ὀρθῶς ἄν λέγοιτο; πᾶσα κ.τ.λ.

Symp. 206 c, πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. τί δὴ οὖν τῆς γεννήσεως; ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

[So Hermann punctuates. The Zurich editors give the answer to another speaker.]

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