1. As of 1800, situation in Tehran is generally quiet.

2. We have number of reports that Left and Khomeini forces irritated and frustrated by peaceable nature of demonstrations Dec. 10-11 and are urging third day of action for Dec. 12 in hope of causing confrontation. Same sources have told us that leading clergy figures have disassociated themselves from this call to action and are particularly annoyed by attempt of extreme Left to stir up violence.

3. Ambassador Zahedi told ambassador that he doubts extremists will be able to get much going on Dec. 12. He also said that after curfew tonight the military forces will move back into their normal places in the city. Military source has confirmed that this is current intention of martial law authorities.

4. Embassy will be open Dec. 12. We are issuing following advisory to American community:

"A. Today's demonstrations were peaceful, but tensions are high.

B. There may be more political activity tomorrow.

C. Exercise extreme caution in any movement outside your residences during course of the day tomorrow." Sullivan

#2102

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O 131401Z DEC 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO RUEEC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2148
INFO RUQMB/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1790
RUECRM/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4179
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 1297
RUECMH/AMCONSUL DHARAMSALA 1988
RUECMJ/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0638
RUECMG/AMEMBASSY EMBASSY ISLAMABAD 3637
RUECMG/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 3866
RUECMH/AMCONSUL KABUL 5024
RUECMG/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0264
RUECMW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4753
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 4865
RUECMG/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 1196
RUECMH/AMCONSUL MOSCOW 1381
RUECMG/AMCONSUL MUSCAT 0629
RUFHMO/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 3299
RUFNWS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3495
RUMJFG/USLO PEKING 0191
RUFHMO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1172
RUECMH/AMCONSUL TOKYO 0791
RUSNAAA/USCONSUL VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L  S E C T I O N 01  T E H R A N  1 2 1 6 7 / 1

CHRG: STATE 12/12/78
APPR: DCM:OONAAS
DRTD: POL:JDEMPOL;LAB
CLEAR: 1. POL:3BLAMEBAKJ
2. ECON:TAYLOR (CONTR
dB)
3. SRF (DRAFT)
DISTR: POL-3 AMB DCM
ECO-2 FM USICA
OR ADMIN SY2
AFOSI DAO SHIR
TAGR ISFA
RF/3

SUMMARY: BOTH OPPOSITION AND GOV ASSESSING THEIR RESPEC-
TIVE POSITIONS AMIDST MILD EUPHORIA OF RELIEF THAT ASHURA
DID NOT PRODUCE EXPECTED VIOLENT CONFRONTATION. KEY
QUESTIONS WILL BE HOW GOVERNMENT HANDLES ANNOUNCED REIN-
STATEMENT OF MARTIAL LAW, AND WHETHER OPPOSITION CAN AGREE
AMONG ITSELF ON CABINET PROPOSAL AND THEN REACH AGREEMENT
WITH SHAH ON HIS CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE AND CONTROL OF THE
ARMY. OPPOSITION SEEKING TO DEVELOP SITUATION WHERE IT
COULD DISCREETLY DISTANCE ITSELF FROM KHOMEINI WITHOUT
DISAVOWING HIM. POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE BY DISCONTENTED
RADICALS REMAINS DISTINCT POSSIBILITY. END SUMMARY.

1. SUMMARY OF 17-POINT OPPOSITION PROGRAM GIVEN REPORT
DOES NOT INCLUDE NUANCES OF FULL PRESENTATION, SOME OF
WHICH MAY BE IMPORTANT IN SUBSEQUENT MANEUVERING. MANIFESTO
WAS APPARENTLY DRAFTED FOR DEC 10 MARCH, BUT WAS FULLY
PROCLAIMED AT DEC 11 EVENT. TRANSLATION OF MAIN POINTS
FOLLOW: 1. ATATOLLAH KHOMEINI IS OUR LEADER, WHATEVER HE
ASKS WE WILL CARRY OUT. THIS MARCH IS A VOTE OF COMPETENCE
IN KHOMEINI; 2. THE APPARATUS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL DICTATOR-
SHIP MUST BE OVERTHROWN AND POWER TRANSFERRED TO THE PEOPLE;
3. THE RULE OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE MUST
BE ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF THE VOTES OF THE PEOPLE.

2. DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENT OF PAST TWO DAYS IS NOT RPT NOT BT #2167

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TEHRAN 12167/1

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YET POSSIBLE, BUT INITIAL IMPLICATIONS ARE CLEAR; 4) AVOID-
ANCE OF VIOLENCE ON TWO MARCH DAYS IS DEFINITE TRIUMPH FOR
THOSE ON BOTH GOI AND MODERATE OPPOSITION SIDE WHO COUNSELED
RESTRAN. BOTH SIDES BELIEVE THEY "WON." B) RADICAL
FACTIONS WERE UPSET THAT THERE WAS VIRTUALLY NO VIOLENCE
AND MAY MOVE TO CREATE SOME. VIRTUAL SIEGE STATE IN
ISFAHAN IS NOT RPT NOT ENCOURAGING IN THIS REGARD. C) MASS
TEHRAN RALLY WAS NEARLY EXCLUSIVELY POLITICAL WITH
MERE LIP SERVICE TO RELIGION. IT WAS IMPRESSIVE DISPLAY OF MASS
ORGANIZATIONAL SKILLS OF NATIONAL FRONT (INF) AND SURPRISED
MOST OBSERVERS. D) FACT BLOODY CONFRONTATION DID NOT RPT
NOT OCCUR HAS BOUGHT TIME FOR REGIME. GOI HAS SAID IT WILL
ENFORCE MARTIAL LAW "WITH DETERMINATION." E) OPPOSITION IS
NOW GOING BACK TO INTERNAL BARGAINING TABLE TO TRY AND
HAMMER OUT CABINET AND REGENCY COUNCIL PROPOSALS AS A BASIS
FOR NEGOTIATION WITH GOI. F) ON THE OTHER HAND, MASSIVE
TURNOUT OF PEOPLE HAS IMPRESSED MANY MIDDLE-CLASS PEOPLE
WHO WERE NOT AWARE OF BREADTH AND DEPTH OF ANTI-SHAH
FEELINGS. SOME OF THESE WERE ALSO DISPLEASED THAT GOVT
CHOSE TO PROTECT ONLY A PORTION OF THE CITY WITH THE ARMY,
LEAVING OTHERS TO THEIR OWN DEVICES.

3. THERE ARE SEVERAL MAJOR QUESTIONS AND "IFS" FOR THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE. WILL GOI REINSTATE MARTIAL LAW WITH
HEAVY HAND OR LIGHT TOUCH? IT IS CLEAR GOI MUST MOVE TO
GET STRIKEES BACK TO WORK, CHILDREN BACK IN SCHOOLS, AND
REGAIN CONTROL OF STREETS. IF THIS CAN BE DONE WITH FIRM-
NESS AND FINESSE, SHAH'S SEARCH FOR COALITION COMBINATION
CAN GO FORWARD. MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION COULD PROVOKE
RADICALS TO MORE VIOLENT CONFRONTATION. MANY MILITARY MEN
COOL. EVEN IF THIS CAN BE DONE, HOWEVER, IT WILL NOT
ALLEVATE SHORT RUN DISLOCATIONS, BOTH ECONOMIC (SEE
SEPTEL) AND POLITICAL. STRIKES CONTINUE, BANKING SYSTEM
IS IN SHAMBLES, OIL PRODUCTION REMAINS DOWN, AND EVEN IF
OPPOSITION PUTS FORWARD PROPOSALS, FAIRLY EXTENDED NEGOTIA-
TIONS WOULD HAVE TO ENSUE IF THERE IS TO BE A FIT. SEEN
IN ABIDING CONTEXT, OPPOSITION PROGRAM IS INTERESTING
PROPOSAL. DESPITE RITUAL REITERATION THAT
KHOMEINI IS
LEADER, PROGRAM ITSELF IS CLEARLY MODERATE DOCUMENT WHICH
WITH ONE EXCEPTION, DOES NOT RPT NOT CALL FOR
EXTR!MIST
ACCORDING TO THREE DIFFERENT SOURCES, PROGRAM WAS DRAFTED
BY INF COMMITTEE, AND BOTH PROGRAM AND MARCHES ACROSS IRAN
BEAR MUCH STRONGER INF IMPRINT THAN RELIGIOUS INPUT.
EXCEPTION ON EXTREMZ
POSITION IS POINT TWO, WHICH CALLS
FOR OVERTHROW OF APPARATUS OF GOVERNMENTAL DICTATORSHIP.
ONE EMBASSY SOURCE NOTES THAT THIS IS LESS EXTREME THAN
KHOMEINI'S CALL FOR END TO SHAH. WHILE NUANCE MAY ESCAPE
MOST, IT DOES LEAVE SLIVER OF LIGHT FOR COMPROMISE, WHICH
IS MAINT HOPE OF MODERATES. BASIC STRATEGY OF MODERATE
RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR LEADERS IS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM
ESTABLISHED BY "SUCCESS" OF PAST TWO DAYS' RALLIES AND COME
UP WITH CABINET LISTS TO PRESENT TO SHAH. WITHOUT DISAVOW-
ING KHOMEINI, THEY HAVE TO RENDER HIM INCREASINGLY
IRRELEVANT TO ACTUAL POLITICAL CHOICE. IF THIS PROCESS
BREAKS DOWN, OR VIOLENT ACTIVITY DISRUPTS CONFERENCE TABLE
WORK, PERSIAN POLITICAL NONSYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO LIMP
ALONG, WITH PROSPECT THAT SHARP CONFRONTATION WHICH NEARLY
ALL FEARED AT ASHURA MAY MERELY HAVE BEEN POSTPONED A FEW
DAYS OR WEEKS. SULLIVAN
WANT TOUGHER STANCE, WHILE RADICAL GROUPS WERE UPSET THAT MODERATES WOULD NOT LET SOME OF THEM MARCH ON DEC 10 AND EVEN 11, AND THAT PARADE ORGANIZERS DID NOT SEEK GREATER CONFRONTATION. COMBINATION OF TWO FACTORS COULD PROVE VERY VOLATILE, PARTICULARLY IF ARMY MOVES FORCEFULLY AGAINST CURRENT VIOLATORS OVER NEXT FEW EVENINGS. ON THE OTHER HAND, ARMY CANNOT BE TOO SOFT OR IMPETUS TO COMPROMISE WILL SLOW AND OPPOSITION WILL RETURN TO EXTREME DEMANDS.

4. SECOND MAJOR QUESTION IS WHETHER OPPOSITION CAN GET ITS ACT TOGETHER FOR A UNIFIED APPROACH TO SHAH/GOI. THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT LEADERS OF MARCH CALLED FOR TWO DAYS OF NO DEMONSTRATIONS. MEETINGS AMONG MAJOR OPPOSITION FIGURES ARE GOING ON TODAY, DEC 12 AND DEC 13, TO TRY HAMMERING OUT PROPOSED CABINET LISTS AND NAMES FOR PROJECTED REGENCY COUNCIL. RUMOR HAS FLOWN AROUND TOWN THAT SANJABI RELEASE DEC 7 WAS RESULT OF DEAL OVER PROPOSED COALITION CABINET, BUT THIS APPEARS FALSE. BASIC PROBLEM REMAINS THAT OPPOSITION SAYS PUBLICLY IT DOES NOT WANT SHAH, EVEN IN CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE. PRIVATELY, INF LEADERS AGREE SHAH IS PROBABLY NECESSARY, BUT THEN DISCUSSIONS BREAK DOWN OVER WHO CONTROLS ARMY, SHAH OR PROJECTED GOI. AT THE MOMENT, DESPITE WHAT IS COMING TO BE CALLED "THE MIRACLE OF MOHARRAM," OPPOSITION AND GOI POSITIONS STILL REMAIN MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. NEXT FEW DAYS SHOULD OFFER SOME HINTS, HOWEVER, WHETHER EVENTS OF PAST WEEKEND MIGHT NOT HAVE DEVELOPED MORE FLEXIBILITY IN POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES.

5. SITUATION FOR IMMEDIATE FUTURE THEREFORE OFFERS BOTH DANGER AND HOPE. DANGER IS THAT RADICALS WILL INSTIGATE VIOLENT INCIDENTS WHICH WILL DRAW MODERATES' ATTENTION AWAY FROM RATHER PLEASANT FEELING OF SUCCESS AND PROVOKE SEVERE MILITARY REACTION. HOPE IS THAT OPPOSITION CAN GET UNIFIED PROPOSAL READY TO MOVE FORWARD TO COALITION GOVERNMENT REASONABLY SOON AND ALL ELEMENTS CAN MAINTAIN THEIR
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Mr. Ebrahim Peshavar, Director, NIRT Isfahan
Mr. Reza Ghaffarian, Prov. Advisor, Consulate
David C. McGaffey, Consul, Isfahan

Date & Place: NIRT Isfahan; Dec. 14, 1978
Subject: Current Disturbances in Isfahan; Pro-Shah Demonstrations; U.S.-Iranian relations; English Language news broadcasts.

Mr. Peshavar is newly assigned to Isfahan; I called on him at our earliest mutual convenience. He appeared pleased to meet me, and discussed freely the current situation. He is young (about 35-40); a graduate of Catholic U. at Wash., D.C.; and has previously worked for NIRT in Tehran. His English is excellent, but a little rusty.

He expressed his opinion that the recent troubles in Isfahan were well organized by a small group of Marxists, who managed to confuse and enflame the unhappy population of Isfahan. When asked, he agreed that the general population are unhappy with conditions and with the regime, but not to the point of violence by themselves; when violence is begun by the small groups, they are caught up in mob fever and carry on the violence. He added, "it is these innocents who are caught when the troops arrive - the Marxists are careful to be gone well in advance."

I asked about the pro-Shah demonstrations, one of which was passing our window at the time. He commented they were mostly farmers and workers from the Steel Mill, brought in for the purpose, and excited about getting back at the "snooty city people", but said that they were in fact saying things many Isfahani's would say, if they were not afraid of reprisals. Even so, some Isfahani's have joined in, not only relatives of soldiers and government officials. He then dispatched a mobile TV-camera team to cover the demonstration. I asked if it was true that his teams had covered demonstration toppling the Shah's statues, and had provided it to security forces for investigation. He said that it was covered, that NIRT had decided not to run it on television, and that such films are routinely shared with "other government agencies." He admitted, however, that he was concerned about possible reprisals on his camera men as this becomes widely known, and asked that I not spread the word.

He then launched into a broad discussion of the troubles, and asked, somewhat rhetorically, why the U.S., such a good friend of Iran, was not doing more to help. He said that when he looks at U.S. assistance, he sees words and military programs, but no assistance in the social field, which is the fount of all Iran's current troubles. I provided a capsule history of development assistance, and spoke of U.S. involvement in Iranian education, financial planning, planning for land reform, social reform theory, and similar programs, and pointed out that changes through
these programs, which perhaps did not take the Iranian cultural constraints sufficiently into account, have contributed to Iran's current turmoil. I stated that recent thinking emphasizes that each country and culture must determine its own solutions, and then ask for technology or other assistance to carry out their programs. "help" from outside the culture could, in fact, exacerbate problems. I assured him, however, that the U.S. values Iran highly, and stands ready to assist when Iran determines its needs. This argument appeared new to him, and appealing.

I then asked him about the feasibility of an English-language local broadcast, providing the text or a summary of Martial Law announcements, local news, and film fillers on a local basis. I pointed out that with his command of English, he could maintain control over the contents, and provide a real service to the foreign community. After discussion, he agreed, and immediately got telephone authorization from NIRT-Tehran, on condition he accept responsibility. He asked that I nominate two persons, a man and a woman, to do the actual broadcasting and correct the English text for idiom and grammar only, and suggest a time. The program is now planned to begin on Dec. 16, at 7:00 p.m. daily.

Comment: Mr. Peshavar was clearly speaking from a government position, blaming small groups, and searching for some outside responsibility, if in a friendly manner toward the U.S. His attitude, however, was much more flexible than his predecessor's, or of other officials I have spoken to, in that he recognized the extent of the popular discontent, and appeared to be groping toward solutions, rather than just relying on blame. This new attitude has been reported by others recently, and to the extent it is representative of government figures, is a healthy development.

Dist. Emb. TEHRAN: POL
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DCM
AmConsul TABRIZ
AmConsul Shiraz
Dept. of State: NEA/IR
INR/NEA
INR/OIL/B

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-10-
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

14 December 1978

Dear Bill,

I'm afraid I've been completely caught up in the swirl of SCC meetings on Iran since my return. However, I did want to take advantage of this brief post-Ashura respite to thank you, your wife, and all the fine members of the Mission for the hospitality and support given to Bob Earl and myself during our few days with you in Tehran. Although the timing of the Shah briefing was quite fortuitous, it couldn't have come at a better time for me to obtain some first-hand views of the situation.

My special thanks for your hosting the cocktail party, which enabled me to have some less formal conversations with several Iranian military and SAVAK people.

Warmest regards,

Robert R. Bowie

The Honorable William Sullivan
American Ambassador
Tehran, Iran
SUMMARY: Corruption has become a major political issue. Despite public indignation, however, there seems to be little mood for fundamental reform. Rather, revenge against those presumed to be guilty is uppermost in mind, with considerable potential for an eventual re-emergence and toleration of the kind of corruption which has figured so prominently in Iranian economic activity heretofore. Ambitious politicians, not excluding the Shah, may be tempted to exploit this situation, but while the issue of corruption itself may prove transitory, it is not likely to disappear without first profoundly shaking Iran's most basic political institution—the monarchy. END SUMMARY

Corruption has become a major political issue in Iran in recent weeks, with much of the criticism of the Shah being couched in terms of the corrupt activities of some of his closest advisors and even members of his family. The outrage which has emerged against the phenomenon is certainly widespread, cutting across social and economic class lines, and it appears to be deeply felt. Further, corruption, as the term is usually defined, has unquestionably been a pervasive fact of Iranian life, and the magnitude of some of the rip-offs
which have been in the news of late is impressive by any standard. It was perhaps inevitable that the vast amounts of money involved in many of the grandiose projects undertaken in Iran during the last decade would constitute temptations for illicit gains that could not be resisted. Nonetheless, the prospect for fundamental change seems slight although the political consequences of current anti-corruption sentiment may indeed prove far-reaching.

It is a sad fact that it was not the discovery of the existence of corruption which prompted reaction against it, but rather a perception that the fruits of corruption have been unequally (and thus presumably unjustly) distributed. That many senior government officials and businessmen had their hands in the public till was for years taken for granted, but there was no significant popular reaction to such activities as long as there seemed to be plenty for everyone. Just as there was little incentive in the United States to do something about the 19th century robber barons while the popular myth that anyone could himself become a robber baron had currency, most Iranians, hardly immune to the lure of a fast rial, were for long undisturbed by the questionable fortunes that were being made around them. Indeed, the phenomenon more often than not was regarded as a hopeful one, and many Iranians took a kind of chauvinistic pride in some of their countrymen's ability to get rich overnight.

The turning point in this regard occurred with the growing realization that Iran's wealth in fact has limits. This became increasingly apparent toward the end of 1977 and in early 1978 as the national economy slowed almost to a halt. It was brought home in a variety of ways, but the persistence with which the share of most Iranians' personal income required for basic necessities tended to remain large or even increase despite steady salary increments perhaps had the most telling effect. At the same time, the proclivity for conspicuous consumption among those who had profited absolutely as well as relatively during the boom years drew popular attention to a central fact of rapid economic development, i.e., that everything else being equal, economic inequalities tend to be exacerbated by such development. Whereas the overnight acquisition of personal fortunes had once been regarded as indicative of Iran's economic dynamism, such fortunes are now seen as evidence of the system gone wrong; practices formerly viewed as no more than shrewd and even perversely laudatory, and which often figured prominently in the making of these fortunes, are now called cor-
rupt.

While the popular mood for the moment is one of righteous indignation, it does not appear, however, to be particularly bent on revolution. Popular demands are less frequently for fundamental reform than for revenge. Even a man such as former Prime Minister Ali Amini appears more intent on blood than social equity in the distribution of economic wealth. He recently suggested that in view of the thousands of school children who had been killed for reading proscribed literature (sic), it was not too much to ask that a hundred plutocrats be hanged. The implication of his remark was that it mattered less that these individuals actually be guilty of wrongdoing than it did that they be perceived as being guilty. In other words, the primary objective of such an exercise would not be the elimination of corruption but rather placating public ire. Indeed, Amini went on to add that corruption, like the poor, may always be with Iran. He conceded that even when he was Prime Minister he had been only "50% successful" in eliminating it, and suggested that it might be necessary to tolerate it up to a point. How else, he asked, could people living on the economic margin be expected to make ends meet?

The kind of corruption Amini apparently is prepared to condone is a common feature of many pre-modern economies. It is sometimes referred to as prebendalism to distinguish it from the version more familiar in fully industrialized societies. The prebend represents the difference between the real market value of a good or service and its nominal value arbitrarily assigned, usually by the government. In such circumstances, payment of this difference frequently determines whether or not the good will be delivered or the service rendered at all, and thus may be regarded as an indispensable feature of the economy. In many respects, this has been true in Iran where arbitrary, often unrealistic prices determined by government fiat rather than market forces have contributed to widespread "corruption." Under-the-board payments can and sometimes have been interpreted as morally reprehensible acts, but the only alternative may have been paralysis of the distribution system. Lacking a more efficient mechanism, "corruption" provided the lubricant which enabled the Iranian economic machinery to function.

The importance of corruption's once catalytic role in the Iranian economy is now apparent. In the face of the public condemnation of it the response of those who otherwise
would be expected to be on the take has been to hunker down. Virtual cessation of entrepreneurial ventures (or in some instances transfer of such efforts out of Iran) and an even greater degree of bureaucratic unresponsiveness than formerly pertained have been the inevitable results. Because few Iranians seem genuinely interested in a critical examination of the function of corruption in Iranian society, preferring retribution instead, the temptation to provide the public with symbolic culprits could prove irresistible to ambitious politicians. In fact, the Shah himself may be susceptible to this temptation as indicated by his apparent willingness to sacrifice some of his closest associates and even to have the royal family's financial activities investigated. The Iranian public may well be placated, at least over the short term, by such an approach, but the problem for the Shah in it, given the highly personalized system of government in Iran, is that logic leads inexorably to the monarch himself in the assignment of ultimate blame. Thus, while corruption may prove a transitory issue, it is not likely to disappear without first profoundly shaking, if not actually overturning, Iran's most basic political institution. Ironically, in view of the current lack of popular sentiment for fundamental reform, even that probably will not prevent corruption's eventual re-emergence as a prominent feature of Iranian economic activity.
The Honorable
William H. Sullivan
American Ambassador
Tehran

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I am sorry that the press of business here and in Tehran has reduced the movement of letters back and forth. A quiet moment has come and I'll use it to bring you up to date on some very sensitive matters that I cannot commit to the phone or cable. You, perhaps, know more about these matters than I do, but let me share with you.

First, there is real concern in this building about back-channel communications from the White House directly to the Iranians, notably the Brzezinski-Zahedi channel. Ben Read called me about a week ago to ask me what I knew of such communications and asked me to keep him informed when I developed any information. From what I hear from other sources, I gather that his concern reflects the feeling of Mr. Christopher and the Secretary. I am not really aware of very much about the channel and have to rely on my Persian-produced cynicism. I do understand that Brzezinski made a call to Zahedi last Friday or Saturday which induced the Ambassador to take off for Isfahan to see about his troops there.

I met with Brzezinski myself 2 or 3 weeks ago in a private session in which he queried me about Iran in general and my pessimistic views of the future. I did not tell him what I have since tried to convey through Gary Sick: That is that I consider Zahedi to be a disastrous counterpart in dealing with the Iranian crisis. In my view he is utterly self-serving, lacks good judgment and is prone to act quickly on the basis of bad information. I regret that I believe his counsel has been one of the strongest factors working on opinion in the White House.
As the Ball report was sent to the Department in one copy for Christopher's eyes only, no one else has seen it. I met a couple of times with Mr. Ball and I believe I understand his views fairly well. He doesn't seem to think that the Shah has much future and believes that we ought to begin to prepare ourselves for the unthinkable. For my own thoughts on that subject I enclose a copy of a memorandum I did for Hal Saunders. I have held these thoughts for a long time now but as we come nearer to the day of investigations, I have decided to put a few of them down on paper. You may not agree with my outlook or analysis, but the task seems to me to be one of finding a graceful exit for the Shah while gaining a fair amount of credit in doing so for the U.S. It doesn't strike me as an impossible task, but it is certainly one that must be carefully prepared, particularly with the Iranian military. I think we have consistently underestimated and not really evaluated our leverage with that group. I do not think we ourselves ought to name ministers, but our midwifery could be very active. We could, for instance, convoque a balanced (including Khomeini rep.) 6-8 man committee of notables to work out a Persian solution which we would back. Whether that solution were a constitutional monarchy or a regency substitute, we should be prepared to endorse it.

I presume you are aware of the Top Secret list of questions that was sent out over the weekend for the Shah. I have not been shown the list, such is level of distrust that exists in the White House towards the State Department (and egotistically, I feel, towards myself). I am afraid that we are losing valuable time and that events may sweep us by, depriving the U.S. of the opportunity to recoup its position in Iran.
I have probably confided more than I should to a piece of paper, but I doubt I have much of a future any way. I would ask you to protect me for the sake of the education of the young. Whatever the risks, I believe it important to give you my frank assessment of how things are shaping up on the Iranian front these days.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Henry Proehl

Enclosure:

Copy of Memorandum to Mr. Saunders.
TO: NEA - Harold H. Saunders
FROM: NEA/IRN - Henry Hecht
SUBJECT: Seeking Stability in Iran

There is general agreement that the Shah has only a marginal chance of surviving as a constitutional monarch. No one, to my knowledge, believes he can return to the exercise of full power, the Shah himself has acknowledged this privately. We have come to our conclusion slowly and reluctantly and more through erosion of our previous position than from a "zero-based" analysis of what the future might hold for Iran and U.S. interests.

I believe the Shah's position has eroded more rapidly than our perception of it. I do not think that it is now possible to salvage even a "king of Sweden" role for the Shah—certainly not over the long term, e.g., one year.

The assumptions behind our preferences for the Shah as a constitutional monarch are that: (a) his continued presence can best ensure stability in Iran; (b) he offers the best means of protecting U.S. interests there; (c) the civilian alternatives are dubious on both counts in the short run and probably only a stage to leftist instability in the long term; and (d) the departure of the Shah would be a shock to our friends in the region and a boon to our critics at home. I believe we should examine each of these assumptions and, if they are not as solid as we suppose, begin quickly to prepare a new U.S. line.

A. The Shah as a Force for Stability

This argument rests principally on the premise that only the Shah can guarantee the unity and discipline...
of the Armed Forces. This is true, if we look at the Armed Forces as a static group. But how is opinion among key elements in the military likely to evolve if (1) the Shah as a constitutional monarch has substantially reduced powers, i.e., does not really lead the Armed Forces, and (2) remains the target of opposition rage that requires the army to suppress continued, large-scale demonstrations? While it is highly unlikely that General Azhari or General Oveis would take any step against the Shah, the same cannot be said of the lieutenant generals and lower ranks that have already ventured to express doubts to us. Some moderates in the military are not willing to see Iran suffer for the sake of the Shah; extremists are probably supporters of Khomeini. Both are perceptive of the way the tide is moving.

If the military is apt to be restive, the civilian dissidents—strikers, the people who marched on December 10 and 11, and the terrorists—are apt to be even more assertive in their unhappiness. There is a profound distrust of the Shah and his sincerity in accepting a role of a monarch with power. Thus, the Shah in a constitutional role could fail to produce tranquility and might lead to greater turmoil.

If this analysis has merit, it seems we should be doing three things:

1. Seeking to identify those officers (e.g., General Djam) who can command the respect of their subordinates in a post-Shah Iran.

2. Identifying those hardline officers who would have to be dropped in order to produce a more tractable military establishment.

3. Designing a U.S. strategy whereby we could influence military opinion to follow (or at least not block) U.S. policy initiatives. This would mean formulating what we say and to whom and deciding how we apply the levers we have (i.e., military sales and services).

B. The Shah is the Best Protection for U.S. Interests in Iran

This assumption based on history does not reflect the radical changes that have occurred in Iran. A
weakened Shah, subject to continuing strong domestic pressures, may not be much different in his foreign policy orientation from an uncertain civilian government that might replace him. Both governments would be introspective; both, as OPEC results have shown, would push for higher oil prices; both would be more difficult for Israel (although a successor regime would be more difficult than the Shah); both will be careful with the Soviet Union (fearing an active Soviet effort to destabilize the Iranian system); both will be forced to cut military and large civilian contracts with the U.S. and our allies; and both will want some public distance between them and the U.S. so as to appear independent. Whether either will have any reason to be grateful or dependent on us will depend on events and, in large measure, what we do.

There is not much we can do to protect U.S. interests if the Shah remains on the throne in a weakened position; he will be effectively boxed in by his opposition and will have little scope for responding in ways that we desire on important questions. To enable us to be in a stronger position with a successor government, we should take the following steps before such a government comes to be:

1. Enlarge our contacts with the opposition and independent Iranians with the object of assuring them that the U.S. is interested in Iran and downplaying our interests in the future of the Shah. We should be quite clear about what our interests are in Iran and what we are not pushing e.g., we will want Iran to be free of Soviet influence, but we are not particularly interested in the quantity of arms that Iran purchases from us.

2. We should extend these contacts in a discreet way to the Khomeini factions. We should, however, keep the Shah informed about what we are doing because he will find it out anyway. We should not be too concerned about his reaction. We should impress upon the Shah that we both share the same objective, a stable and prosperous Iran, and that he has a responsibility to do everything possible to help bring this about.

3. We should move vigorously to promote with the Shah and the opposition a scheme such as the "Council of Notables" idea that will preserve a minimal role for the Shah as constitutional monarch. We should be prepared
to fall back fairly quickly from this position, acqui-
scing in the departure of the Shah if we cannot obtain for him a "King of Sweden" role. We should be prepared in advance for a surprise abdication.

4. We should probably conduct our negotiations with the Shah and the opposition on the future of Iran through a special intermediary, e.g., George Ball, who would embody U.S. interest and evenhandedness in a way that would gain us substantial credit should the opposi-
tion come to power. If the U.S. intermediary role were to fail, we would be no worse off than if we stood aside and trusted the Shah to work out arrangements with his opponents.

C. The Alternatives to the Shah are Dubious and Possibly Destabilizing in the Future

No one can really predict how a successor govern-
ment will "fit" with the Iranian public or as a com-
bination of disparate interests. There is a growing conviction among analysts, based on conversations with leading oppositionists, that there are moderate and responsible groups which would be friendly towards the U.S. and could also govern. There is also a good prob-
bability that if a civilian successor regime came in with the blessings of most key oppositionists, including Khomeini, it would be greeted with relief by an Iranian public terribly fatigued by the turmoil of the past year. Such a government could divert some energies towards the prosecution of the corrupt and unjust in the Shah's civilian and military hierarchy. Its biggest problem would be in managing the economy but there it would probably enjoy an easier road than a government under the Shah which would continue to be afflicted by strikes.

In the past six weeks the military government has demonstrated failure in restoring order and restarting the economy. Under its present leadership the military is damned for its association with the Shah and for its harsh methods. It will not constitute a viable choice for Iranian stability until its top ranks are purged.

We need a much clearer perspective on the players in the opposition--those we can count on and those who would serve only their own interests or interests that are hostile to the U.S. We should not, however, delude
ourselves that we know enough about Iran to pick all of the members of a Council of Notables or cabinet, but we should at least know the core group of foremost figures (independents and oppositionists) and have an idea of the likely orientation of those persons who might be selected in a future government.

D. The Departure of the Shah would Shock our Friends and Please our Critics

There is probably an inevitability in this assumption. It will be extremely difficult for the U.S., which has supported one man for three decades and daily reaffirmed that support in the strongest terms during the past three months, to claim victory when he is dumped. We may simply have to take our lumps on this one, but life will be easier for us if we produce a successor government that is moderate, stable and responsible.

There are certain steps that we can take to minimize the lumps:

1. We should begin now to educate the Saudis and others about the true nature of what the Shah's problem is, e.g., a loss of support and credibility because of corruption, harsh police methods, lack of political freedom, etc. We should steer them away from the communist-in-the-woodpile thesis for which there is little or no hard evidence. We should describe the problem of lack of support for the Shah, including military disaffection. In other words, we should educate those who are worried about the future in Iran about the real forces that are producing that future. We realize this is not an easy task and considerable doubt will remain, but we must make the attempt.

2. We should keep these states fully informed of our actions toward reaching a political solution that is protective of Western interests. We should enlist their support.

3. We should make the same effort with the Congress and the U.S. press.

4. We should not react in panic to bolster Turkey, Pakistan, or other states, but should proceed in a calm manner to do what is necessary under ordinary circumstances to ensure that those states have adequate defenses and reasonable means for economic development.
Conclusion

This paper proposes that we begin to move now with definite steps towards a post-Shah future in Iran. To delude ourselves that we can get something better in the short run that will be useful for the U.S. in the long run could be seriously destructive to the remaining position we have in Iran. That position has been seriously weakened during the past three months because of our delayed perceptions, hesitancy to take hard choices, our unwavering support for the Shah and the anti-Americanism that has flourished. We must move fast to recoup our position.
THE AMBASSADOR OPENED THE MEETING BY REVIEWING THE RATHER DISTURBING EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY IN IRAN. AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, AS WELL AS OTHER SOURCES, REPORT THAT A YOUNG UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR WAS KILLED BY A SHOTGUN WOUND. TROOPS HAVE BLOCKED OFF EISENHOWER AVE. ONTO SHAHREZA AVE. MR. LAMBRAKIS ADDED THAT THE PROFESSOR WAS SHOT FROM A LONG DISTANCE BY A SNIPER WHILE HE SPOKE TO CROWDS OF STUDENTS FROM A BALCONY. THE AMBASSADOR FEELS THIS SHOOTING WILL TOUCH OFF A LARGE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN DEMONSTRATORS AND SECURITY FORCES. AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN IS WORRIED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS IN THESE TROUBLED TIMES. THE ACADEMIC CENTER IS PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE BECAUSE IT IS LOCATED IN THE HEART OF THE UNIVERSITY AREA. MR. SHELLENBERGER SAID THAT THE CENTER HAS FOUR POLICEMEN, AS WELL AS A CLOSE LOCATION TO LARGE TROOP CONCENTRATIONS. THE ARMY IS STRETCHED THIN AT THIS POINT AND THEY PREFER TO MOVE TROOPS ONLY WHEN THE SITUATION WARRANTS IT. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT OTHER FOREIGN DIPLOMATS HAVE ALSO BEEN ATTACKED, IN PARTICULAR TWO WEST GERMANS AND THE DANISH AMBASSADOR. THE DANISH AMBASSADOR ESCAPED SERIOUS HARM WHEN HE DISPLAYED PAPERS PROVING HE IS DANISH. AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN SUGGESTED THAT DISPLAYING OUR U.S. IDENTITIES PROBABLY WOULD NOT HELP.

MR. SHELLENBERGER SAID THAT THERE IS ANOTHER CASSETTE AVAILABLE NOW IN WHICH KHOMEINI MAKES A PLEA TO PRESIDENT CARTER TO PULL BACK FROM HIS STRONG STANDS IN SUPPORT OF THE SHAH. THERE IS A CONTINUING SIT IN STRIKE AT THE UNIVERSITY. THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION HAS BEEN COMANDEERED BY OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME. ALL SCHOOLS IN TEHRAN ARE NOW CLOSED. FINALLY, MR. SHELLENBERGER REPORTED THAT HE, CHRIS SNOW AND OTHERS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT GARY GRAFFMAN'S UPCOMING VISIT TO TEHRAN IS ILL ADVISED.

ADMIRAL COLLINS DISCUSSED HIS LONG CONVERSATION WITH ADMIRAL HABIBOLAHII'. THE IRANIAN NAVAL CHIEF'S TONE WAS DESPERATE AS HE EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE AZHARl GOVERNMENT'S INDECISIVENESS. HABIBOLAHII DID SAY HOWEVER, THAT HE PERCEIVES THE ARMED FORCES TO BE UNIFIED ENOUGH TO PROVIDE SOME SORT OF STABILITY IN THE EVENT OF A TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF GOVERNMENT.

JOHN MILLS SAID THAT OSCO IS NOW READY TO SCALE DOWN THEIR OPERATIONS TO SKELETAL LEVELS. THE AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDED THAT OSCO SEND A SENIOR MAN TO AHWAZ. OSCO IS WITHOUT SENIOR LEADERSHIP IN THE WAKE OF PAUL GRIM'S DEATH AND GEORGE LINK'S TRIP TO LONDON. MR. MILLS ALSO REPORTED THAT IRAN AIR IS ON STRIKE FOR A WEEK.
GEORGE LAMBRAKIS GAVE A DETAILED REPORT ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF HIS REPORT ARE AS FOLLOWS: SOME SOLDIERS WERE KILLED BY GRENADES AND SNIPER FIRE IN TEBRIZ; ONE OF OUR FSN EMPLOYEES WITNESSED A BRUTAL ATTACK ON A POLICEMAN BY MOBS OF DEMONSTRATORS IN MASHAD; ANOTHER POLICEMAN WAS BEATEN AND THEN MURDERED WHILE HE WAS IN THE HOSPITAL BEING TREATED FOR HIS WOUNDS.

L. TRACY; LJT

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ISFAHAN
TABRIZ
ON DECEMBER 28, 1978, IN THE EVENING, JACK WARBRAND AND HIS ATTORNEY, JOEL SCHWEIDEL WERE INTERVIEWED PERTAINING TO CAPTIONED MATTER.

BOTH OF THESE GENTLEMEN SPOKE WITH AMBASSADOR PETRI, USMUN, ON DECEMBER 27, 1978 AND SET FORTH THE FACTS IN THE PLOT TO KILL AMERICANS IN FOUR IRANIAN CITIES ON NEW YEAR'S EVE, 1978 AT VARIOUS PARTIES. MR. WARBRAND PROVIDED THE IDENTICAL INFORMATION TO INTERVIEWING FBI AGENTS AS HE HAD TO AMBASSADOR PETRI, EXCEPT THAT HE ADDED THAT THE SPECIFIC ANTI-AMERICAN ACTION TO TAKE PLACE IN ABADAN WOULD BE AT "THE BOAT CLUB" AND WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO POISON THE FOOD. ALSO BETWEEN JANUARY 5TH AND 15TH, THERE WOULD BE AN ATTEMPT TO BOMB THE ABADAN AIRPORT.

MR. WARBRAND THEN RELATED THAT THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY HIM ORIGINATES WITH THE KHAIBAR KHAN, WHO IS LIVING IN EXILE IN LAS VEGAS, NEVADA BUT WHO MAINTAINS A VAST NETWORK OF CONTACTS THROUGHOUT IRAN STEMMING FROM HIS FAMILY CONTACTS OF LONG STANDING. THE KHAIBAR KHAN'S
MR. WARBRAND THEN EMPHASIZED HIS DESIRE TO AVOID NEEDLESS AMERICAN DEATHS AT THE HANDS OF ANTI-SHAF FORCES. HE FURTHER EXPRESSED HIS STRONG OPINION THAT THE KHAIBAR KHAN IS AN ESSENTIAL CONTACT FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE VARIED FORCES AT WORK WITHIN IRAN, AND SPECIFICALLY IN FURNISHING DETAILED INFORMATION RELATING TO CAPTIONED PLOT AND OTHER PLOTS AS THEY DEVELOP. MR. WARBRAND CONSIDERS THE RELIABILITY OF THE KHAIBAR KHAN AS "IMPECCABLE."

IT IS THE OPINION OF THE INTERVIEWING FBI AGENTS THAT THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY MR. WARBRAND IS WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION AND AN ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO FURTHER DEVELOP THIS INFORMATION.

THE KHAIBAR KHAN EXPRESSED THROUGH MR. WARBRAND THAT HE MUST BE ASSURED THAT THE INFORMATION HE FURNISHES TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT NOT BE FURNISHED TO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT.

FBI IS PLANNING EARLY INTERVIEW OF KHAN.

END QUOTED TEXT.

3. DEPARTMENT SECURITY OFFICER IS PROCEEDING THIS DATE TO LAS VEGAS TO JOINTLY INTERVIEW KHAIBAR KHAN (GOODARZIAN) TOGETHER WITH LAS VEGAS FBI FIELD OFFICE IN THE COMPANY OF LAWYER SCHWEIDEL. INTERVIEW WILL NOT COMMENCE UNTIL EARLY A.M. OF DECEMBER 30. RESULTS WILL BE PROVIDED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS. NEWSOM BT #7052

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SECRET

Following questions provided to Major General Gast by
Lt General Smith, Assistant to Chairman, Joint Chiefs
of Staff, via secure phone 18 December 1973. Questions
from Admiral Turner to Mr. Duncan, who in turn asked for
our inputs. Answers to be coordinated with Embassy (SRF).

1. What would prompt Shah to leave Iran temporarily?

2. What would prompt Shah to leave Iran permanently?

3. If the Shah were to leave permanently which military
leaders would leave with him?

4. If internal security situation deteriorated badly are
there likely to be attempts by the military to take control
out of the Shah's - Azhari's hands?

5. Is dissatisfaction within military more likely in flag
officer rank or colonel ranks or below - comment for each
service.

6. Who among retired military leaders are likely to be
interested in lending their names as part of opposition
coalition?

7. Which military officers of stature already have linked
with opposition? List by rank, tribal association, business
or other category.

8. British saying General Azhari making all or most decisions
exclusive of Shah. Do you see evidence of this?
PM AMBASSADOR TEHERAN
TO RUE/USICA WASHDC
INFO RUEC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2522
ET

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHERAN 12741

USICA

R.O. 12065: N/A

SUBJECT: THE U.S. IMAGE IN IRAN

1. ON THE BASIS OF RECENT EMBASSY SOURCES, MESSAGES, AND REPORTS OF VISITORS HERE, THOSE IN WASHINGTON WHO ARE FOLLOWING EVENTS IN IRAN RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT THE MESSAGE, NAMELY THAT THE UNITED STATES IS INCREASINGLY PERCEIVED BY THE IRANIANS AS BLAMeworthy FOR THEIR PRESENT DIFFICULTIES.


4. DESPITE THE READINESS AT THIS TIME TO BELIEVE THE
WORST OF US AS A GOVERNMENT (THOUGH PREFERABLE TO THE USSR), IRANIANS R ATE THE U.S. AS THE PREFERRED NICHE OF ANY IN THE WORLD FOR ITS POLITICAL SYSTEM, FOR STUDY, FOR LIVING THE GOOD LIFE, FOR FINDING SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MODERNIZATION.

5. HAVING OUTLINED THE ATTITUDE AND SOME OF ITS CAUSES, WHAT IF ANYTHING, CAN BE DONE BY WAY OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO MODIFY THE MORE EXTREME SENTIMENTS OF THE U.S. AND ITS IRANIAN CONNECTION IN THE ABSENCE OF MOST MEDIA, U.S. OFFICIAL POLICY STATEMENTS REGISTER WITH ONLY A HANDFUL, AND EVEN THIS HANDFUL INTERPRET DIFFERENTLY THE INTENT OF THE USG. MORE SALUTARY ARE CONSTRUCTIONS SUCH AS THE PRESIDENT UTTERED ON NOVEMBER 13, I.E., "OUR INCLINATION IS FOR THE IRANIAN PEOPLE TO HAVE A CLEAN EXPRESSION OF THEIR OWN VIEWS AND TO HAVE A GOVERNMENT IN IRAN THAT ACCURATELY EXPRESSES A MAJORITY VIEW IN IRAN.

LOW PROFILE, BUREAUCRATIC IN-COUNTRY ACTIVITIES SUCH AS ENGLISH TEACHING, AN OPEN DOOR LIBRARY, STUDENT COUNSELING AND ORIENTATION, CONTINUATION OF AS WIDE A RANGE OF KEY PERSONAL CONTACTS AS MANAGEABLE, PROVIDING MONTHLY AND BIWEEKLY PERIODICALS WHICH STRESS THE USG' S INTERNATIONAL POLICIES AND THE RELEVANCE OF ITS IRAN CONNECTION ARE THE TYPES OF COMMUNICATION PARE (SECURITY PERMITTING) WHICH WE CAN DISSEMINATE. TO MOUNT MAJOR SPEAKING SEMINARS, CULTURAL PROGRAMS, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD BE FOOLISH. WE AS AN AGENT AND A MISSION MUST FACE THE PROSPECT OF A CERTAIN ENTRAPMENT FROM OUR IRANIAN HOSTS FOR THE PRESENT AND IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

6. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO ADVISE THOSE IN THE U.S. POLICY ARTICULATION ROLE TO BE AWARE OF THE SPECIAL AND PROBLEMATIC COMMUNICATION RELATIONSHIP WHICH EXISTS AMONG US AND THESE DAYS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

SHELENGER

62741

-31-
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Improvements in the Quality and Relevance of Political Analysis

The Department believes that there are four areas where efforts can and should be made to improve the quality and relevance of political analysis over the coming months:

(1) Quality Control: A political intelligence review is in process for eight key countries where our interests would be seriously affected by unexpected changes in the political environment. All our diplomatic missions are working in association with the geographic bureaus. Through this process, we expect to have much tighter control over both the relevance and quality of field reporting as well as a clearer sense of the need for (a) strengthening and augmenting of political reporting officers and analysts in the Department and overseas, (b) providing TDY assistance to posts for special reporting requirements and (c) calling on outside scholars or advisors for supplementing information or for assistance in conducting independent field surveys.

(2) Resource Availability: Over the last few years there has been a steady decline in the number of political reporting officers in the Foreign Service, the number of analysts in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the funds available for local travel by political officers and analysts abroad. At the same time, the requirements we have placed on our missions for non-political reporting and analysis tasks have mounted steadily. It will not be possible to increase both long-term and in-depth reporting and analysis without expanding the resources available. We will look closely at our ability to reprogram within present resources but it may be necessary to look at the requirements for additional resources as well.
(3) Long-Term/Short-Term Intelligence Balance: Our present balance in basic intelligence reporting and analysis as opposed to immediately relevant policy reporting and analysis began to take shape early in the 1960s. At that time policy relevance began to take increasing precedence over fundamental research. The rationale was that the academic world could study the longer-term issues and provide from outside a data base for the policy analysts and reporting officers in the Department and elsewhere in the Government. This approach has worked reasonably well. At the same time, there has been a steady thinning out of our information base within the Government. Academic scholarship has not always focused on those issues we are interested in at critical times, nor is the quality of academic scholars even. Research on a particularly important subject may, therefore, either not have been done at all or done poorly. We need to review on an intelligence community-wide basis whether our analysts have the experience, training, and continuity of involvement on major countries and issues to provide the intelligence and analytic foundation necessary for both short term and longer term analysis. We will also be reviewing what further emphasis on basic political, sociological, cultural and economic background information is necessary, not only for our longer-term intelligence base, but so we are able to assess the reasons for political and social turbulence when it occurs and make sounder judgments on where it may lead and what we might do about it. We will address this issue in reviewing our Embassies' six month reporting programs described in (1) above.

(4) Completeness of Information: We have for many years, in many countries, and for many reasons, permitted our Missions to restrict the collection of intelligence information from certain sensitive sectors of the local political environment. The basic rationale for this has been a desire to avoid jeopardizing relations with Governments in power by meeting with individuals or groups opposing the governments. Usually these restrictions have been concurred in by responsible policy-level officers of the Department and elsewhere in the Government and often they have been necessary. We should focus our attention more sharply, however, on the costs and benefits of such
self-imposed constraints and ensure that wherever they exist or may in future be proposed, senior policy attention is devoted to considering whether they should be continued or not. The absence of reliable information on the views, attitudes, and policies of major political segments of the population of key countries can under some circumstances pose major problems for U.S. policy analysis and intelligence evaluation. We intend to conduct a review of such restraints in the next month for all our missions.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary
1. ACCORDING TO OUR INTELLIGENCE (UNTIL RECENTLY) NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED (NO ONE WANTED TO TALK), GOVERNMENT ORDER TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR ANAI, SHAYEGAN, A PROMINENT POPULIST REFORMER SUPPORTED BY H. YAZDI AND OTHERS, FOR THE RACE.

2. EMBASSY FILMS INDICATE THAT SHAYEGAN (TO PREPARE MATURELY KHOMEINI'S BASE) IS ONE OF THE IDEAS. MOUSADEG AND AHANDI, A REFORMIST (THE MOULHAFI), JUST AS KASHEHI WAS KILLED AS A TROUBLE BREAK WHICH CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE ULTIMATE DOWNFALL). KHAMENEI WOULD GET OUT ON A VISITING AMERICAN AND SO ON WITH THE OPPOSITION TO HIS BROADCAST, DESCRIBING SHAYEGAN AS AN INFLUENTIAL PERSON.

3. SAME INTERIM OFFICIALS ALSO SAID KHOMEINI HAS A LIST OF NO LESS THAN 10 BE ACCUSED OF CORRUPTION OR OTHER OFFENSES. IMPLICATION IS THAT PEOPLE RUPTURED KHOMEINI'S PEOPLE TOO. KHOMEINI TIME WE HAVE HEARD OF SUCH A LIST. FABRICATION OF THE ZADODI CABIN -- BY KHAMENEI. SULLIVAN
ACTION

ACTION:
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OR
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CONIDENTIAL STATE 278732

S.O. 12087: 305 1/5/7 (TWINAM, J.W.)

TAGS: PEER, KS, XP

SUBJECT: IRANIAN SITUATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT ASSET ANY CONVERSATIONS YOU MAY HAVE WITH COST
GOVERNMENT ON SITUATION IN IRAN COULD GET ASCEND TO SECURITY
CONCERNS OF AREAS STATES ON OTHER SIDE OF GULF IN THE MIND
OF IRANIAN DEVELOPMENTS. IN SOME DISCUSSIONS YOU MAY, OR
CONSERVE, ASK A LOT OF CONTROLLING U.S. INTERESTS AND
CONCERNS FOR OBSTACLE AND IRANIAN RESISTANCE STABILITY.

3. WHILE OUT LAST YEAR MODERATE REGIMES GAVE
SALT ALL SIGNS TO IRAN'S SECURITY CONCERNS THEY HAVE
COME UNDER VALUABLE. VALUELESS IN RETURNING, THEREFORE TELL
IN ANALYSIS, WHAT IT IS PROGRESS OF SALT REGRESS A TEND. IN
THE DISCUSSIONS, YOU COULD BE FACE OR CALLING POLICY
MAKERS IN THE INSTRUION IF YOU COULD TRY TO PULL OUT POST
OUTLOOKS IMMEDIATELY THE PAST MINUTES OF THE TERMS.

--- TO USE PUBLIC PRESS ON Efficient INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIONS.

TO TRY TO BEYOND ACTIVITIES, AMBITION INTEREST BY
SUPPERTING DEVOTEDMENT IRANIAN, SUCH AS IRAQ AND/OR ETC?

TO ONLY TAKE THE ACTUAL FOSSILS, INCOME POLICY
OPTIONS BY RATIONAL, SLOWLY-SUPPORTED VICTORY.

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-36-
--- IS THE REAL THREAT INTERNAL SUBVERSION BY A VARIETY OF ARAB NATIONALIST AND DISSIERT ELEMENTS, AND IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT DO MILITARY SECURITY MEASURES AS OPPOSED TO CONTINUED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORM MEET THIS THREAT?

4. IT WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTING TO PURSUE AS APPROPRIATE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS THE IMPACT OF IRANIAN DEVELOPMENTS ON THE PROSPECTS FOR CLOSER COOPERATION AMONG THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF, INCLUDING IRAQ AND SAUDI ARABIA, IN BOTH SECURITY FIELD AND BROADER ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL AREAS.

5. FOR ABU DHABI: ASSUME YOU WILL CONTINUE TO WEAVE INTO ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH UAE OFFICIALS ON REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS USG VIEW THAT A MAJOR ELEMENT IN INCREASING CO-OPERATION AMONG THE GULF STATES WILL BE SUSTAINED PROGRESS IN UAE TOWARD CREATING AN EFFECTIVE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. VANCE BT 53732

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-37-
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency

SUBJECT: Analysis of Security Assistance Programs - Iran

1. (C) This memorandum provides the results of an ARMS/MAAG preliminary review of the United States Security Assistance Program for Iran. As a result of recent Iranian economic difficulties, cash flow problems must be alleviated. Consequently, the objectives of this review are:

a. To analyze the current status of all FMS programs for Iran with particular attention to major weapons systems.

b. To identify feasible reprogramming actions for the new term which will be consistent with ODI fiscal resources.

c. To maintain an IIADF force posture consistent with the current/external threat and at the same time recognize the need for an acceptable degree of risk.

2. (C/NOFORN) Recent internal strife in Iran necessitated a reevaluation of the threat to the sovereignty of Iran as the first step to this review. The ARMS/MAAG revised threat assessment is provided below:

a. Internal Stability - The greatest threat to Iran is the instability of the government and the growing unrest within the military. Since the announcement of Ayatollah Khomeini that the present government is illegal, the Ba'ath government has continued to flounder on the political scene. The government is receiving little support from the populace. Strikes and demonstrations continue despite exhaustive efforts by the Ba'athist...
government to promote seemingly logical and beneficial programs. Recent
hard-nosking of the government to meet the Khomasini threat has caused fractures
in the National Front Organization. Bahlai will not relinquish his position
with the National Front Organization and his entourage. Coupled with this "bowed neck"
attitude is the military position of backing the present government or other
possessing the state until a solution can be made. It appears that the military
will initially back the Bahlai regime until a clear path to stability
can be found. Situated beneath the continuing unrest is subversion by
leftist elements. These elements will continue to plant seeds of discontent
in efforts to prolong the present ordeal, possibly driving the nation to a
state of total economic collapse. Such a state would require assist-
ance from the USSR and other communist nations, giving the leftist cause
a foothold in Iran and the oil fields. Superimposed on the entire national
scene is the proposed return of the Khomeini, an occasion which will
most probably result in open conflict between pro and con elements. Such
a conflict will fuel the unrest and may well initiate a military coup d'
etcetera. A military takeover, once it is achieved, will constitute an
epoch of disorder, unrest and continuing communist influences. The nation
will most probably face years of instability until mutual agreements and
support are applied to an all-out nation building effort.

While the Iranian Armed Forces have remained the principal stabilizing
influence in Iran, there are indications that continued support by conscript
military personnel is questionable. The Iranian military is faced with
conflicting loyalties to the chain of command and religious ties. This
issue is complicated by the confusion over the legitimacy of the current
government. Continued unified support by the military is essential to
overcoming the present internal strife in Iran.

b. Insurgency -- There continues to remain a problem of tribal minorities within Iran. National movements exist among the Kurds in the northwest and the Baluchis in the southeast. In each of these cases, the tribal groups are spread across national frontiers. Other groups, while cohesive as a tribe, do not have the developed national identity of the Kurds and Baluchis, although many have regarded H. I. M. as a father figure. In a situation of continuing turmoil within the country, a rising of national aspirations could be expected, especially if supported by an external power. The Kurds would not likely be expected to be supported by the Iraqis who have only recently defeated a Kurdish national movement. The Baluchi problem is spread over areas of Pakistan, and Afghanistan as well as Iran; therefore, it is unlikely that either of these countries would provide external support. The Soviet Union has never been loath to meddle in national movements, but would probably hesitate to excite the Kurds who also live within their borders. The Baluchis, however, represent an excellent target for Soviet penetration. Establishment of a Baluchistan friendly to the USSR would go a long way toward the Soviet goal of a penetration to the warm water ports in the Sea of Oman, including the developing port of Char Bahar.

c. Conventional attack -- In the near term little likelihood is foreseen of a major invasion of Iran by a foreign power. Continuing instability, however, creates an atmosphere wherein such action might be tempting. Afghanistan is still having difficulties in sorting out its own revolution. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates are too weak militarily to have aggressive aims. The Soviet Union, because of its role as a great power, would be unlikely to move, save in support of a Marxist government.
in Iran (perhaps by using the Cuban surrogates). Iraq remains the greatest threat to Iran, short of world conflagration. Any attack by Iraq would likely be limited, with the oil fields as the target. A decision to mount such an attack would require a weakened Iranian military force and some plausible reason to present to world opinion.

3. (C) The methodology for this review is discussed below:

   a. Based upon the above threat assessment the following priorities have been assigned to assure maintenance of the required military forces consistent with Iranian fiscal resources.

      Priority I: Maintenance of internal stability (for example: indigenous population control, protection of lines of communication and border surveillance).

      Priority II: Protection against an insurgency supported by a third country.

      Priority III: Protection of national boundaries against a conventional attack by a major force.

   b. Substantial reduction of GOI FMS annual cash flow can be achieved primarily by reprogramming (deferrment, suspension or cancellation) of new programs with outyear delivery. Consequently, program elements have been further subdivided into the following delivery categories:

      Category A: Followon support of delivered weapons systems/programs (i.e. F-5, TOW).

      Category B: Programs in process with deliveries scheduled prior to 21 March 1980 (predicated on Iranian fiscal year).
Category C: Programs in process with deliveries scheduled after
21 March 1980.

No review will also address:

(1) MAAG, TACP and other US personnel support requirements.

While this analysis is oriented on major programs, the proposals
will also consider significant individual PMG cases that may offer significant
cost savings.

d. The ARMISH MAAG recommended reprogramming actions are predicated
upon maintaining a balanced force to counter each of the perceived threats,
with the highest risk accepted for Priority III requirements.

e. The ARMISH MAAG recommended reprogramming actions are focused on
cost savings in the near term. In-country DOD and contractor levels of
personnel support have been reviewed to identify possible reductions and
consideration has been given to reduction of stockage levels to a minimum
consistent with the threat.
Reprogramming Action

Program ___________________________ Service ___________________________

Case ___________________________

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<th>Original $'s</th>
<th>Revised $'s</th>
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(a) Summary of Proposed Changes by FMS case line numbers:

(b) Revised program milestones and objectives based on proposed changes:

(c) Rational to include threat risk factor:

(d) Implementation Plan:
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F.O. 12965: GNS 1/6/85 (REECHT, HENRY)
TAGS: IR

SUBJECT: DRAFT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PARTIALLY CLEARED DRAFT HUMAN
   RIGHTS REPORT WHICH WE ANTICIPATE WILL BE DELIVERED TO
   CONGRESS END OF JANUARY IN UNCLASSIFIED FORM. WE WOULD
   APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGES
   BY OUR WASHINGTON TIME, JANUARY 11.

2. BEGIN TEXT: OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS IRAN HAS ENGAGED
   IN A PROGRAM OF RAPID ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION WHICH HAS
   TRANSFORMED THE LIVES OF MOST CITIZENS AND SHARPLY
   AFFECTED THE NATION'S SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND TRADITIONAL
   INSTITUTIONS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE POLITICAL
   INSTITUTIONS, HOWEVER, DID NOT KEEP PACE WITH THESE SIGN-
   IFICANT CHANGES. AS A CONSEQUENCE, AND BECAUSE OF SHADY
   ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, THIS YEAR HAS BEEN MARKED BY SERIOUS
   AND OFTEN VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS OF POPULAR DISCONTENT.

3. SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT
   HAS FELT ENDANGERED BY EXTERNAL THREATS AND INTERNAL SUB-
  VERSION. UNTIL ROUGHLY 1977 THE GOVERNMENT RELIED ON A
   RIGID PATTERN OF CONTROLS TO DEAL WITH THE PERCEIVED DANGER
   OF INTERNAL SUBVERSION. THESE CONTROLS WERE OFTEN INDIS-
   CRIMINATELY APPLIED AND, AS A CONSEQUENCE, VIOLATIONS OF
   HUMAN RIGHTS BY SECURITY FORCES WERE A FAIRLY COMMON-PLACE
   OCCURRENCE. THIS PATTERN BEGAN TO CHANGE GRADUALLY IN
   RECENT YEARS AND PARTICULARLY SINCE 1977, AS THE GOVERNMENT
   UNDERTOOK TO LIBERALIZE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. IN EARLY
   1977 THE GOVERNMENT ENDED THE SYSTEMATIC USE OF TORTURE
   IN PRISONS AND LATER SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF POLITICAL
   PRISONERS WERE RELEASED. UNTIL THE GROWING UNREST LED TO
   THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL IN SEPTEMBER, STEPS WERE
   ANNOUNCED TO OFFER GREATER DUE PROCESS PROTECTION, TO LIFT
   CENSORSHIP AND TO PERMIT GREATER POLITICAL EXPRESSION.

4. IN ADDITION, DURING 1978, PARTICULARLY IN THE SECOND
   HALF OF THE YEAR, THE SHAH BEGAN TO SHARE WITH OTHER
   GROUPS HIS ALMOST EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OVER MAJOR GOVERNMENT
   DECISIONS. INCREASINGLY, THE CABINET, THE PARLIAMENT AND
   MILITARY MARTIAL LAW AUTHORITIES APPEARED TO PLAY A PART
   IN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT DECISIONS. ON AUGUST 5, 1978, THE
   SHAH ANNOUNCED THAT THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR
   WOULD BE "100 PERCENT FREE" AND PROMISED FREEDOM OF THE
   PRESS, SPEECH, AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY. THE SHAH ALSO
   PROMISED FURTHER REFORMS OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM.
5. Despite this commitment, as unrest continued, government security forces sometimes used extreme violence in handling unarmed demonstrators, arbitrary arrests occurred and restrictions on many civil and political liberties continued. These tactics contributed to an atmosphere of confrontation and conflict.

6. The imposition of martial law in September and its accompanying severe controls were both preceded and followed by periods of greatly relaxed restrictions on public debate. With the appointment of a military-led government in early November, subject to martial law controls on all political activity again were enforced, but widespread protests against the regime have continued.

7. These demonstrations were met by armed force as the security organs of the government sought to ban public protest activity. Possibly several thousand persons were killed, several times that number injured, substantial damage was done to property—by both pro- and anti-Shah forces. Numerous arrests were made, and there was a recurrence of reports of mistreatment of detainees.

1. Respect for the integrity of the person, including freedom from:

   A. Torture

The Iranian penal code prohibits torture and provides severe penalties for violators. However, this prohibition was frequently ignored by security forces in the past. Almost two years ago, the Shah announced that torture would no longer be used in the interrogation of prisoners. Its systematic use clearly ended in prisons. However, charges continue that torture is being used during initial interrogations in police stations, particularly outside Tehran. Amnesty International reported that a mission it had sent to Iran in November heard reports of numerous examples of torture used during interrogations and as punishment for political activities. These instances of torture do not appear to have high government sanction and their occurrence may reflect an erosion of discipline. The government has dismissed officials of Savak, the secret police, reportedly for using torture in the past.

B. Cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of punishment

There have been numerous instances of harsh, often brutal treatment by security forces of demonstrators protesting.
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN BRUTAL ASSAULTS BY OPPOSITION GROUPS ON GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THESE KINDS OF INCIDENTS, WHICH BECAME MORE FREQUENT AT THE END OF THE YEAR, OCCURRED MAINLY IN STREET CLASHES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT FORCES AND OPPOSITION SUPPORTERS. NO PRECISE ESTIMATE OF THOSE KILLED IN SUCH CLASHES IS YET AVAILABLE; ROUGH ESTIMATES FOR THE ENTIRE YEAR RANGE BETWEEN ONE THOUSAND TO OVER SEVEN THOUSAND KILLED WITH A SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER NUMBER OF PERSONS INJURED. THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE REGARDING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE HELD IS SCANTY. THERE WERE REPORTS (SOME OF THEM BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH SEVERAL FORMER PRISONERS) THAT CONDITIONS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPROVED DURING THE YEAR. NEVERTHELESS, AN EXTENDED STRIKE IN THE SPRING BY PERSONS HELD IN A PRISON NEAR TEHRAN TOOK PLACE, SUGGESTING THAT THE PROCESS IS NOT YET COMPLETE. Moreover, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL IN THE REPORT BASED ON ITS NOVEMBER MISSION NOTED "INDISCRIMINATE POLICE BRUTALITY FOLLOWING ARREST OR DETENTION." THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN OFTEN THE CASE.

C. ARBITRARY ARREST OR IMPRISONMENT


DESPITE THE STATED INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO REINFORCE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF ACCUSED PERSONS, SAVAK STILL APPEARS TO COMPLY WITH THE FUNCTIONS OF BOTH POLICE AND EXAMINING MAGISTRATE. DETAINEES HAVE BEEN DENIED COUNSEL FOR EXTENDED PERIODS AND SOMETIMES PERMITTED ONLY SEVERELY RESTRICTED OR NO CONTACT WITH FAMILY AND FRIENDS.
D. DENIAL OF FAIR PUBLIC TRIAL

Civil and criminal cases, with the exception of those involving state security, are tried in a civilian court system in which civil rights are fully guaranteed. Persons charged with political and security offenses were until 1978 tried in military courts. The accused had no freedom to choose counsel and the proceedings took place in camera. Early in 1978, the government announced reforms which included trials in civilian courts for political offenders and gave greater freedom in the choice of counsel. While not fully implemented, the number of political defendants tried and subsequently acquitted increased. The effectiveness of the reforms is open to some question, however. In Mazar-e-Sharif during the summer, 38 persons were arrested for a political offense; tried in a civilian court and acquitted. They were subsequently seized by Savak and ordered to stand trial in a military court. Fifteen of those arrested appear to remain in detention. In addition, the International League of Human Rights reported that its mission to Iran had revealed that political offenders continue to be tried by military courts, the reforms notwithstanding. Moreover, during the strike of oil facilities which occurred in the fall, the government announced that striking workers who refused to return to work would be charged with sabotage and tried before a "special tribunal"; the Department of State has no further information regarding this development.

E. INVASION OF HOME

Iran's constitutional law of 1977 states: "Everyone's house and dwelling is protected and safeguarded. No one may enter forcibly into any dwelling except by order of and in conformity with the law." In normal practice, police must apply to a local magistrate for a warrant if they wish to search a house. Security elements have acted in some instances without a warrant. In May, for example, Iranian soldiers forced their way into a religious leader's home and killed two persons seeking refuge there. The government immediately apologized for this action and asserted that it was carried out by inexperienced troops who were disciplined for this violation of human rights.

Earlier in the year, bombs were placed outside the homes of
OF DISSIDENT LEADERS AND SEVERAL WERE BEATEN OR THREATENED WITH VIOLENCE, WHILE THE MAFIA FACTORS WERE NEVER IDENTIFIED, THEY WERE SUSPECTED TO BE LINKED TO THE SECURITY POLICE.

2. GOVERNMENT POLICIES RELATING TO THE FULFILLMENT OF SUCH VITAL NEEDS AND FOOD, SHELTER, HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION


PER CAPITA INCOME HAD REACHED ABOUT $2,400 BY THE BEGINNING OF 1979. THE MAJOR LAND REFORM PROGRAM BEGUN IN THE 1960S NOT ONLY ENDED IRAN'S FEUDAL TENURE SYSTEM BUT BENEFITTED A THIRD OF THE POPULATION DIRECTLY AND ANOTHER 30 PERCENT INDIRECTLY. HEALTH SERVICES HAVE BEEN EXTENDED TO RURAL AREAS AND SERIOUS EFFORTS TO REDUCE ILLITERACY HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN. LIFE EXPECTANCY HAS BEEN RAISED FROM 41 TO 53 YEARS.

THE ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE HAVE NOT YET BEEN SUFFICIENT TO MEET A VARIETY OF NEEDS AND THEIR INCOMPLETE CHARACTER HAS CONTRIBUTED MATERIALLY TO THE STRIFE WHICH MARKED MUCH OF 1978. WHEN EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON INDUSTRIALIZATION, AGRICULTURE FAILED TO GROW. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL INCOME WIDENED FROM 2:1 IN 1959 TO 3:1 IN 1978. THE POPULATION OF IRAN'S CITIES HAS GROWN TOO SWIFTLY FOR AVAILABLE HOUSING AND SERVICES. INCOME DISTRIBUTION IS INEQUITABLE: THE MOST PROSPEROUS TWENTY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION RECEIVED 63.5 PERCENT OF INCOME IN 1975, UP FROM 57.5 IN 1972; THE MIDDLE 40 PERCENT WENT FROM 35 PERCENT IN 1972 TO 25.5 IN 1975; THE POOREST 40 PERCENT WENT FROM 11.5 TO 11 PERCENT. AS THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE POINTED OUT IN A JULY 1977 STUDY...
"While government revenues and expenditures, real net national income, and capital formation have increased considerably, growth has not been balanced, waste has been extensive and the physical and social infrastructure has lagged behind objectives. Middle and low cost housing has been in short supply, and housing objectives have remained far from being met. It had been hoped that Iran's incident inflation could be arrested during 1975-1976 with price controls and fixed profit margins, but shortages and an accompanying black market developed."

Inequalities in wealth, income and opportunity have alienated youth and the intelligentsia. Perhaps corruption has done as much as any other factor to erode the accomplishments of development. Many Iranians believe that it has been widespread, reaching into the highest levels of the government. There have been arrests of former Cabinet ministers. The impact of corruption charges led the Shah to issue a code of conduct for the royal family which banned their involvement in any business or charity.

3. RESPECT FOR CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES, INCLUDING:

A. FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, SPEECH, PRESS, RELIGION AND ASSEMBLY

Iranian law prohibits the advocacy of communism, attacks on the monarchy or the basic tenets of the political system, and the advocacy of violence. The interpretations given at any particularly time by the authorities as to what constitutes violations of these prohibitions have in some instances limited freedom of speech, press and assembly. In 1972, however, the government periodically permitted critical comment in pamphlets, at public gatherings, in the media, and in Parliament.

Foreign language publications of many viewpoints, including some critical of Iran and the Shah, were circulated widely. Domestic newspapers and journals were "until this year, controlled closely by the restrictions noted above and received government guidance on such sensitive issues as foreign policy and security matters. While criticism of the constitution, the monarchy and the Shah-People revolution remains proscribed, the press through much of 1972 was permitted substantially greater latitude to print articles and editorials critical of the government. After a period of generous freedom, restrictions on newspapers and journals were tightened immediately following the imposition of martial law in September. Controls were later relaxed again. However, with the appointment of the military government in November and the imposition of new controls over the press, journalists and other newspaper employees refused to work. Thus, during November and December, the regular Iranian press was effectively shut down."
RADIO AND TELEVISION ARE GOVERNMENT-OWNED, AND THUS GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED. HOWEVER, DURING THE COURSE OF 1978, THEY WERE ALLOWED TO CARRY COMMENT CRITICAL OF THE GOVERNMENT; FOR INSTANCE, THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE IN SEPTEMBER WHICH WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY HIGHLY DEROGATORY CHARGES AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. WHEN EFFORTS TO REIMPose TIGHTER CONTROL WERE MADE IN NOVEMBER, STAFF AT THE RADIO AND TELEVISION FACILITIES STRUCK IN REFUSAL TO ACCEPT CENSORSHIP.

STRIKES IN IRAN ARE ILLEGAL, BUT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF WILDCAT WALKOUTS OCCURRED, AND IN THE LAST QUARTER OF 1978 MUCH OF THE COUNTRY WAS PARALYZED BY STRIKES IN ALL SECTORS.

THE SHI'A SECT OF ISLAM PREDOMINATES IN IRAN BUT THE COUNTRY HAS HAD A LONG HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION WHICH HAS ALLOWED SUCH RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AS CHRISTIANS, JEWS, ZOROASTRIANS AND MEMBERS OF THE BAHAI'S SECT TO PRACTICE THEIR BELIEFS OPENLY AND TO PARTICIPATE FULLY IN PUBLIC LIFE. ONE CONSEQUENCE OF THE STRIFE IN 1978 HAS BEEN PRESSURE FROM CONSERVATIVE SHI'A RELIGIOUS LEADERS AGAINST BAHAI'S WHO ARE VIEWED BY THE SHI'AS AS HETHERICS. AS A RESULT OF THIS PRESSURE, THE GOVERNMENT REMOVED SEVERAL OF ITS OFFICIALS WHO ARE BAHAI'S. THERE HAVE BEEN Instances OF PERSONAL ASSAULTS AGAINST BAHAI'S BY MUSLIMS, ESPECIALLY IN SHIRAZ. OTHER MINORITIES CONTINUE TO ENJOY OFFICIAL PROTECTION AND TOLERATION: 'NEVERTHELESS THEY FEAR PERSECUTION UNDER CONDITIONS OF DISORDER AND SOME EAR PERSECUTION UNDER CONDITIONS OF DISORDER AND SOME

WOMEN BENEFITED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM GOVERNMENT PROTECTION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS DURING THE PAST 20 YEARS.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO PERSONS SEEN BY THE IRANIAN AUTHORITIES AS ADVOCATING SUBVERSION, VIOLENCE OR COMMUNIST DOCTRINES. THESE RE- strictions have been particularly tight on university campuses and have led periodically to clashes between security forces and student and other dissidents. THE GROWTH OF POPULAR DISCONTENT DURING 1978 HAS, HOWEVER, MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS SECURITY FORCES TO PREVENT, MUCH LESS CONTROL, UNAUTHORIZED ASSEMBLIES.
B. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN THE COUNTRY, INTERNA travels, TRAVEL AND EMIGRATION

The large majority of Iranians have normally enjoyed extensive freedom of movement within Iran and abroad. Some members of the opposition, however, perhaps as many as 100, were required to remain in villages and other points remote from their homes. The government has on occasion denied passports to persons whom it suspected would, while abroad, engage in anti-government activities.

During 1978, a few opposition figures were denied exit permits, but others were free to leave; several in the latter group visited the United States and countries in Europe where they publicly criticized the Iranian government.

The ability of the average citizen to travel abroad was restricted only by his ability to pay a $350 exit tax and, in the case of wives and children under 18, the need to obtain permission from the husband or father. This latter provision of law reflects the strong Islamic heritage of Iran.

Iranian law does not provide for emigration. However, Iranians who acquire citizenship in another country without previously informing the government of Iran may apply to the government for recognition of their new citizenship status. Approval of such applications is normally extended. Also, Iranian citizens over 25 years old who have completed their military obligations may submit a renunciation of citizenship, which requires the approval of the council of ministers.

C. FREEDOM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

Iran is a constitutional monarchy. It has a bicameral legislature: the members of the lower house, the Majlis, are elected by full adult suffrage as are one-half of the members of the Senate; the remaining one-half are chosen by the Shah. The powers of the legislature are limited, and power and decision-making have been primarily vested with the Shah.

In 1976, a single political party (resurgence), encompassing all Iranians, was created by fiat and until 1978 was the only political party permitted to operate in Iran. Resurgence was seen as a means to mobilize support for the government's development and modernization programs. In August, the Shah, in the face of growing unrest, lifted the prohibition on other political parties. The formation of thirty new political groups was immediately announced; over 100 were eventually announced. The imposition of martial law in September, however, curtailed formal party
ACTIVITIES.

4. GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE AND RECORD REGARDING INTERNATIONAL AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Iranian government cooperated during the year with the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Commission of Jurists, both of which sent representatives to Iran to inquire into human rights conditions. The government has not exhibited the same spirit of cooperation towards Amnesty International. However, an Amnesty International mission visited Iran in November and was able to conduct numerous interviews which led to charges of continuing torture and brutality by Iranian security elements. A two-member team from the International League for Human Rights also visited Iran in November where it found discrepancies regarding the release of political prisoners and the right of political offenders to be tried by civilian courts. WAVE

RT #5366
ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT AND OTHER AGENCIES HAVE ALREADY
RELEASED SOME UNCLASSIFIED HELP IN SUPPLEMENTARY
AND OTHER AGENCIES HAVE ALREADY
HELPED TO CONTINUE THE USE OF POLITICAL
INCREASED POLITICAL REPORTING OUT TO THE

SUBJECT TO ENTAILS' COMMUNICATION WITH THE
DAVID PATTENSON FOR 9 WEEKS BEFORE HEON.

NOLO. PATTENSON MUST RETURN TO DEPARTMENT ON

1. WE FEEL THAT PATTERSON IS ABLE TO BE

2. ORGANIZATION, IDENTITY, AND LINK TO POLITICAL LEADERS

3. POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE U.S.

4. BOTH OF THESE AREAS WOULD BE INTERESTING IN ANY

5. PLEASE LET US KNOW WHETHER WE CAN PROCEED

CONFIDENTIAL

-53-
The Ambassador began the meeting by noting that this morning's sensational headlines on a change in U.S. policy are not exactly accurate. By the same token Bernard Gwertzman's New York Times piece is not the truth either. At any rate, the Ambassador is now communicating by secure telephone with Washington rather than by cable.

The Ambassador said that the oil and pipeline business is very strange of late. It is difficult to determine which pipelines and which refineries are open. The British have a ship going into Chah Bahar which is willing to help some of the American workers depart Iran. Mr. Bannerman said that the British had made this offer, mainly to Brown and Root, who politely declined. Brown and Root has its own transportation capability.

Ambassador Sullivan said that he has heard many stories that Martial Law will he lifted in Isfahan. The Ambassador fears that if Rakhtiar moves too fast on this the consequences could be very serious.

Mr. Shellenberger commented that the word "anarchy" keeps cropping up lately. Yesterday the NIRT Director and numerous key deputies resigned. An editor at Kayhan told Mr. Shellenberger that there is virtually no control on the stories being run in that newspaper. The Technical University of Tehran may open in the next couple of days, but only for rallying and demonstrating. Many "Khomeini stores" are springing up in south Tehran. These sometimes mobile outlets give away kerosene for free and sell foodstuffs for half-price.

Mr. John Mills said that the Econ/Commercial section is trying to get a reading on industry in Tehran. Out of a sample of 30 companies, only 15 answered their phones. Of this 15 only four were operating (mainly food and construction entities).

Mr. Lammakis said that Bakhtiar has asked for two months in which to get Iran on the move again. POL heard report that massive demonstrations are planned for January 19 and 27. 266 other political prisoners are being released.

Mr. Neeley reported that the Australians delivered a shipload of live sheep. They are probably walking to Tehran.
The situation at the airport is quite unsettled due to precarious weather conditions.

S/A: LTracey/bj

AMR/DC1, GR, POL, CHIEF, AMR/ERAN, ECON, ADMIN, BAIT, ICA, CM, CONS, DFA, MBA/IRN, ITR/IVA, IFG/IVI, TABBIZ, SHIRAZ
E.O. 12665: RDS-4 1/9/89 (LAMBRAXIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P
TAGS: PNS, IR
SUBJECT: RELIGIOUS LEADERS FEAR DEPARTURE OF SHAH

1. EMBASSY KEEPS GETTING REPORTS FROM VARIOUS SOURCES THAT MODERATE RELIGIOUS LEADERS ARE VERY CONCERNED BY SITUATION THAT IS LIKELY TO ARISE WHEN SHAH LEAVES THE COUNTRY. THESE ARE NOT VERY COHERENT OR WELL REASONED, AND THE MOTIVES INVOLVED ARE NOT ALWAYS CLEAR. GENERAL FEAR SEEMS TO BE, HOWEVER, THAT MODERATES' INFLUENCE WILL BE SWEEP AWAY EITHER BY MILITARY TAKEOVER OR BY VICTORY OF COMMUNIST AND LEFT-LEANING FORCES.

2. ONE SOURCE OF THESE REPORTS IS INTERMEDIARY MANSUR RAZAI, AN AMERICAN EDUCATED YOUNG BUSINESSMAN, SCHOAL OF ZORAL FAMILY, WHO HAS IN RECENT WEEKS THREATENED HIMSELF INTO THE ROLE OF MEDIATING BETWEEN DR. HAJAZI, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE RELIGIOUS MODERATES, AND THE QUEEN. HE TOLD POL CONUNSELOR ABOUT A WEEK AGO THAT RELIGIOUS MODERATES HAVE MADE THEIR DEMANDS IN WRITING, WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE DEPARTURE OF THE SHAH, JUST CONSTITUTIONAL RULE. A FEW DAYS AGO HE SAID HE WAS GOING TO WORK CLOSER WITH ZAHEDI. MOST RECENTLY HE HAS EXPRESSED FRICTION THAT THE PALACE AND ZAHEDI HAVE BEEN "PLAYING WITH HIM." HE SAYS HE TRIED TO ARRANGE MEETING BETWEEN ZAHEDI AND HAJAZI OR SHAHIAT-MADANI, BUT ZAHEDI POSTPONED IT AT LAST MOMENT (ZORAL SEEMS UNAWARE OF SHAH'S PLANS TO SHELVE ZAHEDI).

3. ZORAL INSISTS RELIGIOUS MODERATES ARE ANGRY AT ZAMANINI FOR PUTTING THEM IN PRESENT DIFFICULT POSITION BUT DO NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. HE SAYS HE HAS BEEN PRESSING THEM TO APPROACH AMERICANS MOST ANXIOUSLY, SINCE THEY CANNOT HOPE TO RUN THE COUNTRY WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM ONE OF THE TWO SUPER POWERS.

4. A FEW DAYS AGO SECRETARY OF THE SENATE ARTIN APPROACHED EMBASSY'S POLITICAL ADVISER WITH REPORT THAT AYATOLLAS MILANI (WHOSE STRENGTH LIES IN MASJAD AND WHO HAS BEEN INTERNALLY RIVALLED BY GOV'T AT LEAST TWICE) HAD BEEN COMPLAINING TO HIM ABOUT DETERIORATION IN THE SITUATION AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT THE SHAH WILL NOT LEAVE THE COUNTRY. ARTIN SAID MILANI WANTED CONTACT WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY AND "IS APP TRYING TO WORK THIS OUT IN THE SLOW PERSIAN MANNER." ARTIN ALSO SAID COMMUNIST MILLETS HAVE SURROUNDED ZAHEDI, SHAHIAT-MADANI AND OTHER TWO COM (AYATOLLAS), MAKING IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR PEOPLE TO SEE THEM.

5. COMMENT: THESE TWO REPORTS FIT IN WITH OTHER CONVE-
CONFIDENTIAL/LIMITED

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMITED

CONFIDENTIAL/LIMITED
1. GIVEN EXTREMELY CHAOTIC SITUATION IN IRAN, EMBASSY COMMENDS AUTHORS OF DRAFT REPORT FOR HANDLING COMPLEX PROBLEMS IN AN EFFECTIVE MANNER. WE HAVE ONLY TWO LANGUAGE CHANGES TO SUGGEST, BUT WOULD ALSO OFFER A COUPLE OF OBSERVATIONS WHICH MIGHT EITHER BE INCORPORATED INTO REPORT IF SOME EVENTUALITIES COME TO PASS, OR USED AS BACKGROUND FOR TESTIMONY OR OTHER PRESENTATIONS.

2. SUGGESTED LANGUAGE CHANGES: IN PARA SIX, LAST SENTENCE, STRIKE OUT WORD "STRICT." MARTIAL LAW CONTROLS ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY WERE IN THEORY VERY TIGHT, BUT IN PRACTICE QUITE LAX. IN FACT, MARTIAL LAW REGIME ITSELF HAS BEEN SO MILD AS TO ALMOST BERE THE NAME, DESPITE OPPOSITION CHARGES TO THE CONTRARY AND SOME NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS FLEXIBILITY IN MASHAD AND QAZVIN OVER PAST TWO WEEKS. UNDER PARA 7 (1) C, ARBITRARY ARREST, FINAL SENTENCE SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ: "MOOORE, DURING THE STRIKE OF OIL FACILITIES WHICH OCCURRED IN THE FALL OF 1978, THE GOI ANNOUNCED THAT STRIKING WORKERS WHO REFUSED TO RETURN TO WORK WOULD BE CHARGED WITH SABOTAGE AND TRIED BEFORE A SPECIAL TRIBUNAL. THIS WAS IN FACT NEVER DONE. GOI ANNOUNCEMENT IN THIS CASE TURNS OUT TO HAVE BEEN PSYWAR, AND WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF BAZARJAN AGREEMENT IN EARLY JANUARY, 1978, ALL PARTIES AGREE THERE WILL BE NO TRIALS UNDER EARLIER ANNOUNCEMENT.

3. REPORT OF COURSE DOES NOT GO INTO DISINTEGRATION OF SOCIAL FABRIC WHICH HAS TAKEN PLACE IN IRAN OVER PAST THREE--FOUR MONTHS, NOR SHOULD IT. NEVERTHELESS, EFFECT OF UNRAVELING OF AUTHORITY HAS BEEN BREAKDOWN IN ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND SOME INEVITABLE HAPHAZARDNESS IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF A SYSTEM WHICH WAS ALREADY UNDER SEVERE STRAIN, LARGELY DUE TO EFFORTS OF RECENT JUSTICE MINISTER MAJAD, SITUATION HAS BEEN ROUGHLY CONTROLLED. NEW BAKHTIAR JUSTICE MINISTER, YAHYA SADEQ-VAZIRI, ALSO A RESPECTED JURIST, WILL HAVE INEVITABLE PROBLEMS GETTING HIS ACT ORGANIZED IN STEMI-REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION--IF HE LASTS IN OFFICE LONG ENOUGH TO TRY.

4. ABOVE WILL BE COMPLICATED BY FACT THAT CAMPAIGN AGAINST CORRUPTION IS SINGLE BIGGEST POLITICAL ISSUE FACING COUNTRY, AND WILL BE FIRST ONE PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR HAS STATED HE WILL TACKLE WHEN CONFIRMED. MOOD OF COUNTRY, ACCORDING TO OUR KEY LAWYERS AND LEGAL TEACHERS, "WOULD PUSH" GOI INTO
SHOW TRIALS OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES OF FORMER REGIME ON CORRUPTION AND OTHER CHARGES. NUMBER OF IRANIANS WHO HAVE BEEN CRITICAL OF IMPACT OF U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY WILL BE WATCHING VERY CAREFULLY TO SEE IF U.S. IS AS STRONG IN DEFENSE OF RIGHTS OF EX-ESTABLISHMENTARIANS AS IT WAS FORMERLY IN DEFENSE OF OPPOSITIONISTS.

5. FORTUNATELY, LOW-KEY U.S. APPROACH TAKEN TO DATE IN IRAN ON HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS WILL LEND ITSELF TO PRIVATE EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN, SHOULD THIS BECOME NECESSARY, IN QUARTERS WHICH MAY BE HELPFUL IN AVOIDING OR AT LEAST MUTING EXCESSES. CONVERSELY, SINCE PRIVATE GROUPS HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN VOCAL IN SUPPORT OF RIGHTS FOR OPPOSITION FIGURES, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO US IF THEY KEPT UP INTEREST IN IRANIAN DUE PROCESS, REGARDLESS OF WHO DEFENDANTS MIGHT HAPPEN TO BE. GIVEN GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION SENSITIVITY TO THESE GROUPS, THIS COULD ALSO EXERCISE CONSTRUCTIVE PRESSURE AGAINST LEGAL EXTREMISM. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT MIGHT BE NOTED THAT COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOM (CDHF) HAS NOW AGREED TO "COOPERATE WITH" JUSTICE MINISTRY IN ESTABLISHMENT OF FULL JUDICIAL RIGHTS FOR PEOPLE. SULLIVAN

PT

#0574

CONFIDENTIAL/STADIS

TEHRAN 0574

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CONFIDENTIAL/STADIS

TEHRAN 0574
SECRET

CO RUOHR
DE RUHC 0711 0144014
ZNY SSSSS ZZ
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PM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL IN EERIAL AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS

ACTION: POL3
INFO: AMB, DCM, ADM, ECON2, BH, OR, ICA
CRU2 R 8

SECRET STATE 010711

RUHC, STUTTGART FOR ELG
C.O. 22569: GDS 1-13-85 (MARTIN, ROBERT)

TAGS: PINS, IR

SUBJECT: I'AHN SITREP NO. 91, 1-13-79, 1600 HOURS EST
- 8 HOURS EST
- POLITICAL/SECURITY

THE FOLLOWING HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN NAMED TO THE REGENT COUNCIL:

SECRET

-60-
-- PRIME MINISTER BAKHTIAR;
-- PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE SADJADI;
-- SPEAKER OF THE MAJLES SAID;
-- IMPERIAL COURT MINISTER ARDALAN;
-- MOHAMMAD VARASTEH, A FORMER MINISTER;
-- SITTED JALLAL TEHERANI, A FORMER SENATOR;
-- NIOC PRESIDENT SHTEZAN;
-- SCE CHIEF GENERAL GHARABAGI; AND
-- DR. ABDOL HOSEYN ALIABAD, A JUDGE.

-- AFP FROM TEHRAN REPORTS THE FORMATION OF THE COUNCIL
ALSO, BUT HAS A DIFFERENT NINTH NAME, THAT OF SUPREME
COURT CHIEF JUSTICE YEGHANEH, INSTEAD OF DR. ALIABAD. THE
CONSTITUTION DOES INDEED CALL FOR INCLUSION OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICE

-- THE KIASSY JUDGES A COUNCIL OF THIS COMPOSITION WOULD
NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE OPPOSITION,
SUCH AS THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT
(LHI), BECAUSE IT CONTAINS TOO MANY "ESTABLISHMENT"
FIGURES, THE OPPOSITION WAS ASKED ABOUT FILLING POSTS ON
THE COUNCIL BUT HAD TURNED DOWN THE INQUIRIES.

-- THE OPPOSITION, ACCORDING TO THE LMI, WOULD NOT OBJECT
TO THE COUNCIL UNTIL THE SHAH HAD LEFT IRAN. THEN THE
COUNCIL WOULD SEEK TO REPLACE OR MODIFY THE COUNCIL
INTO A "COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" WHICH WOULD
ESTABLISH A CABINET ACCEPTABLE TO KHOMEINI, SUPERVISE A
REFERENDUM ON THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY, AND OVERSEE ELECTIONS
FOR A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY.

-- KHOMEINI ANNOUNCED TODAY THE FORMATION IN IRAN OF AN
ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WITHOUT REVEALING NAMES,
AND TERMINED THE SHAH'S REGENCY COUNCIL "ILLEGAL."

-- KHOMEINI HAS BEEN INTERVIEWED FOR CBS' "FACE THE NATION"
WHICH WILL APPEAR JANUARY 14. EXCERPTS WERE CARRIED
BY CBS JANUARY 12. KHOMEINI SAID:

-- AN ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAN IS VERY CLOSE;
-- A NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ANNOUNCED "PROBABLY IN A
FEW DAYS."
-- HE WOULD APPOINT THE GOVERNMENT;
-- HE WOULD "SUPERVISE AND DIRECT THE GOVERNMENT";
-- IN EFFECT HE WOULD BE THE STRONGMAN OF IRAN;
-- IF IT CAME TO A CIVIL WAR THE MASSES WOULD FIGHT FOR
INSTALLATION OF AN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC.
-- AN OFFICER OF THE IMPERIAL IRANIAN NAVY (IIN) HAS TOLD OUR DAO THAT IF THE WRONG GOVERNMENT WERE TO TAKE POWER THE IIN WOULD TAKE ITS SHIPS AND DEPART IRAN. IF THINGS CAME TO THIS PASS, THE NUMBER OF SHIPS INVOLVED WOULD BE ABOUT 25. IF THE FORMER ITALIAN LINER MICHELANGELO (OWNED AND BEING USED BY THE IIN TO PROVIDE NEEDED BILLETING SPACE AT BANDAR ABBAS) WERE INCLUDED A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF IIN PERSONNEL COULD BE INCLUDED.

-- THE DAO FURTHER REPORTS THE RECENT CANCELLATION BY THE IIN OF AN EXERCISE WITH COMIDEAST FOR WHICH THE IIN HAD ORIGINALLY REQUESTED. THE REASON GIVEN FOR CANCELLATION WAS THAT NUMEROUS IIN SHIPS REQUIRED U KEPP BEFORE A FORTHCOMING UNSCHEDULED AT SEA PERIOD. ADDITIONALLY, ALL IIN HARPOON MISSILES HAVE BEEN LOADED ON TO LAUNCHERS ABOARD SHIP, AND EXTRA HEAVY SECURITY HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE PORT AREAS OF BANDAR ABBAS AND BUSHEHR. A SIGNIFICANT OBTAINED VISAS FOR THEIR FAMILIES TO TRAVEL TO THE U.S. MOST OTHER IIN OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES, SUCH AS THE UK AND ITALY, FOR WHICH ENTRY VISAS FOR THEIR WIVES AND CHILDREN ARE NOT REQUIRED. VANCE SI 6711 SECRET
Public schools throughout Iran have been closed virtually since the beginning of the academic year four months ago, and consequently the Community School may have been the only school open in the country. Security considerations (rumors were that the school was "targeted" because it alone was open) and the impending loss of some expatriate teachers who will be departing Iran prompted a recent Parent-Teachers' Association meeting to decide the fate of the school.

Shiraz's International Community School is affiliated with Pahlavi University, with classes for grades kindergarten through twelve. Instruction is in English. The school is intended to provide education for the English-speaking children of the staff at the university. Approximately 40% of the children are the products of marriages between Iranian professors at the university and foreigners (predominantly American). The rest are sons and daughters of Iranians who either have been exposed to English from a very early age, usually because their parents were pursuing degrees abroad, or whose parents wish them to be educated in English. Many want eventually to send their children abroad to study and feel that an early start in English will give them a leg up.
The first speaker was a dean of one of the faculties at the university, and he emphasized three points: The first was security. He argued that since the school was the only one in Iran remaining open and because of the foreign influences it exhibits, it was a logical target for demonstrations or even terrorist attacks. His second point concerned the quality of education. Because the school had maintained only a partial schedule in recent weeks and the departure of some of the staff was imminent, he felt it possible that the quality of instruction could suffer further if the school was kept open. His third point dealt with solidarity. He wondered if the Community School's students should not show their support for the "cause" by closing the school. After all, he contended, every other school in Iran was closed, and nearly every business and industry was idled. It would seem a slap in the face of the movement for their school to remain open.

One mother rose to ask about partial refund of the sizable tuition (over $2,000 per year) if the school closed. Her question was met with general contempt as being irrelevant.

The next speaker, a medical doctor and professor at the school of medicine, readdressed the security question. He said, "There are now guerrillas in town who are trying to discredit the revolution. An attack on a school would be an ideal way to paint an unfavorable picture of the movement in the eyes of the international press." A small minority greeted his remarks with disapproval.

The American wife of an Iranian professor suggested that to keep the school open it be held in various homes, thereby reducing the threat to the children's security. Another parent protested that the anti-cause guerrilla operations were so pervasive that they would soon learn where each class was being held.

An Iranian mother then rose. She said that the kids could learn more from participation in the revolution than by attending school. She felt that the children should be out in the streets with the people. This mother, whose own brood is enrolled at the Community School, also complained that by attending an English-language, international school, the children could never get to know their own culture (sic)!

An Iranian father, a medical doctor, then took the floor. He felt that they would be holding back both the revolution and
the development of the nation by closing the school and
ignoring the education of their children. He wondered where
the future leaders of Iran would come from if the child-
ren's educations were slighted now. He was hooded down.

Of those parent attending, a majority favored closing the
school for security reasons and to demonstrate solidarity
with the many businesses and institutions on strike. Those
most interested in keeping the school open were American
mothers. It is not surprising that this particular group
would be so politicized. Universities have long been the
focus point of political activity within Iran. It is inter-
esting, however, that a group composed of college profes-
sors and their families would consider education so sec-
ondary to revolutionary fervor. Both the tone and the sub-
stance of the meeting indicated more interest in building
the strength of the cause than in building a stable, pro-
gerative society. It is not only university professors that
feel this way, and the apparent willingness of various
groups to compromise their varied ideals and goals does
not enhance the prospect for resumption of stability in
Iran.
CONCLUSION

CONCLUSIONS

We cannot see any relationship between these events and the personal conduct of the
rationalists.

6. FALL FOUND IT STRANGE THAT AMBASSADOR MYERS
BEHAVING AS A NATIONALIST PATRIOTIC
FEELING ABOUT HIS WORK.

AMBASSADOR ANSWERED THAT FALL WANTED
THE RAGE OF MANY NATIONALISTS TO

ROYAL FAMILY AND TO THEIR STRUGGLE.

WEOP ORGANIZATION TO BE DISAPPROVED OF.

1976, AMBASSADOR SAID THAT

THAT THIS IS A MATTER OF NATIONALIST

CONDUCTING WORK TO KNOW IF PEOPLE

PERSONAL CONDUCT SYSTEM HAD

ANY CONTACT.

4. DUPLICATE THE CRISIS AS BEFORE WE
PEOPLE HELD OR WHO HAD TO TAKE IT TO THE
HIGHER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT TO

PUT THE WAMS IN THE EYES OF

PEOPLE, INCLUDING MILLIONAIRES

CHIPIA ALADDIN AND FRIENDS.

AMBASSADOR SAID MANY

PROMINENT IN THE PUBLIC

WE ASKED THAT WITH NO

TON AS INDICATED. VICARIOUS

BY "

NAME

CONCLUSION:"
CONFIDENTIAL/LIMDIS

TUESDAY 1117

CONFIDENTIAL LIMDIS

UNCLASSIFIED TECIYAN

THIS MESSAGE WAS IMPROVED 3257.

TO DUMPS/AMBASSADOR PARIS, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL TECIYAN 31117

LIMDIS

TEL: 11188: 115/5625 (LAMARIS, GEORGE B.) OR-P

FAX: 11198, PINT, 12

SUBJECT: VISIT OF CLARK CLARK GROUP

FAX: TUESDAY 943

1. ON TUESDAY JUN 15, FAMILY CLARK AND THREE COMPANIES

ONCE ON THE AMBASSADOR, THE THREE COMPANIES WERE

TOWARD D.M., DSW LIP AND IRANIAN-AMERICAN PROFESSOR

SOLD BY THE UNIVERSITY OF THE VANISHING INSTITUTE OF TECHNOL-

Y, WHO WAS SERVING AS INTERPRETER FOR THEM. POL COURSES-

SIST L.Z.H. THE INTERVIEW WAS ALMOST TOTALLY LIMITED

TO ING CLARK AND HIS GROUP TO WHICH THE

AMERICAN TOLD.

LISTED FROM CLARK INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING, WHAT IS

THE HABIT OF THE PARTY INFLUENCE, THE MEMBERS AND RANGE

OF THE COMMUNISTS? WHAT DID WE KNOW ABOUT

THE KAY AIZ CLASS? WHAT IS THE AMBASSADOR'S ESTIMATE

OF THE PROPORTION OF PEOPLE IN IRAN SUPPORTING KHOMEINI?

ANY POSSIBILITIES OF A TRANSITION FROM BALTIAH

TOWARD THE GOVERNMENT, AND WOULD THIS INCLUDE

A NEW ROLE FOR THE SHAH? AT THIS POINT CLARK AGREED

2. CLARK HAS OBVIOUSLY A COURAGEOUS, SOPHISTI-

CATED AND HOW DIFFICULT HIS ROLE IS.

3. CONTINUED THE QUESTIONS IS THE SHAH

4. AMBASSADOR IS THE AMBASSADOR SUPPLYING BALLOON PRAISES

TO MARY? HOW MANY PEOPLE DOES THE AMBASSY

5. MILLED IN TECIYAN ON SEPT 29 (THE AMBASSADOR

APPROXIMATELY 230, DUE TO THE LIMITED DIMENSIONS

OF THE MIKES.) WHAT IS THE AMBASSADOR'S ESTIMATE OF

THE SHAH'S SENTIMENT HERE? PALL ASKED.

AMC THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THE PROVISION OF SO

ARMY TO IRAQ WAS IMPORTANT IN THE REVOLUTION

M.P. CLARK SUGGESTED THESE WERE INCREDIBLE

APPROXIMATELY AMBASSADOR SAID THE COSTS WERE VERY

ALTHOUGH THE SIT OF THE ARMED FORCES WAS

EXTRAORDINARY IN VENUE OF THEIR NEIGHBORING

COUNTRIES SUCH AS IRAQ.)

IT AS TO WHAT THE U.S., IN RETROSPECT SHOULD HAVE

INTERESTED THE PAST TWO YEARS. (AMBASSADOR

THE NUMBER OF THINGS, BUT THEY WOULD

NO ONE FURTHER THAN TWO YEARS.) CLARK ASKED

THE IRAN TO REPAIR ITS REPUTATION WITH THE

-68-
5. TALKED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EPITOME OF NATIONALIST PROSPECTS WHEN THERAPY WAS BEING TREATED AS A VACUUM IN THE 1979 COMMAND.

6. CLAIRE DESCRIBED THE GROUP AS BEING ONE OF SEPARATE PEOPLE, ALL OF WHOM CAME TO IRAQ AS INDIVIDUALS. HE DID NOT NAME ANY LOCAL PERSON OR ORGANIZATION AS HIS HOST, BUT IT MADE IT CLEAR THE GROUP HAD SEEN A WIDE RANGE OF PEOPLE, INCLUDING RELIGIOUS LEADERS SUCH AS SHAHITO AND TALIBIFANI, POLITICAL LEADERS SUCH AS NAJAFI AND SARAFI, PRIME MINISTER BAZIAT, AND OTHERS FAMOUS IN THE LOCAL SCENE SUCH AS LAATI AND NAJAFI. TO ASSURE THEY WOULD BE TOUCHING BASE WITH HEPT IN WASHINGTON-TO AS INDICATED. SULLIVAN
CONFIDENTIAL

C:\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\tah\t
They can assault almost anybody, because most people, often as the result of physical coercion, have Khomeini's picture on prominent display. Tehran was calm yesterday. Several thousand Marxists marched again, but no clashes were reported. Shiraz still has daily demonstrations, but they too have been peaceful.

4. Jai Ali Tehrani, chairman of the Regency Council, resigned in Paris yesterday in order to meet with Khomeini. As merely resigning was insufficient, Tehrani had to make written statement that the council was illegal. After these humiliations, he reportedly saw Khomeini for ten minutes.

5. Ayatollah Khomeini apparently preferred to request yesterday that the Shah be brought to trial. Abol Hassan Pani-Saei stated some excerpts of "Islamic Republic" yesterday. In this Republic, the one-ness of God means the oneness of man and this implies total equality. There will be no bureaucratic coercion, but the Republic will motivate people within the Islamic framework. Each man must be his own Imam. I.e., both leader and follower. Finally, justice is the keystone of the Islamic Republic. asked what economic system Iran will adopt, Pani-Saei said: "Capitalism and Marxism survive because of the utilization of natural resources, but Islam survives because natural resources are everlasting in Islamic economics." His colleague Sadegh Chotzadeh said yesterday that all political ideologies, including Marxism, may be treated in an Islamic Republic provided they are not dictated from abroad. He described a free dialogue among political groups. Newspapers, for example, will be free to publish anything so long as it does not go against public morals. Marxists and Leninists may hold assemblies and propagate their views. (Comment: this is not procedure so far being followed by Moslem mobs here.)

6. Dialogue took place yesterday at offices of Etela'i'at.

#1121

NNNN  CONFIDENTIAL  TEHRAN 1121/1
WHEN MUSLIM STUDENTS WALKED IN TO PROTEST "DIVISIVE" NEWS REPORTING, SPOKESMAN SAID HE RESPECTED EVERYONE'S IDEOLOGY, BUT THERE WERE SOME IDEO'S THAT WERE NOT RIGHT. HE REQUESTED JOURNALISTS TO ENGLISH SELF-CENSORSHIP AND CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE PEOPLE'S ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. REAL FREEDOM OF WRITING MUST BE ESTABLISHED, AND THE VICTORIOUS REVOLUTION RIGH TLY REFLECTED IN THE PRESS.


6. CHIEF OF STAFF STAFF CAPARASHI DECLARED AGAIN AT PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY THAT THE MILITARY STAND BEHIND MOTEHAJ. THEY WILL NEVER STAGE A COUP AND WILL INSTEAD SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT. CAPARASHI SAID HE HAD TAKEN STEPS TO PREVENT THE-COMBINATION FROM ATTACKING PEOPLE, BUT HE WARNED AGAINST TERRORIZING THE ARMY FORCES; PAST INCIDENTS HAD AROUSED THE ANGER OF SOLDIERS. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, CHIEF OF LOGISTICS, HAS PROMISED TO SUBORDINATE CALLING FOR FULL SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE WAS FOUNDED INITIALLY BUT CONTINUED WITH HIS SPEECH. HE DECLARED THAT ANYONE WHO COULD NOT CARRY OUT HIS DUTY.
HAS 48 HOURS IN WHICH TO DECIDE. THOSE REMAINING IN
SERVICE AFTER THAT TIME WILL BE ARRESTED, ENCOURAGED TO LE-EN;
FAIL TO COMPLY ON THEIR OWN. MEANWHILE, SIATAMI ALL
SAID, ISFAHAN IS COMPLETELY CLEAR DUE TO NCO
(HOMELANDS) STRIKE. STRIKE DEMAND THAT FOREIGN ADVISORS
GET OUT. TRUMP HAS WITHDRAWN ALL PERSONNEL FROM THE
BASE, BUT NORTHUP STILL HAS SOME THERE.

9. GENERAL MIRI HOSEINI, TEHRAN'S MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION, HAS BEEN NAILED TEHRAN POLICE CHIEF. HE REPLACES GEN. JAFARI, WHO HELD HIS POST FOR ONLY TWO WEEKS. THE APPOINTMENT PASSES OVER GEN. MOHAMMED AY RODI, WHO WAS NEXT IN LINE.

10. THE DAI CONFERENCE HAS DEMANDED RELEASE OF 16 PRISONERS WHO FALL UNDER CLAIMS ARE NONPOLITICAL.

11. AYATOLLAH TALESHIANI HAS ASKED THAT INTERNATIONAL EMPLOYEES TO RETURN TO WORK, SAYING CONTINUANCE OF THE STRIKE WORSE A HARMSHIP ON THE FOREIGN COMMUNITY.

12. TODAY IS WET, SNOWY, AND QUIET IN TEHRAN, BUT PRO-
GOVERNMENT SUPPORTERS ARE PLANNING TO HOLD A DAILY IN
STADIUM NEAR EMBASSY AT 1400. WEATHER WILL PROBABLY
LARGE EYELIPS'S SPIRITS, BUT PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMO-
STRAATIONS ARE OFTEN INVITATIONS TO PRO-ANTI CLASHES. TANGY-
PRO-GOVERNMENT MARCH BEING PREPARED FOR TOMORROW.

CONSULATE SPIRIT REPORTS SITUATION QUIET. CONSULATE ISFAHAN REPORTS TENSION, CONTINUED THREATS. AND SOME

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F\ AMBASSADOR TEBRIN
TO HUFFCO/SCGSTAT NAVIC HIAT IMMEDIATE 2373
INFO RUCBI/AMBASSADY ABU LUABI 1231
RUCDA/AMBASSADY ANTARIA 4250
FUCBCC/USINT BAGHRAIM 4271
RUFCON/AMBASSADY POKN 1317
RUCBM/AMCONSUL DINHAN IMMEDIATE 2333
RUCBG/AMBASSADY FCFA 2747
RUFHT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1715
RUCCD/AMBASSADY ISLAMABAD 3749
RUCDB/AMBASSADY JIESA 2294
RUCDF/AMBASSADY TAGIL 5155
RUCCM/AMBASSADY CHARTUM 6252
RUCCH/AMBASSADY KUWAIT 4820
RUTFA/AMBASSADY LONDON 4242
RUCDA/AMBASSADY MANSANA 1327
RUCED/AMBASSADY MOSCOW 1407
RUCFN/AMBASSADY KUSCAT 7786
RUSEA/AMBASSADY NEW DELHI 3407
RUFAPF/AMBASSADY PARIS 3666
RUCJPG/USLO PERING 2283
RUCMTA/USO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0131
RUFERO/AMBASSADY ROME 1305
RUFETO/AMBASSADY TOKYO 2027
RUCMKAA/AMBASSADY VIENNA 3E
RUCRPF/USINGPAC

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 TEHRAN 1121

TACTIC CONNECTED WITH AMERICANS MOVING, CUT OR SELLING
FURNITURE SECURITY FORCES AVOID DEMONSTRATIONS WHERE-
EVER THEY OCCUR. CONSULATE TEBRIN REQUESTS THE CITY IS
STILL SHUT TIGHT, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT OFFICES. WHICH
MAY HAVE SKELETON STAFFS BUT NO MORE. SULLIVAN

#1121

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TEHRAN 1121/2

-74-
ACTION
2. DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO ARABIA, SAHAFI WAS NOT OVERTLY HARMFUL OR SUPPORTIVE, BUT SUPPORTED OTHER IRANIAN OPPORTUNITY GROUPS AS WELL. ADDITIONALLY, ANTI-SAN JUAN LANGUAGE RADIO IN CASTILE REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN MADE FROM LEBANON FACILITIES.

HUNGER, I UNDERSTAND THAT IN A RECENT BBC TELEVISION INTERVIEW SADAFI SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN GIVING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO KHOMEINI BUT WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT HIM IF HE ASKED ASSISTANCE. IF HE HAD NOT ASKED ASSISTANCE, WE DO NOT HAVE A CASE FOR SIGNIFING WHETHER OR NOT SADAFI HAS MADE IMPORTANT FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO IRANIAN OPPORTUNITY GROUPS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT KHOMEINI NEVER ASKED FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE, BUT IF HE WANTED, HE PROBABLY COULD HAVE RECEIVED IT. WHATEVER THE LEVEL OF LEBANON AID TO THE IRANIAN OPPORTUNITY, WE DOUBT THAT IT HAS HAD A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE OUTCOME.

3. ALTHOUGH LEBANESE PRESS COVERAGE HAS GIVEN PROMINENT AND FAVORABLE COVERAGE TO THE IRAJAN REVOLUTION, IT MUST BE REALIZED THAT THE REASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ AND ALGERIA HOUGHT A SLIGHTLY LESS FAVORABLE MEDIA APPROACH TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT, WHICH LEADS ME TO THINK "THE IRAJAN REVOLUTION" HAS ASKED THE OPPORTUNITY TO "THE REVOLUTIONARY SHARIF REGIME." AS THIS REVOLUTION CONTINUES, IT HAS LEAD TO THE DISCOVERY OF DRUGS, TO THE KHOMEINI-PRESIDED 1979 MEETING WITH OPPORTUNITY GROUPS AS WELL AS TO QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FATE OF THE LEBANESE CALIFATE.

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7. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

8. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

9. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

10. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

11. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

12. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

13. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

14. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

15. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

16. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

17. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

18. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

19. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.

20. The U.S. has threatened to send troops to Libya, but so far has not done so.
Tehran, Iran
January 24, 1979

Lt. General Amir Hossein Rabii
Commander
Imperial Iranian Air Force

Dear General Rabii:

I am deeply concerned by the apparent failure of Southern Air Transport to obtain proper clearance for its flight into Khatami Air Force Base on January 21. At my request, the Department of State has urgently looked into the matter and it appears that Southern Air Transport believed—incorrectly, as it turned out—it in fact had clearance. Southern Air Transport Company, unfortunately, did not check with us on this matter so that it could be informed that flights to Khatami Air Force Base as well as elsewhere in the country are now controlled by the IIAF. The company has assured us that it had no intentions to violate clearance rules and procedures.

I sincerely regret the problems this flight has caused you and wish to assure you that we are doing everything possible here to work with you and your colleagues to lessen the burden and to provide for the smooth and orderly operation of air charters.

Sincerely,

William H. Sullivan
Ambassador
SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: (U) IRAN SITREP NO. 111, 1/24/79, 0400 HOURS EST

TAGS: PINS, IR

ALL ADDRESSES TAKE FOR ACTION IMMEDIATE

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. TEHRAN'S AIRPORT WAS CLOSED THIS MORNING BY THE MILITARY. THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF TEHRAN ANNOUNCED THAT THE REASON FOR THE CLOSURE WAS INFORMATION THAT "OPPORTUNIST ELEMENTS" INTENDED TO MEET AT THE AIRPORT TODAY AND "CREATE DISORDER AND TROUBLE."  THUS, THE AIRPORT WAS CLOSED TO AVOID THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING ORDER AND CALM.  IT
WAS ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT "AS A RESULT OF BAD WEATHER ALL
FLIGHTS TODAY WILL BE CANCELLED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE."

3. THE EMBASSY HAS HEARD THAT THE OPPOSITION INTENDED TO
HAVE AN IRAN AIR PLANE LEAVE THIS MORNING FOR PARIS TO
PICK UP KHONEINI. AS PART OF THIS A GENERAL INVITATION
WAS EXTENDED FOR PEOPLE TO JOIN AYATOLLAH TALEGHANI TO SEE
THE PLANE OFF. IT SEEMS NOT UNLIKELY THAT THIS WAS THE
"DISORDER" THAT THE MILITARY ACTION TO CLOSE THE AIRPORT
WAS INTENDED TO AVOID.

4. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS IN TEHRAN THIS MORNING
CARRIES COMPETING INTERVIEWS WITH PM BAKHTIAR (HE IS
DETERMINED TO REMAIN) AND LIBERATION MOVEMENT LEADER
BAZARGAN (BAKHTIAR AND THE GOVERNMENT MUST RESIGN) WHICH
CONTINUE TO UNDERSCORE THE CONFRONTATION/NO DEAL SITUATION

5. TWO BILLS WERE INTRODUCED IN THE MAJLIS, ONE TO
ABOLISH SAVAK AND THE OTHER TO ESTABLISH SPECIAL COURTS
TO TRY THOSE BEING HELD FOR POSSIBLE CORRUPTION.

6. THE EDITOR OF ETTELA'AT, WHICH WAS RECENTLY VISITED
BY MUSLIM STUDENTS PRESSING THE NEED FOR PROPER REPORTING
ABOUT THE VICTORIOUS REVOLUTION, HAS COMMENTED THAT IT IS
DIFFICULT TO PUT OUT A NEWSPAPER UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE
KHONEINI FORCES.

7. THE ELITE BRIGADE OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD PUT ON A
HIGHLY PUBLICIZED DEMONSTRATION OF ITS MILITARY SKILLS
AND TOUGHNESS YESTERDAY. THE COMMANDER MADE A STATEMENT
THAT EVERY MAN WAS PREPARED TO SHED THE LAST DROP OF HIS
BLOOD FOR THE SHAH.

8. OUR CONSUL IN ISFAHAN TALKED WITH THE KHAHAMI AFS
COMMANDER THIS MORNING. THE CONSUL WAS TOLD: THERE WILL
BE NO CHARTER FLIGHTS OUT OF ISFAHAN; KHAHAMI IS CLOSED
TO ALL AMERICANS; THE HEAD OF GRUMMAN'S GROUP WAS DENIED
A REQUEST TO MEET WITH THE KHAHAMI COMMANDER THIS MORNING;
AND THE STRIKING NOMFARS HAD BEEN ORDERED BACK TO WORK
AND HAD COMPLIED. THE EMBASSY IS WORKING TO EASE THE BAN
ON CHARTER FLIGHTS, AND IS SOMEWHAT HOPEFUL THAT ITS
EFFORTS WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

9. SCATTERED GROUPS OF CLUBBERS HAVE BEEN AFOOT AROUND
ISFAHAN THIS MORNING. MANY RUMORS ARE ALSO AFOOT THERE,
INCLUDING ONE ABOUT A MAJOR PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION
LATER TODAY. PART OF THAT LATER RUMOR INCLUDES THE POINT
THAT THE NOMFAR-LED GROUP THAT CLOSED KHAHAMI YESTERDAY
MAY LEAD THE RUMORED PRO-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION IN TOWN
TODAY.
SECRET

ACTION

30 JAN 79 17 43Z

DE RUSIHC 64961 1321222
DDY CROSS ZZH
Q 3512A12 JAN 79
PM SEC STATE WASHDC
TO ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE
ALL MBP EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS
RUSSIA AMBASSAD CARACAS IMMEDIATE 4616
RUSSIA AMBASSAD BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 2714
RUSSIA AMBASSAD TOKYO IMMEDIATE 1747
RUSSIA AMBASSAD KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 1184
RUSSIA AMBASSAD PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 4468
RUSSIA AMBASSAD MEXICO IMMEDIATE 8892
RUSSIA AMBASSAD LAGOS IMMEDIATE 4782
RUSSIA AMBASSAD USAK NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 6761
RUSSIA AMBASSAD FRANKFURT IMMEDIATE 9154
RUSSIA AMBASSAD KARACHI IMMEDIATE 7281
RUSSIA AMBASSAD STUTTGART IMMEDIATE 4458
RUSSIA AMBASSAD ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE 9587
RUSSIA AMBASSAD RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1667
RUSSIA AMBASSAD BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 5839
RUSSIA AMBASSAD CAPE TOWN IMMEDIATE 9490
AMSC US Doch VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
AMSC US Doch CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAII IMMEDIATE 2567
AMSC US Doch CORDEAUSFO
ATL G
RUS AF CINCPAC RAMESTEIN GE
RUS AF CINCPAC LONDON UK

SECRET STATE 024961

STUTTGART FOR ELG, CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O. 12865: GDS 1/30/85 (MARTIN, ROBERT)

TA S: PINS, 84

77335: (U) IRAN SITREP NO. 123, 1/30/79, 1400 HOURS EST
ALERT TAKE AS IMMEDIATE
1. (ENTIRE TEXT)
2. POLITICAL/SECURITY: AN AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE HAS JUST
INFORMED THE EMBASSY THAT KHOMEINI EXPECTS TO TAKE OFF FROM
TBI IS THIS EVENING AND TO ARRIVE IN TEHRAN ABOUT 0030 HOURS
LOCAL TIME JANUARY 31.
3. TEHRAN'S AIRPORT DID REOPEN TODAY AND RESUMED COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY WITH A JAL FLIGHT.

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4. All journalists recently arrested by the government have been released. Six more Majlis deputies have resigned, which raises the resignation figure over 29. There is a report that the Foreign Ministry will be closed until Saturday. The report has not been as yet confirmed. Telephone workers have announced that they will shut down the telephone system for one half-hour each week on Thursday mornings.

5. There was a tremendous amount of arson in Tehran yesterday directed against bars and other institutions contrary to reported reports. An interesting side light to the automobile arson reported in IRIREP No. 121 is that a very large amount of payroll money for the company was taken before the car was burned. The money was not confiscated but given to Ayatollah Taleghani whose aides got in touch with the embassy, and this morning the money was returned.

6. Security of Americans: Today's MAC flights were used by departing Americans to capacity. Tomorrow there will be an even larger number of MAC flights.

7. The military (two generals) have provided assurances about the security of the embassy compound and asked personally to be alerted if there are any problems. Our consul in Isfahan and the BHI employee were badly beaten by the crowds following yesterday's incident but are all right. The consul is trying to work out a "forgiveness" Vance

SECRET